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- 04 1月, 2012 6 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
vfs_create() ignores everything outside of 16bit subset of its mode argument; switching it to umode_t is obviously equivalent and it's the only caller of the method Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
vfs_mkdir() gets int, but immediately drops everything that might not fit into umode_t and that's the only caller of ->mkdir()... Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Jan Kara 提交于
Commit 1e39f384 ("evm: fix build problems") makes the stub version of security_old_inode_init_security() return 0 when CONFIG_SECURITY is not set. But that makes callers such as reiserfs_security_init() assume that security_old_inode_init_security() has set name, value, and len arguments properly - but security_old_inode_init_security() left them uninitialized which then results in interesting failures. Revert security_old_inode_init_security() to the old behavior of returning EOPNOTSUPP since both callers (reiserfs and ocfs2) handle this just fine. [ Also fixed the S_PRIVATE(inode) case of the actual non-stub security_old_inode_init_security() function to return EOPNOTSUPP for the same reason, as pointed out by Mimi Zohar. It got incorrectly changed to match the new function in commit fb88c2b6: "evm: fix security/security_old_init_security return code". - Linus ] Reported-by: NJorge Bastos <mysql.jorge@decimal.pt> Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 19 10月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Paul Moore 提交于
The Bluetooth stack has internal connection handlers for all of the various Bluetooth protocols, and unfortunately, they are currently lacking the LSM hooks found in the core network stack's connection handlers. I say unfortunately, because this can cause problems for users who have have an LSM enabled and are using certain Bluetooth devices. See one problem report below: * http://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=741703 In order to keep things simple at this point in time, this patch fixes the problem by cloning the parent socket's LSM attributes to the newly created child socket. If we decide we need a more elaborate LSM marking mechanism for Bluetooth (I somewhat doubt this) we can always revisit this decision in the future. Reported-by: NJames M. Cape <jcape@ignore-your.tv> Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- 15 9月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
security_inode_init_security previously returned -EOPNOTSUPP, for S_PRIVATE inodes, and relied on the callers to change it to 0. As the callers do not change the return code anymore, return 0, intead of -EOPNOTSUPP. Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
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- 10 9月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 James Morris 提交于
Fix sparse warning by moving declaraion to global header. Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 20 7月, 2011 2 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
pass mask instead; kill security_inode_exec_permission() since we can use security_inode_permission() instead. Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Al Viro 提交于
pass that via mask instead. Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 19 7月, 2011 5 次提交
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由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
Permit changing of security.evm only when valid, unless in fixmode. Reported-by: NRoberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
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由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
Changelog v7: - moved the initialization call to security_inode_init_security, renaming evm_inode_post_init_security to evm_inode_init_security - increase size of xattr array for EVM xattr Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
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由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
Imbed the evm calls evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(), evm_inode_removexattr() in the security hooks. evm_inode_setxattr() protects security.evm xattr. evm_inode_post_setxattr() and evm_inode_removexattr() updates the hmac associated with an inode. (Assumes an LSM module protects the setting/removing of xattr.) Changelog: - Don't define evm_verifyxattr(), unless CONFIG_INTEGRITY is enabled. - xattr_name is a 'const', value is 'void *' Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
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由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directory in order to share the iint among the different integrity models. Changelog: - don't define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE - rename several globally visible 'ima_' prefixed functions, structs, locks, etc to 'integrity_' - replace '20' with SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE - reflect location change in appropriate Kconfig and Makefiles - remove unnecessary initialization of iint_initialized to 0 - rebased on current ima_iint.c - define integrity_iint_store/lock as static There should be no other functional changes. Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
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由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
