1. 20 2月, 2012 1 次提交
    • S
      x86/nmi: Test saved %cs in NMI to determine nested NMI case · 45d5a168
      Steven Rostedt 提交于
      Currently, the NMI handler tests if it is nested by checking the
      special variable saved on the stack (set during NMI handling)
      and whether the saved stack is the NMI stack as well (to prevent
      the race when the variable is set to zero).
      
      But userspace may set their %rsp to any value as long as they do
      not derefence it, and it may make it point to the NMI stack,
      which will prevent NMIs from triggering while the userspace app
      is running. (I tested this, and it is indeed the case)
      
      Add another check to determine nested NMIs by looking at the
      saved %cs (code segment register) and making sure that it is the
      kernel code segment.
      Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1329687817.1561.27.camel@acer.local.homeSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
      45d5a168
  2. 09 2月, 2012 1 次提交
  3. 07 2月, 2012 1 次提交
  4. 30 1月, 2012 2 次提交
    • M
      x86/reboot: Remove VersaLogic Menlow reboot quirk · e6d36a65
      Michael D Labriola 提交于
      This commit removes the reboot quirk originally added by commit
      e19e074b ("x86: Fix reboot problem on VersaLogic Menlow boards").
      
      Testing with a VersaLogic Ocelot (VL-EPMs-21a rev 1.00 w/ BIOS
      6.5.102) revealed the following regarding the reboot hang
      problem:
      
      - v2.6.37 reboot=bios was needed.
      
      - v2.6.38-rc1: behavior changed, reboot=acpi is needed,
        reboot=kbd and reboot=bios results in system hang.
      
      - v2.6.38: VersaLogic patch (e19e074b "x86: Fix reboot problem on
        VersaLogic Menlow boards") was applied prior to v2.6.38-rc7.  This
        patch sets a quirk for VersaLogic Menlow boards that forces the use
        of reboot=bios, which doesn't work anymore.
      
      - v3.2: It seems that commit 660e34ce ("x86: Reorder reboot method
        preferences") changed the default reboot method to acpi prior to
        v3.0-rc1, which means the default behavior is appropriate for the
        Ocelot.  No VersaLogic quirk is required.
      
      The Ocelot board used for testing can successfully reboot w/out
      having to pass any reboot= arguments for all 3 current versions
      of the BIOS.
      Signed-off-by: NMichael D Labriola <michael.d.labriola@gmail.com>
      Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
      Cc: Michael D Labriola <mlabriol@gdeb.com>
      Cc: Kushal Koolwal <kushalkoolwal@gmail.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87vcnub9hu.fsf@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
      e6d36a65
    • M
      x86/reboot: Skip DMI checks if reboot set by user · 5955633e
      Michael D Labriola 提交于
      Skip DMI checks for vendor specific reboot quirks if the user
      passed in a reboot= arg on the command line - we should never
      override user choices.
      Signed-off-by: NMichael D Labriola <michael.d.labriola@gmail.com>
      Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
      Cc: Michael D Labriola <mlabriol@gdeb.com>
      Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87wr8ab9od.fsf@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
      5955633e
  5. 28 1月, 2012 1 次提交
  6. 27 1月, 2012 1 次提交
    • P
      bugs, x86: Fix printk levels for panic, softlockups and stack dumps · b0f4c4b3
      Prarit Bhargava 提交于
      rsyslog will display KERN_EMERG messages on a connected
      terminal.  However, these messages are useless/undecipherable
      for a general user.
      
      For example, after a softlockup we get:
      
       Message from syslogd@intel-s3e37-04 at Jan 25 14:18:06 ...
       kernel:Stack:
      
       Message from syslogd@intel-s3e37-04 at Jan 25 14:18:06 ...
       kernel:Call Trace:
      
       Message from syslogd@intel-s3e37-04 at Jan 25 14:18:06 ...
       kernel:Code: ff ff a8 08 75 25 31 d2 48 8d 86 38 e0 ff ff 48 89
       d1 0f 01 c8 0f ae f0 48 8b 86 38 e0 ff ff a8 08 75 08 b1 01 4c 89 e0 0f 01 c9 <e8> ea 69 dd ff 4c 29 e8 48 89 c7 e8 0f bc da ff 49 89 c4 49 89
      
      This happens because the printk levels for these messages are
      incorrect. Only an informational message should be displayed on
      a terminal.
      
