1. 18 5月, 2016 16 次提交
  2. 09 5月, 2016 9 次提交
  3. 06 5月, 2016 1 次提交
    • M
      proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready · 8148a73c
      Mathias Krause 提交于
      If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
      in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
      read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
      set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
      underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
      
      Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
      zero.  It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
      
      This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
      arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
      env_end is still zero.
      
      The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
      /proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
      inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
      variables.
      
      Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
      Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461Signed-off-by: NMathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
      Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
      Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
      Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
      Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
      Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
      Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      8148a73c
  4. 05 5月, 2016 1 次提交
    • E
      propogate_mnt: Handle the first propogated copy being a slave · 5ec0811d
      Eric W. Biederman 提交于
      When the first propgated copy was a slave the following oops would result:
      > BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
      > IP: [<ffffffff811fba4e>] propagate_one+0xbe/0x1c0
      > PGD bacd4067 PUD bac66067 PMD 0
      > Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
      > Modules linked in:
      > CPU: 1 PID: 824 Comm: mount Not tainted 4.6.0-rc5userns+ #1523
      > Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2007
      > task: ffff8800bb0a8000 ti: ffff8800bac3c000 task.ti: ffff8800bac3c000
      > RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811fba4e>]  [<ffffffff811fba4e>] propagate_one+0xbe/0x1c0
      > RSP: 0018:ffff8800bac3fd38  EFLAGS: 00010283
      > RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8800bb77ec00 RCX: 0000000000000010
      > RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8800bb58c000 RDI: ffff8800bb58c480
      > RBP: ffff8800bac3fd48 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
      > R10: 0000000000001ca1 R11: 0000000000001c9d R12: 0000000000000000
      > R13: ffff8800ba713800 R14: ffff8800bac3fda0 R15: ffff8800bb77ec00
      > FS:  00007f3c0cd9b7e0(0000) GS:ffff8800bfb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
      > CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
      > CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 00000000bb79d000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
      > Stack:
      >  ffff8800bb77ec00 0000000000000000 ffff8800bac3fd88 ffffffff811fbf85
      >  ffff8800bac3fd98 ffff8800bb77f080 ffff8800ba713800 ffff8800bb262b40
      >  0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff8800bac3fdd8 ffffffff811f1da0
      > Call Trace:
      >  [<ffffffff811fbf85>] propagate_mnt+0x105/0x140
      >  [<ffffffff811f1da0>] attach_recursive_mnt+0x120/0x1e0
      >  [<ffffffff811f1ec3>] graft_tree+0x63/0x70
      >  [<ffffffff811f1f6b>] do_add_mount+0x9b/0x100
      >  [<ffffffff811f2c1a>] do_mount+0x2aa/0xdf0
      >  [<ffffffff8117efbe>] ? strndup_user+0x4e/0x70
      >  [<ffffffff811f3a45>] SyS_mount+0x75/0xc0
      >  [<ffffffff8100242b>] do_syscall_64+0x4b/0xa0
      >  [<ffffffff81988f3c>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
      > Code: 00 00 75 ec 48 89 0d 02 22 22 01 8b 89 10 01 00 00 48 89 05 fd 21 22 01 39 8e 10 01 00 00 0f 84 e0 00 00 00 48 8b 80 d8 00 00 00 <48> 8b 50 10 48 89 05 df 21 22 01 48 89 15 d0 21 22 01 8b 53 30
      > RIP  [<ffffffff811fba4e>] propagate_one+0xbe/0x1c0
      >  RSP <ffff8800bac3fd38>
      > CR2: 0000000000000010
      > ---[ end trace 2725ecd95164f217 ]---
      
      This oops happens with the namespace_sem held and can be triggered by
      non-root users.  An all around not pleasant experience.
      
      To avoid this scenario when finding the appropriate source mount to
      copy stop the walk up the mnt_master chain when the first source mount
      is encountered.
      
