1. 12 12月, 2016 1 次提交
  2. 15 11月, 2016 1 次提交
  3. 09 11月, 2016 1 次提交
    • K
      gcc-plugins: Adjust Kconfig to avoid cyc_complexity · 215e2aa6
      Kees Cook 提交于
      In preparation for removing "depends on !COMPILE_TEST" from GCC_PLUGINS,
      the GCC_PLUGIN_CYC_COMPLEXITY plugin needs to gain the restriction,
      since it is mainly an example, and produces (intended) voluminous stderr
      reporting, which is generally undesirable for allyesconfig-style build
      tests. This additionally puts the plugin behind EXPERT and improves the
      help text.
      Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      215e2aa6
  4. 11 10月, 2016 1 次提交
    • E
      gcc-plugins: Add latent_entropy plugin · 38addce8
      Emese Revfy 提交于
      This adds a new gcc plugin named "latent_entropy". It is designed to
      extract as much possible uncertainty from a running system at boot time as
      possible, hoping to capitalize on any possible variation in CPU operation
      (due to runtime data differences, hardware differences, SMP ordering,
      thermal timing variation, cache behavior, etc).
      
      At the very least, this plugin is a much more comprehensive example for
      how to manipulate kernel code using the gcc plugin internals.
      
      The need for very-early boot entropy tends to be very architecture or
      system design specific, so this plugin is more suited for those sorts
      of special cases. The existing kernel RNG already attempts to extract
      entropy from reliable runtime variation, but this plugin takes the idea to
      a logical extreme by permuting a global variable based on any variation
      in code execution (e.g. a different value (and permutation function)
      is used to permute the global based on loop count, case statement,
      if/then/else branching, etc).
      
      To do this, the plugin starts by inserting a local variable in every
      marked function. The plugin then adds logic so that the value of this
      variable is modified by randomly chosen operations (add, xor and rol) and
      random values (gcc generates separate static values for each location at
      compile time and also injects the stack pointer at runtime). The resulting
      value depends on the control flow path (e.g., loops and branches taken).
      
      Before the function returns, the plugin mixes this local variable into
      the latent_entropy global variable. The value of this global variable
      is added to the kernel entropy pool in do_one_initcall() and _do_fork(),
      though it does not credit any bytes of entropy to the pool; the contents
      of the global are just used to mix the pool.
      
      Additionally, the plugin can pre-initialize arrays with build-time
      random contents, so that two different kernel builds running on identical
      hardware will not have the same starting values.
      Signed-off-by: NEmese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
      [kees: expanded commit message and code comments]
      Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      38addce8
  5. 22 9月, 2016 1 次提交
  6. 09 9月, 2016 2 次提交
    • N
      kbuild: allow archs to select link dead code/data elimination · b67067f1
      Nicholas Piggin 提交于
      Introduce LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION option for architectures to
      select to build with -ffunction-sections, -fdata-sections, and link
      with --gc-sections. It requires some work (documented) to ensure all
      unreferenced entrypoints are live, and requires toolchain and build
      verification, so it is made a per-arch option for now.
      
      On a random powerpc64le build, this yelds a significant size saving,
      it boots and runs fine, but there is a lot I haven't tested as yet, so
      these savings may be reduced if there are bugs in the link.
      
          text      data        bss        dec   filename
      11169741   1180744    1923176	14273661   vmlinux
      10445269   1004127    1919707	13369103   vmlinux.dce
      
      ~700K text, ~170K data, 6% removed from kernel image size.
      Signed-off-by: NNicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NMichal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>
      b67067f1
    • S
      kbuild: allow architectures to use thin archives instead of ld -r · a5967db9
      Stephen Rothwell 提交于
      ld -r is an incremental link used to create built-in.o files in build
      subdirectories. It produces relocatable object files containing all
      its input files, and these are are then pulled together and relocated
      in the final link. Aside from the bloat, this constrains the final
      link relocations, which has bitten large powerpc builds with
      unresolvable relocations in the final link.
      
      Alan Modra has recommended the kernel use thin archives for linking.
      This is an alternative and means that the linker has more information
      available to it when it links the kernel.
      
      This patch enables a config option architectures can select, which
      causes all built-in.o files to be built as thin archives. built-in.o
      files in subdirectories do not get symbol table or index attached,
      which improves speed and size. The final link pass creates a
      built-in.o archive in the root output directory which includes the
      symbol table and index. The linker then uses takes this file to link.
      
      The --whole-archive linker option is required, because the linker now
      has visibility to every individual object file, and it will otherwise
      just completely avoid including those without external references
      (consider a file with EXPORT_SYMBOL or initcall or hardware exceptions
      as its only entry points). The traditional built works "by luck" as
      built-in.o files are large enough that they're going to get external
      references. However this optimisation is unpredictable for the kernel
      (due to above external references), ineffective at culling unused, and
      costly because the .o files have to be searched for references.
      Superior alternatives for link-time culling should be used instead.
      
