Thank you, git.
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Much like we added a network node cache, this patch adds a network port
cache. The design is taken almost completely from the network node cache
which in turn was taken from the network interface cache.  The basic idea is
to cache entries in a hash table based on protocol/port information.  The
hash function only takes the port number into account since the number of
different protocols in use at any one time is expected to be relatively
small.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Convert the strings used for mount options into #defines rather than
retyping the string throughout the SELinux code.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Introduce the concept of a permissive type.  A new ebitmap is introduced to
the policy database which indicates if a given type has the permissive bit
set or not.  This bit is tested for the scontext of any denial.  The bit is
meaningless on types which only appear as the target of a decision and never
the source.  A domain running with a permissive type will be allowed to
perform any action similarly to when the system is globally set permissive.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

This changes checks related to ptrace to get rid of the ptrace_sid tracking.
It's good to disentangle the security model from the ptrace implementation
internals.  It's sufficient to check against the SID of the ptracer at the
time a tracee attempts a transition.
Signed-off-by: NRoland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Adds a new open permission inside SELinux when 'opening' a file.  The idea
is that opening a file and reading/writing to that file are not the same
thing.  Its different if a program had its stdout redirected to /tmp/output
than if the program tried to directly open /tmp/output. This should allow
policy writers to more liberally give read/write permissions across the
policy while still blocking many design and programing flaws SELinux is so
good at catching today.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Remove unused backpoiters from security objects.
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

The RCU/spinlock locking approach for the nlbl_state in the sk_security_struct
was almost certainly overkill.  This patch removes both the RCU and spinlock
locking, relying on the existing socket locks to handle the case of multiple
writers.  This change also makes several code reductions possible.

Less locking, less code - it's a Good Thing.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

More cases where SELinux must not re-enter the fs code. Called from the
d_instantiate security hook.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Introduce new LSM interfaces to allow an FS to deal with their own mount
options.  This includes a new string parsing function exported from the
LSM that an FS can use to get a security data blob and a new security
data blob.  This is particularly useful for an FS which uses binary
mount data, like NFS, which does not pass strings into the vfs to be
handled by the loaded LSM.  Also fix a BUG() in both SELinux and SMACK
when dealing with binary mount data.  If the binary mount data is less
than one page the copy_page() in security_sb_copy_data() can cause an
illegal page fault and boom.  Remove all NFSisms from the SELinux code
since they were broken by past NFS changes.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

audit_log_d_path() is a d_path() wrapper that is used by the audit code.  To
use a struct path in audit_log_d_path() I need to embed it into struct
avc_audit_data.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: NJan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Acked-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Fix SELinux to handle 64-bit capabilities correctly, and to catch
future extensions of capabilities beyond 64 bits to ensure that SELinux
is properly updated.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

The security_get_policycaps() functions has a couple of bugs in it and it
isn't currently used by any in-tree code, so get rid of it and all of it's
bugginess.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@localhost.localdomain>

Now that the SELinux NetLabel "base SID" is always the netmsg initial SID we
can do a big optimization - caching the SID and not just the MLS attributes.
This not only saves a lot of per-packet memory allocations and copies but it
has a nice side effect of removing a chunk of code.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

This patch introduces a mechanism for checking when labeled IPsec or SECMARK
are in use by keeping introducing a configuration reference counter for each
subsystem.  In the case of labeled IPsec, whenever a labeled SA or SPD entry
is created the labeled IPsec/XFRM reference count is increased and when the
entry is removed it is decreased.  In the case of SECMARK, when a SECMARK
target is created the reference count is increased and later decreased when the
target is removed.  These reference counters allow SELinux to quickly determine
if either of these subsystems are enabled.

NetLabel already has a similar mechanism which provides the netlbl_enabled()
function.

