In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the
struct proto slab cache in which userspace copy operations are allowed.
Some protocols need to copy objects to/from userspace, and they can
declare the region via their proto structure with the new usersize and
useroffset fields. Initially, if no region is specified (usersize ==
0), the entire field is marked as whitelisted. This allows protocols
to be whitelisted in subsequent patches. Once all protocols have been
annotated, the full-whitelist default can be removed.

This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches
can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving
cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region.

This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log, split off per-proto patches]
[kees: add logic for by-default full-whitelist]
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

SCSI sense buffers, stored in struct scsi_cmnd.sense and therefore
contained in the scsi_sense_cache slab cache, need to be copied to/from
userspace.

cache object allocation:
    drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c:
        scsi_select_sense_cache(...):
            return ... ? scsi_sense_isadma_cache : scsi_sense_cache

        scsi_alloc_sense_buffer(...):
            return kmem_cache_alloc_node(scsi_select_sense_cache(), ...);

        scsi_init_request(...):
            ...
            cmd->sense_buffer = scsi_alloc_sense_buffer(...);
            ...
            cmd->req.sense = cmd->sense_buffer

example usage trace:

    block/scsi_ioctl.c:
        (inline from sg_io)
        blk_complete_sghdr_rq(...):
            struct scsi_request *req = scsi_req(rq);
            ...
            copy_to_user(..., req->sense, len)

        scsi_cmd_ioctl(...):
            sg_io(...);

In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in
the scsi_sense_cache slab cache in which userspace copy operations
are allowed.

This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches
can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving
cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log, provide usage trace]
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

CIFS request buffers, stored in the cifs_request slab cache, need to be
copied to/from userspace.

cache object allocation:
    fs/cifs/cifsfs.c:
        cifs_init_request_bufs():
            ...
            cifs_req_poolp = mempool_create_slab_pool(cifs_min_rcv,
                                                      cifs_req_cachep);

    fs/cifs/misc.c:
        cifs_buf_get():
            ...
            ret_buf = mempool_alloc(cifs_req_poolp, GFP_NOFS);
            ...
            return ret_buf;

In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the
cifs_request slab cache in which userspace copy operations are allowed.

This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches
can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving
cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region.

This patch is verbatim from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log, provide usage trace]
Cc: Steve French <sfrench@samba.org>
Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

vxfs symlink pathnames, stored in struct vxfs_inode_info field
vii_immed.vi_immed and therefore contained in the vxfs_inode slab cache,
need to be copied to/from userspace.

cache object allocation:
    fs/freevxfs/vxfs_super.c:
        vxfs_alloc_inode(...):
            ...
            vi = kmem_cache_alloc(vxfs_inode_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
            ...
            return &vi->vfs_inode;

    fs/freevxfs/vxfs_inode.c:
        cxfs_iget(...):
            ...
            inode->i_link = vip->vii_immed.vi_immed;

example usage trace:
    readlink_copy+0x43/0x70
    vfs_readlink+0x62/0x110
    SyS_readlinkat+0x100/0x130

    fs/namei.c:
        readlink_copy(..., link):
            ...
            copy_to_user(..., link, len);

        (inlined in vfs_readlink)
        generic_readlink(dentry, ...):
            struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
            const char *link = inode->i_link;
            ...
            readlink_copy(..., link);

In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the
vxfs_inode slab cache in which userspace copy operations are allowed.

This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches
can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving
cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region.