      Build characteristics for inclink vs thinarc, on a small powerpc64le
      pseries VM with a modest .config:
      
                                        inclink       thinarc
      sizes
      vmlinux                        15 618 680    15 625 028
      sum of all built-in.o          56 091 808     1 054 334
      sum excluding root built-in.o                   151 430
      
      find -name built-in.o | xargs rm ; time make vmlinux
      real                              22.772s       21.143s
      user                              13.280s       13.430s
      sys                                4.310s        2.750s
      
      - Final kernel pulled in only about 6K more, which shows how
        ineffective the object file culling is.
      - Build performance looks improved due to less pagecache activity.
        On IO constrained systems it could be a bigger win.
      - Build size saving is significant.
      
      Side note, the toochain understands archives, so there's some tricks,
      $ ar t built-in.o          # list all files you linked with
      $ size built-in.o          # and their sizes
      $ objdump -d built-in.o    # disassembly (unrelocated) with filenames
      
      Implementation by sfr, minor tweaks by npiggin.
      Signed-off-by: NStephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
      Signed-off-by: NNicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NMichal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>
      a5967db9
  7. 08 9月, 2016 1 次提交
  8. 24 8月, 2016 1 次提交
  9. 09 8月, 2016 1 次提交
  10. 27 7月, 2016 2 次提交
  11. 25 6月, 2016 1 次提交
    • L
      Clarify naming of thread info/stack allocators · b235beea
      Linus Torvalds 提交于
      We've had the thread info allocated together with the thread stack for
      most architectures for a long time (since the thread_info was split off
      from the task struct), but that is about to change.
      
      But the patches that move the thread info to be off-stack (and a part of
      the task struct instead) made it clear how confused the allocator and
      freeing functions are.
      
      Because the common case was that we share an allocation with the thread
      stack and the thread_info, the two pointers were identical.  That
      identity then meant that we would have things like
      
      	ti = alloc_thread_info_node(tsk, node);
      	...
      	tsk->stack = ti;
      
      which certainly _worked_ (since stack and thread_info have the same
      value), but is rather confusing: why are we assigning a thread_info to
      the stack? And if we move the thread_info away, the "confusing" code
      just gets to be entirely bogus.
      
      So remove all this confusion, and make it clear that we are doing the
      stack allocation by renaming and clarifying the function names to be
      about the stack.  The fact that the thread_info then shares the
      allocation is an implementation detail, and not really about the
      allocation itself.
      
      This is a pure renaming and type fix: we pass in the same pointer, it's
      just that we clarify what the pointer means.
      
      The ia64 code that actually only has one single allocation (for all of
      task_struct, thread_info and kernel thread stack) now looks a bit odd,
      but since "tsk->stack" is actually not even used there, that oddity
      doesn't matter.  It would be a separate thing to clean that up, I
      intentionally left the ia64 changes as a pure brute-force renaming and
      type change.
      Acked-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      b235beea
  12. 18 6月, 2016 1 次提交
    • W
      isa: Allow ISA-style drivers on modern systems · 3a495511
      William Breathitt Gray 提交于
      Several modern devices, such as PC/104 cards, are expected to run on
      modern systems via an ISA bus interface. Since ISA is a legacy interface
      for most modern architectures, ISA support should remain disabled in
      general. Support for ISA-style drivers should be enabled on a per driver
      basis.
      
      To allow ISA-style drivers on modern systems, this patch introduces the
      ISA_BUS_API and ISA_BUS Kconfig options. The ISA bus driver will now
      build conditionally on the ISA_BUS_API Kconfig option, which defaults to
      the legacy ISA Kconfig option. The ISA_BUS Kconfig option allows the
      ISA_BUS_API Kconfig option to be selected on architectures which do not
      enable ISA (e.g. X86_64).
      
      The ISA_BUS Kconfig option is currently only implemented for X86
      architectures. Other architectures may have their own ISA_BUS Kconfig
      options added as required.
      Reviewed-by: NGuenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
      Signed-off-by: NWilliam Breathitt Gray <vilhelm.gray@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      3a495511
  13. 08 6月, 2016 3 次提交
    • E
      Add sancov plugin · 543c37cb
      Emese Revfy 提交于
      The sancov gcc plugin inserts a __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() call
      at the start of basic blocks.
      
      This plugin is a helper plugin for the kcov feature. It supports
      all gcc versions with plugin support (from gcc-4.5 on).
      It is based on the gcc commit "Add fuzzing coverage support" by Dmitry Vyukov
      (https://gcc.gnu.org/viewcvs/gcc?limit_changes=0&view=revision&revision=231296).
      Signed-off-by: NEmese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Signed-off-by: NMichal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>
      543c37cb
    • E
      Add Cyclomatic complexity GCC plugin · 0dae776c
      Emese Revfy 提交于
      Add a very simple plugin to demonstrate the GCC plugin infrastructure. This GCC
      plugin computes the cyclomatic complexity of each function.
      
      The complexity M of a function's control flow graph is defined as:
      M = E - N + 2P
      where
      E = the number of edges
      N = the number of nodes
      P = the number of connected components (exit nodes).
      Signed-off-by: NEmese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Signed-off-by: NMichal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>
      0dae776c
    • E
      GCC plugin infrastructure · 6b90bd4b
      Emese Revfy 提交于
      This patch allows to build the whole kernel with GCC plugins. It was ported from
      grsecurity/PaX. The infrastructure supports building out-of-tree modules and
      building in a separate directory. Cross-compilation is supported too.
      Currently the x86, arm, arm64 and uml architectures enable plugins.
      
