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  1. 17 4月, 2018 1 次提交
  3. 10 4月, 2018 1 次提交
    • L
      x86/apic: Fix signedness bug in APIC ID validity checks · a774635d
      由 Li RongQing 提交于 
      The APIC ID as parsed from ACPI MADT is validity checked with the
apic->apic_id_valid() callback, which depends on the selected APIC type.

For non X2APIC types APIC IDs >= 0xFF are invalid, but values > 0x7FFFFFFF
are detected as valid. This happens because the 'apicid' argument of the
apic_id_valid() callback is type 'int'. So the resulting comparison

   apicid < 0xFF

evaluates to true for all unsigned int values > 0x7FFFFFFF which are handed
to default_apic_id_valid(). As a consequence, invalid APIC IDs in !X2APIC
mode are considered valid and accounted as possible CPUs.

Change the apicid argument type of the apic_id_valid() callback to u32 so
the evaluation is unsigned and returns the correct result.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]
Signed-off-by: NLi RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: jgross@suse.com
Cc: Dou Liyang <douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1523322966-10296-1-git-send-email-lirongqing@baidu.com
      a774635d
  5. 12 3月, 2018 2 次提交
  7. 07 2月, 2018 1 次提交
  9. 05 1月, 2018 1 次提交
  11. 28 12月, 2017 4 次提交
  13. 27 11月, 2017 1 次提交
    • R
      ACPI / PM: Make it possible to ignore the system sleep blacklist · 57044031
      由 Rafael J. Wysocki 提交于 
      The ACPI code supporting system transitions to sleep states uses
an internal blacklist to apply special handling to some machines
reported to behave incorrectly in some ways.

However, some entries of that blacklist cover problematic as well as
non-problematic systems, so give the users of the latter a chance to
ignore the blacklist and run their systems in the default way by
adding acpi_sleep=nobl to the kernel command line.

For example, that allows the users of Dell XPS13 9360 systems not
affected by the issue that caused the blacklist entry for this
machine to be added by commit 71630b7a (ACPI / PM: Blacklist Low
Power S0 Idle _DSM for Dell XPS13 9360) to use suspend-to-idle with
the Low Power S0 Idle _DSM interface which in principle should be
more energy-efficient than S3 on them.
Signed-off-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
      57044031
  15. 17 11月, 2017 2 次提交
  17. 10 11月, 2017 1 次提交
  19. 07 11月, 2017 1 次提交
  21. 02 11月, 2017 1 次提交
    • G
      License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license · b2441318
      由 Greg Kroah-Hartman 提交于 
      Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.

How this work was done:

Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
 - file had no licensing information it it.
 - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
 - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
 - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
 - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
   lines of source
 - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
   lines).

All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.

 - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
   considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
   COPYING file license applied.

   For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0                                              11139

   and resulted in the first patch in this series.

   If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
   Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930

   and resulted in the second patch in this series.

 - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
   of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
   any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
   it (per prior point).  Results summary:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
   GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
   LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
   GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
   ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
   LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
   LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1

   and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

 - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
   the concluded license(s).

 - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
   license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
   licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

 - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
   resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
   which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

 - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
   confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

 - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
   the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
   in time.

In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.

Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.

In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.

Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
 - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
   license ids and scores
 - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
   files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
 - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
   was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
   SPDX license was correct

This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.

These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: NKate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: NPhilippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      b2441318
  23. 14 9月, 2017 1 次提交
  25. 25 7月, 2017 3 次提交
  27. 20 7月, 2017 1 次提交
    • S
      x86/acpi: Prevent out of bound access caused by broken ACPI tables · dad5ab0d
      由 Seunghun Han 提交于 
      The bus_irq argument of mp_override_legacy_irq() is used as the index into
the isa_irq_to_gsi[] array. The bus_irq argument originates from
ACPI_MADT_TYPE_IO_APIC and ACPI_MADT_TYPE_INTERRUPT items in the ACPI
tables, but is nowhere sanity checked.

That allows broken or malicious ACPI tables to overwrite memory, which
might cause malfunction, panic or arbitrary code execution.

Add a sanity check and emit a warning when that triggers.

[ tglx: Added warning and rewrote changelog ]
Signed-off-by: NSeunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      dad5ab0d
  29. 18 7月, 2017 1 次提交
    • T
      x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap() for RAM mappings · f7750a79
      由 Tom Lendacky 提交于 
      The ioremap() function is intended for mapping MMIO. For RAM, the
memremap() function should be used. Convert calls from ioremap() to
memremap() when re-mapping RAM.

This will be used later by SME to control how the encryption mask is
applied to memory mappings, with certain memory locations being mapped
decrypted vs encrypted.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b13fccb9abbd547a7eef7b1fdfc223431b211c88.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      f7750a79
  31. 30 6月, 2017 1 次提交
  33. 27 6月, 2017 1 次提交
    • Y
      x86/ACPI/cstate: Allow ACPI C1 FFH MWAIT use on AMD systems · 5209654a
      由 Yazen Ghannam 提交于 
      AMD systems support the Monitor/Mwait instructions and these can be used
for ACPI C1 in the same way as on Intel systems.

