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  1. 24 9月, 2014 1 次提交
  3. 11 9月, 2014 1 次提交
  5. 09 9月, 2014 1 次提交
  7. 05 9月, 2014 1 次提交
  9. 30 8月, 2014 1 次提交
  11. 26 8月, 2014 1 次提交
  13. 19 8月, 2014 2 次提交
  15. 13 8月, 2014 1 次提交
  17. 11 8月, 2014 2 次提交
  19. 10 8月, 2014 2 次提交
  21. 09 8月, 2014 3 次提交
    • V
      kexec: implementation of new syscall kexec_file_load · cb105258
      由 Vivek Goyal 提交于 
      Previous patch provided the interface definition and this patch prvides
implementation of new syscall.

Previously segment list was prepared in user space.  Now user space just
passes kernel fd, initrd fd and command line and kernel will create a
segment list internally.

This patch contains generic part of the code.  Actual segment preparation
and loading is done by arch and image specific loader.  Which comes in
next patch.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: WANG Chao <chaowang@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      cb105258
    • D
      shm: add memfd_create() syscall · 9183df25
      由 David Herrmann 提交于 
      memfd_create() is similar to mmap(MAP_ANON), but returns a file-descriptor
that you can pass to mmap().  It can support sealing and avoids any
connection to user-visible mount-points.  Thus, it's not subject to quotas
on mounted file-systems, but can be used like malloc()'ed memory, but with
a file-descriptor to it.

memfd_create() returns the raw shmem file, so calls like ftruncate() can
be used to modify the underlying inode.  Also calls like fstat() will
return proper information and mark the file as regular file.  If you want
sealing, you can specify MFD_ALLOW_SEALING.  Otherwise, sealing is not
supported (like on all other regular files).

Compared to O_TMPFILE, it does not require a tmpfs mount-point and is not
subject to a filesystem size limit.  It is still properly accounted to
memcg limits, though, and to the same overcommit or no-overcommit
accounting as all user memory.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NHugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Ryan Lortie <desrt@desrt.ca>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Cc: Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      9183df25
    • D
      shm: add sealing API · 40e041a2
      由 David Herrmann 提交于 
      If two processes share a common memory region, they usually want some
guarantees to allow safe access. This often includes:
  - one side cannot overwrite data while the other reads it
  - one side cannot shrink the buffer while the other accesses it
  - one side cannot grow the buffer beyond previously set boundaries

If there is a trust-relationship between both parties, there is no need
for policy enforcement.  However, if there's no trust relationship (eg.,
for general-purpose IPC) sharing memory-regions is highly fragile and
often not possible without local copies.  Look at the following two
use-cases:

  1) A graphics client wants to share its rendering-buffer with a
     graphics-server. The memory-region is allocated by the client for
     read/write access and a second FD is passed to the server. While
     scanning out from the memory region, the server has no guarantee that
     the client doesn't shrink the buffer at any time, requiring rather
     cumbersome SIGBUS handling.
  2) A process wants to perform an RPC on another process. To avoid huge
     bandwidth consumption, zero-copy is preferred. After a message is
     assembled in-memory and a FD is passed to the remote side, both sides
     want to be sure that neither modifies this shared copy, anymore. The
     source may have put sensible data into the message without a separate
     copy and the target may want to parse the message inline, to avoid a
     local copy.

While SIGBUS handling, POSIX mandatory locking and MAP_DENYWRITE provide
ways to achieve most of this, the first one is unproportionally ugly to
use in libraries and the latter two are broken/racy or even disabled due
to denial of service attacks.

This patch introduces the concept of SEALING.  If you seal a file, a
specific set of operations is blocked on that file forever.  Unlike locks,
seals can only be set, never removed.  Hence, once you verified a specific
set of seals is set, you're guaranteed that no-one can perform the blocked
operations on this file, anymore.