This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log, provide usage trace]
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

The ufs symlink pathnames, stored in struct ufs_inode_info.i_u1.i_symlink
and therefore contained in the ufs_inode_cache slab cache, need to be
copied to/from userspace.

cache object allocation:
    fs/ufs/super.c:
        ufs_alloc_inode(...):
            ...
            ei = kmem_cache_alloc(ufs_inode_cachep, GFP_NOFS);
            ...
            return &ei->vfs_inode;

    fs/ufs/ufs.h:
        UFS_I(struct inode *inode):
            return container_of(inode, struct ufs_inode_info, vfs_inode);

    fs/ufs/namei.c:
        ufs_symlink(...):
            ...
            inode->i_link = (char *)UFS_I(inode)->i_u1.i_symlink;

example usage trace:
    readlink_copy+0x43/0x70
    vfs_readlink+0x62/0x110
    SyS_readlinkat+0x100/0x130

    fs/namei.c:
        readlink_copy(..., link):
            ...
            copy_to_user(..., link, len);

        (inlined in vfs_readlink)
        generic_readlink(dentry, ...):
            struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
            const char *link = inode->i_link;
            ...
            readlink_copy(..., link);

In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the
ufs_inode_cache slab cache in which userspace copy operations are allowed.

This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches
can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving
cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region.

This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log, provide usage trace]
Cc: Evgeniy Dushistov <dushistov@mail.ru>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

orangefs symlink pathnames, stored in struct orangefs_inode_s.link_target
and therefore contained in the orangefs_inode_cache, need to be copied
to/from userspace.

cache object allocation:
    fs/orangefs/super.c:
        orangefs_alloc_inode(...):
            ...
            orangefs_inode = kmem_cache_alloc(orangefs_inode_cache, ...);
            ...
            return &orangefs_inode->vfs_inode;

    fs/orangefs/orangefs-utils.c:
        exofs_symlink(...):
            ...
            inode->i_link = orangefs_inode->link_target;

example usage trace:
    readlink_copy+0x43/0x70
    vfs_readlink+0x62/0x110
    SyS_readlinkat+0x100/0x130

    fs/namei.c:
        readlink_copy(..., link):
            ...
            copy_to_user(..., link, len);

        (inlined in vfs_readlink)
        generic_readlink(dentry, ...):
            struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
            const char *link = inode->i_link;
            ...
            readlink_copy(..., link);

In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the
orangefs_inode_cache slab cache in which userspace copy operations are
allowed.

This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches
can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving
cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region.

This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log, provide usage trace]
Cc: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

The exofs short symlink names, stored in struct exofs_i_info.i_data and
therefore contained in the exofs_inode_cache slab cache, need to be copied
to/from userspace.

cache object allocation:
    fs/exofs/super.c:
        exofs_alloc_inode(...):
            ...
            oi = kmem_cache_alloc(exofs_inode_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
            ...
            return &oi->vfs_inode;

    fs/exofs/namei.c:
        exofs_symlink(...):
            ...
            inode->i_link = (char *)oi->i_data;

example usage trace:
    readlink_copy+0x43/0x70
    vfs_readlink+0x62/0x110
    SyS_readlinkat+0x100/0x130

    fs/namei.c:
        readlink_copy(..., link):
            ...
            copy_to_user(..., link, len);

        (inlined in vfs_readlink)
        generic_readlink(dentry, ...):
            struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
            const char *link = inode->i_link;
            ...
            readlink_copy(..., link);

In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the
exofs_inode_cache slab cache in which userspace copy operations are
allowed.

This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches
can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving
cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region.

This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log, provide usage trace]
Cc: Boaz Harrosh <ooo@electrozaur.com>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

befs symlink pathnames, stored in struct befs_inode_info.i_data.symlink
and therefore contained in the befs_inode_cache slab cache, need to be
copied to/from userspace.

cache object allocation:
    fs/befs/linuxvfs.c:
        befs_alloc_inode(...):
            ...
            bi = kmem_cache_alloc(befs_inode_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
            ...
            return &bi->vfs_inode;

        befs_iget(...):
            ...
            strlcpy(befs_ino->i_data.symlink, raw_inode->data.symlink,
                    BEFS_SYMLINK_LEN);
            ...
            inode->i_link = befs_ino->i_data.symlink;

example usage trace:
    readlink_copy+0x43/0x70
    vfs_readlink+0x62/0x110
    SyS_readlinkat+0x100/0x130

    fs/namei.c:
        readlink_copy(..., link):
            ...
            copy_to_user(..., link, len);

        (inlined in vfs_readlink)
        generic_readlink(dentry, ...):
            struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
            const char *link = inode->i_link;
            ...
            readlink_copy(..., link);

In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the
befs_inode_cache slab cache in which userspace copy operations are
allowed.