      The directory of the gcc plugins is scripts/gcc-plugins. You can use a file or a directory
      there. The plugins compile with these options:
       * -fno-rtti: gcc is compiled with this option so the plugins must use it too
       * -fno-exceptions: this is inherited from gcc too
       * -fasynchronous-unwind-tables: this is inherited from gcc too
       * -ggdb: it is useful for debugging a plugin (better backtrace on internal
          errors)
       * -Wno-narrowing: to suppress warnings from gcc headers (ipa-utils.h)
       * -Wno-unused-variable: to suppress warnings from gcc headers (gcc_version
          variable, plugin-version.h)
      
      The infrastructure introduces a new Makefile target called gcc-plugins. It
      supports all gcc versions from 4.5 to 6.0. The scripts/gcc-plugin.sh script
      chooses the proper host compiler (gcc-4.7 can be built by either gcc or g++).
      This script also checks the availability of the included headers in
      scripts/gcc-plugins/gcc-common.h.
      
      The gcc-common.h header contains frequently included headers for GCC plugins
      and it has a compatibility layer for the supported gcc versions.
      
      The gcc-generate-*-pass.h headers automatically generate the registration
      structures for GIMPLE, SIMPLE_IPA, IPA and RTL passes.
      
      Note that 'make clean' keeps the *.so files (only the distclean or mrproper
      targets clean all) because they are needed for out-of-tree modules.
      
      Based on work created by the PaX Team.
      Signed-off-by: NEmese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Signed-off-by: NMichal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>
      6b90bd4b
  14. 29 5月, 2016 1 次提交
    • G
      <linux/hash.h>: Add support for architecture-specific functions · 468a9428
      George Spelvin 提交于
      This is just the infrastructure; there are no users yet.
      
      This is modelled on CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM; a CONFIG_ symbol declares
      the existence of <asm/hash.h>.
      
      That file may define its own versions of various functions, and define
      HAVE_* symbols (no CONFIG_ prefix!) to suppress the generic ones.
      
      Included is a self-test (in lib/test_hash.c) that verifies the basics.
      It is NOT in general required that the arch-specific functions compute
      the same thing as the generic, but if a HAVE_* symbol is defined with
      the value 1, then equality is tested.
      Signed-off-by: NGeorge Spelvin <linux@sciencehorizons.net>
      Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
      Cc: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>
      Cc: Andreas Schwab <schwab@linux-m68k.org>
      Cc: Philippe De Muyter <phdm@macq.eu>
      Cc: linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org
      Cc: Alistair Francis <alistai@xilinx.com>
      Cc: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
      Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
      Cc: uclinux-h8-devel@lists.sourceforge.jp
      468a9428
  15. 21 5月, 2016 3 次提交
    • Z
      lib/GCD.c: use binary GCD algorithm instead of Euclidean · fff7fb0b
      Zhaoxiu Zeng 提交于
      The binary GCD algorithm is based on the following facts:
      	1. If a and b are all evens, then gcd(a,b) = 2 * gcd(a/2, b/2)
      	2. If a is even and b is odd, then gcd(a,b) = gcd(a/2, b)
      	3. If a and b are all odds, then gcd(a,b) = gcd((a-b)/2, b) = gcd((a+b)/2, b)
      
      Even on x86 machines with reasonable division hardware, the binary
      algorithm runs about 25% faster (80% the execution time) than the
      division-based Euclidian algorithm.
      
      On platforms like Alpha and ARMv6 where division is a function call to
      emulation code, it's even more significant.
      
      There are two variants of the code here, depending on whether a fast
      __ffs (find least significant set bit) instruction is available.  This
      allows the unpredictable branches in the bit-at-a-time shifting loop to
      be eliminated.
      
      If fast __ffs is not available, the "even/odd" GCD variant is used.
      
      I use the following code to benchmark:
      
      	#include <stdio.h>
      	#include <stdlib.h>
      	#include <stdint.h>
      	#include <string.h>
      	#include <time.h>
      	#include <unistd.h>
      
      	#define swap(a, b) \
      		do { \
      			a ^= b; \
      			b ^= a; \
      			a ^= b; \
      		} while (0)
      
      	unsigned long gcd0(unsigned long a, unsigned long b)
      	{
      		unsigned long r;
      
      		if (a < b) {
      			swap(a, b);
      		}
      
      		if (b == 0)
      			return a;
      
      		while ((r = a % b) != 0) {
      			a = b;
      			b = r;
      		}
      
      		return b;
      	}
      
      	unsigned long gcd1(unsigned long a, unsigned long b)
      	{
      		unsigned long r = a | b;
      
      		if (!a || !b)
      			return r;
      
      		b >>= __builtin_ctzl(b);
      
      		for (;;) {
      			a >>= __builtin_ctzl(a);
      			if (a == b)
      				return a << __builtin_ctzl(r);
      
      			if (a < b)
      				swap(a, b);
      			a -= b;
      		}
      	}
      
      	unsigned long gcd2(unsigned long a, unsigned long b)
      	{
      		unsigned long r = a | b;
      
      		if (!a || !b)
      			return r;
      
      		r &= -r;
      
      		while (!(b & r))
      			b >>= 1;
      
      		for (;;) {
      			while (!(a & r))
      				a >>= 1;
      			if (a == b)
      				return a;
      