      I modified the printk levels for various messages in the kernel
      and tested the output by using the drivers/misc/lkdtm.c kernel
      modules (ie, softlockups, panics, hard lockups, etc.) and
      confirmed that the console output was still the same and that
      the output to the terminals was correct.
      
      For example, in the case of a softlockup we now see the much
      more informative:
      
       Message from syslogd@intel-s3e37-04 at Jan 25 10:18:06 ...
       BUG: soft lockup - CPU4 stuck for 60s!
      
      instead of the above confusing messages.
      
      AFAICT, the messages no longer have to be KERN_EMERG.  In the
      most important case of a panic we set console_verbose().  As for
      the other less severe cases the correct data is output to the
      console and /var/log/messages.
      
      Successfully tested by me using the drivers/misc/lkdtm.c module.
      Signed-off-by: NPrarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
      Cc: dzickus@redhat.com
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1327586134-11926-1-git-send-email-prarit@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
      b0f4c4b3
  7. 26 1月, 2012 1 次提交
  8. 18 1月, 2012 4 次提交
    • A
      x86-32: Fix build failure with AUDIT=y, AUDITSYSCALL=n · 6015ff10
      Al Viro 提交于
      JONGMAN HEO reports:
      
        With current linus git (commit a25a2b84), I got following build error,
      
        arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c: In function 'do_sys_vm86':
        arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c:340: error: implicit declaration of function '__audit_syscall_exit'
        make[3]: *** [arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.o] Error 1
      
      OK, I can reproduce it (32bit allmodconfig with AUDIT=y, AUDITSYSCALL=n)
      
      It's due to commit d7e7528b: "Audit: push audit success and retcode
      into arch ptrace.h".
      Reported-by: NJONGMAN HEO <jongman.heo@samsung.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      6015ff10
    • L
      x86, tsc: Fix SMI induced variation in quick_pit_calibrate() · 68f30fbe
      Linus Torvalds 提交于
      pit_expect_msb() returns success wrongly in the below SMI scenario:
      
      a. pit_verify_msb() has not yet seen the MSB transition.
      
      b. we are close to the MSB transition though and got a SMI immediately after
         returning from pit_verify_msb() which didn't see the MSB transition. PIT MSB
         transition has happened somewhere during SMI execution.
      
      c. returned from SMI and we noted down the 'tsc', saw the pit MSB change now and
         exited the loop to calculate 'deltatsc'. Instead of noting the TSC at the MSB
         transition, we are way off because of the SMI.  And as the SMI happened
         between the pit_verify_msb() and before the 'tsc' is recorded in the
         for loop, 'delattsc' (d1/d2 in quick_pit_calibrate()) will be small and
         quick_pit_calibrate() will not notice this error.
      
      Depending on whether SMI disturbance happens while computing d1 or d2, we will
      see the TSC calibrated value smaller or bigger than the expected value. As a
      result, in a cluster we were seeing a variation of approximately +/- 20MHz in
      the calibrated values, resulting in NTP failures.
      
        [ As far as the SMI source is concerned, this is a periodic SMI that gets
          disabled after ACPI is enabled by the OS. But the TSC calibration happens
          before the ACPI is enabled. ]
      
      To address this, change pit_expect_msb() so that
      
       - the 'tsc' is the TSC in between the two reads that read the MSB
      change from the PIT (same as before)
      
       - the 'delta' is the difference in TSC from *before* the MSB changed
      to *after* the MSB changed.
      
      Now the delta is twice as big as before (it covers four PIT accesses,
      roughly 4us) and quick_pit_calibrate() will loop a bit longer to get
      the calibrated value with in the 500ppm precision. As the delta (d1/d2)
      covers four PIT accesses, actual calibrated result might be closer to
      250ppm precision.
      
      As the loop now takes longer to stabilize, double MAX_QUICK_PIT_MS to 50.
      
      SMI disturbance will showup as much larger delta's and the loop will take
      longer than usual for the result to be with in the accepted precision. Or will
      fallback to slow PIT calibration if it takes more than 50msec.
      