This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches
can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving
cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region.

This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log, provide usage trace]
Cc: Luis de Bethencourt <luisbg@kernel.org>
Cc: Salah Triki <salah.triki@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NLuis de Bethencourt <luisbg@kernel.org>

The jfs symlink pathnames, stored in struct jfs_inode_info.i_inline and
therefore contained in the jfs_ip slab cache, need to be copied to/from
userspace.

cache object allocation:
    fs/jfs/super.c:
        jfs_alloc_inode(...):
            ...
            jfs_inode = kmem_cache_alloc(jfs_inode_cachep, GFP_NOFS);
            ...
            return &jfs_inode->vfs_inode;

    fs/jfs/jfs_incore.h:
        JFS_IP(struct inode *inode):
            return container_of(inode, struct jfs_inode_info, vfs_inode);

    fs/jfs/inode.c:
        jfs_iget(...):
            ...
            inode->i_link = JFS_IP(inode)->i_inline;

example usage trace:
    readlink_copy+0x43/0x70
    vfs_readlink+0x62/0x110
    SyS_readlinkat+0x100/0x130

    fs/namei.c:
        readlink_copy(..., link):
            ...
            copy_to_user(..., link, len);

        (inlined in vfs_readlink)
        generic_readlink(dentry, ...):
            struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
            const char *link = inode->i_link;
            ...
            readlink_copy(..., link);

In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the
jfs_ip slab cache in which userspace copy operations are allowed.

This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches
can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving
cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region.

This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log, provide usage trace]
Cc: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@kernel.org>
Cc: jfs-discussion@lists.sourceforge.net
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NDave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>

The ext2 symlink pathnames, stored in struct ext2_inode_info.i_data and
therefore contained in the ext2_inode_cache slab cache, need to be copied
to/from userspace.

cache object allocation:
    fs/ext2/super.c:
        ext2_alloc_inode(...):
            struct ext2_inode_info *ei;
            ...
            ei = kmem_cache_alloc(ext2_inode_cachep, GFP_NOFS);
            ...
            return &ei->vfs_inode;

    fs/ext2/ext2.h:
        EXT2_I(struct inode *inode):
            return container_of(inode, struct ext2_inode_info, vfs_inode);

    fs/ext2/namei.c:
        ext2_symlink(...):
            ...
            inode->i_link = (char *)&EXT2_I(inode)->i_data;

example usage trace:
    readlink_copy+0x43/0x70
    vfs_readlink+0x62/0x110
    SyS_readlinkat+0x100/0x130

    fs/namei.c:
        readlink_copy(..., link):
            ...
            copy_to_user(..., link, len);

        (inlined into vfs_readlink)
        generic_readlink(dentry, ...):
            struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
            const char *link = inode->i_link;
            ...
            readlink_copy(..., link);

In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the
ext2_inode_cache slab cache in which userspace copy operations are
allowed.

This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches
can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving
cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region.

This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log, provide usage trace]
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>

The ext4 symlink pathnames, stored in struct ext4_inode_info.i_data
and therefore contained in the ext4_inode_cache slab cache, need
to be copied to/from userspace.

cache object allocation:
    fs/ext4/super.c:
        ext4_alloc_inode(...):
            struct ext4_inode_info *ei;
            ...
            ei = kmem_cache_alloc(ext4_inode_cachep, GFP_NOFS);
            ...
            return &ei->vfs_inode;

    include/trace/events/ext4.h:
            #define EXT4_I(inode) \
                (container_of(inode, struct ext4_inode_info, vfs_inode))

    fs/ext4/namei.c:
        ext4_symlink(...):
            ...
            inode->i_link = (char *)&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data;

example usage trace:
    readlink_copy+0x43/0x70
    vfs_readlink+0x62/0x110
    SyS_readlinkat+0x100/0x130

    fs/namei.c:
        readlink_copy(..., link):
            ...
            copy_to_user(..., link, len)

        (inlined into vfs_readlink)
        generic_readlink(dentry, ...):
            struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
            const char *link = inode->i_link;
            ...
            readlink_copy(..., link);

In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the
ext4_inode_cache slab cache in which userspace copy operations are
allowed.