      			if (a < b)
      				swap(a, b);
      			a -= b;
      			a >>= 1;
      			if (a & r)
      				a += b;
      			a >>= 1;
      		}
      	}
      
      	unsigned long gcd3(unsigned long a, unsigned long b)
      	{
      		unsigned long r = a | b;
      
      		if (!a || !b)
      			return r;
      
      		b >>= __builtin_ctzl(b);
      		if (b == 1)
      			return r & -r;
      
      		for (;;) {
      			a >>= __builtin_ctzl(a);
      			if (a == 1)
      				return r & -r;
      			if (a == b)
      				return a << __builtin_ctzl(r);
      
      			if (a < b)
      				swap(a, b);
      			a -= b;
      		}
      	}
      
      	unsigned long gcd4(unsigned long a, unsigned long b)
      	{
      		unsigned long r = a | b;
      
      		if (!a || !b)
      			return r;
      
      		r &= -r;
      
      		while (!(b & r))
      			b >>= 1;
      		if (b == r)
      			return r;
      
      		for (;;) {
      			while (!(a & r))
      				a >>= 1;
      			if (a == r)
      				return r;
      			if (a == b)
      				return a;
      
      			if (a < b)
      				swap(a, b);
      			a -= b;
      			a >>= 1;
      			if (a & r)
      				a += b;
      			a >>= 1;
      		}
      	}
      
      	static unsigned long (*gcd_func[])(unsigned long a, unsigned long b) = {
      		gcd0, gcd1, gcd2, gcd3, gcd4,
      	};
      
      	#define TEST_ENTRIES (sizeof(gcd_func) / sizeof(gcd_func[0]))
      
      	#if defined(__x86_64__)
      
      	#define rdtscll(val) do { \
      		unsigned long __a,__d; \
      		__asm__ __volatile__("rdtsc" : "=a" (__a), "=d" (__d)); \
      		(val) = ((unsigned long long)__a) | (((unsigned long long)__d)<<32); \
      	} while(0)
      
      	static unsigned long long benchmark_gcd_func(unsigned long (*gcd)(unsigned long, unsigned long),
      								unsigned long a, unsigned long b, unsigned long *res)
      	{
      		unsigned long long start, end;
      		unsigned long long ret;
      		unsigned long gcd_res;
      
      		rdtscll(start);
      		gcd_res = gcd(a, b);
      		rdtscll(end);
      
      		if (end >= start)
      			ret = end - start;
      		else
      			ret = ~0ULL - start + 1 + end;
      
      		*res = gcd_res;
      		return ret;
      	}
      
      	#else
      
      	static inline struct timespec read_time(void)
      	{
      		struct timespec time;
      		clock_gettime(CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID, &time);
      		return time;
      	}
      
      	static inline unsigned long long diff_time(struct timespec start, struct timespec end)
      	{
      		struct timespec temp;
      
      		if ((end.tv_nsec - start.tv_nsec) < 0) {
      			temp.tv_sec = end.tv_sec - start.tv_sec - 1;
      			temp.tv_nsec = 1000000000ULL + end.tv_nsec - start.tv_nsec;
      		} else {
      			temp.tv_sec = end.tv_sec - start.tv_sec;
      			temp.tv_nsec = end.tv_nsec - start.tv_nsec;
      		}
      
      		return temp.tv_sec * 1000000000ULL + temp.tv_nsec;
      	}
      
      	static unsigned long long benchmark_gcd_func(unsigned long (*gcd)(unsigned long, unsigned long),
      								unsigned long a, unsigned long b, unsigned long *res)
      	{
      		struct timespec start, end;
      		unsigned long gcd_res;
      
      		start = read_time();
      		gcd_res = gcd(a, b);
      		end = read_time();
      
      		*res = gcd_res;
      		return diff_time(start, end);
      	}
      
      	#endif
      
      	static inline unsigned long get_rand()
      	{
      		if (sizeof(long) == 8)
      			return (unsigned long)rand() << 32 | rand();
      		else
      			return rand();
      	}
      
      	int main(int argc, char **argv)
      	{
      		unsigned int seed = time(0);
      		int loops = 100;
      		int repeats = 1000;
      		unsigned long (*res)[TEST_ENTRIES];
      		unsigned long long elapsed[TEST_ENTRIES];
      		int i, j, k;
      
      		for (;;) {
      			int opt = getopt(argc, argv, "n:r:s:");
      			/* End condition always first */
      			if (opt == -1)
      				break;
      
      			switch (opt) {
      			case 'n':
      				loops = atoi(optarg);
      				break;
      			case 'r':
      				repeats = atoi(optarg);
      				break;
      			case 's':
      				seed = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
      				break;
      			default:
      				/* You won't actually get here. */
      				break;
      			}
      		}
      
      		res = malloc(sizeof(unsigned long) * TEST_ENTRIES * loops);
      		memset(elapsed, 0, sizeof(elapsed));
      