      Further rewrite the walk up the last_source mnt_master chain so that
      it is clear what is going on.
      
      The reason why the first source mount is special is that it it's
      mnt_parent is not a mount in the dest_mnt propagation tree, and as
      such termination conditions based up on the dest_mnt mount propgation
      tree do not make sense.
      
      To avoid other kinds of confusion last_dest is not changed when
      computing last_source.  last_dest is only used once in propagate_one
      and that is above the point of the code being modified, so changing
      the global variable is meaningless and confusing.
      
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      fixes: f2ebb3a9 ("smarter propagate_mnt()")
      Reported-by: NTycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>
      Reviewed-by: NSeth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
      Tested-by: NSeth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      5ec0811d
  5. 29 4月, 2016 2 次提交
    • X
      ocfs2/dlm: return zero if deref_done message is successfully handled · b7341364
      xuejiufei 提交于
      dlm_deref_lockres_done_handler() should return zero if the message is
      successfully handled.
      
      Fixes: 60d663cb ("ocfs2/dlm: add DEREF_DONE message").
      Signed-off-by: Nxuejiufei <xuejiufei@huawei.com>
      Reviewed-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com>
      Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de>
      Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
      Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      b7341364
    • G
      numa: fix /proc/<pid>/numa_maps for THP · 28093f9f
      Gerald Schaefer 提交于
      In gather_pte_stats() a THP pmd is cast into a pte, which is wrong
      because the layouts may differ depending on the architecture.  On s390
      this will lead to inaccurate numa_maps accounting in /proc because of
      misguided pte_present() and pte_dirty() checks on the fake pte.
      
      On other architectures pte_present() and pte_dirty() may work by chance,
      but there may be an issue with direct-access (dax) mappings w/o
      underlying struct pages when HAVE_PTE_SPECIAL is set and THP is
      available.  In vm_normal_page() the fake pte will be checked with
      pte_special() and because there is no "special" bit in a pmd, this will
      always return false and the VM_PFNMAP | VM_MIXEDMAP checking will be
      skipped.  On dax mappings w/o struct pages, an invalid struct page
      pointer would then be returned that can crash the kernel.
      
      This patch fixes the numa_maps THP handling by introducing new "_pmd"
      variants of the can_gather_numa_stats() and vm_normal_page() functions.
      Signed-off-by: NGerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com>
      Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
      Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
      Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
      Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
      Cc: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
      Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
      Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
      Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
      Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
      Cc: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[4.3+]
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      28093f9f
  6. 27 4月, 2016 1 次提交
    • L
      devpts: more pty driver interface cleanups · 8ead9dd5
      Linus Torvalds 提交于
      This is more prep-work for the upcoming pty changes.  Still just code
      cleanup with no actual semantic changes.
      
      This removes a bunch pointless complexity by just having the slave pty
      side remember the dentry associated with the devpts slave rather than
      the inode.  That allows us to remove all the "look up the dentry" code
      for when we want to remove it again.
      
      Together with moving the tty pointer from "inode->i_private" to
      "dentry->d_fsdata" and getting rid of pointless inode locking, this
      removes about 30 lines of code.  Not only is the end result smaller,
      it's simpler and easier to understand.
      
      The old code, for example, depended on the d_find_alias() to not just
      find the dentry, but also to check that it is still hashed, which in
      turn validated the tty pointer in the inode.
      
      That is a _very_ roundabout way to say "invalidate the cached tty
      pointer when the dentry is removed".
      
      The new code just does
      
      	dentry->d_fsdata = NULL;
      
      in devpts_pty_kill() instead, invalidating the tty pointer rather more
      directly and obviously.  Don't do something complex and subtle when the
      obvious straightforward approach will do.
      
      The rest of the patch (ie apart from code deletion and the above tty
      pointer clearing) is just switching the calling convention to pass the
      dentry or file pointer around instead of the inode.
      
      Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      Cc: Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
      Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
      Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
      Cc: Aurelien Jarno <aurelien@aurel32.net>
      Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
      Cc: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
      Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
      Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
      Cc: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      8ead9dd5
  7. 26 4月, 2016 1 次提交
    • I
      libceph: make authorizer destruction independent of ceph_auth_client · 6c1ea260
      Ilya Dryomov 提交于
      Starting the kernel client with cephx disabled and then enabling cephx
      and restarting userspace daemons can result in a crash:
      
          [262671.478162] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffebe000000000
          [262671.531460] IP: [<ffffffff811cd04a>] kfree+0x5a/0x130
          [262671.584334] PGD 0
          [262671.635847] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
          [262672.055841] CPU: 22 PID: 2961272 Comm: kworker/22:2 Not tainted 4.2.0-34-generic #39~14.04.1-Ubuntu
          [262672.162338] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R720/068CDY, BIOS 2.4.3 07/09/2014
          [262672.268937] Workqueue: ceph-msgr con_work [libceph]
          [262672.322290] task: ffff88081c2d0dc0 ti: ffff880149ae8000 task.ti: ffff880149ae8000
          [262672.428330] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811cd04a>]  [<ffffffff811cd04a>] kfree+0x5a/0x130
          [262672.535880] RSP: 0018:ffff880149aeba58  EFLAGS: 00010286
          [262672.589486] RAX: 000001e000000000 RBX: 0000000000000012 RCX: ffff8807e7461018
          [262672.695980] RDX: 000077ff80000000 RSI: ffff88081af2be04 RDI: 0000000000000012
          [262672.803668] RBP: ffff880149aeba78 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
          [262672.912299] R10: ffffebe000000000 R11: ffff880819a60e78 R12: ffff8800aec8df40
          [262673.021769] R13: ffffffffc035f70f R14: ffff8807e5b138e0 R15: ffff880da9785840
          [262673.131722] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88081fac0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
          [262673.245377] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
          [262673.303281] CR2: ffffebe000000000 CR3: 0000000001c0d000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
          [262673.417556] Stack:
          [262673.472943]  ffff880149aeba88 ffff88081af2be04 ffff8800aec8df40 ffff88081af2be04
          [262673.583767]  ffff880149aeba98 ffffffffc035f70f ffff880149aebac8 ffff8800aec8df00
          [262673.694546]  ffff880149aebac8 ffffffffc035c89e ffff8807e5b138e0 ffff8805b047f800
          [262673.805230] Call Trace:
          [262673.859116]  [<ffffffffc035f70f>] ceph_x_destroy_authorizer+0x1f/0x50 [libceph]
          [262673.968705]  [<ffffffffc035c89e>] ceph_auth_destroy_authorizer+0x3e/0x60 [libceph]
          [262674.078852]  [<ffffffffc0352805>] put_osd+0x45/0x80 [libceph]
          [262674.134249]  [<ffffffffc035290e>] remove_osd+0xae/0x140 [libceph]
          [262674.189124]  [<ffffffffc0352aa3>] __reset_osd+0x103/0x150 [libceph]
          [262674.243749]  [<ffffffffc0354703>] kick_requests+0x223/0x460 [libceph]
          [262674.297485]  [<ffffffffc03559e2>] ceph_osdc_handle_map+0x282/0x5e0 [libceph]
          [262674.350813]  [<ffffffffc035022e>] dispatch+0x4e/0x720 [libceph]
          [262674.403312]  [<ffffffffc034bd91>] try_read+0x3d1/0x1090 [libceph]
          [262674.454712]  [<ffffffff810ab7c2>] ? dequeue_entity+0x152/0x690
          [262674.505096]  [<ffffffffc034cb1b>] con_work+0xcb/0x1300 [libceph]
          [262674.555104]  [<ffffffff8108fb3e>] process_one_work+0x14e/0x3d0
          [262674.604072]  [<ffffffff810901ea>] worker_thread+0x11a/0x470
          [262674.652187]  [<ffffffff810900d0>] ? rescuer_thread+0x310/0x310
          [262674.699022]  [<ffffffff810957a2>] kthread+0xd2/0xf0
          [262674.744494]  [<ffffffff810956d0>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c0/0x1c0
          [262674.789543]  [<ffffffff817bd81f>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
          [262674.834094]  [<ffffffff810956d0>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c0/0x1c0
      
