This marks many critical kernel structures for randomization. These are
structures that have been targeted in the past in security exploits, or
contain functions pointers, pointers to function pointer tables, lists,
workqueues, ref-counters, credentials, permissions, or are otherwise
sensitive. This initial list was extracted from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's
code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding
of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and
don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

Left out of this list is task_struct, which requires special handling
and will be covered in a subsequent patch.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

Right now we use the 'readlock' both for protecting some of the af_unix
IO path and for making the bind be single-threaded.

The two are independent, but using the same lock makes for a nasty
deadlock due to ordering with regards to filesystem locking.  The bind
locking would want to nest outside the VSF pathname locking, but the IO
locking wants to nest inside some of those same locks.

We tried to fix this earlier with commit c845acb3 ("af_unix: Fix
splice-bind deadlock") which moved the readlock inside the vfs locks,
but that caused problems with overlayfs that will then call back into
filesystem routines that take the lock in the wrong order anyway.

Splitting the locks means that we can go back to having the bind lock be
the outermost lock, and we don't have any deadlocks with lock ordering.
Acked-by: NRainer Weikusat <rweikusat@cyberadapt.com>
Acked-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: NHannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.

To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.

Fixes: 712f4aad ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: NDavid Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NHannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> writes:
An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with
some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the
receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog
datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go
to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server
receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be
woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll
routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue
of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake
up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently
problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive
for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the
connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic
in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the
polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the
corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a
wait queue with epoll.

Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such
that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the
peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full
condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the
peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client
socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again
dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client
socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is
itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from
unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring
that no blocked writer sleeps forever.
Signed-off-by: NRainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Fixes: ec0d215f ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets")
Reviewed-by: NJason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Make unix_sk() just like inet[6]_sk() by constify'ing the sock
parameter.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

As suggested by Eric Dumazet this change replaces the
#define with a static inline function to enjoy
complaints by the compiler when misusing the API.
Signed-off-by: NAaron Conole <aconole@bytheb.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

SCM_SECURITY was originally only implemented for datagram sockets,
not for stream sockets.  However, SCM_CREDENTIALS is supported on
Unix stream sockets.  For consistency, implement Unix stream support
for SCM_SECURITY as well.  Also clean up the existing code and get
rid of the superfluous UNIXSID macro.

Motivated by https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1224211,
where systemd was using SCM_CREDENTIALS and assumed wrongly that
SCM_SECURITY was also supported on Unix stream sockets.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

unix_stream_sendmsg() currently uses order-2 allocations,
and we had numerous reports this can fail.

The __GFP_REPEAT flag present in sock_alloc_send_pskb() is
not helping.

This patch extends the work done in commit eb6a2481
("af_unix: reduce high order page allocations) for
datagram sockets.

This opens the possibility of zero copy IO (splice() and
friends)

The trick is to not use skb_pull() anymore in recvmsg() path,
and instead add a @consumed field in UNIXCB() to track amount
of already read payload in the skb.

There is a performance regression for large sends
because of extra page allocations that will be addressed
in a follow-up patch, allowing sock_alloc_send_pskb()
to attempt high order page allocations.
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

There are a mix of function prototypes with and without extern
in the kernel sources.  Standardize on not using extern for
function prototypes.

Function prototypes don't need to be written with extern.
extern is assumed by the compiler.  Its use is as unnecessary as
using auto to declare automatic/local variables in a block.

Reflow modified prototypes to 80 columns.
Signed-off-by: NJoe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Using bit fields is dangerous on ppc64/sparc64, as the compiler [1]
uses 64bit instructions to manipulate them.
If the 64bit word includes any atomic_t or spinlock_t, we can lose
critical concurrent changes.

This is happening in af_unix, where unix_sk(sk)->gc_candidate/
gc_maybe_cycle/lock share the same 64bit word.

This leads to fatal deadlock, as one/several cpus spin forever
on a spinlock that will never be available again.

A safer way would be to use a long to store flags.
This way we are sure compiler/arch wont do bad things.

As we own unix_gc_lock spinlock when clearing or setting bits,
we can use the non atomic __set_bit()/__clear_bit().

recursion_level can share the same 64bit location with the spinlock,
as it is set only with this spinlock held.

[1] bug fixed in gcc-4.8.0 :
http://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=52080Reported-by: NAmbrose Feinstein <ambrose@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Now that uids and gids are completely encapsulated in kuid_t
and kgid_t we no longer need to pass struct cred which allowed
us to test both the uid and the user namespace for equality.