      		srand(seed);
      		for (j = 0; j < loops; j++) {
      			unsigned long a = get_rand();
      			/* Do we have args? */
      			unsigned long b = argc > optind ? strtoul(argv[optind], NULL, 10) : get_rand();
      			unsigned long long min_elapsed[TEST_ENTRIES];
      			for (k = 0; k < repeats; k++) {
      				for (i = 0; i < TEST_ENTRIES; i++) {
      					unsigned long long tmp = benchmark_gcd_func(gcd_func[i], a, b, &res[j][i]);
      					if (k == 0 || min_elapsed[i] > tmp)
      						min_elapsed[i] = tmp;
      				}
      			}
      			for (i = 0; i < TEST_ENTRIES; i++)
      				elapsed[i] += min_elapsed[i];
      		}
      
      		for (i = 0; i < TEST_ENTRIES; i++)
      			printf("gcd%d: elapsed %llu\n", i, elapsed[i]);
      
      		k = 0;
      		srand(seed);
      		for (j = 0; j < loops; j++) {
      			unsigned long a = get_rand();
      			unsigned long b = argc > optind ? strtoul(argv[optind], NULL, 10) : get_rand();
      			for (i = 1; i < TEST_ENTRIES; i++) {
      				if (res[j][i] != res[j][0])
      					break;
      			}
      			if (i < TEST_ENTRIES) {
      				if (k == 0) {
      					k = 1;
      					fprintf(stderr, "Error:\n");
      				}
      				fprintf(stderr, "gcd(%lu, %lu): ", a, b);
      				for (i = 0; i < TEST_ENTRIES; i++)
      					fprintf(stderr, "%ld%s", res[j][i], i < TEST_ENTRIES - 1 ? ", " : "\n");
      			}
      		}
      
      		if (k == 0)
      			fprintf(stderr, "PASS\n");
      
      		free(res);
      
      		return 0;
      	}
      
      Compiled with "-O2", on "VirtualBox 4.4.0-22-generic #38-Ubuntu x86_64" got:
      
        zhaoxiuzeng@zhaoxiuzeng-VirtualBox:~/develop$ ./gcd -r 500000 -n 10
        gcd0: elapsed 10174
        gcd1: elapsed 2120
        gcd2: elapsed 2902
        gcd3: elapsed 2039
        gcd4: elapsed 2812
        PASS
        zhaoxiuzeng@zhaoxiuzeng-VirtualBox:~/develop$ ./gcd -r 500000 -n 10
        gcd0: elapsed 9309
        gcd1: elapsed 2280
        gcd2: elapsed 2822
        gcd3: elapsed 2217
        gcd4: elapsed 2710
        PASS
        zhaoxiuzeng@zhaoxiuzeng-VirtualBox:~/develop$ ./gcd -r 500000 -n 10
        gcd0: elapsed 9589
        gcd1: elapsed 2098
        gcd2: elapsed 2815
        gcd3: elapsed 2030
        gcd4: elapsed 2718
        PASS
        zhaoxiuzeng@zhaoxiuzeng-VirtualBox:~/develop$ ./gcd -r 500000 -n 10
        gcd0: elapsed 9914
        gcd1: elapsed 2309
        gcd2: elapsed 2779
        gcd3: elapsed 2228
        gcd4: elapsed 2709
        PASS
      
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: avoid #defining a CONFIG_ variable]
      Signed-off-by: NZhaoxiu Zeng <zhaoxiu.zeng@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NGeorge Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      fff7fb0b
    • P
      printk/nmi: generic solution for safe printk in NMI · 42a0bb3f
      Petr Mladek 提交于
      printk() takes some locks and could not be used a safe way in NMI
      context.
      
      The chance of a deadlock is real especially when printing stacks from
      all CPUs.  This particular problem has been addressed on x86 by the
      commit a9edc880 ("x86/nmi: Perform a safe NMI stack trace on all
      CPUs").
      
      The patchset brings two big advantages.  First, it makes the NMI
      backtraces safe on all architectures for free.  Second, it makes all NMI
      messages almost safe on all architectures (the temporary buffer is
      limited.  We still should keep the number of messages in NMI context at
      minimum).
      
      Note that there already are several messages printed in NMI context:
      WARN_ON(in_nmi()), BUG_ON(in_nmi()), anything being printed out from MCE
      handlers.  These are not easy to avoid.
      
      This patch reuses most of the code and makes it generic.  It is useful
      for all messages and architectures that support NMI.
      
      The alternative printk_func is set when entering and is reseted when
      leaving NMI context.  It queues IRQ work to copy the messages into the
      main ring buffer in a safe context.
      
      __printk_nmi_flush() copies all available messages and reset the buffer.
      Then we could use a simple cmpxchg operations to get synchronized with
      writers.  There is also used a spinlock to get synchronized with other
      flushers.
      
      We do not longer use seq_buf because it depends on external lock.  It
      would be hard to make all supported operations safe for a lockless use.
      It would be confusing and error prone to make only some operations safe.
      
      The code is put into separate printk/nmi.c as suggested by Steven
      Rostedt.  It needs a per-CPU buffer and is compiled only on
      architectures that call nmi_enter().  This is achieved by the new
      HAVE_NMI Kconfig flag.
      
      The are MN10300 and Xtensa architectures.  We need to clean up NMI
      handling there first.  Let's do it separately.
      