This patch also renames the selinux_relabel_packet_permission() function to
selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission() as the original name and
description were misleading in that they referenced a single packet label which
is not the case.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Rework the handling of network peer labels so that the different peer labeling
subsystems work better together.  This includes moving both subsystems to a
single "peer" object class which involves not only changes to the permission
checks but an improved method of consolidating multiple packet peer labels.
As part of this work the inbound packet permission check code has been heavily
modified to handle both the old and new behavior in as sane a fashion as
possible.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Add additional Flask definitions to support the new "peer" object class and
additional permissions to the netif, node, and packet object classes.  Also,
bring the kernel Flask definitions up to date with the Fedora SELinux policies
by adding the "flow_in" and "flow_out" permissions to the "packet" class.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Add a new policy capabilities bitmap to SELinux policy version 22.  This bitmap
will enable the security server to query the policy to determine which features
it supports.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

This patch adds a SELinux IP address/node SID caching mechanism similar to the
sel_netif_*() functions.  The node SID queries in the SELinux hooks files are
also modified to take advantage of this new functionality.  In addition, remove
the address length information from the sk_buff parsing routines as it is
redundant since we already have the address family.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Instead of storing the packet's network interface name store the ifindex.  This
allows us to defer the need to lookup the net_device structure until the audit
record is generated meaning that in the majority of cases we never need to
bother with this at all.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

The current SELinux netif code requires the caller have a valid net_device
struct pointer to lookup network interface information.  However, we don't
always have a valid net_device pointer so convert the netif code to use
the ifindex values we always have as part of the sk_buff.  This patch also
removes the default message SID from the network interface record, it is
not being used and therefore is "dead code".
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

In order to do any sort of IP header inspection of incoming packets we need to
know which address family, AF_INET/AF_INET6/etc., it belongs to and since the
sk_buff structure does not store this information we need to pass along the
address family separate from the packet itself.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Adds security_get_sb_mnt_opts, security_set_sb_mnt_opts, and
security_clont_sb_mnt_opts to the LSM and to SELinux.  This will allow
filesystems to directly own and control all of their mount options if they
so choose.  This interface deals only with option identifiers and strings so
it should generic enough for any LSM which may come in the future.

Filesystems which pass text mount data around in the kernel (almost all of
them) need not currently make use of this interface when dealing with
SELinux since it will still parse those strings as it always has.  I assume
future LSM's would do the same.  NFS is the primary FS which does not use
text mount data and thus must make use of this interface.

An LSM would need to implement these functions only if they had mount time
options, such as selinux has context= or fscontext=.  If the LSM has no
mount time options they could simply not implement and let the dummy ops
take care of things.

An LSM other than SELinux would need to define new option numbers in
security.h and any FS which decides to own there own security options would
need to be patched to use this new interface for every possible LSM.  This
is because it was stated to me very clearly that LSM's should not attempt to
understand FS mount data and the burdon to understand security should be in
the FS which owns the options.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Allow policy to select, in much the same way as it selects MLS support, how
the kernel should handle access decisions which contain either unknown
classes or unknown permissions in known classes.  The three choices for the
policy flags are

0 - Deny unknown security access. (default)
2 - reject loading policy if it does not contain all definitions
4 - allow unknown security access

The policy's choice is exported through 2 booleans in
selinuxfs.  /selinux/deny_unknown and /selinux/reject_unknown.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

It reduces the selinux overhead on read/write by only revalidating
permissions in selinux_file_permission if the task or inode labels have
changed or the policy has changed since the open-time check.  A new LSM
hook, security_dentry_open, is added to capture the necessary state at open
time to allow this optimization.

(see http://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=118972995207740&w=2)

Signed-off-by: Yuichi Nakamura<ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Add a new security check on mmap operations to see if the user is attempting
to mmap to low area of the address space.  The amount of space protected is
indicated by the new proc tunable /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr and defaults to
0, preserving existing behavior.