This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches
can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving
cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region.

This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log, provide usage trace]
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>
Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

The mnt_id field can be copied with put_user(), so there is no need to
use copy_to_user(). In both cases, hardened usercopy is being bypassed
since the size is constant, and not open to runtime manipulation.

This patch is verbatim from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log]
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

VFS pathnames are stored in the names_cache slab cache, either inline
or across an entire allocation entry (when approaching PATH_MAX). These
are copied to/from userspace, so they must be entirely whitelisted.

cache object allocation:
    include/linux/fs.h:
        #define __getname()    kmem_cache_alloc(names_cachep, GFP_KERNEL)

example usage trace:
    strncpy_from_user+0x4d/0x170
    getname_flags+0x6f/0x1f0
    user_path_at_empty+0x23/0x40
    do_mount+0x69/0xda0
    SyS_mount+0x83/0xd0

    fs/namei.c:
        getname_flags(...):
            ...
            result = __getname();
            ...
            kname = (char *)result->iname;
            result->name = kname;
            len = strncpy_from_user(kname, filename, EMBEDDED_NAME_MAX);
            ...
            if (unlikely(len == EMBEDDED_NAME_MAX)) {
                const size_t size = offsetof(struct filename, iname[1]);
                kname = (char *)result;

                result = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
                ...
                result->name = kname;
                len = strncpy_from_user(kname, filename, PATH_MAX);

In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines the entire cache
object in the names_cache slab cache as whitelisted, since it may entirely
hold name strings to be copied to/from userspace.

This patch is verbatim from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log, add usage trace]
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

When a dentry name is short enough, it can be stored directly in the
dentry itself (instead in a separate kmalloc allocation). These dentry
short names, stored in struct dentry.d_iname and therefore contained in
the dentry_cache slab cache, need to be coped to userspace.

cache object allocation:
    fs/dcache.c:
        __d_alloc(...):
            ...
            dentry = kmem_cache_alloc(dentry_cache, ...);
            ...
            dentry->d_name.name = dentry->d_iname;

example usage trace:
    filldir+0xb0/0x140
    dcache_readdir+0x82/0x170
    iterate_dir+0x142/0x1b0
    SyS_getdents+0xb5/0x160

    fs/readdir.c:
        (called via ctx.actor by dir_emit)
        filldir(..., const char *name, ...):
            ...
            copy_to_user(..., name, namlen)

    fs/libfs.c:
        dcache_readdir(...):
            ...
            next = next_positive(dentry, p, 1)
            ...
            dir_emit(..., next->d_name.name, ...)

In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the
dentry_cache slab cache in which userspace copy operations are allowed.

This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches can
now check that each dynamic copy operation involving cache-managed memory
falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region.

This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust hunks for kmalloc-specific things moved later]
[kees: adjust commit log, provide usage trace]
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

Mark the kmalloc slab caches as entirely whitelisted. These caches
are frequently used to fulfill kernel allocations that contain data
to be copied to/from userspace. Internal-only uses are also common,
but are scattered in the kernel. For now, mark all the kmalloc caches
as whitelisted.

This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: merged in moved kmalloc hunks, adjust commit log]
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NChristoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>

This introduces CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK to control the
behavior of hardened usercopy whitelist violations. By default, whitelist
violations will continue to WARN() so that any bad or missing usercopy
whitelists can be discovered without being too disruptive.

