Allow for module init sections to be traced as well as core kernel init
sections. Now that filtering modules functions can be stored, for when they
are loaded, it makes sense to be able to trace them.

Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

ddebug_remove_module() use mod->name to find the ddebug_table of the
module and remove it. But dynamic_debug_setup() use the first
_ddebug->modname to create ddebug_table for the module. It's ok when
the _ddebug->modname is the same with the mod->name.

But livepatch module is special, it may contain _ddebugs of other
modules, the modname of which is different from the name of livepatch
module. So ddebug_remove_module() can't use mod->name to find the
right ddebug_table and remove it. It can cause kernel crash when we cat
the file <debugfs>/dynamic_debug/control.
Signed-off-by: NZhou Chengming <zhouchengming1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NJessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>

[thomas@m3y3r.de: v3: fix arch specific implementations]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497890858.12931.7.camel@m3y3r.deSigned-off-by: NThomas Meyer <thomas@m3y3r.de>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

This header always exists, so doesn't require an ifdef around its
inclusion.  When CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY=y it includes the asm
header, otherwise it provides empty versions of the set_memory_xx()
routines.

The usages of set_memory_xx() are still guarded by
CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1498717781-29151-3-git-send-email-mpe@ellerman.id.auSigned-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NLaura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

This can be accomplished by making blacklisted() also accept const.
Signed-off-by: NLuis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[jeyu: fix typo]
Signed-off-by: NJessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>

The module list has been using RCU in a lot of other calls
for a while now, we just overlooked changing this one over to
use RCU.
Signed-off-by: NLuis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NJessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>

This patch fix the following warning:
kernel/module.c: In function 'add_usage_links':
kernel/module.c:1653:6: warning: variable 'nowarn' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]

[jeyu: folded in first patch since it only swapped the function order
so that del_usage_links can be called from add_usage_links]
Signed-off-by: NCorentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NJessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>

Each module has a list of enum's its contributing to the
enum map, rename that entry to reflect its use by more than
enums.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170531215653.3240-4-jeremy.linton@arm.comSigned-off-by: NJeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

The kernel and its modules have sections containing the enum
string to value conversions. Rename this section because we
intend to store more than enums in it.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170531215653.3240-2-jeremy.linton@arm.comSigned-off-by: NJeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

This patch makes it possible to pass additional arguments in addition
to uevent action name when writing /sys/.../uevent attribute. These
additional arguments are then inserted into generated synthetic uevent
as additional environment variables.

Before, we were not able to pass any additional uevent environment
variables for synthetic uevents. This made it hard to identify such uevents
properly in userspace to make proper distinction between genuine uevents
originating from kernel and synthetic uevents triggered from userspace.
Also, it was not possible to pass any additional information which would
make it possible to optimize and change the way the synthetic uevents are
processed back in userspace based on the originating environment of the
triggering action in userspace. With the extra additional variables, we are
able to pass through this extra information needed and also it makes it
possible to synchronize with such synthetic uevents as they can be clearly
identified back in userspace.

The format for writing the uevent attribute is following:

    ACTION [UUID [KEY=VALUE ...]

There's no change in how "ACTION" is recognized - it stays the same
("add", "change", "remove"). The "ACTION" is the only argument required
to generate synthetic uevent, the rest of arguments, that this patch
adds support for, are optional.

The "UUID" is considered as transaction identifier so it's possible to
use the same UUID value for one or more synthetic uevents in which case
we logically group these uevents together for any userspace listeners.
The "UUID" is expected to be in "xxxxxxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx"
format where "x" is a hex digit. The value appears in uevent as
"SYNTH_UUID=xxxxxxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx" environment variable.

The "KEY=VALUE" pairs can contain alphanumeric characters only. It's
possible to define zero or more more pairs - each pair is then delimited
by a space character " ". Each pair appears in synthetic uevents as
"SYNTH_ARG_KEY=VALUE" environment variable. That means the KEY name gains
"SYNTH_ARG_" prefix to avoid possible collisions with existing variables.
To pass the "KEY=VALUE" pairs, it's also required to pass in the "UUID"
part for the synthetic uevent first.