Passing struct cred potentially allows us to pass the entire group
list as BSD does but I don't believe the cost of cache line misses
justifies retaining code for a future potential application.
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The struct sock *other one seem to be unused. Grep and make do not object.
Signed-off-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

/proc/net/unix has quadratic behavior, and can hold unix_table_lock for
a while if high number of unix sockets are alive. (90 ms for 200k
sockets...)

We already have a hash table, so its quite easy to use it.

Problem is unbound sockets are still hashed in a single hash slot
(unix_socket_table[UNIX_HASH_TABLE])

This patch also spreads unbound sockets to 256 hash slots, to speedup
both /proc/net/unix and unix_diag.

Time to read /proc/net/unix with 200k unix sockets :
(time dd if=/proc/net/unix of=/dev/null bs=4k)

before : 520 secs
after : 2 secs
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Use of "unsigned int" is preferred to bare "unsigned" in net tree.
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Currently tcp diag reports rqlen and wqlen values similar to how
the CINQ/COUTQ iotcls do. To make unix diag report these values
in the same way move the respective code into helpers.
Signed-off-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

These header files are never installed to user consumption, so any
__KERNEL__ cpp checks are superfluous.

Projects should also not copy these files into their userland utility
sources and try to use them there.  If they insist on doing so, the
onus is on them to sanitize the headers as needed.
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Its easy to eat all kernel memory and trigger NMI watchdog, using an
exploit program that queues unix sockets on top of others.

lkml ref : http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/11/25/8

This mechanism is used in applications, one choice we have is to have a
recursion limit.

Other limits might be needed as well (if we queue other types of files),
since the passfd mechanism is currently limited by socket receive queue
sizes only.

Add a recursion_level to unix socket, allowing up to 4 levels.

Each time we send an unix socket through sendfd mechanism, we copy its
recursion level (plus one) to receiver. This recursion level is cleared
when socket receive queue is emptied.
Reported-by: NМарк Коренберг <socketpair@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

In unix_skb_parms store pointers to struct pid and struct cred instead
of raw uid, gid, and pid values, then translate the credentials on
reception into values that are meaningful in the receiving processes
namespaces.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

sk_callback_lock rwlock actually protects sk->sk_sleep pointer, so we
need two atomic operations (and associated dirtying) per incoming
packet.

RCU conversion is pretty much needed :

1) Add a new structure, called "struct socket_wq" to hold all fields
that will need rcu_read_lock() protection (currently: a
wait_queue_head_t and a struct fasync_struct pointer).

[Future patch will add a list anchor for wakeup coalescing]

2) Attach one of such structure to each "struct socket" created in
sock_alloc_inode().

3) Respect RCU grace period when freeing a "struct socket_wq"

4) Change sk_sleep pointer in "struct sock" by sk_wq, pointer to "struct
socket_wq"

5) Change sk_sleep() function to use new sk->sk_wq instead of
sk->sk_sleep

6) Change sk_has_sleeper() to wq_has_sleeper() that must be used inside
a rcu_read_lock() section.

7) Change all sk_has_sleeper() callers to :
  - Use rcu_read_lock() instead of read_lock(&sk->sk_callback_lock)
  - Use wq_has_sleeper() to eventually wakeup tasks.
  - Use rcu_read_unlock() instead of read_unlock(&sk->sk_callback_lock)

8) sock_wake_async() is modified to use rcu protection as well.

9) Exceptions :
  macvtap, drivers/net/tun.c, af_unix use integrated "struct socket_wq"
instead of dynamically allocated ones. They dont need rcu freeing.

Some cleanups or followups are probably needed, (possible
sk_callback_lock conversion to a spinlock for example...).
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This is an implementation of David Miller's suggested fix in:
  https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=470201

It has been updated to use wait_event() instead of
wait_event_interruptible().

Paraphrasing the description from the above report, it makes sendmsg()
block while UNIX garbage collection is in progress. This avoids a
situation where child processes continue to queue new FDs over a
AF_UNIX socket to a parent which is in the exit path and running
garbage collection on these FDs. This contention can result in soft
lockups and oom-killing of unrelated processes.
Signed-off-by: Ndann frazier <dannf@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Previously I assumed that the receive queues of candidates don't
change during the GC.  This is only half true, nothing can be received
from the queues (see comment in unix_gc()), but buffers could be added
through the other half of the socket pair, which may still have file
descriptors referring to it.

This can result in inc_inflight_move_tail() erronously increasing the
"inflight" counter for a unix socket for which dec_inflight() wasn't
previously called.  This in turn can trigger the "BUG_ON(total_refs <
inflight_refs)" in a later garbage collection run.