If this config is disabled at build time or a system is booted with
"slab_common.usercopy_fallback=0", usercopy whitelists will BUG() instead
of WARN(). This is useful for admins that want to use usercopy whitelists
immediately.
Suggested-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

This patch adds checking of usercopy cache whitelisting, and is modified
from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the
last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the
code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't
reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

The SLAB and SLUB allocators are modified to WARN() on all copy operations
in which the kernel heap memory being modified falls outside of the cache's
defined usercopy region.

Based on an earlier patch from David Windsor.

Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

This patch prepares the slab allocator to handle caches having annotations
(useroffset and usersize) defining usercopy regions.

This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on
my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original
code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab
cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory
available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further
restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to
whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from
userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches
that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their
objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy
operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant
sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass
hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.)

To support this whitelist annotation, usercopy region offset and size
members are added to struct kmem_cache. The slab allocator receives a
new function, kmem_cache_create_usercopy(), that creates a new cache
with a usercopy region defined, suitable for declaring spans of fields
within the objects that get copied to/from userspace.

In this patch, the default kmem_cache_create() marks the entire allocation
as whitelisted, leaving it semantically unchanged. Once all fine-grained
whitelists have been added (in subsequent patches), this will be changed
to a usersize of 0, making caches created with kmem_cache_create() not
copyable to/from userspace.

After the entire usercopy whitelist series is applied, less than 15%
of the slab cache memory remains exposed to potential usercopy bugs
after a fresh boot:

Total Slab Memory:           48074720
Usercopyable Memory:          6367532  13.2%
         task_struct                    0.2%         4480/1630720
         RAW                            0.3%            300/96000
         RAWv6                          2.1%           1408/64768
         ext4_inode_cache               3.0%       269760/8740224
         dentry                        11.1%       585984/5273856
         mm_struct                     29.1%         54912/188448
         kmalloc-8                    100.0%          24576/24576
         kmalloc-16                   100.0%          28672/28672
         kmalloc-32                   100.0%          81920/81920
         kmalloc-192                  100.0%          96768/96768
         kmalloc-128                  100.0%        143360/143360
         names_cache                  100.0%        163840/163840
         kmalloc-64                   100.0%        167936/167936
         kmalloc-256                  100.0%        339968/339968
         kmalloc-512                  100.0%        350720/350720
         kmalloc-96                   100.0%        455616/455616
         kmalloc-8192                 100.0%        655360/655360
         kmalloc-1024                 100.0%        812032/812032
         kmalloc-4096                 100.0%        819200/819200
         kmalloc-2048                 100.0%      1310720/1310720

After some kernel build workloads, the percentage (mainly driven by
dentry and inode caches expanding) drops under 10%:

Total Slab Memory:           95516184
Usercopyable Memory:          8497452   8.8%
         task_struct                    0.2%         4000/1456000
         RAW                            0.3%            300/96000
         RAWv6                          2.1%           1408/64768
         ext4_inode_cache               3.0%     1217280/39439872
         dentry                        11.1%     1623200/14608800
         mm_struct                     29.1%         73216/251264
         kmalloc-8                    100.0%          24576/24576
         kmalloc-16                   100.0%          28672/28672
         kmalloc-32                   100.0%          94208/94208
         kmalloc-192                  100.0%          96768/96768
         kmalloc-128                  100.0%        143360/143360
         names_cache                  100.0%        163840/163840
         kmalloc-64                   100.0%        245760/245760
         kmalloc-256                  100.0%        339968/339968
         kmalloc-512                  100.0%        350720/350720
         kmalloc-96                   100.0%        563520/563520
         kmalloc-8192                 100.0%        655360/655360
         kmalloc-1024                 100.0%        794624/794624
         kmalloc-4096                 100.0%        819200/819200
         kmalloc-2048                 100.0%      1257472/1257472
Signed-off-by: NDavid Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log, split out a few extra kmalloc hunks]
[kees: add field names to function declarations]
[kees: convert BUGs to WARNs and fail closed]
[kees: add attack surface reduction analysis to commit log]
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NChristoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>

The size of fields within a structure is needed in a few places in the
kernel already, and will be needed for the usercopy whitelisting when
declaring whitelist regions within structures. This creates a dedicated
macro and redefines offsetofend() to use it.

