[ Upstream commit acd3e96d53a24d219f720ed4012b62723ae05da1 ]

Commit 86029d10 ("tls: zero the crypto information from tls_context
before freeing") added memzero_explicit() calls to clear the key material
before freeing struct tls_context, but it missed tls_device.c has its
own way of freeing this structure. Replace the missing free.

Fixes: 86029d10 ("tls: zero the crypto information from tls_context before freeing")
Signed-off-by: NJakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: NDirk van der Merwe <dirk.vandermerwe@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 8d650cdedaabb33e85e9b7c517c0c71fcecc1de9 ]

Neal reported incorrect use of ns_capable() from bpf hook.

bpf_setsockopt(...TCP_CONGESTION...)
  -> tcp_set_congestion_control()
   -> ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)
    -> ns_capable_common()
     -> current_cred()
      -> rcu_dereference_protected(current->cred, 1)

Accessing 'current' in bpf context makes no sense, since packets
are processed from softirq context.

As Neal stated : The capability check in tcp_set_congestion_control()
was written assuming a system call context, and then was reused from
a BPF call site.

The fix is to add a new parameter to tcp_set_congestion_control(),
so that the ns_capable() call is only performed under the right
context.

Fixes: 91b5b21c ("bpf: Add support for changing congestion control")
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Lawrence Brakmo <brakmo@fb.com>
Reported-by: NNeal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: NNeal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: NLawrence Brakmo <brakmo@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit b617158dc096709d8600c53b6052144d12b89fab ]

Some applications set tiny SO_SNDBUF values and expect
TCP to just work. Recent patches to address CVE-2019-11478
broke them in case of losses, since retransmits might
be prevented.

We should allow these flows to make progress.

This patch allows the first and last skb in retransmit queue
to be split even if memory limits are hit.

It also adds the some room due to the fact that tcp_sendmsg()
and tcp_sendpage() might overshoot sk_wmem_queued by about one full
TSO skb (64KB size). Note this allowance was already present
in stable backports for kernels < 4.15

Note for < 4.15 backports :
 tcp_rtx_queue_tail() will probably look like :

static inline struct sk_buff *tcp_rtx_queue_tail(const struct sock *sk)
{
	struct sk_buff *skb = tcp_send_head(sk);

	return skb ? tcp_write_queue_prev(sk, skb) : tcp_write_queue_tail(sk);
}

Fixes: f070ef2ac667 ("tcp: tcp_fragment() should apply sane memory limits")
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: NAndrew Prout <aprout@ll.mit.edu>
Tested-by: NAndrew Prout <aprout@ll.mit.edu>
Tested-by: NJonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
Tested-by: NMichal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Acked-by: NNeal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: NYuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Acked-by: NChristoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
Cc: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit b60a77386b1d4868f72f6353d35dabe5fbe981f2 ]

netfilter did not expect that skb_dst_force() can cause skb to lose its
dst entry.

I got a bug report with a skb->dst NULL dereference in netfilter
output path.  The backtrace contains nf_reinject(), so the dst might have
been cleared when skb got queued to userspace.

Other users were fixed via
if (skb_dst(skb)) {
	skb_dst_force(skb);
	if (!skb_dst(skb))
		goto handle_err;
}

But I think its preferable to make the 'dst might be cleared' part
of the function explicit.

In netfilter case, skb with a null dst is expected when queueing in
prerouting hook, so drop skb for the other hooks.

v2:
 v1 of this patch returned true in case skb had no dst entry.
 Eric said:
   Say if we have two skb_dst_force() calls for some reason
   on the same skb, only the first one will return false.

 This now returns false even when skb had no dst, as per Erics
 suggestion, so callers might need to check skb_dst() first before
 skb_dst_force().
Signed-off-by: NFlorian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 5db7c8b9f9fc2aeec671ae3ca6375752c162e0e7 ]

syzkaller reports for memory leak in start_sync_thread [1]

As Eric points out, kthread may start and stop before the
threadfn function is called, so there is no chance the
data (tinfo in our case) to be released in thread.

Fix this by releasing tinfo in the controlling code instead.