      Also while we are at this, remove the calibration correction that aims to
      get the result to the middle of the error bars. We really don't know which
      direction to correct into, so remove it.
      Reported-and-tested-by: NSuresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NSuresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1326843337.5291.4.camel@sbsiddha-mobl2Signed-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      68f30fbe
    • E
      audit: inline audit_syscall_entry to reduce burden on archs · b05d8447
      Eric Paris 提交于
      Every arch calls:
      
      if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
      	audit_syscall_entry()
      
      which requires knowledge about audit (the existance of audit_context) in
      the arch code.  Just do it all in static inline in audit.h so that arch's
      can remain blissfully ignorant.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
      b05d8447
    • E
      Audit: push audit success and retcode into arch ptrace.h · d7e7528b
      Eric Paris 提交于
      The audit system previously expected arches calling to audit_syscall_exit to
      supply as arguments if the syscall was a success and what the return code was.
      Audit also provides a helper AUDITSC_RESULT which was supposed to simplify things
      by converting from negative retcodes to an audit internal magic value stating
      success or failure.  This helper was wrong and could indicate that a valid
      pointer returned to userspace was a failed syscall.  The fix is to fix the
      layering foolishness.  We now pass audit_syscall_exit a struct pt_reg and it
      in turns calls back into arch code to collect the return value and to
      determine if the syscall was a success or failure.  We also define a generic
      is_syscall_success() macro which determines success/failure based on if the
      value is < -MAX_ERRNO.  This works for arches like x86 which do not use a
      separate mechanism to indicate syscall failure.
      
      We make both the is_syscall_success() and regs_return_value() static inlines
      instead of macros.  The reason is because the audit function must take a void*
      for the regs.  (uml calls theirs struct uml_pt_regs instead of just struct
      pt_regs so audit_syscall_exit can't take a struct pt_regs).  Since the audit
      function takes a void* we need to use static inlines to cast it back to the
      arch correct structure to dereference it.
      
      The other major change is that on some arches, like ia64, MIPS and ppc, we
      change regs_return_value() to give us the negative value on syscall failure.
      THE only other user of this macro, kretprobe_example.c, won't notice and it
      makes the value signed consistently for the audit functions across all archs.
      
      In arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_64.c I see that we were using regs[9] in the old
      audit code as the return value.  But the ptrace_64.h code defined the macro
      regs_return_value() as regs[3].  I have no idea which one is correct, but this
      patch now uses the regs_return_value() function, so it now uses regs[3].
      
      For powerpc we previously used regs->result but now use the
      regs_return_value() function which uses regs->gprs[3].  regs->gprs[3] is
      always positive so the regs_return_value(), much like ia64 makes it negative
      before calling the audit code when appropriate.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> [for x86 portion]
      Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> [for ia64]
      Acked-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> [for uml]
      Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [for sparc]
      Acked-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> [for mips]
      Acked-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> [for ppc]
      d7e7528b
  9. 17 1月, 2012 2 次提交
  10. 14 1月, 2012 1 次提交
  11. 13 1月, 2012 1 次提交
  12. 11 1月, 2012 1 次提交
  13. 08 1月, 2012 1 次提交
  14. 07 1月, 2012 3 次提交
  15. 04 1月, 2012 1 次提交
  16. 27 12月, 2011 1 次提交
  17. 24 12月, 2011 6 次提交
  18. 22 12月, 2011 8 次提交
    • K
      driver-core: remove sysdev.h usage. · edbaa603
      Kay Sievers 提交于
      The sysdev.h file should not be needed by any in-kernel code, so remove
      the .h file from these random files that seem to still want to include
      it.
      
      The sysdev code will be going away soon, so this include needs to be
      removed no matter what.
      
      Cc: Jiandong Zheng <jdzheng@broadcom.com>
      Cc: Scott Branden <sbranden@broadcom.com>
      Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
      Cc: Kukjin Kim <kgene.kim@samsung.com>
      Cc: David Brown <davidb@codeaurora.org>
      Cc: Daniel Walker <dwalker@fifo99.com>
      Cc: Bryan Huntsman <bryanh@codeaurora.org>
      Cc: Ben Dooks <ben-linux@fluff.org>
      Cc: Wan ZongShun <mcuos.com@gmail.com>
      Cc: Haavard Skinnemoen <hskinnemoen@gmail.com>
      Cc: Hans-Christian Egtvedt <egtvedt@samfundet.no>
      Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@mprc.pku.edu.cn>
      Cc: "Venkatesh Pallipadi
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
      Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Grant Likely <grant.likely@secretlab.ca>
      Cc: Richard Purdie <rpurdie@rpsys.net>
      Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NKay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
      edbaa603
    • K
      cpu: convert 'cpu' and 'machinecheck' sysdev_class to a regular subsystem · 8a25a2fd
      Kay Sievers 提交于
      This moves the 'cpu sysdev_class' over to a regular 'cpu' subsystem
      and converts the devices to regular devices. The sysdev drivers are
      implemented as subsystem interfaces now.
      