      What happens is the following:
      
          (1) new MON session is established
          (2) old "none" ac is destroyed
          (3) new "cephx" ac is constructed
          ...
          (4) old OSD session (w/ "none" authorizer) is put
                ceph_auth_destroy_authorizer(ac, osd->o_auth.authorizer)
      
      osd->o_auth.authorizer in the "none" case is just a bare pointer into
      ac, which contains a single static copy for all services.  By the time
      we get to (4), "none" ac, freed in (2), is long gone.  On top of that,
      a new vtable installed in (3) points us at ceph_x_destroy_authorizer(),
      so we end up trying to destroy a "none" authorizer with a "cephx"
      destructor operating on invalid memory!
      
      To fix this, decouple authorizer destruction from ac and do away with
      a single static "none" authorizer by making a copy for each OSD or MDS
      session.  Authorizers themselves are independent of ac and so there is
      no reason for destroy_authorizer() to be an ac op.  Make it an op on
      the authorizer itself by turning ceph_authorizer into a real struct.
      
      Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/15447Reported-by: NAlan Zhang <alan.zhang@linux.com>
      Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
      Reviewed-by: NSage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
      6c1ea260
  8. 25 4月, 2016 2 次提交
    • A
      udf: Fix conversion of 'dstring' fields to UTF8 · c26f6c61
      Andrew Gabbasov 提交于
      Commit 9293fcfb
      ("udf: Remove struct ustr as non-needed intermediate storage"),
      while getting rid of 'struct ustr', does not take any special care
      of 'dstring' fields and effectively use fixed field length instead
      of actual string length, encoded in the last byte of the field.
      
      Also, commit 484a10f4
      ("udf: Merge linux specific translation into CS0 conversion function")
      introduced checking of the length of the string being converted,
      requiring proper alignment to number of bytes constituing each
      character.
      
      The UDF volume identifier is represented as a 32-bytes 'dstring',
      and needs to be converted from CS0 to UTF8, while mounting UDF
      filesystem. The changes in mentioned commits can in some cases
      lead to incorrect handling of volume identifier:
      - if the actual string in 'dstring' is of maximal length and
      does not have zero bytes separating it from dstring encoded
      length in last byte, that last byte may be included in conversion,
      thus making incorrect resulting string;
      - if the identifier is encoded with 2-bytes characters (compression
      code is 16), the length of 31 bytes (32 bytes of field length minus
      1 byte of compression code), taken as the string length, is reported
      as an incorrect (unaligned) length, and the conversion fails, which
      in its turn leads to volume mounting failure.
      
      This patch introduces handling of 'dstring' encoded length field
      in udf_CS0toUTF8 function, that is used in all and only cases
      when 'dstring' fields are converted. Currently these cases are
      processing of Volume Identifier and Volume Set Identifier fields.
      The function is also renamed to udf_dstrCS0toUTF8 to distinctly
      indicate that it handles 'dstring' input.
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Gabbasov <andrew_gabbasov@mentor.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
      c26f6c61
    • A
      fuse: Fix return value from fuse_get_user_pages() · 2c932d4c
      Ashish Samant 提交于
      fuse_get_user_pages() should return error or 0. Otherwise fuse_direct_io
      read will not return 0 to indicate that read has completed.
      