If "UUID" is not passed in, the generated synthetic uevent gains
"SYNTH_UUID=0" environment variable automatically so it's possible to
identify this situation in userspace when reading generated uevent and so
we can still make a difference between genuine and synthetic uevents.
Signed-off-by: NPeter Rajnoha <prajnoha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Accessing the mod structure (e.g. for mod->name) prior to having completed
check_modstruct_version() can result in writing garbage to the error logs
if the layout of the mod structure loaded from disk doesn't match the
running kernel's mod structure layout. This kind of mismatch will become
much more likely if a kernel is built with different randomization seed
for the struct layout randomization plugin.

Instead, add and use a new modinfo string for logging the module name.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NJessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>

Since we're already using values from struct load_info, just pass this
pointer in directly and use what's needed as we need it. This allows us
to access future fields in struct load_info too.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NJessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>

set_memory_* functions have moved to set_memory.h.  Switch to this
explicitly.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1488920133-27229-12-git-send-email-labbott@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NLaura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NJessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

__vmalloc* allows users to provide gfp flags for the underlying
allocation.  This API is quite popular

  $ git grep "=[[:space:]]__vmalloc\|return[[:space:]]*__vmalloc" | wc -l
  77

The only problem is that many people are not aware that they really want
to give __GFP_HIGHMEM along with other flags because there is really no
reason to consume precious lowmemory on CONFIG_HIGHMEM systems for pages
which are mapped to the kernel vmalloc space.  About half of users don't
use this flag, though.  This signals that we make the API unnecessarily
too complex.

This patch simply uses __GFP_HIGHMEM implicitly when allocating pages to
be mapped to the vmalloc space.  Current users which add __GFP_HIGHMEM
are simplified and drop the flag.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170307141020.29107-1-mhocko@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NMatthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Cristopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

When a sysadmin wishes to monitor module unloading with a syscall rule such as:
 -a always,exit -F arch=x86_64 -S delete_module -F key=mod-unload
the SYSCALL record doesn't tell us what module was requested for unloading.

Use the new KERN_MODULE auxiliary record to record it.
The SYSCALL record result code will list the return code.

See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/37
    https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/7
    https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Module-Load-Record-FormatSigned-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NJessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

When parsing for the <module:name> format, we use strchr() to look for
the separator, when we know that the module name can't be longer than
MODULE_NAME_LEN. Enforce the same using strnchr().
Signed-off-by: NNaveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NMasami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NJessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>

Since commit 383776fa ("locking/lockdep: Handle statically initialized
PER_CPU locks properly") we try to collapse per-cpu locks into a single
class by giving them all the same key. For this key we choose the canonical
address of the per-cpu object, which would be the offset into the per-cpu
area.

This has two problems:

 - there is a case where we run !0 lock->key through static_obj() and
   expect this to pass; it doesn't for canonical pointers.

 - 0 is a valid canonical address.

Cure both issues by redefining the canonical address as the address of the
per-cpu variable on the boot CPU.

Since I didn't want to rely on CPU0 being the boot-cpu, or even existing at
all, track the boot CPU in a variable.

Fixes: 383776fa ("locking/lockdep: Handle statically initialized PER_CPU locks properly")
Reported-by: Nkernel test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: wfg@linux.intel.com
Cc: kernel test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Cc: LKP <lkp@01.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170320114108.kbvcsuepem45j5cr@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.netSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

If a PER_CPU struct which contains a spin_lock is statically initialized
via:

DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct foo, bla) = {
	.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(bla.lock)
};

then lockdep assigns a seperate key to each lock because the logic for
assigning a key to statically initialized locks is to use the address as
the key. With per CPU locks the address is obvioulsy different on each CPU.

That's wrong, because all locks should have the same key.

To solve this the following modifications are required:

 1) Extend the is_kernel/module_percpu_addr() functions to hand back the
    canonical address of the per CPU address, i.e. the per CPU address
    minus the per CPU offset.

 2) Check the lock address with these functions and if the per CPU check
    matches use the returned canonical address as the lock key, so all per
    CPU locks have the same key.