      The patch is heavily based on the draft from Peter Zijlstra, see
      
        https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/6/10/327
      
      [arnd@arndb.de: printk-nmi: use %zu format string for size_t]
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: min_t->min - all types are size_t here]
      Signed-off-by: NPetr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
      Suggested-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Suggested-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
      Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
      Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>	[arm part]
      Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
      Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
      Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
      Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      42a0bb3f
    • J
      exit_thread: remove empty bodies · 5f56a5df
      Jiri Slaby 提交于
      Define HAVE_EXIT_THREAD for archs which want to do something in
      exit_thread. For others, let's define exit_thread as an empty inline.
      
      This is a cleanup before we change the prototype of exit_thread to
      accept a task parameter.
      
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix mips]
      Signed-off-by: NJiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
      Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
      Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org>
      Cc: Aurelien Jacquiot <a-jacquiot@ti.com>
      Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
      Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      Cc: Chen Liqin <liqin.linux@gmail.com>
      Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
      Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
      Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
      Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
      Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@mprc.pku.edu.cn>
      Cc: Haavard Skinnemoen <hskinnemoen@gmail.com>
      Cc: Hans-Christian Egtvedt <egtvedt@samfundet.no>
      Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
      Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
      Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
      Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
      Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
      Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com>
      Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
      Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se>
      Cc: Koichi Yasutake <yasutake.koichi@jp.panasonic.com>
      Cc: Lennox Wu <lennox.wu@gmail.com>
      Cc: Ley Foon Tan <lftan@altera.com>
      Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
      Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
      Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
      Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
      Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
      Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
      Cc: Mikael Starvik <starvik@axis.com>
      Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
      Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
      Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
      Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org>
      Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
      Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
      Cc: Steven Miao <realmz6@gmail.com>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
      Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      5f56a5df
  16. 29 2月, 2016 1 次提交
  17. 21 1月, 2016 2 次提交
    • C
      dma-mapping: always provide the dma_map_ops based implementation · e1c7e324
      Christoph Hellwig 提交于
      Move the generic implementation to <linux/dma-mapping.h> now that all
      architectures support it and remove the HAVE_DMA_ATTR Kconfig symbol now
      that everyone supports them.
      
      [valentinrothberg@gmail.com: remove leftovers in Kconfig]
      Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
      Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
      Cc: Aurelien Jacquiot <a-jacquiot@ti.com>
      Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
      Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
      Cc: Haavard Skinnemoen <hskinnemoen@gmail.com>
      Cc: Hans-Christian Egtvedt <egtvedt@samfundet.no>
      Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
      Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
      Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com>
      Cc: Koichi Yasutake <yasutake.koichi@jp.panasonic.com>
      Cc: Ley Foon Tan <lftan@altera.com>
      Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
      Cc: Mikael Starvik <starvik@axis.com>
      Cc: Steven Miao <realmz6@gmail.com>
      Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
      Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
      Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
      Cc: Sebastian Ott <sebott@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NValentin Rothberg <valentinrothberg@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      e1c7e324
    • C
      dma-mapping: make the generic coherent dma mmap implementation optional · 0d4a619b
      Christoph Hellwig 提交于
      This series converts all remaining architectures to use dma_map_ops and
      the generic implementation of the DMA API.  This not only simplifies the
      code a lot, but also prepares for possible future changes like more
      generic non-iommu dma_ops implementations or generic per-device
      dma_map_ops.
      
      This patch (of 16):
      
      We have a couple architectures that do not want to support this code, so
      add another Kconfig symbol that disables the code similar to what we do
      for the nommu case.
      Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
      Cc: Haavard Skinnemoen <hskinnemoen@gmail.com>
      Cc: Hans-Christian Egtvedt <egtvedt@samfundet.no>
      Cc: Steven Miao <realmz6@gmail.com>
      Cc: Ley Foon Tan <lftan@altera.com>
      Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Cc: Koichi Yasutake <yasutake.koichi@jp.panasonic.com>
      Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
      Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
      Cc: Aurelien Jacquiot <a-jacquiot@ti.com>
      Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
      Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
      Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
      Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com>
      Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
      Cc: Mikael Starvik <starvik@axis.com>
      Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
      Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
      Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
      Cc: Sebastian Ott <sebott@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      0d4a619b
  18. 15 1月, 2016 1 次提交
    • D
      mm: mmap: add new /proc tunable for mmap_base ASLR · d07e2259
      Daniel Cashman 提交于
      Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) provides a barrier to
      exploitation of user-space processes in the presence of security
      vulnerabilities by making it more difficult to find desired code/data
      which could help an attack.  This is done by adding a random offset to
      the location of regions in the process address space, with a greater
      range of potential offset values corresponding to better protection/a
      larger search-space for brute force, but also to greater potential for
      fragmentation.
      
      The offset added to the mmap_base address, which provides the basis for
      the majority of the mappings for a process, is set once on process exec
      in arch_pick_mmap_layout() and is done via hard-coded per-arch values,
      which reflect, hopefully, the best compromise for all systems.  The
      trade-off between increased entropy in the offset value generation and
      the corresponding increased variability in address space fragmentation
      is not absolute, however, and some platforms may tolerate higher amounts
      of entropy.  This patch introduces both new Kconfig values and a sysctl
      interface which may be used to change the amount of entropy used for
      offset generation on a system.
      