      Fixes: 742f9927 ("fuse: return patrial success from fuse_direct_io()")
      Signed-off-by: NAshish Samant <ashish.samant@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: NSeth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
      2c932d4c
  9. 19 4月, 2016 1 次提交
    • L
      devpts: clean up interface to pty drivers · 67245ff3
      Linus Torvalds 提交于
      This gets rid of the horrible notion of having that
      
          struct inode *ptmx_inode
      
      be the linchpin of the interface between the pty code and devpts.
      
      By de-emphasizing the ptmx inode, a lot of things actually get cleaner,
      and we will have a much saner way forward.  In particular, this will
      allow us to associate with any particular devpts instance at open-time,
      and not be artificially tied to one particular ptmx inode.
      
      The patch itself is actually fairly straightforward, and apart from some
      locking and return path cleanups it's pretty mechanical:
      
       - the interfaces that devpts exposes all take "struct pts_fs_info *"
         instead of "struct inode *ptmx_inode" now.
      
         NOTE! The "struct pts_fs_info" thing is a completely opaque structure
         as far as the pty driver is concerned: it's still declared entirely
         internally to devpts. So the pty code can't actually access it in any
         way, just pass it as a "cookie" to the devpts code.
      
       - the "look up the pts fs info" is now a single clear operation, that
         also does the reference count increment on the pts superblock.
      
         So "devpts_add/del_ref()" is gone, and replaced by a "lookup and get
         ref" operation (devpts_get_ref(inode)), along with a "put ref" op
         (devpts_put_ref()).
      
       - the pty master "tty->driver_data" field now contains the pts_fs_info,
         not the ptmx inode.
      
       - because we don't care about the ptmx inode any more as some kind of
         base index, the ref counting can now drop the inode games - it just
         gets the ref on the superblock.
      
       - the pts_fs_info now has a back-pointer to the super_block. That's so
         that we can easily look up the information we actually need. Although
         quite often, the pts fs info was actually all we wanted, and not having
         to look it up based on some magical inode makes things more
         straightforward.
      
      In particular, now that "devpts_get_ref(inode)" operation should really
      be the *only* place we need to look up what devpts instance we're
      associated with, and we do it exactly once, at ptmx_open() time.
      
      The other side of this is that one ptmx node could now be associated
      with multiple different devpts instances - you could have a single
      /dev/ptmx node, and then have multiple mount namespaces with their own
      instances of devpts mounted on /dev/pts/.  And that's all perfectly sane
      in a model where we just look up the pts instance at open time.
      
      This will eventually allow us to get rid of our odd single-vs-multiple
      pts instance model, but this patch in itself changes no semantics, only
      an internal binding model.
      
      Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      Cc: Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
      Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
      Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
      Cc: Aurelien Jarno <aurelien@aurel32.net>
      Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
      Cc: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
      Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
      Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
      Cc: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      67245ff3
  10. 15 4月, 2016 1 次提交
    • L
      Make file credentials available to the seqfile interfaces · 34dbbcdb
      Linus Torvalds 提交于
      A lot of seqfile users seem to be using things like %pK that uses the
      credentials of the current process, but that is actually completely
      wrong for filesystem interfaces.
      
      The unix semantics for permission checking files is to check permissions
      at _open_ time, not at read or write time, and that is not just a small
      detail: passing off stdin/stdout/stderr to a suid application and making
      the actual IO happen in privileged context is a classic exploit
      technique.
      
      So if we want to be able to look at permissions at read time, we need to
      use the file open credentials, not the current ones.  Normal file
      accesses can just use "f_cred" (or any of the helper functions that do
      that, like file_ns_capable()), but the seqfile interfaces do not have
      any such options.
      
      It turns out that seq_file _does_ save away the user_ns information of
      the file, though.  Since user_ns is just part of the full credential
      information, replace that special case with saving off the cred pointer
      instead, and suddenly seq_file has all the permission information it
      needs.
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      34dbbcdb
  11. 13 4月, 2016 5 次提交