 3) Move the static_obj(key) check into look_up_lock_class() so this check
    can be avoided for statically initialized per CPU locks.  That's
    required because the canonical address fails the static_obj(key) check
    for obvious reasons.
Reported-by: NMike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[ Merged Dan's fixups for !MODULES and !SMP into this patch. ]
Signed-off-by: NSebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dan Murphy <dmurphy@ti.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170227143736.pectaimkjkan5kow@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

While looking for early possible module loading failures I was
able to reproduce a memory leak possible with kmemleak. There
are a few rare ways to trigger a failure:

  o we've run into a failure while processing kernel parameters
    (parse_args() returns an error)
  o mod_sysfs_setup() fails
  o we're a live patch module and copy_module_elf() fails

Chances of running into this issue is really low.

kmemleak splat:

unreferenced object 0xffff9f2c4ada1b00 (size 32):
  comm "kworker/u16:4", pid 82, jiffies 4294897636 (age 681.816s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    6d 65 6d 73 74 69 63 6b 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  memstick0.......
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
  backtrace:
    [<ffffffff8c6cfeba>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4a/0xa0
    [<ffffffff8c200046>] __kmalloc_track_caller+0x126/0x230
    [<ffffffff8c1bc581>] kstrdup+0x31/0x60
    [<ffffffff8c1bc5d4>] kstrdup_const+0x24/0x30
    [<ffffffff8c3c23aa>] kvasprintf_const+0x7a/0x90
    [<ffffffff8c3b5481>] kobject_set_name_vargs+0x21/0x90
    [<ffffffff8c4fbdd7>] dev_set_name+0x47/0x50
    [<ffffffffc07819e5>] memstick_check+0x95/0x33c [memstick]
    [<ffffffff8c09c893>] process_one_work+0x1f3/0x4b0
    [<ffffffff8c09cb98>] worker_thread+0x48/0x4e0
    [<ffffffff8c0a2b79>] kthread+0xc9/0xe0
    [<ffffffff8c6dab5f>] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
    [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff

Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.30
Fixes: e180a6b7 ("param: fix charp parameters set via sysfs")
Reviewed-by: NMiroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: NAaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NLuis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NJessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>

This adds a new auxiliary record MODULE_INIT to the SYSCALL event.

We get finit_module for free since it made most sense to hook this in to
load_module().

https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/7
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Module-Load-Record-FormatSigned-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NJessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>
[PM: corrected links in the commit description]
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

While looking through the __ex_table stuff I found that we do a linear
lookup of the module. Also fix up a comment.
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>

These files were including module.h for exception table related
functions.  We've now separated that content out into its own file
"extable.h" so now move over to that and where possible, avoid all
the extra header content in module.h that we don't really need to
compile these non-modular files.

Note:
   init/main.c still needs module.h for __init_or_module
   kernel/extable.c still needs module.h for is_module_text_address

...and so we don't get the benefit of removing module.h from the cpp
feed for these two files, unlike the almost universal 1:1 exchange
of module.h for extable.h we were able to do in the arch dirs.

Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: NJessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>

Both of these options are poorly named. The features they provide are
necessary for system security and should not be considered debug only.
Change the names to CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX and
CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX to better describe what these options do.
Signed-off-by: NLaura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NJessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

The modversion symbol CRCs are emitted as ELF symbols, which allows us
to easily populate the kcrctab sections by relying on the linker to
associate each kcrctab slot with the correct value.

This has a couple of downsides:

 - Given that the CRCs are treated as memory addresses, we waste 4 bytes
   for each CRC on 64 bit architectures,

 - On architectures that support runtime relocation, a R_<arch>_RELATIVE
   relocation entry is emitted for each CRC value, which identifies it
   as a quantity that requires fixing up based on the actual runtime
   load offset of the kernel. This results in corrupted CRCs unless we
   explicitly undo the fixup (and this is currently being handled in the
   core module code)

 - Such runtime relocation entries take up 24 bytes of __init space
   each, resulting in a x8 overhead in [uncompressed] kernel size for
   CRCs.