Three things are needed:
 1) This patch.
 2) BIOS that declares a C1 state in _CST to use FFH, with correct values.
 3) CPUID_Fn00000005_EDX is non-zero on the system.

The BIOS on AMD systems have historically not defined a C1 state in _CST,
so the acpi_idle driver uses HALT for ACPI C1.

Currently released systems have CPUID_Fn00000005_EDX as reserved/RAZ. If a
BIOS is released for these systems that requests a C1 state with FFH, the
FFH implementation in Linux will fail since CPUID_Fn00000005_EDX is 0. The
acpi_idle driver will then fallback to using HALT for ACPI C1.

Future systems are expected to have non-zero CPUID_Fn00000005_EDX and BIOS
support for using FFH for ACPI C1.

Allow ffh_cstate_init() to succeed on AMD systems.

Tested on Fam15h and Fam17h systems.
Signed-off-by: NYazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Acked-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
      5209654a
  35. 05 4月, 2017 1 次提交
  37. 16 3月, 2017 1 次提交
    • T
      x86: Remap GDT tables in the fixmap section · 69218e47
      由 Thomas Garnier 提交于 
      Each processor holds a GDT in its per-cpu structure. The sgdt
instruction gives the base address of the current GDT. This address can
be used to bypass KASLR memory randomization. With another bug, an
attacker could target other per-cpu structures or deduce the base of
the main memory section (PAGE_OFFSET).

This patch relocates the GDT table for each processor inside the
fixmap section. The space is reserved based on number of supported
processors.

For consistency, the remapping is done by default on 32 and 64-bit.

Each processor switches to its remapped GDT at the end of
initialization. For hibernation, the main processor returns with the
original GDT and switches back to the remapping at completion.

This patch was tested on both architectures. Hibernation and KVM were
both tested specially for their usage of the GDT.

Thanks to Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> for testing and
recommending changes for Xen support.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com>
Cc: Luis R . Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rafael J . Wysocki <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: lguest@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: zijun_hu <zijun_hu@htc.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170314170508.100882-2-thgarnie@google.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      69218e47
  39. 11 3月, 2017 2 次提交
  41. 07 2月, 2017 1 次提交
  43. 01 2月, 2017 1 次提交
  45. 29 1月, 2017 1 次提交
    • I
      x86/boot/e820: Prefix the E820_* type names with "E820_TYPE_" · 09821ff1
      由 Ingo Molnar 提交于 
      So there's a number of constants that start with "E820" but which
are not types - these create a confusing mixture when seen together
with 'enum e820_type' values:

	E820MAP
	E820NR
	E820_X_MAX
	E820MAX

To better differentiate the 'enum e820_type' values prefix them
with E820_TYPE_.

No change in functionality.

Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huang, Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      09821ff1
  47. 28 1月, 2017 3 次提交
    • I
      x86/boot/e820: Create coherent API function names for E820 range operations · ab6bc04c
      由 Ingo Molnar 提交于 
      We have these three related functions:

 extern void e820_add_region(u64 start, u64 size, int type);
 extern u64  e820_update_range(u64 start, u64 size, unsigned old_type, unsigned new_type);
 extern u64  e820_remove_range(u64 start, u64 size, unsigned old_type, int checktype);

But it's not clear from the naming that they are 3 operations based around the
same 'memory range' concept. Rename them to better signal this, and move
the prototypes next to each other:

 extern void e820__range_add   (u64 start, u64 size, int type);
 extern u64  e820__range_update(u64 start, u64 size, unsigned old_type, unsigned new_type);
 extern u64  e820__range_remove(u64 start, u64 size, unsigned old_type, int checktype);

Note that this improved organization of the functions shows another problem that was easy
to miss before: sometimes the E820 entry type is 'int', sometimes 'unsigned int' - but this
will be fixed in a separate patch.

No change in functionality.

Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huang, Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      ab6bc04c
    • I
      x86/boot/e820: Rename update_e820() to e820__update_table() · 6464d294
      由 Ingo Molnar 提交于 
      update_e820() should have 'e820' as a prefix as most of the other E820
functions have - but it's also a bit unclear about its purpose, as
it's unclear what is updated - the whole table, or an entry?

Also, the name does not express that it's a trivial wrapper
around sanitize_e820_table() that also prints out the resulting
table.

So rename it to e820__update_table_print(). This also makes it
harmonize with the e820__update_table_firmware() function which
has a very similar purpose.

No change in functionality.

Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huang, Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      6464d294
    • I
      x86/boot/e820: Remove spurious asm/e820/api.h inclusions · 5520b7e7
      由 Ingo Molnar 提交于 
      A commonly used lowlevel x86 header, asm/pgtable.h, includes asm/e820/api.h
spuriously, without making direct use of it.