This patch changes the security_inode_init_security API by adding a filesystem specific callback to write security extended attributes. This change is in preparation for supporting the initialization of multiple LSM xattrs and the EVM xattr. Initially the callback function walks an array of xattrs, writing each xattr separately, but could be optimized to write multiple xattrs at once. For existing security_inode_init_security() calls, which have not yet been converted to use the new callback function, such as those in reiserfs and ocfs2, this patch defines security_old_inode_init_security(). Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
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- 25 4月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Andi Kleen 提交于
Right now all RCU walks fall back to reference walk when CONFIG_SECURITY is enabled, even though just the standard capability module is active. This is because security_inode_exec_permission unconditionally fails RCU walks. Move this decision to the low level security module. This requires passing the RCU flags down the security hook. This way at least the capability module and a few easy cases in selinux/smack work with RCU walks with CONFIG_SECURITY=y Signed-off-by: NAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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- 23 4月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Andi Kleen 提交于
Right now all RCU walks fall back to reference walk when CONFIG_SECURITY is enabled, even though just the standard capability module is active. This is because security_inode_exec_permission unconditionally fails RCU walks. Move this decision to the low level security module. This requires passing the RCU flags down the security hook. This way at least the capability module and a few easy cases in selinux/smack work with RCU walks with CONFIG_SECURITY=y Signed-off-by: NAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 24 3月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Serge E. Hallyn 提交于
- Introduce ns_capable to test for a capability in a non-default user namespace. - Teach cap_capable to handle capabilities in a non-default user namespace. The motivation is to get to the unprivileged creation of new namespaces. It looks like this gets us 90% of the way there, with only potential uid confusion issues left. I still need to handle getting all caps after creation but otherwise I think I have a good starter patch that achieves all of your goals. Changelog: 11/05/2010: [serge] add apparmor 12/14/2010: [serge] fix capabilities to created user namespaces Without this, if user serge creates a user_ns, he won't have capabilities to the user_ns he created. THis is because we were first checking whether his effective caps had the caps he needed and returning -EPERM if not, and THEN checking whether he was the creator. Reverse those checks. 12/16/2010: [serge] security_real_capable needs ns argument in !security case 01/11/2011: [serge] add task_ns_capable helper 01/11/2011: [serge] add nsown_capable() helper per Bastian Blank suggestion 02/16/2011: [serge] fix a logic bug: the root user is always creator of init_user_ns, but should not always have capabilities to it! Fix the check in cap_capable(). 02/21/2011: Add the required user_ns parameter to security_capable, fixing a compile failure. 02/23/2011: Convert some macros to functions as per akpm comments. Some couldn't be converted because we can't easily forward-declare them (they are inline if !SECURITY, extern if SECURITY). Add a current_user_ns function so we can use it in capability.h without #including cred.h. Move all forward declarations together to the top of the #ifdef __KERNEL__ section, and use kernel-doc format. 02/23/2011: Per dhowells, clean up comment in cap_capable(). 02/23/2011: Per akpm, remove unreachable 'return -EPERM' in cap_capable. (Original written and signed off by Eric; latest, modified version acked by him) [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: export current_user_ns() for ecryptfs] [serge.hallyn@canonical.com: remove unneeded extra argument in selinux's task_has_capability] Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: NSerge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: NDaniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Acked-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: NSerge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 13 3月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 David S. Miller 提交于
I intend to turn struct flowi into a union of AF specific flowi structs. There will be a common structure that each variant includes first, much like struct sock_common. This is the first step to move in that direction. Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- 04 3月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
The VFS mount code passes the mount options to the LSM. The LSM will remove options it understands from the data and the VFS will then pass the remaining options onto the underlying filesystem. This is how options like the SELinux context= work. The problem comes in that -o remount never calls into LSM code. So if you include an LSM specific option it will get passed to the filesystem and will cause the remount to fail. An example of where this is a problem is the 'seclabel' option. The SELinux LSM hook will print this word in /proc/mounts if the filesystem is being labeled using xattrs. If you pass this word on mount it will be silently stripped and ignored. But if you pass this word on remount the LSM never gets called and it will be passed to the FS. The FS doesn't know what seclabel means and thus should fail the mount. For example an ext3 fs mounted over loop # mount -o loop /tmp/fs /mnt/tmp # cat /proc/mounts | grep /mnt/tmp /dev/loop0 /mnt/tmp ext3 rw,seclabel,relatime,errors=continue,barrier=0,data=ordered 0 0 # mount -o remount /mnt/tmp mount: /mnt/tmp not mounted already, or bad option # dmesg EXT3-fs (loop0): error: unrecognized mount option "seclabel" or missing value This patch passes the remount mount options to an new LSM hook. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 23 2月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 David S. Miller 提交于