Switching to explicit 32 bit values on 64 bit architectures fixes most
of these issues, given that 32 bit values are not treated as quantities
that require fixing up based on the actual runtime load offset.  Note
that on some ELF64 architectures [such as PPC64], these 32-bit values
are still emitted as [absolute] runtime relocatable quantities, even if
the value resolves to a build time constant.  Since relative relocations
are always resolved at build time, this patch enables MODULE_REL_CRCS on
powerpc when CONFIG_RELOCATABLE=y, which turns the absolute CRC
references into relative references into .rodata where the actual CRC
value is stored.

So redefine all CRC fields and variables as u32, and redefine the
__CRC_SYMBOL() macro for 64 bit builds to emit the CRC reference using
inline assembler (which is necessary since 64-bit C code cannot use
32-bit types to hold memory addresses, even if they are ultimately
resolved using values that do not exceed 0xffffffff).  To avoid
potential problems with legacy 32-bit architectures using legacy
toolchains, the equivalent C definition of the kcrctab entry is retained
for 32-bit architectures.

Note that this mostly reverts commit d4703aef ("module: handle ppc64
relocating kcrctabs when CONFIG_RELOCATABLE=y")
Acked-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Add back the "tainting kernel with TAINT_LIVEPATCH" kernel log message
that commit 2992ef29 ("livepatch/module: make TAINT_LIVEPATCH
module-specific") dropped.  Now that it's a module-specific taint flag,
include the module name.
Signed-off-by: NJoe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NKamalesh Babulal <kamalesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>

Commit 7fd8329b ("taint/module: Clean up global and module taint
flags handling") used the key words true and false as character members
of a new struct. These names cause problems when out-of-kernel modules
such as VirtualBox include their own definitions of true and false.

Fixes: 7fd8329b ("taint/module: Clean up global and module taint flags handling")
Signed-off-by: NLarry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Reported-by: NValdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu>
Reviewed-by: NPetr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Acked-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: NJessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>

This was entirely automated, using the script by Al:

  PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*<asm/uaccess.h>'
  sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include <linux/uaccess.h>!" \
        $(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h)

to do the replacement at the end of the merge window.
Requested-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

This enables CONFIG_MODVERSIONS again, but allows for missing symbol CRC
information in order to work around the issue that newer binutils
versions seem to occasionally drop the CRC on the floor.  binutils 2.26
seems to work fine, while binutils 2.27 seems to break MODVERSIONS of
symbols that have been defined in assembler files.

[ We've had random missing CRC's before - it may be an old problem that
  just is now reliably triggered with the weak asm symbols and a new
  version of binutils ]

Some day I really do want to remove MODVERSIONS entirely.  Sadly, today
does not appear to be that day: Debian people apparently do want the
option to enable MODVERSIONS to make it easier to have external modules
across kernel versions, and this seems to be a fairly minimal fix for
the annoying problem.

Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Acked-by: NMichal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The current "rodata=off" parameter disables read-only kernel mappings
under CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA:
    commit d2aa1aca ("mm/init: Add 'rodata=off' boot cmdline parameter
    to disable read-only kernel mappings")

This patch is a logical extension to module mappings ie. read-only mappings
at module loading can be disabled even if CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
(mainly for debug use). Please note, however, that it only affects RO/RW
permissions, keeping NX set.

This is the first step to make CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX mandatory
(always-on) in the future as CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA on x86 and arm64.
Suggested-by: Nand Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161114061505.15238-1-takahiro.akashi@linaro.orgSigned-off-by: NJessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>

The comment above strong_try_module_get() function is not true anymore.
Return values changed with commit c9a3ba55 ("module: wait for
dependent modules doing init.").
Signed-off-by: NMiroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LNX.2.00.1611161635330.12580@pobox.suse.cz
[jeyu@redhat.com: style fixes to make checkpatch.pl happy]
Signed-off-by: NJessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>

By default, during the access permission modification of a module's core
and init pages, we only ignore modules that are malformed. Albeit for a
module which is going away, it does not make sense to change its text to
RO since the module should be RW, before deallocation.