      After all sysdev classes are ported to regular driver core entities, the
      sysdev implementation will be entirely removed from the kernel.
      
      Userspace relies on events and generic sysfs subsystem infrastructure
      from sysdev devices, which are made available with this conversion.
      
      Cc: Haavard Skinnemoen <hskinnemoen@gmail.com>
      Cc: Hans-Christian Egtvedt <egtvedt@samfundet.no>
      Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
      Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
      Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
      Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
      Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
      Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
      Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
      Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
      Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
      Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@amd64.org>
      Cc: Tigran Aivazian <tigran@aivazian.fsnet.co.uk>
      Cc: Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org>
      Cc: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
      Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@sisk.pl>
      Cc: "Srivatsa S. Bhat" <srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NKay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
      8a25a2fd
    • S
      x86: Add counter when debug stack is used with interrupts enabled · 42181186
      Steven Rostedt 提交于
      Mathieu Desnoyers pointed out a case that can cause issues with
      NMIs running on the debug stack:
      
        int3 -> interrupt -> NMI -> int3
      
      Because the interrupt changes the stack, the NMI will not see that
      it preempted the debug stack. Looking deeper at this case,
      interrupts only happen when the int3 is from userspace or in
      an a location in the exception table (fixup).
      
        userspace -> int3 -> interurpt -> NMI -> int3
      
      All other int3s that happen in the kernel should be processed
      without ever enabling interrupts, as the do_trap() call will
      panic the kernel if it is called to process any other location
      within the kernel.
      
      Adding a counter around the sections that enable interrupts while
      using the debug stack allows the NMI to also check that case.
      If the NMI sees that it either interrupted a task using the debug
      stack or the debug counter is non-zero, then it will have to
      change the IDT table to make the int3 not change stacks (which will
      corrupt the stack if it does).
      
      Note, I had to move the debug_usage functions out of processor.h
      and into debugreg.h because of the static inlined functions to
      inc and dec the debug_usage counter. __get_cpu_var() requires
      smp.h which includes processor.h, and would fail to build.
      
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1323976535.23971.112.camel@gandalf.stny.rr.comReported-by: NMathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
      Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
      42181186
    • S
      x86: Allow NMIs to hit breakpoints in i386 · ccd49c23
      Steven Rostedt 提交于
      With i386, NMIs and breakpoints use the current stack and they
      do not reset the stack pointer to a fix point that might corrupt
      a previous NMI or breakpoint (as it does in x86_64). But NMIs are
      still not made to be re-entrant, and need to prevent the case that
      an NMI hitting a breakpoint (which does an iret), doesn't allow
      another NMI to run.
      
      The fix is to let the NMI be in 3 different states:
      
      1) not running
      2) executing
      3) latched
      
      When no NMI is executing on a given CPU, the state is "not running".
      When the first NMI comes in, the state is switched to "executing".
      On exit of that NMI, a cmpxchg is performed to switch the state
      back to "not running" and if that fails, the NMI is restarted.
      
      If a breakpoint is hit and does an iret, which re-enables NMIs,
      and another NMI comes in before the first NMI finished, it will
      detect that the state is not in the "not running" state and the
      current NMI is nested. In this case, the state is switched to "latched"
      to let the interrupted NMI know to restart the NMI handler, and
      the nested NMI exits without doing anything.
      
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
      Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
      Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
      Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
      ccd49c23
    • S
      x86: Keep current stack in NMI breakpoints · 228bdaa9
      Steven Rostedt 提交于
      We want to allow NMI handlers to have breakpoints to be able to
      remove stop_machine from ftrace, kprobes and jump_labels. But if
      an NMI interrupts a current breakpoint, and then it triggers a
      breakpoint itself, it will switch to the breakpoint stack and
      corrupt the data on it for the breakpoint processing that it
      interrupted.
      
      Instead, have the NMI check if it interrupted breakpoint processing
      by checking if the stack that is currently used is a breakpoint
      stack. If it is, then load a special IDT that changes the IST
      for the debug exception to keep the same stack in kernel context.
      When the NMI is done, it puts it back.
      
