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  1. 22 5月, 2019 1 次提交
  3. 17 5月, 2019 5 次提交
  5. 15 5月, 2019 22 次提交
  7. 10 5月, 2019 2 次提交
  9. 08 5月, 2019 6 次提交
    • P
      x86/mm/tlb: Revert "x86/mm: Align TLB invalidation info" · 7a32cbf1
      由 Peter Zijlstra 提交于 
      commit 780e0106d468a2962b16b52fdf42898f2639e0a0 upstream.

Revert the following commit:

  515ab7c4: ("x86/mm: Align TLB invalidation info")

I found out (the hard way) that under some .config options (notably L1_CACHE_SHIFT=7)
and compiler combinations this on-stack alignment leads to a 320 byte
stack usage, which then triggers a KASAN stack warning elsewhere.

Using 320 bytes of stack space for a 40 byte structure is ludicrous and
clearly not right.
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: NNadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: 515ab7c4 ("x86/mm: Align TLB invalidation info")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190416080335.GM7905@worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net
[ Minor changelog edits. ]
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      7a32cbf1
    • Q
      x86/mm: Fix a crash with kmemleak_scan() · c48b027f
      由 Qian Cai 提交于 
      commit 0d02113b31b2017dd349ec9df2314e798a90fa6e upstream.

The first kmemleak_scan() call after boot would trigger the crash below
because this callpath:

  kernel_init
    free_initmem
      mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem
        free_init_pages

unmaps memory inside the .bss when DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=y.

kmemleak_init() will register the .data/.bss sections and then
kmemleak_scan() will scan those addresses and dereference them looking
for pointer references. If free_init_pages() frees and unmaps pages in
those sections, kmemleak_scan() will crash if referencing one of those
addresses:

  BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffbd402000
  CPU: 12 PID: 325 Comm: kmemleak Not tainted 5.1.0-rc4+ #4
  RIP: 0010:scan_block
  Call Trace:
   scan_gray_list
   kmemleak_scan
   kmemleak_scan_thread
   kthread
   ret_from_fork

Since kmemleak_free_part() is tolerant to unknown objects (not tracked
by kmemleak), it is fine to call it from free_init_pages() even if not
all address ranges passed to this function are known to kmemleak.

 [ bp: Massage. ]

Fixes: b3f0907c ("x86/mm: Add .bss..decrypted section to hold shared variables")
Signed-off-by: NQian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190423165811.36699-1-cai@lca.pwSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      c48b027f
    • B
      x86/mm/KASLR: Fix the size of the direct mapping section · 052c78f5
      由 Baoquan He 提交于 
      commit ec3937107ab43f3e8b2bc9dad95710043c462ff7 upstream.

kernel_randomize_memory() uses __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT to calculate
the maximum amount of system RAM supported. The size of the direct
mapping section is obtained from the smaller one of the below two
values:

  (actual system RAM size + padding size) vs (max system RAM size supported)

This calculation is wrong since commit

  b83ce5ee ("x86/mm/64: Make __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT always 52").

In it, __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT was changed to be 52, regardless of whether
the kernel is using 4-level or 5-level page tables. Thus, it will always
use 4 PB as the maximum amount of system RAM, even in 4-level paging
mode where it should actually be 64 TB.

Thus, the size of the direct mapping section will always
be the sum of the actual system RAM size plus the padding size.

Even when the amount of system RAM is 64 TB, the following layout will
still be used. Obviously KALSR will be weakened significantly.

   |____|_______actual RAM_______|_padding_|______the rest_______|
   0            64TB                                            ~120TB

Instead, it should be like this:

   |____|_______actual RAM_______|_________the rest______________|
   0            64TB                                            ~120TB

The size of padding region is controlled by
CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING, which is 10 TB by default.

The above issue only exists when
CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING is set to a non-zero value,
which is the case when CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG is enabled. Otherwise,
using __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT doesn't affect KASLR.

Fix it by replacing __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT with MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS.

