1. 15 5月, 2009 2 次提交
  2. 22 4月, 2009 1 次提交
  3. 18 4月, 2009 1 次提交
  4. 03 4月, 2009 1 次提交
  5. 02 4月, 2009 2 次提交
  6. 28 3月, 2009 3 次提交
  7. 13 3月, 2009 1 次提交
  8. 11 3月, 2009 1 次提交
  9. 25 2月, 2009 2 次提交
  10. 23 2月, 2009 1 次提交
  11. 08 2月, 2009 4 次提交
  12. 22 1月, 2009 2 次提交
  13. 16 1月, 2009 1 次提交
    • D
      drm/i915: add support for physical memory objects · 71acb5eb
      Dave Airlie 提交于
      This is an initial patch to do support for objects which needs physical
      contiguous main ram, cursors and overlay registers on older chipsets.
      
      These objects are bound on cursor bin, like pinning, and we copy
      the data to/from the backing store object into the real one on attach/detach.
      
      notes:
      possible over the top in attach/detach operations.
      no overlay support yet.
      Signed-off-by: NDave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
      71acb5eb
  14. 12 1月, 2009 1 次提交
  15. 07 1月, 2009 1 次提交
  16. 29 12月, 2008 7 次提交
  17. 19 12月, 2008 1 次提交
  18. 09 12月, 2008 1 次提交
    • K
      drm/i915: Disable the GM965 MSI errata workaround. · b60678a7
      Keith Packard 提交于
      Since applying the fix suggested by the errata (disabling MSI), we've had
      issues with interrupts being stuck on despite IIR being 0 on GM965 hardware.
      Most reporters of the issue have confirmed that turning MSI back on fixes
      things, and given the difficulties experienced in getting reliable MSI working
      on Linux, it's believable that the errata was about software issues and not
      actual hardware issues.
      Signed-off-by: NDave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
      b60678a7
  19. 25 11月, 2008 1 次提交
  20. 11 11月, 2008 3 次提交
  21. 03 11月, 2008 1 次提交
  22. 23 10月, 2008 1 次提交
  23. 18 10月, 2008 1 次提交
    • M
      drm/i915: fix ioremap of a user address for non-root (CVE-2008-3831) · 4b408939
      Matthias Hopf 提交于
      Olaf Kirch noticed that the i915_set_status_page() function of the i915
      kernel driver calls ioremap with an address offset that is supplied by
      userspace via ioctl. The function zeroes the mapped memory via memset
      and tells the hardware about the address. Turns out that access to that
      ioctl is not restricted to root so users could probably exploit that to
      do nasty things. We haven't tried to write actual exploit code though.
      
      It only affects the Intel G33 series and newer.
      Signed-off-by: NDave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
      4b408939