[1]
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8881206bf700 (size 32):
 comm "syz-executor761", pid 7268, jiffies 4294943441 (age 20.470s)
 hex dump (first 32 bytes):
   00 40 7c 09 81 88 ff ff 80 45 b8 21 81 88 ff ff  .@|......E.!....
   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
 backtrace:
   [<0000000057619e23>] kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:55 [inline]
   [<0000000057619e23>] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:439 [inline]
   [<0000000057619e23>] slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3326 [inline]
   [<0000000057619e23>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x13d/0x280 mm/slab.c:3553
   [<0000000086ce5479>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:547 [inline]
   [<0000000086ce5479>] start_sync_thread+0x5d2/0xe10 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sync.c:1862
   [<000000001a9229cc>] do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x4c5/0x780 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2402
   [<00000000ece457c8>] nf_sockopt net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:106 [inline]
   [<00000000ece457c8>] nf_setsockopt+0x4c/0x80 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:115
   [<00000000942f62d4>] ip_setsockopt net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1258 [inline]
   [<00000000942f62d4>] ip_setsockopt+0x9b/0xb0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1238
   [<00000000a56a8ffd>] udp_setsockopt+0x4e/0x90 net/ipv4/udp.c:2616
   [<00000000fa895401>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x38/0x50 net/core/sock.c:3130
   [<0000000095eef4cf>] __sys_setsockopt+0x98/0x120 net/socket.c:2078
   [<000000009747cf88>] __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2089 [inline]
   [<000000009747cf88>] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2086 [inline]
   [<000000009747cf88>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x26/0x30 net/socket.c:2086
   [<00000000ded8ba80>] do_syscall_64+0x76/0x1a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301
   [<00000000893b4ac8>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Reported-by: syzbot+7e2e50c8adfccd2e5041@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Suggested-by: NEric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Fixes: 998e7a76 ("ipvs: Use kthread_run() instead of doing a double-fork via kernel_thread()")
Signed-off-by: NJulian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Acked-by: NSimon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 6f6a8622057c92408930c31698394fae1557b188 ]

A similar fix to Patch "ip_tunnel: allow not to count pkts on tstats by
setting skb's dev to NULL" is also needed by ip6_tunnel.
Signed-off-by: NXin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 47d3d7fdb10a21c223036b58bd70ffdc24a472c4 ]

Since ip6frag_expire_frag_queue() now pulls the head skb
from frag queue, we should no longer use skb_get(), since
this leads to an skb leak.

Stefan Bader initially reported a problem in 4.4.stable [1] caused
by the skb_get(), so this patch should also fix this issue.

296583.091021] kernel BUG at /build/linux-6VmqmP/linux-4.4.0/net/core/skbuff.c:1207!
[296583.091734] Call Trace:
[296583.091749]  [<ffffffff81740e50>] __pskb_pull_tail+0x50/0x350
[296583.091764]  [<ffffffff8183939a>] _decode_session6+0x26a/0x400
[296583.091779]  [<ffffffff817ec719>] __xfrm_decode_session+0x39/0x50
[296583.091795]  [<ffffffff818239d0>] icmpv6_route_lookup+0xf0/0x1c0
[296583.091809]  [<ffffffff81824421>] icmp6_send+0x5e1/0x940
[296583.091823]  [<ffffffff81753238>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x18/0x60
[296583.091838]  [<ffffffff817532b2>] ? netif_receive_skb_internal+0x32/0xa0
[296583.091858]  [<ffffffffc0199f74>] ? ixgbe_clean_rx_irq+0x594/0xac0 [ixgbe]
[296583.091876]  [<ffffffffc04eb260>] ? nf_ct_net_exit+0x50/0x50 [nf_defrag_ipv6]
[296583.091893]  [<ffffffff8183d431>] icmpv6_send+0x21/0x30
[296583.091906]  [<ffffffff8182b500>] ip6_expire_frag_queue+0xe0/0x120
[296583.091921]  [<ffffffffc04eb27f>] nf_ct_frag6_expire+0x1f/0x30 [nf_defrag_ipv6]
[296583.091938]  [<ffffffff810f3b57>] call_timer_fn+0x37/0x140
[296583.091951]  [<ffffffffc04eb260>] ? nf_ct_net_exit+0x50/0x50 [nf_defrag_ipv6]
[296583.091968]  [<ffffffff810f5464>] run_timer_softirq+0x234/0x330
[296583.091982]  [<ffffffff8108a339>] __do_softirq+0x109/0x2b0

Fixes: d4289fcc9b16 ("net: IP6 defrag: use rbtrees for IPv6 defrag")
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: NStefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Cc: Peter Oskolkov <posk@google.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 728356dedeff8ef999cb436c71333ef4ac51a81c ]

To avoid use-after-free(s), use a refcount to keep track of the
usable references to any instantiated struct p9_req_t.

This commit adds p9_req_put(), p9_req_get() and p9_req_try_get() as
wrappers to kref_put(), kref_get() and kref_get_unless_zero().
These are used by the client and the transports to keep track of
valid requests' references.

p9_free_req() is added back and used as callback by kref_put().

Add SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU as it ensures that the memory freed by
kmem_cache_free() will not be reused for another type until the rcu
synchronisation period is over, so an address gotten under rcu read
lock is safe to inc_ref() without corrupting random memory while
the lock is held.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1535626341-20693-1-git-send-email-asmadeus@codewreck.orgCo-developed-by: NDominique Martinet <dominique.martinet@cea.fr>
Signed-off-by: NTomas Bortoli <tomasbortoli@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+467050c1ce275af2a5b8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: NDominique Martinet <dominique.martinet@cea.fr>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 91a76be37ff89795526c452a6799576b03bec501 ]

Having a specific cache for the fcall allocations helps speed up
end-to-end latency.