      This way, if the NMI does trigger a breakpoint, it will keep
      using the same stack and not stomp on the breakpoint data for
      the breakpoint it interrupted.
      Suggested-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
      228bdaa9
    • S
      x86: Add workaround to NMI iret woes · 3f3c8b8c
      Steven Rostedt 提交于
      In x86, when an NMI goes off, the CPU goes into an NMI context that
      prevents other NMIs to trigger on that CPU. If an NMI is suppose to
      trigger, it has to wait till the previous NMI leaves NMI context.
      At that time, the next NMI can trigger (note, only one more NMI will
      trigger, as only one can be latched at a time).
      
      The way x86 gets out of NMI context is by calling iret. The problem
      with this is that this causes problems if the NMI handle either
      triggers an exception, or a breakpoint. Both the exception and the
      breakpoint handlers will finish with an iret. If this happens while
      in NMI context, the CPU will leave NMI context and a new NMI may come
      in. As NMI handlers are not made to be re-entrant, this can cause
      havoc with the system, not to mention, the nested NMI will write
      all over the previous NMI's stack.
      
      Linus Torvalds proposed the following workaround to this problem:
      
      https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/7/14/264
      
      "In fact, I wonder if we couldn't just do a software NMI disable
      instead? Hav ea per-cpu variable (in the _core_ percpu areas that get
      allocated statically) that points to the NMI stack frame, and just
      make the NMI code itself do something like
      
       NMI entry:
       - load percpu NMI stack frame pointer
       - if non-zero we know we're nested, and should ignore this NMI:
          - we're returning to kernel mode, so return immediately by using
      "popf/ret", which also keeps NMI's disabled in the hardware until the
      "real" NMI iret happens.
          - before the popf/iret, use the NMI stack pointer to make the NMI
      return stack be invalid and cause a fault
        - set the NMI stack pointer to the current stack pointer
      
       NMI exit (not the above "immediate exit because we nested"):
         clear the percpu NMI stack pointer
         Just do the iret.
      
      Now, the thing is, now the "iret" is atomic. If we had a nested NMI,
      we'll take a fault, and that re-does our "delayed" NMI - and NMI's
      will stay masked.
      
      And if we didn't have a nested NMI, that iret will now unmask NMI's,
      and everything is happy."
      
      I first tried to follow this advice but as I started implementing this
      code, a few gotchas showed up.
      
      One, is accessing per-cpu variables in the NMI handler.
      
      The problem is that per-cpu variables use the %gs register to get the
      variable for the given CPU. But as the NMI may happen in userspace,
      we must first perform a SWAPGS to get to it. The NMI handler already
      does this later in the code, but its too late as we have saved off
      all the registers and we don't want to do that for a disabled NMI.
      
      Peter Zijlstra suggested to keep all variables on the stack. This
      simplifies things greatly and it has the added benefit of cache locality.
      
      Two, faulting on the iret.
      
      I really wanted to make this work, but it was becoming very hacky, and
      I never got it to be stable. The iret already had a fault handler for
      userspace faulting with bad segment registers, and getting NMI to trigger
      a fault and detect it was very tricky. But for strange reasons, the system
      would usually take a double fault and crash. I never figured out why
      and decided to go with a simple "jmp" approach. The new approach I took
      also simplified things.
      
      Finally, the last problem with Linus's approach was to have the nested
      NMI handler do a ret instead of an iret to give the first NMI NMI-context
      again.
      
      The problem is that ret is much more limited than an iret. I couldn't figure
      out how to get the stack back where it belonged. I could have copied the
      current stack, pushed the return onto it, but my fear here is that there
      may be some place that writes data below the stack pointer. I know that
      is not something code should depend on, but I don't want to chance it.
      I may add this feature later, but for now, an NMI handler that loses NMI
      context will not get it back.
      
      Here's what is done:
      
      When an NMI comes in, the HW pushes the interrupt stack frame onto the
      per cpu NMI stack that is selected by the IST.
      
      A special location on the NMI stack holds a variable that is set when
      the first NMI handler runs. If this variable is set then we know that
      this is a nested NMI and we process the nested NMI code.
      
      There is still a race when this variable is cleared and an NMI comes
      in just before the first NMI does the return. For this case, if the
      variable is cleared, we also check if the interrupted stack is the
      NMI stack. If it is, then we process the nested NMI code.
      
      Why the two tests and not just test the interrupted stack?
      