Existing usage, ignoring the 1200+ lustre assert uses:

$ git grep -E 'sizeof\(\(\((struct )?[a-zA-Z_]+ \*\)0\)->' | \
	grep -v staging/lustre | wc -l
65
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

Instead of doubling the size, push the start position up by 16 bytes to
still trigger an overflow. This allows to verify that offset reporting
is working correctly.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

This refactors the hardened usercopy code so that failure reporting can
happen within the checking functions instead of at the top level. This
simplifies the return value handling and allows more details and offsets
to be included in the report. Having the offset can be much more helpful
in understanding hardened usercopy bugs.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

In preparation for refactoring the usercopy checks to pass offset to
the hardened usercopy report, this renames report_usercopy() to the
more accurate usercopy_abort(), marks it as noreturn because it is,
adds a hopefully helpful comment for anyone investigating such reports,
makes the function available to the slab allocators, and adds new "detail"
and "offset" arguments.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

Using %p was already mostly useless in the usercopy overflow reports,
so this removes it entirely to avoid confusion now that %p-hashing
is enabled.

Fixes: ad67b74d ("printk: hash addresses printed with %p")
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

Pull ARM fix from Russell King:
 "Just one fix this time around, for the late commit in the merge window
  that triggered a problem with qemu. Qemu is apparently also going to
  receive a fix for the discovered issue"

* 'fixes' of git://git.armlinux.org.uk/~rmk/linux-arm:
  ARM: avoid faulting on qemu

Pull i2c fixes from Wolfram Sang:
 "Here are two bugfixes for I2C, fixing a memleak in the core and irq
  allocation for i801.

  Also three bugfixes for the at24 eeprom driver which Bartosz collected
  while taking over maintainership for this driver"

* 'i2c/for-current' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wsa/linux:
  eeprom: at24: check at24_read/write arguments
  eeprom: at24: fix reading from 24MAC402/24MAC602
  eeprom: at24: correctly set the size for at24mac402
  i2c: i2c-boardinfo: fix memory leaks on devinfo
  i2c: i801: Fix Failed to allocate irq -2147483648 error

Merge tag 'hwmon-for-linus-v4.15-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/groeck/linux-staging

Pull hwmon fixes from Guenter Roeck:
 "Fixes:

   - Drop reference to obsolete maintainer tree

   - Fix overflow bug in pmbus driver

   - Fix SMBUS timeout problem in jc42 driver

  For the SMBUS timeout handling, we had a brief discussion if this
  should be considered a bug fix or a feature. Peter says "it fixes real
  problems where the application misbehave due to faulty content when
  reading from an eeprom", and he needs the patch in his company's v4.14
  images. This is good enough for me and warrants backport to stable
  kernels"

* tag 'hwmon-for-linus-v4.15-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/groeck/linux-staging:
  hwmon: (jc42) optionally try to disable the SMBUS timeout
  hwmon: (pmbus) Use 64bit math for DIRECT format values
  hwmon: Drop reference to Jean's tree

Merge tag 'at24-4.15-fixes-for-wolfram' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brgl/linux into i2c/for-current

Please consider pulling the following fixes for v4.15. While it doesn't
fix any regression introduced in the v4.15 merge window, we have a
feature in at24 since linux v4.8 - reading the mac address block from
at24mac series - which turned out to be not working.

This pull request contains changes that fix it together with a patch
that hardens the read and write argument sanitization with
out-of-bounds checks that were missing.

Pull NFS client fixes from Anna Schumaker:
 "These patches fix a problem with compiling using an old version of
  gcc, and also fix up error handling in the SUNRPC layer.