The caches will automatically be merged if there are multiple caches
of items with the same size so we do not need to try to share a cache
between different clients of the same size.

Since the msize is negotiated with the server, only allocate the cache
after that negotiation has happened - previous allocations or
allocations of different sizes (e.g. zero-copy fcall) are made with
kmalloc directly.

Some figures on two beefy VMs with Connect-IB (sriov) / trans=rdma,
with ior running 32 processes in parallel doing small 32 bytes IOs:
 - no alloc (4.18-rc7 request cache): 65.4k req/s
 - non-power of two alloc, no patch: 61.6k req/s
 - power of two alloc, no patch: 62.2k req/s
 - non-power of two alloc, with patch: 64.7k req/s
 - power of two alloc, with patch: 65.1k req/s

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1532943263-24378-2-git-send-email-asmadeus@codewreck.orgSigned-off-by: NDominique Martinet <dominique.martinet@cea.fr>
Acked-by: NJun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 523adb6cc10b48655c0abe556505240741425b49 ]

'msize' is often a power of two, or at least page-aligned, so avoiding
an overhead of two dozen bytes for each allocation will help the
allocator do its work and reduce memory fragmentation.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1533825236-22896-1-git-send-email-asmadeus@codewreck.orgSuggested-by: NMatthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NDominique Martinet <dominique.martinet@cea.fr>
Reviewed-by: NGreg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Acked-by: NJun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 996d5b4db4b191f2676cf8775565cab8a5e2753b ]

Replace the custom batch allocation with a slab.  Use an IDR to store
pointers to the active requests instead of an array.  We don't try to
handle P9_NOTAG specially; the IDR will happily shrink all the way back
once the TVERSION call has completed.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180711210225.19730-6-willy@infradead.orgSigned-off-by: NMatthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
Cc: Ron Minnich <rminnich@sandia.gov>
Cc: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net>
Signed-off-by: NDominique Martinet <dominique.martinet@cea.fr>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 33d915d9e8ce811d8958915ccd18d71a66c7c495 upstream.

As per the current design, in the case of sw crypto controlled devices,
it is the device which advertises the support for AP/VLAN iftype based
on it's ability to tranmsit packets encrypted in software
(In VLAN functionality, group traffic generated for a specific
VLAN group is always encrypted in software). Commit db3bdcb9
("mac80211: allow AP_VLAN operation on crypto controlled devices")
has introduced this change.

Since 4addr AP operation also uses AP/VLAN iftype, this conditional
way of advertising AP/VLAN support has broken 4addr AP mode operation on
crypto controlled devices which do not support VLAN functionality.

In the case of ath10k driver, not all firmwares have support for VLAN
functionality but all can support 4addr AP operation. Because AP/VLAN
support is not advertised for these devices, 4addr AP operations are
also blocked.

Fix this by allowing 4addr operation on devices which do not support
AP/VLAN iftype but can support 4addr AP operation (decision is based on
the wiphy flag WIPHY_FLAG_4ADDR_AP).

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: db3bdcb9 ("mac80211: allow AP_VLAN operation on crypto controlled devices")
Signed-off-by: NManikanta Pubbisetty <mpubbise@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit d5bb334a8e171b262e48f378bd2096c0ea458265 upstream.

The minimum encryption key size for LE connections is 56 bits and to
align LE with BR/EDR, enforce 56 bits of minimum encryption key size for
BR/EDR connections as well.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 5f3e2bf008c2221478101ee72f5cb4654b9fc363 upstream.

Some TCP peers announce a very small MSS option in their SYN and/or
SYN/ACK messages.

This forces the stack to send packets with a very high network/cpu
overhead.

Linux has enforced a minimal value of 48. Since this value includes
the size of TCP options, and that the options can consume up to 40
bytes, this means that each segment can include only 8 bytes of payload.

In some cases, it can be useful to increase the minimal value
to a saner value.

We still let the default to 48 (TCP_MIN_SND_MSS), for compatibility
reasons.

Note that TCP_MAXSEG socket option enforces a minimal value
of (TCP_MIN_MSS). David Miller increased this minimal value
in commit c39508d6 ("tcp: Make TCP_MAXSEG minimum more correct.")
from 64 to 88.

We might in the future merge TCP_MIN_SND_MSS and TCP_MIN_MSS.

CVE-2019-11479 -- tcp mss hardcoded to 48
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: NJonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com>
Acked-by: NNeal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com>
Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 3b4929f65b0d8249f19a50245cd88ed1a2f78cff upstream.

Jonathan Looney reported that TCP can trigger the following crash
in tcp_shifted_skb() :

	BUG_ON(tcp_skb_pcount(skb) < pcount);

This can happen if the remote peer has advertized the smallest
MSS that linux TCP accepts : 48

An skb can hold 17 fragments, and each fragment can hold 32KB
on x86, or 64KB on PowerPC.

This means that the 16bit witdh of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_gso_segs
can overflow.

