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  1. 13 12月, 2019 1 次提交
  3. 07 8月, 2019 1 次提交
  5. 25 6月, 2019 1 次提交
  7. 10 5月, 2019 1 次提交
    • K
      IB/hfi1: Fix the allocation of RSM table · 09c6954e
      由 Kaike Wan 提交于 
      [ Upstream commit d0294344470e6b52d097aa7369173f32d11f2f52 ]

The receive side mapping (RSM) on hfi1 hardware is a special
matching mechanism to direct an incoming packet to a given
hardware receive context. It has 4 instances of matching capabilities
(RSM0 - RSM3) that share the same RSM table (RMT). The RMT has a total of
256 entries, each of which points to a receive context.

Currently, three instances of RSM have been used:
1. RSM0 by QOS;
2. RSM1 by PSM FECN;
3. RSM2 by VNIC.

Each RSM instance should reserve enough entries in RMT to function
properly. Since both PSM and VNIC could allocate any receive context
between dd->first_dyn_alloc_ctxt and dd->num_rcv_contexts, PSM FECN must
reserve enough RMT entries to cover the entire receive context index
range (dd->num_rcv_contexts - dd->first_dyn_alloc_ctxt) instead of only
the user receive contexts allocated for PSM
(dd->num_user_contexts). Consequently, the sizing of
dd->num_user_contexts in set_up_context_variables is incorrect.

Fixes: 2280740f ("IB/hfi1: Virtual Network Interface Controller (VNIC) HW support")
Reviewed-by: NMike Marciniszyn <mike.marciniszyn@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NMichael J. Ruhl <michael.j.ruhl@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NKaike Wan <kaike.wan@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
      09c6954e
  9. 17 12月, 2018 1 次提交
    • P
      IB/hfi1: Fix an out-of-bounds access in get_hw_stats · 1fd99ac1
      由 Piotr Stankiewicz 提交于 
      commit 36d842194a57f1b21fbc6a6875f2fa2f9a7f8679 upstream.

When running with KASAN, the following trace is produced:

[   62.535888]

==================================================================
[   62.544930] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in
gut_hw_stats+0x122/0x230 [hfi1]
[   62.553856] Write of size 8 at addr ffff88080e8d6330 by task
kworker/0:1/14