This patch uses a new SELinux security class "memprotect."  Policy already
contains a number of allow rules like a_t self:process * (unconfined_t being
one of them) which mean that putting this check in the process class (its
best current fit) would make it useless as all user processes, which we also
want to protect against, would be allowed. By taking the memprotect name of
the new class it will also make it possible for us to move some of the other
memory protect permissions out of 'process' and into the new class next time
we bump the policy version number (which I also think is a good future idea)
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NChris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

In security_get_user_sids, move the transition permission checks
outside of the section holding the policy rdlock, and use the AVC to
perform the checks, calling cond_resched after each one.  These
changes should allow preemption between the individual checks and
enable caching of the results.  It may however increase the overall
time spent in the function in some cases, particularly in the cache
miss case.

The long term fix will be to take much of this logic to userspace by
exporting additional state via selinuxfs, and ultimately deprecating
and eliminating this interface from the kernel.
Tested-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

The structure is as follows (relative to selinuxfs root):

/class/file/index
/class/file/perms/read
/class/file/perms/write
...

Each class is allocated 33 inodes, 1 for the class index and 32 for
permissions.  Relative to SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET, the inode of the index file
DIV 33 is the class number.  The inode of the permission file % 33 is the
index of the permission for that class.
Signed-off-by: NChristopher J. PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Add support to the SELinux security server for obtaining a list of classes,
and for obtaining a list of permissions for a specified class.
Signed-off-by: NChristopher J. PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Make the initial SID contexts accessible to userspace via selinuxfs.
An initial use of this support will be to make the unlabeled context
available to libselinux for use for invalidated userspace SIDs.
Signed-off-by: NJames Carter <jwcart2@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Remove userland security class and permission definitions from the kernel
as the kernel only needs to use and validate its own class and permission
definitions and userland definitions may change.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

As suggested, move the security_skb_extlbl_sid() function out of the security
server and into the SELinux hooks file.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

In the beginning I named the file selinux_netlabel.h to avoid potential
namespace colisions.  However, over time I have realized that there are several
other similar cases of multiple header files with the same name so I'm changing
the name to something which better fits with existing naming conventions.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Up until this patch the functions which have provided NetLabel support to
SELinux have been integrated into the SELinux security server, which for
various reasons is not really ideal.  This patch makes an effort to extract as
much of the NetLabel support from the security server as possibile and move it
into it's own file within the SELinux directory structure.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

This patch is an incremental fix to the flow_cache_genid
patch for selinux that breaks the build of 2.6.20-rc6 when
xfrm is not configured.
Signed-off-by: NVenkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Use a forward declaration instead of dragging in skbuff.h and
related junk.
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Now that labeled IPsec makes use of the peer_sid field in the
sk_security_struct we can remove a lot of the special cases between labeled
IPsec and NetLabel.  In addition, create a new function,
security_skb_extlbl_sid(), which we can use in several places to get the
security context of the packet's external label which allows us to further
simplify the code in a few places.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

This patch does a lot of cleanup in the SELinux NetLabel support code.  A
summary of the changes include:

* Use RCU locking for the NetLabel state variable in the skk_security_struct
  instead of using the inode_security_struct mutex.
* Remove unnecessary parameters in selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create().
* Rename selinux_netlbl_sk_clone_security() to
  selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone() to better fit the other NetLabel
  sk_security functions.
* Improvements to selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() to help reduce the cost of
  the common case.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

This patch implements SELinux kernel support for DCCP
(http://linux-net.osdl.org/index.php/DCCP), which is similar in
operation to TCP in terms of connected state between peers.

The SELinux support for DCCP is thus modeled on existing handling of
TCP.

A new DCCP socket class is introduced, to allow protocol
differentation.  The permissions for this class inherit all of the
socket permissions, as well as the current TCP permissions (node_bind,
name_bind etc). IPv4 and IPv6 are supported, although labeled
networking is not, at this stage.

Patches for SELinux userspace are at:
http://people.redhat.com/jmorris/selinux/dccp/user/

I've performed some basic testing, and it seems to be working as
expected.  Adding policy support is similar to TCP, the only real
difference being that it's a different protocol.
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>