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  1. 07 8月, 2019 1 次提交
  3. 23 1月, 2019 1 次提交
  5. 13 1月, 2019 1 次提交
    • O
      selinux: policydb - fix byte order and alignment issues · b37fdd94
      由 Ondrej Mosnacek 提交于 
      commit 5df275cd4cf51c86d49009f1397132f284ba515e upstream.

Do the LE conversions before doing the Infiniband-related range checks.
The incorrect checks are otherwise causing a failure to load any policy
with an ibendportcon rule on BE systems. This can be reproduced by
running (on e.g. ppc64):

cat >my_module.cil <<EOF
(type test_ibendport_t)
(roletype object_r test_ibendport_t)
(ibendportcon mlx4_0 1 (system_u object_r test_ibendport_t ((s0) (s0))))
EOF
semodule -i my_module.cil

Also, fix loading/storing the 64-bit subnet prefix for OCON_IBPKEY to
use a correctly aligned buffer.

Finally, do not use the 'nodebuf' (u32) buffer where 'buf' (__le32)
should be used instead.

Tested internally on a ppc64 machine with a RHEL 7 kernel with this
patch applied.

Cc: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Cc: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.13+
Fixes: a806f7a1 ("selinux: Create policydb version for Infiniband support")
Signed-off-by: NOndrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      b37fdd94
  7. 01 12月, 2018 1 次提交
  9. 20 6月, 2018 1 次提交
  11. 18 8月, 2017 1 次提交
  13. 24 5月, 2017 1 次提交
  15. 23 5月, 2017 1 次提交
  17. 01 4月, 2017 1 次提交
  19. 29 3月, 2017 10 次提交
  21. 24 3月, 2017 7 次提交
  23. 28 2月, 2017 1 次提交
  25. 10 10月, 2016 1 次提交
    • L
      printk: reinstate KERN_CONT for printing continuation lines · 4bcc595c
      由 Linus Torvalds 提交于 
      Long long ago the kernel log buffer was a buffered stream of bytes, very
much like stdio in user space.  It supported log levels by scanning the
stream and noticing the log level markers at the beginning of each line,
but if you wanted to print a partial line in multiple chunks, you just
did multiple printk() calls, and it just automatically worked.

Except when it didn't, and you had very confusing output when different
lines got all mixed up with each other.  Then you got fragment lines
mixing with each other, or with non-fragment lines, because it was
traditionally impossible to tell whether a printk() call was a
continuation or not.

To at least help clarify the issue of continuation lines, we added a
KERN_CONT marker back in 2007 to mark continuation lines:

  47492527 ("printk: add KERN_CONT annotation").

That continuation marker was initially an empty string, and didn't
actuall make any semantic difference.  But it at least made it possible
to annotate the source code, and have check-patch notice that a printk()
didn't need or want a log level marker, because it was a continuation of
a previous line.

To avoid the ambiguity between a continuation line that had that
KERN_CONT marker, and a printk with no level information at all, we then
in 2009 made KERN_CONT be a real log level marker which meant that we
could now reliably tell the difference between the two cases.

  5fd29d6c ("printk: clean up handling of log-levels and newlines")

and we could take advantage of that to make sure we didn't mix up
continuation lines with lines that just didn't have any loglevel at all.

Then, in 2012, the kernel log buffer was changed to be a "record" based
log, where each line was a record that has a loglevel and a timestamp.

You can see the beginning of that conversion in commits

  e11fea92 ("kmsg: export printk records to the /dev/kmsg interface")
  7ff9554b ("printk: convert byte-buffer to variable-length record buffer")

with a number of follow-up commits to fix some painful fallout from that
conversion.  Over all, it took a couple of months to sort out most of
it.  But the upside was that you could have concurrent readers (and
writers) of the kernel log and not have lines with mixed output in them.

And one particular pain-point for the record-based kernel logging was
exactly the fragmentary lines that are generated in smaller chunks.  In
order to still log them as one recrod, the continuation lines need to be
attached to the previous record properly.

However the explicit continuation record marker that is actually useful
for this exact case was actually removed in aroundm the same time by commit

  61e99ab8 ("printk: remove the now unnecessary "C" annotation for KERN_CONT")

due to the incorrect belief that KERN_CONT wasn't meaningful.  The
ambiguity between "is this a continuation line" or "is this a plain
printk with no log level information" was reintroduced, and in fact
became an even bigger pain point because there was now the whole
record-level merging of kernel messages going on.

This patch reinstates the KERN_CONT as a real non-empty string marker,
so that the ambiguity is fixed once again.

But it's not a plain revert of that original removal: in the four years
since we made KERN_CONT an empty string again, not only has the format
of the log level markers changed, we've also had some usage changes in
this area.

For example, some ACPI code seems to use KERN_CONT _together_ with a log
level, and now uses both the KERN_CONT marker and (for example) a
KERN_INFO marker to show that it's an informational continuation of a
line.

Which is actually not a bad idea - if the continuation line cannot be
attached to its predecessor, without the log level information we don't
know what log level to assign to it (and we traditionally just assigned
it the default loglevel).  So having both a log level and the KERN_CONT
marker is not necessarily a bad idea, but it does mean that we need to
actually iterate over potentially multiple markers, rather than just a
single one.

Also, since KERN_CONT was still conceptually needed, and encouraged, but
didn't actually _do_ anything, we've also had the reverse problem:
rather than having too many annotations it has too few, and there is bit
rot with code that no longer marks the continuation lines with the
KERN_CONT marker.

So this patch not only re-instates the non-empty KERN_CONT marker, it
also fixes up the cases of bit-rot I noticed in my own logs.