Note that tcp_sendmsg() builds skbs with less than 64KB
of payload, so this problem needs SACK to be enabled.
SACK blocks allow TCP to coalesce multiple skbs in the retransmit
queue, thus filling the 17 fragments to maximal capacity.

CVE-2019-11477 -- u16 overflow of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_gso_segs

Fixes: 832d11c5 ("tcp: Try to restore large SKBs while SACK processing")
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: NJonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com>
Acked-by: NNeal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com>
Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

This reverts commit 38f092c4 which is
commit d5bb334a8e171b262e48f378bd2096c0ea458265 upstream.

Lots of people have reported issues with this patch, and as there does
not seem to be a fix going into Linus's kernel tree any time soon,
revert the commit in the stable trees so as to get people's machines
working properly again.
Reported-by: NVasily Khoruzhick <anarsoul@gmail.com>
Reported-by: NHans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Cc: Jeremy Cline <jeremy@jcline.org>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 9b3040a6aafd7898ece7fc7efcbca71e42aa8069 upstream.

Define __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref to return NULL when CONFIG_INET is disabled.

Fixes: 4b2a2bfeb3f0 ("neighbor: Call __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref in neigh_xmit")
Reported-by: Nkbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Nobuhiro Iwamatsu <nobuhiro1.iwamatsu@toshiba.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit e52972c11d6b1262964db96d65934196db621685 ]

Commit 38030d7cb779 ("net/tls: avoid NULL-deref on resync during device removal")
tried to fix a potential NULL-dereference by taking the
context rwsem.  Unfortunately the RX resync may get called
from soft IRQ, so we can't use the rwsem to protect from
the device disappearing.  Because we are guaranteed there
can be only one resync at a time (it's called from strparser)
use a bit to indicate resync is busy and make device
removal wait for the bit to get cleared.

Note that there is a leftover "flags" field in struct
tls_context already.

Fixes: 4799ac81 ("tls: Add rx inline crypto offload")
Signed-off-by: NJakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit b7999b07726c16974ba9ca3bb9fe98ecbec5f81c ]

In Jianlin's testing, netperf was broken with 'Connection reset by peer',
as the cookie check failed in rt6_check() and ip6_dst_check() always
returned NULL.

It's caused by Commit 93531c67 ("net/ipv6: separate handling of FIB
entries from dst based routes"), where the cookie can be got only when
'c1'(see below) for setting dst_cookie whereas rt6_check() is called
when !'c1' for checking dst_cookie, as we can see in ip6_dst_check().

Since in ip6_dst_check() both rt6_dst_from_check() (c1) and rt6_check()
(!c1) will check the 'from' cookie, this patch is to remove the c1 check
in rt6_get_cookie(), so that the dst_cookie can always be set properly.

c1:
  (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_PCPU || unlikely(!list_empty(&rt->rt6i_uncached)))

Fixes: 93531c67 ("net/ipv6: separate handling of FIB entries from dst based routes")
Reported-by: NJianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NXin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit df453700e8d81b1bdafdf684365ee2b9431fb702 ]

According to Amit Klein and Benny Pinkas, IP ID generation is too weak
and might be used by attackers.

Even with recent net_hash_mix() fix (netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix())
having 64bit key and Jenkins hash is risky.

It is time to switch to siphash and its 128bit keys.
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: NAmit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: NBenny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit f80c5dad7b6467b884c445ffea45985793b4b2d0 ]

This commit makes the kernel not send the next queued HCI command until
a command complete arrives for the last HCI command sent to the
controller. This change avoids a problem with some buggy controllers
(seen on two SKUs of QCA9377) that send an extra command complete event
for the previous command after the kernel had already sent a new HCI
command to the controller.

The problem was reproduced when starting an active scanning procedure,
where an extra command complete event arrives for the LE_SET_RANDOM_ADDR
command. When this happends the kernel ends up not processing the
command complete for the following commmand, LE_SET_SCAN_PARAM, and
ultimately behaving as if a passive scanning procedure was being
performed, when in fact controller is performing an active scanning
procedure. This makes it impossible to discover BLE devices as no device
found events are sent to userspace.

This problem is reproducible on 100% of the attempts on the affected
controllers. The extra command complete event can be seen at timestamp
27.420131 on the btmon logs bellow.

