1. 03 1月, 2015 1 次提交
    • A
      x86, entry: Switch stacks on a paranoid entry from userspace · 48e08d0f
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      This causes all non-NMI, non-double-fault kernel entries from
      userspace to run on the normal kernel stack.  Double-fault is
      exempt to minimize confusion if we double-fault directly from
      userspace due to a bad kernel stack.
      
      This is, suprisingly, simpler and shorter than the current code.  It
      removes the IMO rather frightening paranoid_userspace path, and it
      make sync_regs much simpler.
      
      There is no risk of stack overflow due to this change -- the kernel
      stack that we switch to is empty.
      
      This will also enable us to create non-atomic sections within
      machine checks from userspace, which will simplify memory failure
      handling.  It will also allow the upcoming fsgsbase code to be
      simplified, because it doesn't need to worry about usergs when
      scheduling in paranoid_exit, as that code no longer exists.
      
      Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
      Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
      Acked-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      48e08d0f
  2. 18 12月, 2014 5 次提交
  3. 16 12月, 2014 32 次提交
  4. 15 12月, 2014 1 次提交
  5. 14 12月, 2014 1 次提交
    • A
      x86/tls: Disallow unusual TLS segments · 0e58af4e
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      Users have no business installing custom code segments into the
      GDT, and segments that are not present but are otherwise valid
      are a historical source of interesting attacks.
      
      For completeness, block attempts to set the L bit.  (Prior to
      this patch, the L bit would have been silently dropped.)
      
      This is an ABI break.  I've checked glibc, musl, and Wine, and
      none of them look like they'll have any trouble.
      
      Note to stable maintainers: this is a hardening patch that fixes
      no known bugs.  Given the possibility of ABI issues, this
      probably shouldn't be backported quickly.
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Acked-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # optional
      Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: security@kernel.org <security@kernel.org>
      Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      0e58af4e