- 02 11月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: NRichard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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- 17 5月, 2010 1 次提交
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由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
The ACPI dependency moved to the TPM, where it belongs. Although IMA per-se does not require access to the bios measurement log, verifying the IMA boot aggregate does, which requires ACPI. This patch prereq's 'TPM: ACPI/PNP dependency removal' http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/5/4/378. Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Reported-by: NJean-Christophe Dubois <jcd@tribudubois.net> Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Tested-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 07 5月, 2010 1 次提交
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由 James Morris 提交于
This reverts commit a674fa46. Previous revert was a prereq. Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 05 5月, 2010 1 次提交
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由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
The ACPI dependency moved to the TPM, where it belongs. Although IMA per-se does not require access to the bios measurement log, verifying the IMA boot aggregate does, which requires ACPI. This patch prereq's 'TPM: ACPI/PNP dependency removal' http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/5/4/378. Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Reported-by: NJean-Christophe Dubois <jcd@tribudubois.net> Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Tested-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 25 10月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
Based on discussions on LKML and LSM, where there are consecutive security_ and ima_ calls in the vfs layer, move the ima_ calls to the existing security_ hooks. Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 13 2月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Randy Dunlap 提交于
IMA_LSM_RULES requires AUDIT. This is automatic if SECURITY_SELINUX=y but not when SECURITY_SMACK=y (and SECURITY_SELINUX=n), so make the dependency explicit. This fixes the following build error: security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:111:error: implicit declaration of function 'security_audit_rule_match' security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:230:error: implicit declaration of function 'security_audit_rule_init' Signed-off-by: NRandy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 06 2月, 2009 2 次提交
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由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
Support for a user loadable policy through securityfs with support for LSM specific policy data. - free invalid rule in ima_parse_add_rule() Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
IMA provides hardware (TPM) based measurement and attestation for file measurements. As the Trusted Computing (TPM) model requires, IMA measures all files before they are accessed in any way (on the integrity_bprm_check, integrity_path_check and integrity_file_mmap hooks), and commits the measurements to the TPM. Once added to the TPM, measurements can not be removed. In addition, IMA maintains a list of these file measurements, which can be used to validate the aggregate value stored in the TPM. The TPM can sign these measurements, and thus the system can prove, to itself and to a third party, the system's integrity in a way that cannot be circumvented by malicious or compromised software. - alloc ima_template_entry before calling ima_store_template() - log ima_add_boot_aggregate() failure - removed unused IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN - replaced hard coded string length with #define name Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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