Bluetooth monitor ver 5.50
= Note: Linux version 5.0.0+ (x86_64)                                  0.352340
= Note: Bluetooth subsystem version 2.22                               0.352343
= New Index: 80:C5:F2:8F:87:84 (Primary,USB,hci0)               [hci0] 0.352344
= Open Index: 80:C5:F2:8F:87:84                                 [hci0] 0.352345
= Index Info: 80:C5:F2:8F:87:84 (Qualcomm)                      [hci0] 0.352346
@ MGMT Open: bluetoothd (privileged) version 1.14             {0x0001} 0.352347
@ MGMT Open: btmon (privileged) version 1.14                  {0x0002} 0.352366
@ MGMT Open: btmgmt (privileged) version 1.14                {0x0003} 27.302164
@ MGMT Command: Start Discovery (0x0023) plen 1       {0x0003} [hci0] 27.302310
        Address type: 0x06
          LE Public
          LE Random
< HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6   #1 [hci0] 27.302496
        Address: 15:60:F2:91:B2:24 (Non-Resolvable)
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4                 #2 [hci0] 27.419117
      LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
< HCI Command: LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) plen 7  #3 [hci0] 27.419244
        Type: Active (0x01)
        Interval: 11.250 msec (0x0012)
        Window: 11.250 msec (0x0012)
        Own address type: Random (0x01)
        Filter policy: Accept all advertisement (0x00)
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4                 #4 [hci0] 27.420131
      LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
< HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2      #5 [hci0] 27.420259
        Scanning: Enabled (0x01)
        Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01)
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4                 #6 [hci0] 27.420969
      LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) ncmd 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4                 #7 [hci0] 27.421983
      LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
@ MGMT Event: Command Complete (0x0001) plen 4        {0x0003} [hci0] 27.422059
      Start Discovery (0x0023) plen 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
        Address type: 0x06
          LE Public
          LE Random
@ MGMT Event: Discovering (0x0013) plen 2             {0x0003} [hci0] 27.422067
        Address type: 0x06
          LE Public
          LE Random
        Discovery: Enabled (0x01)
@ MGMT Event: Discovering (0x0013) plen 2             {0x0002} [hci0] 27.422067
        Address type: 0x06
          LE Public
          LE Random
        Discovery: Enabled (0x01)
@ MGMT Event: Discovering (0x0013) plen 2             {0x0001} [hci0] 27.422067
        Address type: 0x06
          LE Public
          LE Random
        Discovery: Enabled (0x01)
Signed-off-by: NJoão Paulo Rechi Vita <jprvita@endlessm.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 025c65e119bf58b610549ca359c9ecc5dee6a8d2 ]

If an xfrmi is associated to a vrf layer 3 master device,
xfrm_policy_check() fails after traffic decapsulation. The input
interface is replaced by the layer 3 master device, and hence
xfrmi_decode_session() can't match the xfrmi anymore to satisfy
policy checking.

Extend ingress xfrmi lookup to honor the original layer 3 slave
device, allowing xfrm interfaces to operate within a vrf domain.

Fixes: f203b76d ("xfrm: Add virtual xfrm interfaces")
Signed-off-by: NMartin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit dbb2483b2a46fbaf833cfb5deb5ed9cace9c7399 ]

In commit 6a53b759 ("xfrm: check id proto in validate_tmpl()")
I introduced a check for xfrm protocol, but according to Herbert
IPSEC_PROTO_ANY should only be used as a wildcard for lookup, so
it should be removed from validate_tmpl().

And, IPSEC_PROTO_ANY is expected to only match 3 IPSec-specific
protocols, this is why xfrm_state_flush() could still miss
IPPROTO_ROUTING, which leads that those entries are left in
net->xfrm.state_all before exit net. Fix this by replacing
IPSEC_PROTO_ANY with zero.

This patch also extracts the check from validate_tmpl() to
xfrm_id_proto_valid() and uses it in parse_ipsecrequest().
With this, no other protocols should be added into xfrm.

Fixes: 6a53b759 ("xfrm: check id proto in validate_tmpl()")
Reported-by: syzbot+0bf0519d6e0de15914fe@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NCong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 61fb0d01680771f72cc9d39783fb2c122aaad51e ]

At ipv6 route dismantle, fib6_drop_pcpu_from() is responsible
for finding all percpu routes and set their ->from pointer
to NULL, so that fib6_ref can reach its expected value (1).

The problem right now is that other cpus can still catch the
route being deleted, since there is no rcu grace period
between the route deletion and call to fib6_drop_pcpu_from()

This can leak the fib6 and associated resources, since no
notifier will take care of removing the last reference(s).

I decided to add another boolean (fib6_destroying) instead
of reusing/renaming exception_bucket_flushed to ease stable backports,
and properly document the memory barriers used to implement this fix.

This patch has been co-developped with Wei Wang.

Fixes: 93531c67 ("net/ipv6: separate handling of FIB entries from dst based routes")
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Martin Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Acked-by: NWei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Acked-by: NMartin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 6491d698396fd5da4941980a35ca7c162a672016 ]

This is similar to commit e285d5bf ("NFC: Fix the number of pipes")
where we changed NFC_HCI_MAX_PIPES from 127 to 128.

As the comment next to the define explains, the pipe identifier is 7
bits long.  The highest possible pipe is 127, but the number of possible
pipes is 128.  As the code is now, then there is potential for an
out of bounds array access:

    net/nfc/nci/hci.c:297 nci_hci_cmd_received() warn: array off by one?
    'ndev->hci_dev->pipes[pipe]' '0-127 == 127'

Fixes: 11f54f22 ("NFC: nci: Add HCI over NCI protocol support")
Signed-off-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>

[ Upstream commit 3c79107631db1f7fd32cf3f7368e4672004a3010 ]

else, we leak the addresses to userspace via ctnetlink events
and dumps.