An initial set of SEALS is introduced by this patch:
  - SHRINK: If SEAL_SHRINK is set, the file in question cannot be reduced
            in size. This affects ftruncate() and open(O_TRUNC).
  - GROW: If SEAL_GROW is set, the file in question cannot be increased
          in size. This affects ftruncate(), fallocate() and write().
  - WRITE: If SEAL_WRITE is set, no write operations (besides resizing)
           are possible. This affects fallocate(PUNCH_HOLE), mmap() and
           write().
  - SEAL: If SEAL_SEAL is set, no further seals can be added to a file.
          This basically prevents the F_ADD_SEAL operation on a file and
          can be set to prevent others from adding further seals that you
          don't want.

The described use-cases can easily use these seals to provide safe use
without any trust-relationship:

  1) The graphics server can verify that a passed file-descriptor has
     SEAL_SHRINK set. This allows safe scanout, while the client is
     allowed to increase buffer size for window-resizing on-the-fly.
     Concurrent writes are explicitly allowed.
  2) For general-purpose IPC, both processes can verify that SEAL_SHRINK,
     SEAL_GROW and SEAL_WRITE are set. This guarantees that neither
     process can modify the data while the other side parses it.
     Furthermore, it guarantees that even with writable FDs passed to the
     peer, it cannot increase the size to hit memory-limits of the source
     process (in case the file-storage is accounted to the source).

The new API is an extension to fcntl(), adding two new commands:
  F_GET_SEALS: Return a bitset describing the seals on the file. This
               can be called on any FD if the underlying file supports
               sealing.
  F_ADD_SEALS: Change the seals of a given file. This requires WRITE
               access to the file and F_SEAL_SEAL may not already be set.
               Furthermore, the underlying file must support sealing and
               there may not be any existing shared mapping of that file.
               Otherwise, EBADF/EPERM is returned.
               The given seals are _added_ to the existing set of seals
               on the file. You cannot remove seals again.

The fcntl() handler is currently specific to shmem and disabled on all
files. A file needs to explicitly support sealing for this interface to
work. A separate syscall is added in a follow-up, which creates files that
support sealing. There is no intention to support this on other
file-systems. Semantics are unclear for non-volatile files and we lack any
use-case right now. Therefore, the implementation is specific to shmem.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NHugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Ryan Lortie <desrt@desrt.ca>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Cc: Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      40e041a2
  23. 07 8月, 2014 1 次提交
  25. 06 8月, 2014 5 次提交
    • W
      net-timestamp: ACK timestamp for bytestreams · e1c8a607
      由 Willem de Bruijn 提交于 
      Add SOF_TIMESTAMPING_TX_ACK, a request for a tstamp when the last byte
in the send() call is acknowledged. It implements the feature for TCP.

The timestamp is generated when the TCP socket cumulative ACK is moved
beyond the tracked seqno for the first time. The feature ignores SACK
and FACK, because those acknowledge the specific byte, but not
necessarily the entire contents of the buffer up to that byte.
Signed-off-by: NWillem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      e1c8a607
    • W
      net-timestamp: SCHED timestamp on entering packet scheduler · e7fd2885
      由 Willem de Bruijn 提交于 
      Kernel transmit latency is often incurred in the packet scheduler.
Introduce a new timestamp on transmission just before entering the
scheduler. When data travels through multiple devices (bonding,
tunneling, ...) each device will export an individual timestamp.
Signed-off-by: NWillem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      e7fd2885
    • W
      net-timestamp: add key to disambiguate concurrent datagrams · 09c2d251
      由 Willem de Bruijn 提交于 
      Datagrams timestamped on transmission can coexist in the kernel stack
and be reordered in packet scheduling. When reading looped datagrams
from the socket error queue it is not always possible to unique
correlate looped data with original send() call (for application
level retransmits). Even if possible, it may be expensive and complex,
requiring packet inspection.

Introduce a data-independent ID mechanism to associate timestamps with
send calls. Pass an ID alongside the timestamp in field ee_data of
sock_extended_err.