This patch makes set_all_modules_text_ro() skip modules which are going
away too.
Signed-off-by: NAaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1477560966-781-1-git-send-email-atomlin@redhat.com
[jeyu@redhat.com: add comment as suggested by Steven Rostedt]
Signed-off-by: NJessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>

In load_module() in the event of an error, for e.g. unknown module
parameter(s) specified we go to perform some module coming clean up
operations. At this point the module is still in a "formed" state
when it is actually going away.

This patch updates the module's state accordingly to ensure anyone on the
module_notify_list waiting for a module going away notification will be
notified accordingly.
Signed-off-by: NAaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Reviewed-by: NMiroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1476980293-19062-2-git-send-email-atomlin@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NJessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>

The commit 66cc69e3 ("Fix: module signature vs tracepoints:
add new TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE") updated module_taint_flags() to
potentially print one more character. But it did not increase the
size of the corresponding buffers in m_show() and print_modules().

We have recently done the same mistake when adding a taint flag
for livepatching, see
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cfba2c823bb984690b73572aaae1db596b54a082.1472137475.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com

Also struct module uses an incompatible type for mod-taints flags.
It survived from the commit 2bc2d61a ("[PATCH] list module
taint flags in Oops/panic"). There was used "int" for the global taint
flags at these times. But only the global tain flags was later changed
to "unsigned long" by the commit 25ddbb18 ("Make the taint
flags reliable").

This patch defines TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT that can be used to create
arrays and buffers of the right size. Note that we could not use
enum because the taint flag indexes are used also in assembly code.

Then it reworks the table that describes the taint flags. The TAINT_*
numbers can be used as the index. Instead, we add information
if the taint flag is also shown per-module.

Finally, it uses "unsigned long", bit operations, and the updated
taint_flags table also for mod->taints.

It is not optimal because only few taint flags can be printed by
module_taint_flags(). But better be on the safe side. IMHO, it is
not worth the optimization and this is a good compromise.
Signed-off-by: NPetr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1474458442-21581-1-git-send-email-pmladek@suse.com
[jeyu@redhat.com: fix broken lkml link in changelog]
Signed-off-by: NJessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>

There's no reliable way to determine which module tainted the kernel
with TAINT_LIVEPATCH.  For example, /sys/module/<klp module>/taint
doesn't report it.  Neither does the "mod -t" command in the crash tool.

Make it crystal clear who the guilty party is by associating
TAINT_LIVEPATCH with any module which sets the "livepatch" modinfo
attribute.  The flag will still get set in the kernel like before, but
now it also sets the same flag in mod->taint.

Note that now the taint flag gets set when the module is loaded rather
than when it's enabled.

I also renamed find_livepatch_modinfo() to check_modinfo_livepatch() to
better reflect its purpose: it's basically a livepatch-specific
sub-function of check_modinfo().
Reported-by: NChunyu Hu <chuhu@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NPetr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Acked-by: NMiroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Acked-by: NJessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>

Add ro_after_init support for modules by adding a new page-aligned section
in the module layout (after rodata) for ro_after_init data and enabling RO
protection for that section after module init runs.
Signed-off-by: NJessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

Blacklisting a module in linux has long been a problem.  The current
procedure is to use rd.blacklist=module_name, however, that doesn't
cover the case after the initramfs and before a boot prompt (where one
is supposed to use /etc/modprobe.d/blacklist.conf to blacklist
runtime loading). Using rd.shell to get an early prompt is hit-or-miss,
and doesn't cover all situations AFAICT.

This patch adds this functionality of permanently blacklisting a module
by its name via the kernel parameter module_blacklist=module_name.

[v2]: Rusty, use core_param() instead of __setup() which simplifies
things.

[v3]: Rusty, undo wreckage from strsep()

[v4]: Rusty, simpler version of blacklisted()
Signed-off-by: NPrarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

When running with lockdep enabled, I triggered the WARN_ON() in the
module code that asserts when module_mutex or rcu_read_lock_sched are
not held. The issue I have is that this can also be called from the
dump_stack() code, causing us to enter an infinite loop...