Compute an ID on demand based on the immutable parts of nf_conn struct.

Another advantage compared to using an address is that there is no
immediate re-use of the same ID in case the conntrack entry is freed and
reallocated again immediately.

Fixes: 35832402 ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack_expect: kill unique ID")
Fixes: 7f85f914 ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack: kill unique ID")
Signed-off-by: NFlorian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit d5bb334a8e171b262e48f378bd2096c0ea458265 upstream.

The minimum encryption key size for LE connections is 56 bits and to
align LE with BR/EDR, enforce 56 bits of minimum encryption key size for
BR/EDR connections as well.
Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: NJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit fbd019737d71e405f86549fd738f81e2ff3dd073 ]

Ying triggered a call trace when doing an asconf testing:

  BUG: scheduling while atomic: swapper/12/0/0x10000100
  Call Trace:
   <IRQ>  [<ffffffffa4375904>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
   [<ffffffffa436fcaf>] __schedule_bug+0x64/0x72
   [<ffffffffa437b93a>] __schedule+0x9ba/0xa00
   [<ffffffffa3cd5326>] __cond_resched+0x26/0x30
   [<ffffffffa437bc4a>] _cond_resched+0x3a/0x50
   [<ffffffffa3e22be8>] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x38/0x200
   [<ffffffffa423512d>] __alloc_skb+0x5d/0x2d0
   [<ffffffffc0995320>] sctp_packet_transmit+0x610/0xa20 [sctp]
   [<ffffffffc098510e>] sctp_outq_flush+0x2ce/0xc00 [sctp]
   [<ffffffffc098646c>] sctp_outq_uncork+0x1c/0x20 [sctp]
   [<ffffffffc0977338>] sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.22+0xc8/0x1460 [sctp]
   [<ffffffffc0976ad1>] sctp_do_sm+0xe1/0x350 [sctp]
   [<ffffffffc099443d>] sctp_primitive_ASCONF+0x3d/0x50 [sctp]
   [<ffffffffc0977384>] sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.22+0x114/0x1460 [sctp]
   [<ffffffffc0976ad1>] sctp_do_sm+0xe1/0x350 [sctp]
   [<ffffffffc097b3a4>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xf4/0x1b0 [sctp]
   [<ffffffffc09840f1>] sctp_inq_push+0x51/0x70 [sctp]
   [<ffffffffc099732b>] sctp_rcv+0xa8b/0xbd0 [sctp]

As it shows, the first sctp_do_sm() running under atomic context (NET_RX
softirq) invoked sctp_primitive_ASCONF() that uses GFP_KERNEL flag later,
and this flag is supposed to be used in non-atomic context only. Besides,
sctp_do_sm() was called recursively, which is not expected.

Vlad tried to fix this recursive call in Commit c0786693 ("sctp: Fix
oops when sending queued ASCONF chunks") by introducing a new command
SCTP_CMD_SEND_NEXT_ASCONF. But it didn't work as this command is still
used in the first sctp_do_sm() call, and sctp_primitive_ASCONF() will
be called in this command again.

To avoid calling sctp_do_sm() recursively, we send the next queued ASCONF
not by sctp_primitive_ASCONF(), but by sctp_sf_do_prm_asconf() in the 1st
sctp_do_sm() directly.
Reported-by: NYing Xu <yinxu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NXin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: NMarcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit fe384e2fa36ca084a456fd30558cccc75b4b3fbd ]

callers of tcf_gact_goto_chain_index() can potentially read an old value
of the chain index, or even dereference a NULL 'goto_chain' pointer,
because 'goto_chain' and 'tcfa_action' are read in the traffic path
without caring of concurrent write in the control path. The most recent
value of chain index can be read also from a->tcfa_action (it's encoded
there together with TC_ACT_GOTO_CHAIN bits), so we don't really need to
dereference 'goto_chain': just read the chain id from the control action.

Fixes: e457d86a ("net: sched: add couple of goto_chain helpers")
Signed-off-by: NDavide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin (Microsoft) <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 044175a06706d516aa42874bb44dbbfc3c4d20eb ]

When the umem is cleaned up, the task that created it might already be
gone. If the task was gone, the xdp_umem_release function did not free
the pages member of struct xdp_umem.

It turned out that the task lookup was not needed at all; The code was
a left-over when we moved from task accounting to user accounting [1].

This patch fixes the memory leak by removing the task lookup logic
completely.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20180131135356.19134-3-bjorn.topel@gmail.com/

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/c1cb2ca8-6a14-3980-8672-f3de0bb38dfd@suse.cz/
Fixes: c0c77d8f ("xsk: add user memory registration support sockopt")
Reported-by: NJiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NBjörn Töpel <bjorn.topel@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin (Microsoft) <sashal@kernel.org>

commit d3706566ae3d92677b932dd156157fd6c72534b1 upstream.