The ID is a simple 32 bit unsigned int that is associated with the
socket and incremented on each send() call for which software tx
timestamp generation is enabled.

The feature is enabled only if SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID is set, to
avoid changing ee_data for existing applications that expect it 0.
The counter is reset each time the flag is reenabled. Reenabling
does not change the ID of already submitted data. It is possible
to receive out of order IDs if the timestamp stream is not quiesced
first.
Signed-off-by: NWillem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      09c2d251
    • W
      net-timestamp: extend SCM_TIMESTAMPING ancillary data struct · f24b9be5
      由 Willem de Bruijn 提交于 
      Applications that request kernel tx timestamps with SO_TIMESTAMPING
read timestamps as recvmsg() ancillary data. The response is defined
implicitly as timespec[3].

1) define struct scm_timestamping explicitly and

2) add support for new tstamp types. On tx, scm_timestamping always
   accompanies a sock_extended_err. Define previously unused field
   ee_info to signal the type of ts[0]. Introduce SCM_TSTAMP_SND to
   define the existing behavior.

The reception path is not modified. On rx, no struct similar to
sock_extended_err is passed along with SCM_TIMESTAMPING.
Signed-off-by: NWillem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      f24b9be5
    • T
      random: introduce getrandom(2) system call · c6e9d6f3
      由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于 
      The getrandom(2) system call was requested by the LibreSSL Portable
developers.  It is analoguous to the getentropy(2) system call in
OpenBSD.

The rationale of this system call is to provide resiliance against
file descriptor exhaustion attacks, where the attacker consumes all
available file descriptors, forcing the use of the fallback code where
/dev/[u]random is not available.  Since the fallback code is often not
well-tested, it is better to eliminate this potential failure mode
entirely.

The other feature provided by this new system call is the ability to
request randomness from the /dev/urandom entropy pool, but to block
until at least 128 bits of entropy has been accumulated in the
/dev/urandom entropy pool.  Historically, the emphasis in the
/dev/urandom development has been to ensure that urandom pool is
initialized as quickly as possible after system boot, and preferably
before the init scripts start execution.

This is because changing /dev/urandom reads to block represents an
interface change that could potentially break userspace which is not
acceptable.  In practice, on most x86 desktop and server systems, in
general the entropy pool can be initialized before it is needed (and
in modern kernels, we will printk a warning message if not).  However,
on an embedded system, this may not be the case.  And so with this new
interface, we can provide the functionality of blocking until the
urandom pool has been initialized.  Any userspace program which uses
this new functionality must take care to assure that if it is used
during the boot process, that it will not cause the init scripts or
other portions of the system startup to hang indefinitely.

SYNOPSIS
	#include <linux/random.h>

	int getrandom(void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags);

DESCRIPTION
	The system call getrandom() fills the buffer pointed to by buf
	with up to buflen random bytes which can be used to seed user
	space random number generators (i.e., DRBG's) or for other
	cryptographic uses.  It should not be used for Monte Carlo
	simulations or other programs/algorithms which are doing
	probabilistic sampling.

	If the GRND_RANDOM flags bit is set, then draw from the
	/dev/random pool instead of the /dev/urandom pool.  The
	/dev/random pool is limited based on the entropy that can be
	obtained from environmental noise, so if there is insufficient
	entropy, the requested number of bytes may not be returned.
	If there is no entropy available at all, getrandom(2) will
	either block, or return an error with errno set to EAGAIN if
	the GRND_NONBLOCK bit is set in flags.

	If the GRND_RANDOM bit is not set, then the /dev/urandom pool
	will be used.  Unlike using read(2) to fetch data from
	/dev/urandom, if the urandom pool has not been sufficiently
	initialized, getrandom(2) will block (or return -1 with the
	errno set to EAGAIN if the GRND_NONBLOCK bit is set in flags).