[   62.565333] CPU: 0 PID: 14 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted
4.19.0-test-build-kasan+ #8
[   62.575087] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600KPR/S2600KPR, BIOS
SE5C610.86B.01.01.0019.101220160604 10/12/2016
[   62.587951] Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn
[   62.594050] Call Trace:
[   62.598023]  dump_stack+0xc6/0x14c
[   62.603089]  ? dump_stack_print_info.cold.1+0x2f/0x2f
[   62.610041]  ? kmsg_dump_rewind_nolock+0x59/0x59
[   62.616615]  ? get_hw_stats+0x122/0x230 [hfi1]
[   62.622985]  print_address_description+0x6c/0x23c
[   62.629744]  ? get_hw_stats+0x122/0x230 [hfi1]
[   62.636108]  kasan_report.cold.6+0x241/0x308
[   62.642365]  get_hw_stats+0x122/0x230 [hfi1]
[   62.648703]  ? hfi1_alloc_rn+0x40/0x40 [hfi1]
[   62.655088]  ? __kmalloc+0x110/0x240
[   62.660695]  ? hfi1_alloc_rn+0x40/0x40 [hfi1]
[   62.667142]  setup_hw_stats+0xd8/0x430 [ib_core]
[   62.673972]  ? show_hfi+0x50/0x50 [hfi1]
[   62.680026]  ib_device_register_sysfs+0x165/0x180 [ib_core]
[   62.687995]  ib_register_device+0x5a2/0xa10 [ib_core]
[   62.695340]  ? show_hfi+0x50/0x50 [hfi1]
[   62.701421]  ? ib_unregister_device+0x2e0/0x2e0 [ib_core]
[   62.709222]  ? __vmalloc_node_range+0x2d0/0x380
[   62.716131]  ? rvt_driver_mr_init+0x11f/0x2d0 [rdmavt]
[   62.723735]  ? vmalloc_node+0x5c/0x70
[   62.729697]  ? rvt_driver_mr_init+0x11f/0x2d0 [rdmavt]
[   62.737347]  ? rvt_driver_mr_init+0x1f5/0x2d0 [rdmavt]
[   62.744998]  ? __rvt_alloc_mr+0x110/0x110 [rdmavt]
[   62.752315]  ? rvt_rc_error+0x140/0x140 [rdmavt]
[   62.759434]  ? rvt_vma_open+0x30/0x30 [rdmavt]
[   62.766364]  ? mutex_unlock+0x1d/0x40
[   62.772445]  ? kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x15d/0x230
[   62.780115]  rvt_register_device+0x1f6/0x360 [rdmavt]
[   62.787823]  ? rvt_get_port_immutable+0x180/0x180 [rdmavt]
[   62.796058]  ? __get_txreq+0x400/0x400 [hfi1]
[   62.802969]  ? memcpy+0x34/0x50
[   62.808611]  hfi1_register_ib_device+0xde6/0xeb0 [hfi1]
[   62.816601]  ? hfi1_get_npkeys+0x10/0x10 [hfi1]
[   62.823760]  ? hfi1_init+0x89f/0x9a0 [hfi1]
[   62.830469]  ? hfi1_setup_eagerbufs+0xad0/0xad0 [hfi1]
[   62.838204]  ? pcie_capability_clear_and_set_word+0xcd/0xe0
[   62.846429]  ? pcie_capability_read_word+0xd0/0xd0
[   62.853791]  ? hfi1_pcie_init+0x187/0x4b0 [hfi1]
[   62.860958]  init_one+0x67f/0xae0 [hfi1]
[   62.867301]  ? hfi1_init+0x9a0/0x9a0 [hfi1]
[   62.873876]  ? wait_woken+0x130/0x130
[   62.879860]  ? read_word_at_a_time+0xe/0x20
[   62.886329]  ? strscpy+0x14b/0x280
[   62.891998]  ? hfi1_init+0x9a0/0x9a0 [hfi1]
[   62.898405]  local_pci_probe+0x70/0xd0
[   62.904295]  ? pci_device_shutdown+0x90/0x90
[   62.910833]  work_for_cpu_fn+0x29/0x40
[   62.916750]  process_one_work+0x584/0x960
[   62.922974]  ? rcu_work_rcufn+0x40/0x40
[   62.928991]  ? __schedule+0x396/0xdc0
[   62.934806]  ? __sched_text_start+0x8/0x8
[   62.941020]  ? pick_next_task_fair+0x68b/0xc60
[   62.947674]  ? run_rebalance_domains+0x260/0x260
[   62.954471]  ? __list_add_valid+0x29/0xa0
[   62.960607]  ? move_linked_works+0x1c7/0x230
[   62.967077]  ?
trace_event_raw_event_workqueue_execute_start+0x140/0x140
[   62.976248]  ? mutex_lock+0xa6/0x100
[   62.982029]  ? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x10/0x10
[   62.988795]  ? __switch_to+0x37a/0x710
[   62.994731]  worker_thread+0x62e/0x9d0
[   63.000602]  ? max_active_store+0xf0/0xf0
[   63.006828]  ? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70
[   63.012932]  ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70
[   63.019013]  ? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70
[   63.025042]  ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70
[   63.031030]  ? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70
[   63.037006]  ? __schedule+0x396/0xdc0
[   63.042660]  ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xf3/0x1f0
[   63.049323]  ? kthread+0x59/0x1d0
[   63.054594]  ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[   63.060257]  ? __sched_text_start+0x8/0x8
[   63.066212]  ? schedule+0xcf/0x250
[   63.071529]  ? __wake_up_common+0x110/0x350
[   63.077794]  ? __schedule+0xdc0/0xdc0
[   63.083348]  ? wait_woken+0x130/0x130
[   63.088963]  ? finish_task_switch+0x1f1/0x520
[   63.095258]  ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x30/0x40
[   63.101792]  ? __init_waitqueue_head+0xa0/0xd0
[   63.108183]  ? replenish_dl_entity.cold.60+0x18/0x18
[   63.115151]  ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x25/0x50
[   63.121754]  ? max_active_store+0xf0/0xf0
[   63.127753]  kthread+0x1ae/0x1d0
[   63.132894]  ? kthread_bind+0x30/0x30
[   63.138422]  ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40