Syzkaller report this:

BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffffbfff830524b
PGD 237fe8067 P4D 237fe8067 PUD 237e64067 PMD 1c9716067 PTE 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 4465 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0+ #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid+0x21/0xe0 lib/list_debug.c:23
Code: 8b 0c 24 e9 17 fd ff ff 90 55 48 89 fd 48 8d 7a 08 53 48 89 d3 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 48 83 ec 08 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 8b 00 00 00 48 8b 53 08 48 39 f2 75 35 48 89 f2
RSP: 0018:ffff8881ea2278d0 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffffc1829250 RCX: 1ffff1103d444ef4
RDX: 1ffffffff830524b RSI: ffffffff85659300 RDI: ffffffffc1829258
RBP: ffffffffc1879250 R08: fffffbfff0acb269 R09: fffffbfff0acb269
R10: ffff8881ea2278f0 R11: fffffbfff0acb268 R12: ffffffffc1829250
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000000008 R15: ffffffffc187c830
FS:  00007fe0361df700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: fffffbfff830524b CR3: 00000001eb39a001 CR4: 00000000007606e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 __list_add include/linux/list.h:60 [inline]
 list_add include/linux/list.h:79 [inline]
 proto_register+0x444/0x8f0 net/core/sock.c:3375
 nr_proto_init+0x73/0x4b3 [netrom]
 ? 0xffffffffc1628000
 ? 0xffffffffc1628000
 do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:887
 do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
 load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
 __do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
 do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fe0361dec58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fe0361dec70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe0361df6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004
Modules linked in: netrom(+) ax25 fcrypt pcbc af_alg arizona_ldo1 v4l2_common videodev media v4l2_dv_timings hdlc ide_cd_mod snd_soc_sigmadsp_regmap snd_soc_sigmadsp intel_spi_platform intel_spi mtd spi_nor snd_usbmidi_lib usbcore lcd ti_ads7950 hi6421_regulator snd_soc_kbl_rt5663_max98927 snd_soc_hdac_hdmi snd_hda_ext_core snd_hda_core snd_soc_rt5663 snd_soc_core snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_compress snd_soc_rl6231 mac80211 rtc_rc5t583 spi_slave_time leds_pwm hid_gt683r hid industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio ir_kbd_i2c rc_core led_class_flash dwc_xlgmac snd_ymfpci gameport snd_mpu401_uart snd_rawmidi snd_ac97_codec snd_pcm ac97_bus snd_opl3_lib snd_timer snd_seq_device snd_hwdep snd soundcore iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan
 bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun joydev mousedev ppdev tpm kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ide_pci_generic piix aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd glue_helper ide_core psmouse input_leds i2c_piix4 serio_raw intel_agp intel_gtt ata_generic agpgart pata_acpi parport_pc rtc_cmos parport floppy sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: rxrpc]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
   (ftrace buffer empty)
CR2: fffffbfff830524b
---[ end trace 039ab24b305c4b19 ]---

If nr_proto_init failed, it may forget to call proto_unregister,
tiggering this issue.This patch rearrange code of nr_proto_init
to avoid such issues.
Reported-by: NHulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NYueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 273fe3f1006ea5ebc63d6729e43e8e45e32b256a ]

Set deletion after flush coming in the same batch results in EBUSY. Add
set use counter to track the number of references to this set from
rules. We cannot rely on the list of bindings for this since such list
is still populated from the preparation phase.
Reported-by: NVáclav Zindulka <vaclav.zindulka@tlapnet.cz>
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 40ba1d9b4d19796afc9b7ece872f5f3e8f5e2c13 ]

The abort path can cause a double-free of an anonymous set.
Added-and-to-be-aborted rule looks like this:

udp dport { 137, 138 } drop

The to-be-aborted transaction list looks like this:

newset
newsetelem
newsetelem
rule

This gets walked in reverse order, so first pass disables the rule, the
set elements, then the set.

After synchronize_rcu(), we then destroy those in same order: rule, set
element, set element, newset.

Problem is that the anonymous set has already been bound to the rule, so
the rule (lookup expression destructor) already frees the set, when then
cause use-after-free when trying to delete the elements from this set,
then try to free the set again when handling the newset expression.

Rule releases the bound set in first place from the abort path, this
causes the use-after-free on set element removal when undoing the new
element transactions. To handle this, skip new element transaction if
set is bound from the abort path.

This is still causes the use-after-free on set element removal.  To
handle this, remove transaction from the list when the set is already
bound.

Joint work with Florian Westphal.

Fixes: f6ac85858976 ("netfilter: nf_tables: unbind set in rule from commit path")
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.netfilter.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1325Acked-by: NFlorian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit b8e204006340b7aaf32bd2b9806c692f6e0cb38a ]

Add .release_ops, that is called in case of error at a later stage in
the expression initialization path, ie. .select_ops() has been already
set up operations and that needs to be undone. This allows us to unwind
.select_ops from the error path, ie. release the dynamic operations for
this extension.