	The getentropy(2) system call in OpenBSD can be emulated using
	the following function:

            int getentropy(void *buf, size_t buflen)
            {
                    int     ret;

                    if (buflen > 256)
                            goto failure;
                    ret = getrandom(buf, buflen, 0);
                    if (ret < 0)
                            return ret;
                    if (ret == buflen)
                            return 0;
            failure:
                    errno = EIO;
                    return -1;
            }

RETURN VALUE
       On success, the number of bytes that was filled in the buf is
       returned.  This may not be all the bytes requested by the
       caller via buflen if insufficient entropy was present in the
       /dev/random pool, or if the system call was interrupted by a
       signal.

       On error, -1 is returned, and errno is set appropriately.

ERRORS
	EINVAL		An invalid flag was passed to getrandom(2)

	EFAULT		buf is outside the accessible address space.

	EAGAIN		The requested entropy was not available, and
			getentropy(2) would have blocked if the
			GRND_NONBLOCK flag was not set.

	EINTR		While blocked waiting for entropy, the call was
			interrupted by a signal handler; see the description
			of how interrupted read(2) calls on "slow" devices
			are handled with and without the SA_RESTART flag
			in the signal(7) man page.

NOTES
	For small requests (buflen <= 256) getrandom(2) will not
	return EINTR when reading from the urandom pool once the
	entropy pool has been initialized, and it will return all of
	the bytes that have been requested.  This is the recommended
	way to use getrandom(2), and is designed for compatibility
	with OpenBSD's getentropy() system call.

	However, if you are using GRND_RANDOM, then getrandom(2) may
	block until the entropy accounting determines that sufficient
	environmental noise has been gathered such that getrandom(2)
	will be operating as a NRBG instead of a DRBG for those people
	who are working in the NIST SP 800-90 regime.  Since it may
	block for a long time, these guarantees do *not* apply.  The
	user may want to interrupt a hanging process using a signal,
	so blocking until all of the requested bytes are returned
	would be unfriendly.

	For this reason, the user of getrandom(2) MUST always check
	the return value, in case it returns some error, or if fewer
	bytes than requested was returned.  In the case of
	!GRND_RANDOM and small request, the latter should never
	happen, but the careful userspace code (and all crypto code
	should be careful) should check for this anyway!

	Finally, unless you are doing long-term key generation (and
	perhaps not even then), you probably shouldn't be using
	GRND_RANDOM.  The cryptographic algorithms used for
	/dev/urandom are quite conservative, and so should be
	sufficient for all purposes.  The disadvantage of GRND_RANDOM
	is that it can block, and the increased complexity required to
	deal with partially fulfilled getrandom(2) requests.
Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NZach Brown <zab@zabbo.net>
      c6e9d6f3
  27. 05 8月, 2014 2 次提交
  29. 04 8月, 2014 2 次提交
  31. 03 8月, 2014 1 次提交
    • A
      net: filter: split 'struct sk_filter' into socket and bpf parts · 7ae457c1
      由 Alexei Starovoitov 提交于 
      clean up names related to socket filtering and bpf in the following way:
- everything that deals with sockets keeps 'sk_*' prefix
- everything that is pure BPF is changed to 'bpf_*' prefix

split 'struct sk_filter' into
struct sk_filter {
	atomic_t        refcnt;
	struct rcu_head rcu;
	struct bpf_prog *prog;
};
and
struct bpf_prog {
        u32                     jited:1,
                                len:31;
        struct sock_fprog_kern  *orig_prog;
        unsigned int            (*bpf_func)(const struct sk_buff *skb,
                                            const struct bpf_insn *filter);
        union {
                struct sock_filter      insns[0];
                struct bpf_insn         insnsi[0];
                struct work_struct      work;
        };
};
so that 'struct bpf_prog' can be used independent of sockets and cleans up
'unattached' bpf use cases

split SK_RUN_FILTER macro into:
    SK_RUN_FILTER to be used with 'struct sk_filter *' and
    BPF_PROG_RUN to be used with 'struct bpf_prog *'