Fix this by only manipulating the "inflight" counter for sockets which
are candidates themselves.  Duplicating the file references in
unix_attach_fds() is also needed to prevent a socket becoming a
candidate for GC while the skb that contains it is not yet queued.
Reported-by: NAndrea Bittau <a.bittau@cs.ucl.ac.uk>
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

make it atomic_long_t; while we are at it, get rid of useless checks in affs,
hfs and hpfs - ->open() always has it equal to 1, ->release() - to 0.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NDenis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Add the struct net * argument to both of them to use in
the future. Also make the register one return an error code.

It is useless right now, but will make the future patches
much simpler.
Signed-off-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This counter is _always_ modified under the unix_gc_lock spinlock, 
so its atomicity can be provided w/o additional efforts.
Signed-off-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The following code can now become static:
- struct unix_socket_table
- unix_table_lock
Signed-off-by: NAdrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Throw out the old mark & sweep garbage collector and put in a
refcounting cycle detecting one.

The old one had a race with recvmsg, that resulted in false positives
and hence data loss.  The old algorithm operated on all unix sockets
in the system, so any additional locking would have meant performance
problems for all users of these.

The new algorithm instead only operates on "in flight" sockets, which
are very rare, and the additional locking for these doesn't negatively
impact the vast majority of users.

In fact it's probable, that there weren't *any* heavy senders of
sockets over sockets, otherwise the above race would have been
discovered long ago.

The patch works OK with the app that exposed the race with the old
code.  The garbage collection has also been verified to work in a few
simple cases.
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The unix_state_*() locking macros imply that there is some
rwlock kind of thing going on, but the implementation is
actually a spinlock which makes the code more confusing than
it needs to be.

So use plain unix_state_lock and unix_state_unlock.
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

From: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>

This patch implements a cleaner fix for the memory leak problem of the
original unix datagram getpeersec patch.  Instead of creating a
security context each time a unix datagram is sent, we only create the
security context when the receiver requests it.

This new design requires modification of the current
unix_getsecpeer_dgram LSM hook and addition of two new hooks, namely,
secid_to_secctx and release_secctx.  The former retrieves the security
context and the latter releases it.  A hook is required for releasing
the security context because it is up to the security module to decide
how that's done.  In the case of Selinux, it's a simple kfree
operation.
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Teach special (recursive) locking code to the lock validator.  Also splits
af_unix's sk_receive_queue.lock class from the other networking skb-queue
locks.  Has no effect on non-lockdep kernels.
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: NArjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

This patch implements an API whereby an application can determine the
label of its peer's Unix datagram sockets via the auxiliary data mechanism of
recvmsg.

Patch purpose:

This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the
security context of the peer of a Unix datagram socket.  The application
can then use this security context to determine the security context for
processing on behalf of the peer who sent the packet.

Patch design and implementation:

The design and implementation is very similar to the UDP case for INET
sockets.  Basically we build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for
retrieving user credentials.  Linux offers the API for obtaining user
credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages
that are bundled together with a normal message).  To retrieve the security
context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by
setting the SO_PASSSEC option via getsockopt.  Then the application
retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism.

An example server application for Unix datagram socket should look like this:

toggle = 1;
toggle_len = sizeof(toggle);

setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len);
recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0);
if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) {
    cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr);
    if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) &&
        cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET &&
        cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) {
        memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext));
    }
}

sock_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option SOCK_PASSSEC to allow
a server socket to receive security context of the peer.

Testing:

We have tested the patch by setting up Unix datagram client and server
applications.  We verified that the server can retrieve the security context
using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.
Signed-off-by: NCatherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NAcked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>

Semaphore to mutex conversion.

The conversion was generated via scripts, and the result was validated
automatically via a script as well.
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

From: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>

In af_unix, a rwlock is used to protect internal state.  At least on my 
P4 with HT it is faster to use a spinlock due to the simpler memory 
barrier used to unlock.  This patch raises bw_unix to ~690K/s.
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This lock is actually taken mostly as a writer,
so using a rwlock actually just makes performance
worse especially on chips like the Intel P4.
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Of this type, mostly:

CHECK   net/ipv6/netfilter.c
net/ipv6/netfilter.c:96:12: warning: symbol 'ipv6_netfilter_init' was not declared. Should it be static?
net/ipv6/netfilter.c:101:6: warning: symbol 'ipv6_netfilter_fini' was not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.

Let it rip!