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  1. 12 8月, 2011 1 次提交
  3. 07 7月, 2011 1 次提交
  5. 22 6月, 2011 2 次提交
  7. 24 5月, 2011 1 次提交
    • D
      net: convert %p usage to %pK · 71338aa7
      由 Dan Rosenberg 提交于 
      The %pK format specifier is designed to hide exposed kernel pointers,
specifically via /proc interfaces.  Exposing these pointers provides an
easy target for kernel write vulnerabilities, since they reveal the
locations of writable structures containing easily triggerable function
pointers.  The behavior of %pK depends on the kptr_restrict sysctl.

If kptr_restrict is set to 0, no deviation from the standard %p behavior
occurs.  If kptr_restrict is set to 1, the default, if the current user
(intended to be a reader via seq_printf(), etc.) does not have CAP_SYSLOG
(currently in the LSM tree), kernel pointers using %pK are printed as 0's.
 If kptr_restrict is set to 2, kernel pointers using %pK are printed as
0's regardless of privileges.  Replacing with 0's was chosen over the
default "(null)", which cannot be parsed by userland %p, which expects
"(nil)".

The supporting code for kptr_restrict and %pK are currently in the -mm
tree.  This patch converts users of %p in net/ to %pK.  Cases of printing
pointers to the syslog are not covered, since this would eliminate useful
information for postmortem debugging and the reading of the syslog is
already optionally protected by the dmesg_restrict sysctl.
Signed-off-by: NDan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Graf <tgraf@infradead.org>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      71338aa7
  9. 11 5月, 2011 1 次提交
  11. 09 5月, 2011 3 次提交
  13. 29 4月, 2011 1 次提交
    • E
      inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt · f6d8bd05
      由 Eric Dumazet 提交于 
      We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options

Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.

Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.

Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).

Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.

We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      f6d8bd05
  15. 23 4月, 2011 1 次提交
  17. 31 3月, 2011 2 次提交
  19. 13 3月, 2011 5 次提交
  21. 04 3月, 2011 1 次提交
  23. 03 3月, 2011 1 次提交
  25. 02 3月, 2011 5 次提交
  27. 25 1月, 2011 1 次提交
  29. 17 12月, 2010 2 次提交
  31. 18 11月, 2010 1 次提交
  33. 17 11月, 2010 1 次提交
  35. 11 11月, 2010 1 次提交
  37. 26 10月, 2010 1 次提交
  39. 09 9月, 2010 1 次提交
    • E
      udp: add rehash on connect() · 719f8358
      由 Eric Dumazet 提交于 
      commit 30fff923 introduced in linux-2.6.33 (udp: bind() optimisation)
added a secondary hash on UDP, hashed on (local addr, local port).

Problem is that following sequence :

fd = socket(...)
connect(fd, &remote, ...)

not only selects remote end point (address and port), but also sets
local address, while UDP stack stored in secondary hash table the socket
while its local address was INADDR_ANY (or ipv6 equivalent)

Sequence is :
 - autobind() : choose a random local port, insert socket in hash tables
              [while local address is INADDR_ANY]
 - connect() : set remote address and port, change local address to IP
              given by a route lookup.

When an incoming UDP frame comes, if more than 10 sockets are found in
primary hash table, we switch to secondary table, and fail to find
socket because its local address changed.

One solution to this problem is to rehash datagram socket if needed.

We add a new rehash(struct socket *) method in "struct proto", and
implement this method for UDP v4 & v6, using a common helper.

This rehashing only takes care of secondary hash table, since primary
hash (based on local port only) is not changed.
Reported-by: NKrzysztof Piotr Oledzki <ole@ans.pl>
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Tested-by: NKrzysztof Piotr Oledzki <ole@ans.pl>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      719f8358
  41. 19 8月, 2010 1 次提交
  43. 11 6月, 2010 1 次提交
  45. 01 6月, 2010 1 次提交
  47. 29 5月, 2010 1 次提交
  49. 27 5月, 2010 1 次提交
    • E
      net: fix lock_sock_bh/unlock_sock_bh · 8a74ad60
      由 Eric Dumazet 提交于 
      This new sock lock primitive was introduced to speedup some user context
socket manipulation. But it is unsafe to protect two threads, one using
regular lock_sock/release_sock, one using lock_sock_bh/unlock_sock_bh

This patch changes lock_sock_bh to be careful against 'owned' state.
If owned is found to be set, we must take the slow path.
lock_sock_bh() now returns a boolean to say if the slow path was taken,
and this boolean is used at unlock_sock_bh time to call the appropriate
unlock function.

After this change, BH are either disabled or enabled during the
lock_sock_bh/unlock_sock_bh protected section. This might be misleading,
so we rename these functions to lock_sock_fast()/unlock_sock_fast().
Reported-by: NAnton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Tested-by: NAnton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      8a74ad60
  51. 25 5月, 2010 1 次提交
  53. 16 5月, 2010 1 次提交