[   63.146973] Allocated by task 14:
[   63.152077]  kasan_kmalloc+0xbf/0xe0
[   63.157471]  __kmalloc+0x110/0x240
[   63.162804]  init_cntrs+0x34d/0xdf0 [hfi1]
[   63.168883]  hfi1_init_dd+0x29a3/0x2f90 [hfi1]
[   63.175244]  init_one+0x551/0xae0 [hfi1]
[   63.181065]  local_pci_probe+0x70/0xd0
[   63.186759]  work_for_cpu_fn+0x29/0x40
[   63.192310]  process_one_work+0x584/0x960
[   63.198163]  worker_thread+0x62e/0x9d0
[   63.203843]  kthread+0x1ae/0x1d0
[   63.208874]  ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40

[   63.217203] Freed by task 1:
[   63.221844]  __kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x180
[   63.227844]  kfree+0x92/0x1a0
[   63.232570]  single_release+0x3a/0x60
[   63.238024]  __fput+0x1d9/0x480
[   63.242911]  task_work_run+0x139/0x190
[   63.248440]  exit_to_usermode_loop+0x191/0x1a0
[   63.254814]  do_syscall_64+0x301/0x330
[   63.260283]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

[   63.270199] The buggy address belongs to the object at
ffff88080e8d5500
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4096 of size 4096
[   63.287247] The buggy address is located 3632 bytes inside of
 4096-byte region [ffff88080e8d5500, ffff88080e8d6500)
[   63.303564] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[   63.310447] page:ffffea00203a3400 count:1 mapcount:0
mapping:ffff88081380e840 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[   63.323102] flags: 0x2fffff80008100(slab|head)
[   63.329775] raw: 002fffff80008100 0000000000000000 0000000100000001
ffff88081380e840
[   63.340175] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000070007 00000001ffffffff
0000000000000000
[   63.350564] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

[   63.361974] Memory state around the buggy address:
[   63.369137]  ffff88080e8d6200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00
[   63.379082]  ffff88080e8d6280: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00
[   63.389032] >ffff88080e8d6300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
fc fc fc
[   63.398944]                                      ^
[   63.406141]  ffff88080e8d6380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
fc fc fc
[   63.416109]  ffff88080e8d6400: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
fc fc fc
[   63.426099]
==================================================================

The trace happens because get_hw_stats() assumes there is room in the
memory allocated in init_cntrs() to accommodate the driver counters.
Unfortunately, that routine only allocated space for the device
counters.

Fix by insuring the allocation has room for the additional driver
counters.

Cc: <Stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14+
Fixes: b7481944 ("IB/hfi1: Show statistics counters under IB stats interface")
Reviewed-by: NMike Marciniczyn <mike.marciniszyn@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NMike Ruhl <michael.j.ruhl@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPiotr Stankiewicz <piotr.stankiewicz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      1fd99ac1
  11. 21 9月, 2018 1 次提交
    • M
      IB/hfi1: Fix destroy_qp hang after a link down · b4a4957d
      由 Michael J. Ruhl 提交于 
      rvt_destroy_qp() cannot complete until all in process packets have
been released from the underlying hardware.  If a link down event
occurs, an application can hang with a kernel stack similar to:

cat /proc/<app PID>/stack
 quiesce_qp+0x178/0x250 [hfi1]
 rvt_reset_qp+0x23d/0x400 [rdmavt]
 rvt_destroy_qp+0x69/0x210 [rdmavt]
 ib_destroy_qp+0xba/0x1c0 [ib_core]
 nvme_rdma_destroy_queue_ib+0x46/0x80 [nvme_rdma]
 nvme_rdma_free_queue+0x3c/0xd0 [nvme_rdma]
 nvme_rdma_destroy_io_queues+0x88/0xd0 [nvme_rdma]
 nvme_rdma_error_recovery_work+0x52/0xf0 [nvme_rdma]
 process_one_work+0x17a/0x440
 worker_thread+0x126/0x3c0
 kthread+0xcf/0xe0
 ret_from_fork+0x58/0x90
 0xffffffffffffffff

quiesce_qp() waits until all outstanding packets have been freed.
This wait should be momentary.  During a link down event, the cleanup
handling does not ensure that all packets caught by the link down are
flushed properly.

This is caused by the fact that the freeze path and the link down
event is handled the same.  This is not correct.  The freeze path
waits until the HFI is unfrozen and then restarts PIO.  A link down
is not a freeze event.  The link down path cannot restart the PIO
until link is restored.  If the PIO path is restarted before the link
comes up, the application (QP) using the PIO path will hang (until
link is restored).

Fix by separating the linkdown path from the freeze path and use the
link down path for link down events.

Close a race condition sc_disable() by acquiring both the progress
and release locks.

Close a race condition in sc_stop() by moving the setting of the flag
bits under the alloc lock.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.9.x+
Fixes: 77241056 ("IB/hfi1: add driver files")
Reviewed-by: NMike Marciniszyn <mike.marciniszyn@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMichael J. Ruhl <michael.j.ruhl@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
      b4a4957d
  13. 04 7月, 2018 2 次提交
  15. 22 6月, 2018 4 次提交
  17. 20 6月, 2018 2 次提交
  19. 05 6月, 2018 2 次提交
  21. 10 5月, 2018 5 次提交
    • S
      IB/{hfi1, rdmavt, qib}: Implement CQ completion vector support · 5d18ee67
      由 Sebastian Sanchez 提交于 
      Currently the driver doesn't support completion vectors. These
are used to indicate which sets of CQs should be grouped together
into the same vector. A vector is a CQ processing thread that
runs on a specific CPU.

If an application has several CQs bound to different completion
vectors, and each completion vector runs on different CPUs, then
the completion queue workload is balanced. This helps scale as more
nodes are used.

Implement CQ completion vector support using a global workqueue
where a CQ entry is queued to the CPU corresponding to the CQ's
completion vector. Since the workqueue is global, it's guaranteed
to always be there when queueing CQ entries; Therefore, the RCU
locking for cq->rdi->worker in the hot path is superfluous.

Each completion vector is assigned to a different CPU. The number of
completion vectors available is computed by taking the number of
online, physical CPUs from the local NUMA node and subtracting the
CPUs used for kernel receive queues and the general interrupt.
Special use cases:

  * If there are no CPUs left for completion vectors, the same CPU
    for the general interrupt is used; Therefore, there would only
    be one completion vector available.

  * For multi-HFI systems, the number of completion vectors available
    for each device is the total number of completion vectors in
    the local NUMA node divided by the number of devices in the same
    NUMA node. If there's a division remainder, the first device to
    get initialized gets an extra completion vector.

Upon a CQ creation, an invalid completion vector could be specified.
Handle it as follows:

  * If the completion vector is less than 0, set it to 0.

  * Set the completion vector to the result of the passed completion
    vector moded with the number of device completion vectors
    available.
Reviewed-by: NMike Marciniszyn <mike.marciniszyn@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NSebastian Sanchez <sebastian.sanchez@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
      5d18ee67
    • K
      IB/Hfi1: Read CCE Revision register to verify the device is responsive · c872a1f9
      由 Kamenee Arumugam 提交于 
      When Hfi1 device is unresponsive, reading the RcvArrayCnt register
will return all 1's. This value is then used to remap chip's RcvArray.
The incorrect all ones value used in remapping RcvArray
will cause warn on as shown by trace below:

[<ffffffff81685eac>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
[<ffffffff81085820>] warn_slowpath_common+0x70/0xb0
[<ffffffff810858bc>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x5c/0x80
[<ffffffff81065c29>] __ioremap_caller+0x279/0x320
[<ffffffff8142873c>] ? _dev_info+0x6c/0x90
[<ffffffffa021d155>] ? hfi1_pcie_ddinit+0x1d5/0x330 [hfi1]
[<ffffffff81065d62>] ioremap_wc+0x32/0x40
[<ffffffffa021d155>] hfi1_pcie_ddinit+0x1d5/0x330 [hfi1]
[<ffffffffa0204851>] hfi1_init_dd+0x1d1/0x2440 [hfi1]
[<ffffffff813503dc>] ? pci_write_config_word+0x1c/0x20

Read CCE revision register first to verify that WFR device is
responsive. If the read return "all ones", bail out from init
and fail the driver load.
Reviewed-by: NMike Marciniszyn <mike.marciniszyn@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NMichael J. Ruhl <michael.j.ruhl@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NKamenee Arumugam <kamenee.arumugam@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
      c872a1f9
    • M
      IB/hfi1: Rework fault injection machinery · a74d5307
      由 Mitko Haralanov 提交于 
      The packet fault injection code present in the HFI1 driver had some
issues which not only fragment the code but also created user
confusion. Furthermore, it suffered from the following issues:

  1. The fault_packet method only worked for received packets. This
     meant that the only fault injection mode available for sent
     packets is fault_opcode, which did not allow for random packet
     drops on all egressing packets.
  2. The mask available for the fault_opcode mode did not really work
     due to the fact that the opcode values are not bits in a bitmask but
     rather sequential integer values. Creating a opcode/mask pair that
     would successfully capture a set of packets was nearly impossible.
  3. The code was fragmented and used too many debugfs entries to
     operate and control. This was confusing to users.
  4. It did not allow filtering fault injection on a per direction basis -
     egress vs. ingress.

In order to improve or fix the above issues, the following changes have
been made:

   1. The fault injection methods have been combined into a single fault
      injection facility. As such, the fault injection has been plugged
      into both the send and receive code paths. Regardless of method used
      the fault injection will operate on both egress and ingress packets.
   2. The type of fault injection - by packet or by opcode - is now controlled
      by changing the boolean value of the file "opcode_mode". When the value
      is set to True, fault injection is done by opcode. Otherwise, by
      packet.
   2. The masking ability has been removed in favor of a bitmap that holds
      opcodes of interest (one bit per opcode, a total of 256 bits). This
      works in tandem with the "opcode_mode" value. When the value of
      "opcode_mode" is False, this bitmap is ignored. When the value is
      True, the bitmap lists all opcodes to be considered for fault injection.
      By default, the bitmap is empty. When the user wants to filter by opcode,
      the user sets the corresponding bit in the bitmap by echo'ing the bit
      position into the 'opcodes' file. This gets around the issue that the set
      of opcodes does not lend itself to effective masks and allow for extremely
      fine-grained filtering by opcode.
   4. fault_packet and fault_opcode methods have been combined. Hence, there
      is only one debugfs directory controlling the entire operation of the
      fault injection machinery. This reduces the number of debugfs entries
      and provides a more unified user experience.
   5. A new control files - "direction" - is provided to allow the user to
      control the direction of packets, which are subject to fault injection.
   6. A new control file - "skip_usec" - is added that would allow the user
      to specify a "timeout" during which no fault injection will occur.