   - NFSv4: Ensure gcc 4.4.4 can compile initialiser for
     "invalid_stateid"

   - SUNRPC: Allow connect to return EHOSTUNREACH

   - SUNRPC: Handle ENETDOWN errors"

* tag 'nfs-for-4.15-2' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/anna/linux-nfs:
  SUNRPC: Handle ENETDOWN errors
  SUNRPC: Allow connect to return EHOSTUNREACH
  NFSv4: Ensure gcc 4.4.4 can compile initialiser for "invalid_stateid"

Pull xfs fixes from Darrick Wong:
 "Here are some bug fixes for 4.15-rc2.

   - fix memory leaks that appeared after removing ifork inline data
     buffer

   - recover deferred rmap update log items in correct order

   - fix memory leaks when buffer construction fails

   - fix memory leaks when bmbt is corrupt

   - fix some uninitialized variables and math problems in the quota
     scrubber

   - add some omitted attribution tags on the log replay commit

   - fix some UBSAN complaints about integer overflows with large sparse
     files

   - implement an effective inode mode check in online fsck

   - fix log's inability to retry quota item writeout due to transient
     errors"

* tag 'xfs-4.15-fixes-4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/xfs/xfs-linux:
  xfs: Properly retry failed dquot items in case of error during buffer writeback
  xfs: scrub inode mode properly
  xfs: remove unused parameter from xfs_writepage_map
  xfs: ubsan fixes
  xfs: calculate correct offset in xfs_scrub_quota_item
  xfs: fix uninitialized variable in xfs_scrub_quota
  xfs: fix leaks on corruption errors in xfs_bmap.c
  xfs: fortify xfs_alloc_buftarg error handling
  xfs: log recovery should replay deferred ops in order
  xfs: always free inline data before resetting inode fork during ifree

Merge tag 'riscv-for-linus-4.15-rc2_cleanups' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/palmer/linux

Pull RISC-V cleanups and ABI fixes from Palmer Dabbelt:
 "This contains a handful of small cleanups that are a result of
  feedback that didn't make it into our original patch set, either
  because the feedback hadn't been given yet, I missed the original
  emails, or we weren't ready to submit the changes yet.

  I've been maintaining the various cleanup patch sets I have as their
  own branches, which I then merged together and signed. Each merge
  commit has a short summary of the changes, and each branch is based on
  your latest tag (4.15-rc1, in this case). If this isn't the right way
  to do this then feel free to suggest something else, but it seems sane
  to me.

  Here's a short summary of the changes, roughly in order of how
  interesting they are.

   - libgcc.h has been moved from include/lib, where it's the only
     member, to include/linux. This is meant to avoid tab completion
     conflicts.

   - VDSO entries for clock_get/gettimeofday/getcpu have been added.
     These are simple syscalls now, but we want to let glibc use them
     from the start so we can make them faster later.

   - A VDSO entry for instruction cache flushing has been added so
     userspace can flush the instruction cache.

   - The VDSO symbol versions for __vdso_cmpxchg{32,64} have been
     removed, as those VDSO entries don't actually exist.

   - __io_writes has been corrected to respect the given type.

   - A new READ_ONCE in arch_spin_is_locked().

   - __test_and_op_bit_ord() is now actually ordered.

   - Various small fixes throughout the tree to enable allmodconfig to
     build cleanly.

   - Removal of some dead code in our atomic support headers.

   - Improvements to various comments in our atomic support headers"

* tag 'riscv-for-linus-4.15-rc2_cleanups' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/palmer/linux: (23 commits)
  RISC-V: __io_writes should respect the length argument
  move libgcc.h to include/linux
  RISC-V: Clean up an unused include
  RISC-V: Allow userspace to flush the instruction cache
  RISC-V: Flush I$ when making a dirty page executable
  RISC-V: Add missing include
  RISC-V: Use define for get_cycles like other architectures
  RISC-V: Provide stub of setup_profiling_timer()
  RISC-V: Export some expected symbols for modules
  RISC-V: move empty_zero_page definition to C and export it
  RISC-V: io.h: type fixes for warnings
  RISC-V: use RISCV_{INT,SHORT} instead of {INT,SHORT} for asm macros
  RISC-V: use generic serial.h
  RISC-V: remove spin_unlock_wait()
  RISC-V: `sfence.vma` orderes the instruction cache
  RISC-V: Add READ_ONCE in arch_spin_is_locked()
  RISC-V: __test_and_op_bit_ord should be strongly ordered
  RISC-V: Remove smb_mb__{before,after}_spinlock()
  RISC-V: Remove __smp_bp__{before,after}_atomic
  RISC-V: Comment on why {,cmp}xchg is ordered how it is
  ...