 [ bp: Massage commit message. ]

Fixes: b83ce5ee ("x86/mm/64: Make __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT always 52")
Signed-off-by: NBaoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Acked-by: NKirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: frank.ramsay@hpe.com
Cc: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au
Cc: kirill@shutemov.name
Cc: mike.travis@hpe.com
Cc: thgarnie@google.com
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: yamada.masahiro@socionext.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190417083536.GE7065@MiWiFi-R3L-srvSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      052c78f5
    • T
      x86/mce: Improve error message when kernel cannot recover, p2 · 61ff4406
      由 Tony Luck 提交于 
      commit 41f035a86b5b72a4f947c38e94239d20d595352a upstream.

In

  c7d606f5 ("x86/mce: Improve error message when kernel cannot recover")

a case was added for a machine check caused by a DATA access to poison
memory from the kernel. A case should have been added also for an
uncorrectable error during an instruction fetch in the kernel.

Add that extra case so the error message now reads:

  mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check: Instruction fetch error in kernel

Fixes: c7d606f5 ("x86/mce: Improve error message when kernel cannot recover")
Signed-off-by: NTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190225205940.15226-1-tony.luck@intel.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      61ff4406
    • K
      perf/x86/amd: Update generic hardware cache events for Family 17h · 3f8497cf
      由 Kim Phillips 提交于 
      commit 0e3b74e26280f2cf8753717a950b97d424da6046 upstream.

Add a new amd_hw_cache_event_ids_f17h assignment structure set
for AMD families 17h and above, since a lot has changed.  Specifically:

L1 Data Cache

The data cache access counter remains the same on Family 17h.

For DC misses, PMCx041's definition changes with Family 17h,
so instead we use the L2 cache accesses from L1 data cache
misses counter (PMCx060,umask=0xc8).

For DC hardware prefetch events, Family 17h breaks compatibility
for PMCx067 "Data Prefetcher", so instead, we use PMCx05a "Hardware
Prefetch DC Fills."

L1 Instruction Cache

PMCs 0x80 and 0x81 (32-byte IC fetches and misses) are backward
compatible on Family 17h.

For prefetches, we remove the erroneous PMCx04B assignment which
counts how many software data cache prefetch load instructions were
dispatched.

LL - Last Level Cache

Removing PMCs 7D, 7E, and 7F assignments, as they do not exist
on Family 17h, where the last level cache is L3.  L3 counters
can be accessed using the existing AMD Uncore driver.

Data TLB

On Intel machines, data TLB accesses ("dTLB-loads") are assigned
to counters that count load/store instructions retired.  This
is inconsistent with instruction TLB accesses, where Intel
implementations report iTLB misses that hit in the STLB.

Ideally, dTLB-loads would count higher level dTLB misses that hit
in lower level TLBs, and dTLB-load-misses would report those
that also missed in those lower-level TLBs, therefore causing
a page table walk.  That would be consistent with instruction
TLB operation, remove the redundancy between dTLB-loads and
L1-dcache-loads, and prevent perf from producing artificially
low percentage ratios, i.e. the "0.01%" below:

        42,550,869      L1-dcache-loads
        41,591,860      dTLB-loads
             4,802      dTLB-load-misses          #    0.01% of all dTLB cache hits
         7,283,682      L1-dcache-stores
         7,912,392      dTLB-stores
               310      dTLB-store-misses

On AMD Families prior to 17h, the "Data Cache Accesses" counter is
used, which is slightly better than load/store instructions retired,
but still counts in terms of individual load/store operations
instead of TLB operations.

So, for AMD Families 17h and higher, this patch assigns "dTLB-loads"
to a counter for L1 dTLB misses that hit in the L2 dTLB, and
"dTLB-load-misses" to a counter for L1 DTLB misses that caused
L2 DTLB misses and therefore also caused page table walks.  This
results in a much more accurate view of data TLB performance:

        60,961,781      L1-dcache-loads
             4,601      dTLB-loads
               963      dTLB-load-misses          #   20.93% of all dTLB cache hits

Note that for all AMD families, data loads and stores are combined
in a single accesses counter, so no 'L1-dcache-stores' are reported
separately, and stores are counted with loads in 'L1-dcache-loads'.

Also note that the "% of all dTLB cache hits" string is misleading
because (a) "dTLB cache": although TLBs can be considered caches for
page tables, in this context, it can be misinterpreted as data cache
hits because the figures are similar (at least on Intel), and (b) not
all those loads (technically accesses) technically "hit" at that
hardware level.  "% of all dTLB accesses" would be more clear/accurate.