__sk_filter_release(struct sk_filter *) gains
__bpf_prog_release(struct bpf_prog *) helper function

also perform related renames for the functions that work
with 'struct bpf_prog *', since they're on the same lines:

sk_filter_size -> bpf_prog_size
sk_filter_select_runtime -> bpf_prog_select_runtime
sk_filter_free -> bpf_prog_free
sk_unattached_filter_create -> bpf_prog_create
sk_unattached_filter_destroy -> bpf_prog_destroy
sk_store_orig_filter -> bpf_prog_store_orig_filter
sk_release_orig_filter -> bpf_release_orig_filter
__sk_migrate_filter -> bpf_migrate_filter
__sk_prepare_filter -> bpf_prepare_filter

API for attaching classic BPF to a socket stays the same:
sk_attach_filter(prog, struct sock *)/sk_detach_filter(struct sock *)
and SK_RUN_FILTER(struct sk_filter *, ctx) to execute a program
which is used by sockets, tun, af_packet

API for 'unattached' BPF programs becomes:
bpf_prog_create(struct bpf_prog **)/bpf_prog_destroy(struct bpf_prog *)
and BPF_PROG_RUN(struct bpf_prog *, ctx) to execute a program
which is used by isdn, ppp, team, seccomp, ptp, xt_bpf, cls_bpf, test_bpf
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      7ae457c1
  33. 02 8月, 2014 1 次提交
  35. 31 7月, 2014 2 次提交
  37. 30 7月, 2014 1 次提交
  39. 29 7月, 2014 1 次提交
  41. 28 7月, 2014 2 次提交
    • A
      KVM: Allow KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION on the vm fd · 92b591a4
      由 Alexander Graf 提交于 
      The KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION is only available on the kvm fd today. Unfortunately
on PPC some of the capabilities change depending on the way a VM was created.

So instead we need a way to expose capabilities as VM ioctl, so that we can
see which VM type we're using (HV or PR). To enable this, add the
KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION ioctl to our vm ioctl portfolio.
Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
Acked-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      92b591a4
    • P
      KVM: PPC: Book3S: Controls for in-kernel sPAPR hypercall handling · 699a0ea0
      由 Paul Mackerras 提交于 
      This provides a way for userspace controls which sPAPR hcalls get
handled in the kernel.  Each hcall can be individually enabled or
disabled for in-kernel handling, except for H_RTAS.  The exception
for H_RTAS is because userspace can already control whether
individual RTAS functions are handled in-kernel or not via the
KVM_PPC_RTAS_DEFINE_TOKEN ioctl, and because the numeric value for
H_RTAS is out of the normal sequence of hcall numbers.

Hcalls are enabled or disabled using the KVM_ENABLE_CAP ioctl for the
KVM_CAP_PPC_ENABLE_HCALL capability on the file descriptor for the VM.
The args field of the struct kvm_enable_cap specifies the hcall number
in args[0] and the enable/disable flag in args[1]; 0 means disable
in-kernel handling (so that the hcall will always cause an exit to
userspace) and 1 means enable.  Enabling or disabling in-kernel
handling of an hcall is effective across the whole VM.

The ability for KVM_ENABLE_CAP to be used on a VM file descriptor
on PowerPC is new, added by this commit.  The KVM_CAP_ENABLE_CAP_VM
capability advertises that this ability exists.

When a VM is created, an initial set of hcalls are enabled for
in-kernel handling.  The set that is enabled is the set that have
an in-kernel implementation at this point.  Any new hcall
implementations from this point onwards should not be added to the
default set without a good reason.

No distinction is made between real-mode and virtual-mode hcall
implementations; the one setting controls them both.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
      699a0ea0
  43. 26 7月, 2014 2 次提交
  45. 24 7月, 2014 1 次提交
  47. 23 7月, 2014 1 次提交
  49. 22 7月, 2014 2 次提交