      The direct motivation for this change was in response to the
      libstagefright vulnerabilities that affected Android, specifically to
      information provided by Google's project zero at:
      
        http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/09/stagefrightened.html
      
      The attack presented therein, by Google's project zero, specifically
      targeted the limited randomness used to generate the offset added to the
      mmap_base address in order to craft a brute-force-based attack.
      Concretely, the attack was against the mediaserver process, which was
      limited to respawning every 5 seconds, on an arm device.  The hard-coded
      8 bits used resulted in an average expected success rate of defeating
      the mmap ASLR after just over 10 minutes (128 tries at 5 seconds a
      piece).  With this patch, and an accompanying increase in the entropy
      value to 16 bits, the same attack would take an average expected time of
      over 45 hours (32768 tries), which makes it both less feasible and more
      likely to be noticed.
      
      The introduced Kconfig and sysctl options are limited by per-arch
      minimum and maximum values, the minimum of which was chosen to match the
      current hard-coded value and the maximum of which was chosen so as to
      give the greatest flexibility without generating an invalid mmap_base
      address, generally a 3-4 bits less than the number of bits in the
      user-space accessible virtual address space.
      
      When decided whether or not to change the default value, a system
      developer should consider that mmap_base address could be placed
      anywhere up to 2^(value) bits away from the non-randomized location,
      which would introduce variable-sized areas above and below the mmap_base
      address such that the maximum vm_area_struct size may be reduced,
      preventing very large allocations.
      
      This patch (of 4):
      
      ASLR only uses as few as 8 bits to generate the random offset for the
      mmap base address on 32 bit architectures.  This value was chosen to
      prevent a poorly chosen value from dividing the address space in such a
      way as to prevent large allocations.  This may not be an issue on all
      platforms.  Allow the specification of a minimum number of bits so that
      platforms desiring greater ASLR protection may determine where to place
      the trade-off.
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel Cashman <dcashman@google.com>
      Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
      Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
      Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
      Cc: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
      Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
      Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
      Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
      Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
      Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
      Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      d07e2259
  19. 11 9月, 2015 1 次提交
    • D
      kexec: split kexec_load syscall from kexec core code · 2965faa5
      Dave Young 提交于
      There are two kexec load syscalls, kexec_load another and kexec_file_load.
       kexec_file_load has been splited as kernel/kexec_file.c.  In this patch I
      split kexec_load syscall code to kernel/kexec.c.
      
      And add a new kconfig option KEXEC_CORE, so we can disable kexec_load and
      use kexec_file_load only, or vice verse.
      
      The original requirement is from Ted Ts'o, he want kexec kernel signature
      being checked with CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG enabled.  But kexec-tools use
      kexec_load syscall can bypass the checking.
      
      Vivek Goyal proposed to create a common kconfig option so user can compile
      in only one syscall for loading kexec kernel.  KEXEC/KEXEC_FILE selects
      KEXEC_CORE so that old config files still work.
      
      Because there's general code need CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE, so I updated all the
      architecture Kconfig with a new option KEXEC_CORE, and let KEXEC selects
      KEXEC_CORE in arch Kconfig.  Also updated general kernel code with to
      kexec_load syscall.
      
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
      Signed-off-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
      Cc: Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.cz>
      Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
      Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
      Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      2965faa5
  20. 15 8月, 2015 1 次提交
  21. 03 8月, 2015 1 次提交
  22. 18 7月, 2015 1 次提交
  23. 26 6月, 2015 1 次提交
    • J
      clone: support passing tls argument via C rather than pt_regs magic · 3033f14a
      Josh Triplett 提交于
      clone has some of the quirkiest syscall handling in the kernel, with a
      pile of special cases, historical curiosities, and architecture-specific
      calling conventions.  In particular, clone with CLONE_SETTLS accepts a
      parameter "tls" that the C entry point completely ignores and some
      assembly entry points overwrite; instead, the low-level arch-specific
      code pulls the tls parameter out of the arch-specific register captured
      as part of pt_regs on entry to the kernel.  That's a massive hack, and
      it makes the arch-specific code only work when called via the specific
      existing syscall entry points; because of this hack, any new clone-like
      system call would have to accept an identical tls argument in exactly
      the same arch-specific position, rather than providing a unified system
      call entry point across architectures.
      
      The first patch allows architectures to handle the tls argument via
      normal C parameter passing, if they opt in by selecting
      HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS.  The second patch makes 32-bit and 64-bit x86 opt
      into this.
      
      These two patches came out of the clone4 series, which isn't ready for
      this merge window, but these first two cleanup patches were entirely
      uncontroversial and have acks.  I'd like to go ahead and submit these
      two so that other architectures can begin building on top of this and
      opting into HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS.  However, I'm also happy to wait and
      send these through the next merge window (along with v3 of clone4) if
      anyone would prefer that.
      
      This patch (of 2):
      
      clone with CLONE_SETTLS accepts an argument to set the thread-local
      storage area for the new thread.  sys_clone declares an int argument
      tls_val in the appropriate point in the argument list (based on the
      various CLONE_BACKWARDS variants), but doesn't actually use or pass along
      that argument.  Instead, sys_clone calls do_fork, which calls
      copy_process, which calls the arch-specific copy_thread, and copy_thread
      pulls the corresponding syscall argument out of the pt_regs captured at
      kernel entry (knowing what argument of clone that architecture passes tls
      in).
      
      Apart from being awful and inscrutable, that also only works because only
      one code path into copy_thread can pass the CLONE_SETTLS flag, and that
      code path comes from sys_clone with its architecture-specific
      argument-passing order.  This prevents introducing a new version of the
      clone system call without propagating the same architecture-specific
      position of the tls argument.
      