There are probably other cases where KERN_CONT will be needed to be
added, either because it is new code that never dealt with the need for
KERN_CONT, or old code that has bitrotted without anybody noticing.

That said, we should strive to avoid the need for KERN_CONT.  It does
result in real problems for logging, and should generally not be seen as
a good feature.  If we some day can get rid of the feature entirely,
because nobody does any fragmented printk calls, that would be lovely.

But until that point, let's at mark the code that relies on the hacky
multi-fragment kernel printk's.  Not only does it avoid the ambiguity,
it also annotates code as "maybe this would be good to fix some day".

(That said, particularly during single-threaded bootup, the downsides of
KERN_CONT are very limited.  Things get much hairier when you have
multiple threads going on and user level reading and writing logs too).
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      4bcc595c
  27. 14 9月, 2016 1 次提交
  29. 31 8月, 2016 1 次提交
  31. 30 8月, 2016 1 次提交
  33. 14 7月, 2015 1 次提交
    • J
      selinux: extended permissions for ioctls · fa1aa143
      由 Jeff Vander Stoep 提交于 
      Add extended permissions logic to selinux. Extended permissions
provides additional permissions in 256 bit increments. Extend the
generic ioctl permission check to use the extended permissions for
per-command filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl
permission may additionally include a set of commands. Example:

allowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl unpriv_app_socket_cmds
auditallowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl priv_gpu_cmds

Where unpriv_app_socket_cmds and priv_gpu_cmds are macros
representing commonly granted sets of ioctl commands.

When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked.
This feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl
permission that may be too imprecise. For example, the same driver
may use ioctls to provide important and benign functionality such as
driver version or socket type as well as dangerous capabilities such
as debugging features, read/write/execute to physical memory or
access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering provides a mechanism
to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and limit applications
to the subset of commands required.

The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl
commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to
POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL=30 to account for the format
change.

The extended permissions logic is deliberately generic to allow
components to be reused e.g. netlink filters
Signed-off-by: NJeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Acked-by: NNick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
      fa1aa143
  35. 05 2月, 2015 1 次提交
  37. 19 6月, 2014 1 次提交
  39. 18 6月, 2014 1 次提交
  41. 21 2月, 2014 1 次提交
  43. 07 1月, 2014 1 次提交
    • T
      SELinux: Fix memory leak upon loading policy · 8ed81460
      由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于 
      Hello.

I got below leak with linux-3.10.0-54.0.1.el7.x86_64 .

[  681.903890] kmemleak: 5538 new suspected memory leaks (see /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak)

Below is a patch, but I don't know whether we need special handing for undoing
ebitmap_set_bit() call.
----------
>>From fe97527a90fe95e2239dfbaa7558f0ed559c0992 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2014 16:30:21 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] SELinux: Fix memory leak upon loading policy

Commit 2463c26d "SELinux: put name based create rules in a hashtable" did not
check return value from hashtab_insert() in filename_trans_read(). It leaks
memory if hashtab_insert() returns error.

  unreferenced object 0xffff88005c9160d0 (size 8):
    comm "systemd", pid 1, jiffies 4294688674 (age 235.265s)
    hex dump (first 8 bytes):
      57 0b 00 00 6b 6b 6b a5                          W...kkk.
    backtrace:
      [<ffffffff816604ae>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0
      [<ffffffff811cba5e>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x12e/0x360
      [<ffffffff812aec5d>] policydb_read+0xd1d/0xf70
      [<ffffffff812b345c>] security_load_policy+0x6c/0x500
      [<ffffffff812a623c>] sel_write_load+0xac/0x750
      [<ffffffff811eb680>] vfs_write+0xc0/0x1f0
      [<ffffffff811ec08c>] SyS_write+0x4c/0xa0
      [<ffffffff81690419>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
      [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff

However, we should not return EEXIST error to the caller, or the systemd will
show below message and the boot sequence freezes.

  systemd[1]: Failed to load SELinux policy. Freezing.
Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
      8ed81460
  45. 20 11月, 2013 1 次提交
  47. 26 7月, 2013 1 次提交
    • E
      SELinux: fix selinuxfs policy file on big endian systems · b138004e
      由 Eric Paris 提交于 
      The /sys/fs/selinux/policy file is not valid on big endian systems like
ppc64 or s390.  Let's see why:

static int hashtab_cnt(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
{
	int *cnt = ptr;
	*cnt = *cnt + 1;

	return 0;
}

static int range_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
{
	size_t nel;
[...]
	/* count the number of entries in the hashtab */
	nel = 0;
	rc = hashtab_map(p->range_tr, hashtab_cnt, &nel);
	if (rc)
		return rc;
	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);

So size_t is 64 bits.  But then we pass a pointer to it as we do to
hashtab_cnt.  hashtab_cnt thinks it is a 32 bit int and only deals with
the first 4 bytes.  On x86_64 which is little endian, those first 4
bytes and the least significant, so this works out fine.  On ppc64/s390
those first 4 bytes of memory are the high order bits.  So at the end of
the call to hashtab_map nel has a HUGE number.  But the least
significant 32 bits are all 0's.

We then pass that 64 bit number to cpu_to_le32() which happily truncates
it to a 32 bit number and does endian swapping.  But the low 32 bits are
all 0's.  So no matter how many entries are in the hashtab, big endian
systems always say there are 0 entries because I screwed up the
counting.

The fix is easy.  Use a 32 bit int, as the hashtab_cnt expects, for nel.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
      b138004e
  49. 09 6月, 2013 1 次提交