Instruction TLB

On Intel machines, 'iTLB-loads' measure iTLB misses that hit in the
STLB, and 'iTLB-load-misses' measure iTLB misses that also missed in
the STLB and completed a page table walk.

For AMD Family 17h and above, for 'iTLB-loads' we replace the
erroneous instruction cache fetches counter with PMCx084
"L1 ITLB Miss, L2 ITLB Hit".

For 'iTLB-load-misses' we still use PMCx085 "L1 ITLB Miss,
L2 ITLB Miss", but set a 0xff umask because without it the event
does not get counted.

Branch Predictor (BPU)

PMCs 0xc2 and 0xc3 continue to be valid across all AMD Families.

Node Level Events

Family 17h does not have a PMCx0e9 counter, and corresponding counters
have not been made available publicly, so for now, we mark them as
unsupported for Families 17h and above.

Reference:

  "Open-Source Register Reference For AMD Family 17h Processors Models 00h-2Fh"
  Released 7/17/2018, Publication #56255, Revision 3.03:
  https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/56255_OSRR.pdf

[ mingo: tidied up the line breaks. ]
Signed-off-by: NKim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.9+
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Janakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Martin Liška <mliska@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e40ed154 ("perf/x86: Add perf support for AMD family-17h processors")
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      3f8497cf
    • D
      KVM: SVM: prevent DBG_DECRYPT and DBG_ENCRYPT overflow · 82e8da1f
      由 David Rientjes 提交于 
      [ Upstream commit b86bc2858b389255cd44555ce4b1e427b2b770c0 ]

This ensures that the address and length provided to DBG_DECRYPT and
DBG_ENCRYPT do not cause an overflow.

At the same time, pass the actual number of pages pinned in memory to
sev_unpin_memory() as a cleanup.
Reported-by: NCfir Cohen <cfir@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
      82e8da1f
  11. 05 5月, 2019 2 次提交
  13. 04 5月, 2019 2 次提交
    • R
      x86/mm: Don't exceed the valid physical address space · 6a364b2e
      由 Ralph Campbell 提交于 
      [ Upstream commit 92c77f7c4d5dfaaf45b2ce19360e69977c264766 ]

valid_phys_addr_range() is used to sanity check the physical address range
of an operation, e.g., access to /dev/mem. It uses __pa(high_memory)
internally.

If memory is populated at the end of the physical address space, then
__pa(high_memory) is outside of the physical address space because:

   high_memory = (void *)__va(max_pfn * PAGE_SIZE - 1) + 1;

For the comparison in valid_phys_addr_range() this is not an issue, but if
CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL is enabled, __pa() maps to __phys_addr(), which
verifies that the resulting physical address is within the valid physical
address space of the CPU. So in the case that memory is populated at the
end of the physical address space, this is not true and triggers a
VIRTUAL_BUG_ON().

Use __pa(high_memory - 1) to prevent the conversion from going beyond
the end of valid physical addresses.

Fixes: be62a320 ("x86/mm: Limit mmap() of /dev/mem to valid physical addresses")
Signed-off-by: NRalph Campbell <rcampbell@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Craig Bergstrom <craigb@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it>
Cc: Sean Young <sean@mess.org>

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190326001817.15413-2-rcampbell@nvidia.comSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin (Microsoft) <sashal@kernel.org>
      6a364b2e
    • M
      x86/realmode: Don't leak the trampoline kernel address · fe71e625
      由 Matteo Croce 提交于 
      [ Upstream commit b929a500d68479163c48739d809cbf4c1335db6f ]

Since commit

  ad67b74d ("printk: hash addresses printed with %p")

at boot "____ptrval____" is printed instead of the trampoline addresses:

  Base memory trampoline at [(____ptrval____)] 99000 size 24576

Remove the print as we don't want to leak kernel addresses and this
statement is not needed anymore.

Fixes: ad67b74d ("printk: hash addresses printed with %p")
Signed-off-by: NMatteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190326203046.20787-1-mcroce@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin (Microsoft) <sashal@kernel.org>
      fe71e625