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- 11 2月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Chris Wright 提交于
Expand security_capable() to include cred, so that it can be usable in a wider range of call sites. Signed-off-by: NChris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 02 2月, 2011 3 次提交
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由 Richard Cochran 提交于
Both settimeofday() and clock_settime() promise with a 'const' attribute not to alter the arguments passed in. This patch adds the missing 'const' attribute into the various kernel functions implementing these calls. Signed-off-by: NRichard Cochran <richard.cochran@omicron.at> Acked-by: NJohn Stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com> LKML-Reference: <20110201134417.545698637@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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由 Lucian Adrian Grijincu 提交于
The only user for this hook was selinux. sysctl routes every call through /proc/sys/. Selinux and other security modules use the file system checks for sysctl too, so no need for this hook any more. Signed-off-by: NLucian Adrian Grijincu <lucian.grijincu@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
SELinux would like to implement a new labeling behavior of newly created inodes. We currently label new inodes based on the parent and the creating process. This new behavior would also take into account the name of the new object when deciding the new label. This is not the (supposed) full path, just the last component of the path. This is very useful because creating /etc/shadow is different than creating /etc/passwd but the kernel hooks are unable to differentiate these operations. We currently require that userspace realize it is doing some difficult operation like that and than userspace jumps through SELinux hoops to get things set up correctly. This patch does not implement new behavior, that is obviously contained in a seperate SELinux patch, but it does pass the needed name down to the correct LSM hook. If no such name exists it is fine to pass NULL. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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- 24 1月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 David Howells 提交于
Add calls to path-based security hooks into CacheFiles as, unlike inode-based security, these aren't implicit in the vfs_mkdir() and similar calls. Reported-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 07 1月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Nick Piggin 提交于
Perform common cases of path lookups without any stores or locking in the ancestor dentry elements. This is called rcu-walk, as opposed to the current algorithm which is a refcount based walk, or ref-walk. This results in far fewer atomic operations on every path element, significantly improving path lookup performance. It also avoids cacheline bouncing on common dentries, significantly improving scalability. The overall design is like this: * LOOKUP_RCU is set in nd->flags, which distinguishes rcu-walk from ref-walk. * Take the RCU lock for the entire path walk, starting with the acquiring of the starting path (eg. root/cwd/fd-path). So now dentry refcounts are not required for dentry persistence. * synchronize_rcu is called when unregistering a filesystem, so we can access d_ops and i_ops during rcu-walk. * Similarly take the vfsmount lock for the entire path walk. So now mnt refcounts are not required for persistence. Also we are free to perform mount lookups, and to assume dentry mount points and mount roots are stable up and down the path. * Have a per-dentry seqlock to protect the dentry name, parent, and inode, so we can load this tuple atomically, and also check whether any of its members have changed. * Dentry lookups (based on parent, candidate string tuple) recheck the parent sequence after the child is found in case anything changed in the parent during the path walk. * inode is also RCU protected so we can load d_inode and use the inode for limited things. * i_mode, i_uid, i_gid can be tested for exec permissions during path walk. * i_op can be loaded. When we reach the destination dentry, we lock it, recheck lookup sequence, and increment its refcount and mountpoint refcount. RCU and vfsmount locks are dropped. This is termed "dropping rcu-walk". If the dentry refcount does not match, we can not drop rcu-walk gracefully at the current point in the lokup, so instead return -ECHILD (for want of a better errno). This signals the path walking code to re-do the entire lookup with a ref-walk. Aside from the final dentry, there are other situations that may be encounted where we cannot continue rcu-walk. In that case, we drop rcu-walk (ie. take a reference on the last good dentry) and continue with a ref-walk. Again, if