      If the first NMI hits a breakpoint and loses NMI context, and then it
      hits another breakpoint and while processing that breakpoint we get a
      nested NMI. When processing a breakpoint, the stack changes to the
      breakpoint stack. If another NMI comes in here we can't rely on the
      interrupted stack to be the NMI stack.
      
      If the variable is not set and the interrupted task's stack is not the
      NMI stack, then we know this is the first NMI and we can process things
      normally. But in order to do so, we need to do a few things first.
      
      1) Set the stack variable that tells us that we are in an NMI handler
      
      2) Make two copies of the interrupt stack frame.
         One copy is used to return on iret
         The other is used to restore the first one if we have a nested NMI.
      
      This is what the stack will look like:
      
      	  +-------------------------+
      	  | original SS             |
      	  | original Return RSP     |
      	  | original RFLAGS         |
      	  | original CS             |
      	  | original RIP            |
      	  +-------------------------+
      	  | temp storage for rdx    |
      	  +-------------------------+
      	  | NMI executing variable  |
      	  +-------------------------+
      	  | Saved SS                |
      	  | Saved Return RSP        |
      	  | Saved RFLAGS            |
      	  | Saved CS                |
      	  | Saved RIP               |
      	  +-------------------------+
      	  | copied SS               |
      	  | copied Return RSP       |
      	  | copied RFLAGS           |
      	  | copied CS               |
      	  | copied RIP              |
      	  +-------------------------+
      	  | pt_regs                 |
      	  +-------------------------+
      
      The original stack frame contains what the HW put in when we entered
      the NMI.
      
      We store %rdx as a temp variable to use. Both the original HW stack
      frame and this %rdx storage will be clobbered by nested NMIs so we
      can not rely on them later in the first NMI handler.
      
      The next item is the special stack variable that is set when we execute
      the rest of the NMI handler.
      
      Then we have two copies of the interrupt stack. The second copy is
      modified by any nested NMIs to let the first NMI know that we triggered
      a second NMI (latched) and that we should repeat the NMI handler.
      
      If the first NMI hits an exception or breakpoint that takes it out of
      NMI context, if a second NMI comes in before the first one finishes,
      it will update the copied interrupt stack to point to a fix up location
      to trigger another NMI.
      
      When the first NMI calls iret, it will instead jump to the fix up
      location. This fix up location will copy the saved interrupt stack back
      to the copy and execute the nmi handler again.
      
      Note, the nested NMI knows enough to check if it preempted a previous
      NMI handler while it is in the fixup location. If it has, it will not
      modify the copied interrupt stack and will just leave as if nothing
      happened. As the NMI handle is about to execute again, there's no reason
      to latch now.
      
      To test all this, I forced the NMI handler to call iret and take itself
      out of NMI context. I also added assemble code to write to the serial to
      make sure that it hits the nested path as well as the fix up path.
      Everything seems to be working fine.
      
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
      Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
      Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
      Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
      3f3c8b8c
    • S
      x86: Document the NMI handler about not using paranoid_exit · 1fd466ef
      Steven Rostedt 提交于
      Linus cleaned up the NMI handler but it still needs some comments to
      explain why it uses save_paranoid but not paranoid_exit. Just to keep
      others from adding that in the future, document why it's not used.
      
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
      Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
      1fd466ef
    • L
      x86: Do not schedule while still in NMI context · 549c89b9
      Linus Torvalds 提交于
      The NMI handler uses the paranoid_exit routine that checks the
      NEED_RESCHED flag, and if it is set and the return is for userspace,
      then interrupts are enabled, the stack is swapped to the thread's stack,
      and schedule is called. The problem with this is that we are still in an
      NMI context until an iret is executed. This means that any new NMIs are
      now starved until an interrupt or exception occurs and does the iret.
      
      As NMIs can not be masked and can interrupt any location, they are
      treated as a special case. NEED_RESCHED should not be set in an NMI
      handler. The interruption by the NMI should not disturb the work flow
      for scheduling. Any IPI sent to a processor after sending the
      NEED_RESCHED would have to wait for the NMI anyway, and after the IPI
      finishes the schedule would be called as required.
      
      There is no reason to do anything special leaving an NMI. Remove the
      call to paranoid_exit and do a simple return. This not only fixes the
      bug of starved NMIs, but it also cleans up the code.
      
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzgM55hXTs4griX5e9=v_O+=ue+7Rj0PTD=M7hFYpyULQ@mail.gmail.comAcked-by: NAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
      549c89b9
  19. 21 12月, 2011 3 次提交