Removing it is not simple: over the years various .c code learned to rely
on this indirect inclusion.

Remove the unnecessary include - this should speed up the kernel build a bit,
as a large header is not included anymore in totally unrelated code.

Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huang, Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      5520b7e7
  49. 27 1月, 2017 1 次提交
  51. 19 12月, 2016 1 次提交
  53. 15 12月, 2016 1 次提交
  55. 06 12月, 2016 1 次提交
    • J
      x86/suspend: fix false positive KASAN warning on suspend/resume · b53f40db
      由 Josh Poimboeuf 提交于 
      Resuming from a suspend operation is showing a KASAN false positive
warning:

  BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in unwind_get_return_address+0x11d/0x130 at addr ffff8803867d7878
  Read of size 8 by task pm-suspend/7774
  page:ffffea000e19f5c0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:          (null) index:0x0
  flags: 0x2ffff0000000000()
  page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
  CPU: 0 PID: 7774 Comm: pm-suspend Tainted: G    B           4.9.0-rc7+ #8
  Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. Z170X-UD5/Z170X-UD5-CF, BIOS F5 03/07/2016
  Call Trace:
    dump_stack+0x63/0x82
    kasan_report_error+0x4b4/0x4e0
    ? acpi_hw_read_port+0xd0/0x1ea
    ? kfree_const+0x22/0x30
    ? acpi_hw_validate_io_request+0x1a6/0x1a6
    __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x61/0x70
    ? unwind_get_return_address+0x11d/0x130
    unwind_get_return_address+0x11d/0x130
    ? unwind_next_frame+0x97/0xf0
    __save_stack_trace+0x92/0x100
    save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20
    save_stack+0x46/0xd0
    ? save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20
    ? save_stack+0x46/0xd0
    ? kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
    ? kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
    ? acpi_hw_read+0x2b6/0x3aa
    ? acpi_hw_validate_register+0x20b/0x20b
    ? acpi_hw_write_port+0x72/0xc7
    ? acpi_hw_write+0x11f/0x15f
    ? acpi_hw_read_multiple+0x19f/0x19f
    ? memcpy+0x45/0x50
    ? acpi_hw_write_port+0x72/0xc7
    ? acpi_hw_write+0x11f/0x15f
    ? acpi_hw_read_multiple+0x19f/0x19f
    ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
    kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
    kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
    kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xbc/0x1e0
    ? acpi_get_sleep_type_data+0x9a/0x578
    acpi_get_sleep_type_data+0x9a/0x578
    acpi_hw_legacy_wake_prep+0x88/0x22c
    ? acpi_hw_legacy_sleep+0x3c7/0x3c7
    ? acpi_write_bit_register+0x28d/0x2d3
    ? acpi_read_bit_register+0x19b/0x19b
    acpi_hw_sleep_dispatch+0xb5/0xba
    acpi_leave_sleep_state_prep+0x17/0x19
    acpi_suspend_enter+0x154/0x1e0
    ? trace_suspend_resume+0xe8/0xe8
    suspend_devices_and_enter+0xb09/0xdb0
    ? printk+0xa8/0xd8
    ? arch_suspend_enable_irqs+0x20/0x20
    ? try_to_freeze_tasks+0x295/0x600
    pm_suspend+0x6c9/0x780
    ? finish_wait+0x1f0/0x1f0
    ? suspend_devices_and_enter+0xdb0/0xdb0
    state_store+0xa2/0x120
    ? kobj_attr_show+0x60/0x60
    kobj_attr_store+0x36/0x70
    sysfs_kf_write+0x131/0x200
    kernfs_fop_write+0x295/0x3f0
    __vfs_write+0xef/0x760
    ? handle_mm_fault+0x1346/0x35e0
    ? do_iter_readv_writev+0x660/0x660
    ? __pmd_alloc+0x310/0x310
    ? do_lock_file_wait+0x1e0/0x1e0
    ? apparmor_file_permission+0x18/0x20
    ? security_file_permission+0x73/0x1c0
    ? rw_verify_area+0xbd/0x2b0
    vfs_write+0x149/0x4a0
    SyS_write+0xd9/0x1c0
    ? SyS_read+0x1c0/0x1c0
    entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0xad
  Memory state around the buggy address:
   ffff8803867d7700: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
   ffff8803867d7780: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  >ffff8803867d7800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f4
                                                                  ^
   ffff8803867d7880: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
   ffff8803867d7900: 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 04 f4 f4 f4 f3 f3 f3 f3 00

KASAN instrumentation poisons the stack when entering a function and
unpoisons it when exiting the function.  However, in the suspend path,
some functions never return, so their stack never gets unpoisoned,
resulting in stale KASAN shadow data which can cause later false
positive warnings like the one above.
Reported-by: NScott Bauer <scott.bauer@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Signed-off-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
      b53f40db
  57. 02 12月, 2016 1 次提交
  59. 24 10月, 2016 1 次提交