Moreover, allocate one single operation instead of recycling them, this
comes at the cost of consuming a bit more memory per rule, but it
simplifies the infrastructure.
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

Anonymous sets that are bound to rules from the same transaction trigger
a kernel splat from the abort path due to double set list removal and
double free.

This patch updates the logic to search for the transaction that is
responsible for creating the set and disable the set list removal and
release, given the rule is now responsible for this. Lookup is reverse
since the transaction that adds the set is likely to be at the tail of
the list.

Moreover, this patch adds the unbind step to deliver the event from the
commit path.  This should not be done from the worker thread, since we
have no guarantees of in-order delivery to the listener.

This patch removes the assumption that both activate and deactivate
callbacks need to be provided.

Fixes: cd5125d8f518 ("netfilter: nf_tables: split set destruction in deactivate and destroy phase")
Reported-by: NMikhail Morfikov <mmorfikov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

[ Upstream commit cd5125d8f51882279f50506bb9c7e5e89dc9bef3 ]

Splits unbind_set into destroy_set and unbinding operation.

Unbinding removes set from lists (so new transaction would not
find it anymore) but keeps memory allocated (so packet path continues
to work).

Rebind function is added to allow unrolling in case transaction
that wants to remove set is aborted.

Destroy function is added to free the memory, but this could occur
outside of transaction in the future.
Signed-off-by: NFlorian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit d4289fcc9b16b89619ee1c54f829e05e56de8b9a ]

Currently, IPv6 defragmentation code drops non-last fragments that
are smaller than 1280 bytes: see
commit 0ed4229b ("ipv6: defrag: drop non-last frags smaller than min mtu")

This behavior is not specified in IPv6 RFCs and appears to break
compatibility with some IPv6 implemenations, as reported here:
https://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg543846.html

This patch re-uses common IP defragmentation queueing and reassembly
code in IPv6, removing the 1280 byte restriction.

v2: change handling of overlaps to match that of upstream.
Signed-off-by: NPeter Oskolkov <posk@google.com>
Reported-by: NTom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit c23f35d19db3b36ffb9e04b08f1d91565d15f84f ]

This is a refactoring patch: without changing runtime behavior,
it moves rbtree-related code from IPv4-specific files/functions
into .h/.c defrag files shared with IPv6 defragmentation code.

v2: make handling of overlapping packets match upstream.
Signed-off-by: NPeter Oskolkov <posk@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit b4f47f3848eb70986f75d06112af7b48b7f5f462 ]

Unlike '&&' operator, the '&' does not have short-circuit
evaluation semantics.  IOW both sides of the operator always
get evaluated.  Fix the wrong operator in
tls_is_sk_tx_device_offloaded(), which would lead to
out-of-bounds access for for non-full sockets.

Fixes: 4799ac81 ("tls: Add rx inline crypto offload")
Signed-off-by: NJakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: NDirk van der Merwe <dirk.vandermerwe@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: NSimon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit f75a2804da391571563c4b6b29e7797787332673 ]

xfrm_state_put() moves struct xfrm_state to the GC list
and schedules the GC work to clean it up. On net exit call
path, xfrm_state_flush() is called to clean up and
xfrm_flush_gc() is called to wait for the GC work to complete
before exit.

However, this doesn't work because one of the ->destructor(),
ipcomp_destroy(), schedules the same GC work again inside
the GC work. It is hard to wait for such a nested async
callback. This is also why syzbot still reports the following
warning:

 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 33 at net/ipv6/xfrm6_tunnel.c:351 xfrm6_tunnel_net_exit+0x2cb/0x500 net/ipv6/xfrm6_tunnel.c:351
 ...
  ops_exit_list.isra.0+0xb0/0x160 net/core/net_namespace.c:153
  cleanup_net+0x51d/0xb10 net/core/net_namespace.c:551
  process_one_work+0xd0c/0x1ce0 kernel/workqueue.c:2153
  worker_thread+0x143/0x14a0 kernel/workqueue.c:2296
  kthread+0x357/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:246
  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352

In fact, it is perfectly fine to bypass GC and destroy xfrm_state
synchronously on net exit call path, because it is in process context
and doesn't need a work struct to do any blocking work.

This patch introduces xfrm_state_put_sync() which simply bypasses
GC, and lets its callers to decide whether to use this synchronous
version. On net exit path, xfrm_state_fini() and
xfrm6_tunnel_net_exit() use it. And, as ipcomp_destroy() itself is
blocking, it can use xfrm_state_put_sync() directly too.

Also rename xfrm_state_gc_destroy() to ___xfrm_state_destroy() to
reflect this change.

Fixes: b48c05ab ("xfrm: Fix warning in xfrm6_tunnel_net_exit.")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+e9aebef558e3ed673934@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: NCong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>