 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at kernel/module.c:268 module_assert_mutex_or_preempt+0x3c/0x3e
 Modules linked in: ip6t_REJECT nf_reject_ipv6 nf_conntrack_ipv6
 CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.7.0-rc3-test-00013-g501c2375 #14
 Hardware name: MSI MS-7823/CSM-H87M-G43 (MS-7823), BIOS V1.6 02/22/2014
  ffff880215e8fa70 ffff880215e8fa70 ffffffff812fc8e3 0000000000000000
  ffffffff81d3e55b ffff880215e8fac0 ffffffff8104fc88 ffffffff8104fcab
  0000000915e88300 0000000000000046 ffffffffa019b29a 0000000000000001
 Call Trace:
  [<ffffffff812fc8e3>] dump_stack+0x67/0x90
  [<ffffffff8104fc88>] __warn+0xcb/0xe9
  [<ffffffff8104fcab>] ? warn_slowpath_null+0x5/0x1f
 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at kernel/module.c:268 module_assert_mutex_or_preempt+0x3c/0x3e
 Modules linked in: ip6t_REJECT nf_reject_ipv6 nf_conntrack_ipv6
 CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.7.0-rc3-test-00013-g501c2375 #14
 Hardware name: MSI MS-7823/CSM-H87M-G43 (MS-7823), BIOS V1.6 02/22/2014
  ffff880215e8f7a0 ffff880215e8f7a0 ffffffff812fc8e3 0000000000000000
  ffffffff81d3e55b ffff880215e8f7f0 ffffffff8104fc88 ffffffff8104fcab
  0000000915e88300 0000000000000046 ffffffffa019b29a 0000000000000001
 Call Trace:
  [<ffffffff812fc8e3>] dump_stack+0x67/0x90
  [<ffffffff8104fc88>] __warn+0xcb/0xe9
  [<ffffffff8104fcab>] ? warn_slowpath_null+0x5/0x1f
 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at kernel/module.c:268 module_assert_mutex_or_preempt+0x3c/0x3e
 Modules linked in: ip6t_REJECT nf_reject_ipv6 nf_conntrack_ipv6
 CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.7.0-rc3-test-00013-g501c2375 #14
 Hardware name: MSI MS-7823/CSM-H87M-G43 (MS-7823), BIOS V1.6 02/22/2014
  ffff880215e8f4d0 ffff880215e8f4d0 ffffffff812fc8e3 0000000000000000
  ffffffff81d3e55b ffff880215e8f520 ffffffff8104fc88 ffffffff8104fcab
  0000000915e88300 0000000000000046 ffffffffa019b29a 0000000000000001
 Call Trace:
  [<ffffffff812fc8e3>] dump_stack+0x67/0x90
  [<ffffffff8104fc88>] __warn+0xcb/0xe9
  [<ffffffff8104fcab>] ? warn_slowpath_null+0x5/0x1f
 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at kernel/module.c:268 module_assert_mutex_or_preempt+0x3c/0x3e
[...]

Which gives us rather useless information. Worse yet, there's some race
that causes this, and I seldom trigger it, so I have no idea what
happened.

This would not be an issue if that warning was a WARN_ON_ONCE().
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

kernel.h header doesn't directly use dynamic debug, instead we can
include it in module.c (which used it via kernel.h).  printk.h only uses
it if CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG is on, changing the inclusion to only happen
in that case.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1468429793-16917-1-git-send-email-luisbg@osg.samsung.com
[luisbg@osg.samsung.com: include dynamic_debug.h in drb_int.h]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1468447828-18558-2-git-send-email-luisbg@osg.samsung.comSigned-off-by: NLuis de Bethencourt <luisbg@osg.samsung.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Signing a module should only make it trusted by the specific kernel it
was built for, not anything else.  Loading a signed module meant for a
kernel with a different ABI could have interesting effects.
Therefore, treat all signatures as invalid when a module is
force-loaded.
Signed-off-by: NBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

While most of the locations where a kernel taint bit is set are accompanied
with a warning message, there are two which set their bits silently.  If
the tainting module gets unloaded later on, it is almost impossible to tell
what was the reason for setting the flag.
Signed-off-by: NLibor Pechacek <lpechacek@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>