In addition, the following bug fixes have been applied:

   1. The fault injection code has been split into its own header and source
      files. This was done to better organize the code and support conditional
      compilation without littering the code with #ifdef's.
   2. The method by which the TX PIO packets were being marked for drop
      conflicted with the way send contexts were being setup. As a result,
      the send context was repeatedly being reset.
   3. The fault injection only makes sense when the user can control it
      through the debugfs entries. However, a kernel configuration can
      enable fault injection but keep fault injection debugfs entries
      disabled. Therefore, it makes sense that the HFI fault injection
      code depends on both.
   4. Error suppression did not take into account the method by which PIO
      packets were being dropped. Therefore, even with error suppression
      turned on, errors would still be displayed to the screen. A larger
      enough packet drop percentage would case the kernel to crash because
      the driver would be stuck printing errors.
Reviewed-by: NDennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NDon Hiatt <don.hiatt@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NMike Marciniszyn <mike.marciniszyn@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMitko Haralanov <mitko.haralanov@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
      a74d5307
    • M
      IB/hfi1: Return correct value for device state · e4607073
      由 Michael J. Ruhl 提交于 
      The driver_pstate() function is used to map internal driver state
information to externally defined states.

The VERIFY_CAP and GOING_UP states are config/training states, but
the mapping routing returns the POLLING value.

Update the return values for VERIFY_CAP and GOING_UP to return the
correct value: TRAINING.
Reviewed-by: NSebastian Sanchez <sebastian.sanchez@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMichael J. Ruhl <michael.j.ruhl@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
      e4607073
    • S
      IB/hfi1: Prevent LNI hang when LCB can't obtain lanes · 254361c1
      由 Sebastian Sanchez 提交于 
      When the LCB isn't able to get any lanes operational on the
first transition into mission mode, the link transfer active
never happens and the LNI stays in the polling state indefinitely.

Reset LCB upon receiving an 8051 interrupt for LCB to try to obtain
lanes with firmware version 1.25.0 or later. Also, update the LCB
reset value in other parts of the code with a macro defined to make
the code more maintainable and rename functions with the link_width
label to link_mode to reflect the fact that those functions set and
read link related data not just the link width.
Reviewed-by: NMichael J. Ruhl <michael.j.ruhl@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NMike Marciniszyn <mike.marciniszyn@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NSebastian Sanchez <sebastian.sanchez@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
      254361c1
  23. 09 5月, 2018 1 次提交
    • M
      IB/hfi1: Use after free race condition in send context error path · f9e76ca3
      由 Michael J. Ruhl 提交于 
      A pio send egress error can occur when the PSM library attempts to
to send a bad packet.  That issue is still being investigated.

The pio error interrupt handler then attempts to progress the recovery
of the errored pio send context.

Code inspection reveals that the handling lacks the necessary locking
if that recovery interleaves with a PSM close of the "context" object
contains the pio send context.

The lack of the locking can cause the recovery to access the already
freed pio send context object and incorrectly deduce that the pio
send context is actually a kernel pio send context as shown by the
NULL deref stack below:

[<ffffffff8143d78c>] _dev_info+0x6c/0x90
[<ffffffffc0613230>] sc_restart+0x70/0x1f0 [hfi1]
[<ffffffff816ab124>] ? __schedule+0x424/0x9b0
[<ffffffffc06133c5>] sc_halted+0x15/0x20 [hfi1]
[<ffffffff810aa3ba>] process_one_work+0x17a/0x440
[<ffffffff810ab086>] worker_thread+0x126/0x3c0
[<ffffffff810aaf60>] ? manage_workers.isra.24+0x2a0/0x2a0
[<ffffffff810b252f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff810b2460>] ? insert_kthread_work+0x40/0x40
[<ffffffff816b8798>] ret_from_fork+0x58/0x90
[<ffffffff810b2460>] ? insert_kthread_work+0x40/0x40

This is the best case scenario and other scenarios can corrupt the
already freed memory.

Fix by adding the necessary locking in the pio send context error
handler.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.9.x
Reviewed-by: NMike Marciniszyn <mike.marciniszyn@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NDennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMichael J. Ruhl <michael.j.ruhl@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
      f9e76ca3
  25. 02 2月, 2018 2 次提交
  27. 06 1月, 2018 2 次提交
  29. 14 11月, 2017 3 次提交
  31. 31 10月, 2017 4 次提交
  33. 18 10月, 2017 2 次提交
  35. 05 10月, 2017 3 次提交
  37. 27 9月, 2017 2 次提交