Pull arm64 fixes from Will Deacon:
 "The critical one here is a fix for fpsimd register corruption across
  signals which was introduced by the SVE support code (the register
  files overlap), but the others are worth having as well.

  Summary:

   - Fix FP register corruption when SVE is not available or in use

   - Fix out-of-tree module build failure when CONFIG_ARM64_MODULE_PLTS=y

   - Missing 'const' generating errors with LTO builds

   - Remove unsupported events from Cortex-A73 PMU description

   - Removal of stale and incorrect comments"

* tag 'arm64-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux:
  arm64: context: Fix comments and remove pointless smp_wmb()
  arm64: cpu_ops: Add missing 'const' qualifiers
  arm64: perf: remove unsupported events for Cortex-A73
  arm64: fpsimd: Fix failure to restore FPSIMD state after signals
  arm64: pgd: Mark pgd_cache as __ro_after_init
  arm64: ftrace: emit ftrace-mod.o contents through code
  arm64: module-plts: factor out PLT generation code for ftrace
  arm64: mm: cleanup stale AIVIVT references

Olaf said: Here's a short series of patches that produces a working
allmodconfig. Would be nice to see them go in so we can add build
coverage.

I've dropped patches 8 and 10 from the original set:

* [PATCH 08/10] (RISC-V: Set __ARCH_WANT_RENAMEAT to pick up generic
  version) has a better fix that I've sent out for review, we don't want
  renameat.
* [PATCH 10/10] (input: joystick: riscv has get_cycles) has already been
  taken into Dmitry Torokhov's tree.

This merge contains the user-visible, ABI-breaking changes that we want
to make sure we have in Linux before our first release.   Highlights
include:

* VDSO entries for clock_get/gettimeofday/getcpu have been added.  These
  are simple syscalls now, but we want to let glibc use them from the
  start so we can make them faster later.
* A VDSO entry for instruction cache flushing has been added so
  userspace can flush the instruction cache.
* The VDSO symbol versions for __vdso_cmpxchg{32,64} have been removed,
  as those VDSO entries don't actually exist.

Conflicts:
        arch/riscv/include/asm/tlbflush.h

This patch set is the result of some feedback that filtered through
after our original patch set was reviewed, some of which was the result
of me missing some email.  It contains:

* A new READ_ONCE in arch_spin_is_locked()
* __test_and_op_bit_ord() is now actually ordered
* Improvements to various comments
* Removal of some dead code

Whoops -- I must have just been being an idiot again.  Thanks to Segher
for finding the bug :).

CC: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: NPalmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>

Introducing a new include/lib directory just for this file totally
messes up tab completion for include/linux, which is highly annoying.

Move it to include/linux where we have headers for all kinds of other
lib/ code as well.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NPalmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>

Pull powerpc fixes from Michael Ellerman:
 "Two fixes for nasty kexec/kdump crashes in certain configurations.

  A couple of minor fixes for the new TIDR code.

  A fix for an oops in a CXL error handling path.

  Thanks to: Andrew Donnellan, Christophe Lombard, David Gibson, Mahesh
  Salgaonkar, Vaibhav Jain"

* tag 'powerpc-4.15-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux:
  powerpc: Do not assign thread.tidr if already assigned
  powerpc: Avoid signed to unsigned conversion in set_thread_tidr()
  powerpc/kexec: Fix kexec/kdump in P9 guest kernels
  powerpc/powernv: Fix kexec crashes caused by tlbie tracing
  cxl: Check if vphb exists before iterating over AFU devices