we can drop rcu-walk gracefully, we return -ECHILD and do the whole lookup using ref-walk. But it is very important that we can continue with ref-walk for most cases, particularly to avoid the overhead of double lookups, and to gain the scalability advantages on common path elements (like cwd and root). The cases where rcu-walk cannot continue are: * NULL dentry (ie. any uncached path element) * parent with d_inode->i_op->permission or ACLs * dentries with d_revalidate * Following links In future patches, permission checks and d_revalidate become rcu-walk aware. It may be possible eventually to make following links rcu-walk aware. Uncached path elements will always require dropping to ref-walk mode, at the very least because i_mutex needs to be grabbed, and objects allocated. Signed-off-by: NNick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>
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- 06 1月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 David S. Miller 提交于
unix_release() can asynchornously set socket->sk to NULL, and it does so without holding the unix_state_lock() on "other" during stream connects. However, the reverse mapping, sk->sk_socket, is only transitioned to NULL under the unix_state_lock(). Therefore make the security hooks follow the reverse mapping instead of the forward mapping. Reported-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org> Reported-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- 16 11月, 2010 1 次提交
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
The addition of CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT resulted in a build failure when CONFIG_PRINTK=n. This is because the capabilities code which used the new option was built even though the variable in question didn't exist. The patch here fixes this by moving the capabilities checks out of the LSM and into the caller. All (known) LSMs should have been calling the capabilities hook already so it actually makes the code organization better to eliminate the hook altogether. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 27 10月, 2010 1 次提交
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
IMA always allocates an integrity structure to hold information about every inode, but only needed this structure to track the number of readers and writers currently accessing a given inode. Since that information was moved into struct inode instead of the integrity struct this patch stops allocating the integrity stucture until it is needed. Thus greatly reducing memory usage. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 21 10月, 2010 3 次提交
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
Right now secmark has lots of direct selinux calls. Use all LSM calls and remove all SELinux specific knowledge. The only SELinux specific knowledge we leave is the mode. The only point is to make sure that other LSMs at least test this generic code before they assume it works. (They may also have to make changes if they do not represent labels as strings) Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 KOSAKI Motohiro 提交于
All security modules shouldn't change sched_param parameter of security_task_setscheduler(). This is not only meaningless, but also make a harmful result if caller pass a static variable. This patch remove policy and sched_param parameter from security_task_setscheduler() becuase none of security module is using it. Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: NKOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
We can set default LSM module to DAC (which means "enable no LSM module"). If default LSM module was set to DAC, security_module_enable() must return 0 unless overridden via boot time parameter. Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: NSerge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 02 8月, 2010 1 次提交
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
When commit be6d3e56 "introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available." was proposed, regarding security_path_truncate(), only "struct file *" argument (which AppArmor wanted to use) was removed. But length and time_attrs arguments are not used by TOMOYO nor AppArmor. Thus, let's remove these arguments. Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: NNick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 28 7月, 2010 1 次提交
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
introduce a new fsnotify hook, fsnotify_perm(), which is called from the security code. This hook is used to allow fsnotify groups to make access control decisions about events on the system. We also must change the generic fsnotify function to return an error code if we intend these hooks to be in any way useful. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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- 16 7月, 2010 1 次提交
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由 Jiri Slaby 提交于
Add task_struct to task_setrlimit of security_operations to be able to set rlimit of task other than current. Signed-off-by: NJiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com> Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 17 5月, 2010 1 次提交
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
register_security() became __init function. So do verify() and security_fixup_ops(). Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 12 4月, 2010 2 次提交
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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