      However, there's no reason to pull the argument out of pt_regs when
      sys_clone could just pass it down via C function call arguments.
      
      Introduce a new CONFIG_HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS for architectures to opt into,
      and a new copy_thread_tls that accepts the tls parameter as an additional
      unsigned long (syscall-argument-sized) argument.  Change sys_clone's tls
      argument to an unsigned long (which does not change the ABI), and pass
      that down to copy_thread_tls.
      
      Architectures that don't opt into copy_thread_tls will continue to ignore
      the C argument to sys_clone in favor of the pt_regs captured at kernel
      entry, and thus will be unable to introduce new versions of the clone
      syscall.
      
      Patch co-authored by Josh Triplett and Thiago Macieira.
      Signed-off-by: NJosh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
      Acked-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
      Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Thiago Macieira <thiago.macieira@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      3033f14a
  24. 15 4月, 2015 4 次提交
    • K
      mm: fold arch_randomize_brk into ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE · 204db6ed
      Kees Cook 提交于
      The arch_randomize_brk() function is used on several architectures,
      even those that don't support ET_DYN ASLR. To avoid bulky extern/#define
      tricks, consolidate the support under CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE for
      the architectures that support it, while still handling CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK.
      Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
      Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
      Reviewed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
      Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
      Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
      Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
      Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
      Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
      Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Cc: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org>
      Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
      Cc: Arun Chandran <achandran@mvista.com>
      Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
      Cc: Min-Hua Chen <orca.chen@gmail.com>
      Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com>
      Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk>
      Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com>
      Cc: Vineeth Vijayan <vvijayan@mvista.com>
      Cc: Jeff Bailey <jeffbailey@google.com>
      Cc: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
      Cc: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com>
      Cc: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
      Cc: Jan-Simon Mller <dl9pf@gmx.de>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      204db6ed
    • K
      mm: expose arch_mmap_rnd when available · 2b68f6ca
      Kees Cook 提交于
      When an architecture fully supports randomizing the ELF load location,
      a per-arch mmap_rnd() function is used to find a randomized mmap base.
      In preparation for randomizing the location of ET_DYN binaries
      separately from mmap, this renames and exports these functions as
      arch_mmap_rnd(). Additionally introduces CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE
      for describing this feature on architectures that support it
      (which is a superset of ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE, since s390
      already supports a separated ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR without the
      ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE logic).
      Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
      Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
      Reviewed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
      Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
      Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
      Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
      Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
      Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
      Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Cc: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org>
      Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
      Cc: Arun Chandran <achandran@mvista.com>
      Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
      Cc: Min-Hua Chen <orca.chen@gmail.com>
      Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com>
      Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk>
      Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com>
      Cc: Vineeth Vijayan <vvijayan@mvista.com>
      Cc: Jeff Bailey <jeffbailey@google.com>
      Cc: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
      Cc: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com>
      Cc: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
      Cc: Jan-Simon Mller <dl9pf@gmx.de>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      2b68f6ca
    • T
      lib/ioremap.c: add huge I/O map capability interfaces · 0ddab1d2
      Toshi Kani 提交于
      Add ioremap_pud_enabled() and ioremap_pmd_enabled(), which return 1 when
      I/O mappings with pud/pmd are enabled on the kernel.
      
      ioremap_huge_init() calls arch_ioremap_pud_supported() and
      arch_ioremap_pmd_supported() to initialize the capabilities at boot-time.
      
      A new kernel option "nohugeiomap" is also added, so that user can disable
      the huge I/O map capabilities when necessary.
      Signed-off-by: NToshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
      Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
      Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Robert Elliott <Elliott@hp.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      0ddab1d2
    • K
      mm: define default PGTABLE_LEVELS to two · 235a8f02
      Kirill A. Shutemov 提交于
      By this time all architectures which support more than two page table
      levels should be covered.  This patch add default definiton of
      PGTABLE_LEVELS equal 2.
      
      We also add assert to detect inconsistence between CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS
      and __PAGETABLE_PMD_FOLDED/__PAGETABLE_PUD_FOLDED.
      Signed-off-by: NKirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
      Tested-by: NGuenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
      Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
      Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
      Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
      Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
      Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org>
      Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
      Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
      Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
      Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
      Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
      Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
      Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
      Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Koichi Yasutake <yasutake.koichi@jp.panasonic.com>
      Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
      Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
      Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
      Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
      Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
      Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      235a8f02
  25. 11 4月, 2015 1 次提交
  26. 04 9月, 2014 1 次提交
  27. 19 7月, 2014 1 次提交
    • K
      seccomp: add "seccomp" syscall · 48dc92b9
      Kees Cook 提交于
      This adds the new "seccomp" syscall with both an "operation" and "flags"
      parameter for future expansion. The third argument is a pointer value,
      used with the SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER operation. Currently, flags must
      be 0. This is functionally equivalent to prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, ...).
      
      In addition to the TSYNC flag later in this patch series, there is a
      non-zero chance that this syscall could be used for configuring a fixed
      argument area for seccomp-tracer-aware processes to pass syscall arguments
      in the future. Hence, the use of "seccomp" not simply "seccomp_add_filter"
      for this syscall. Additionally, this syscall uses operation, flags,
      and user pointer for arguments because strictly passing arguments via
      a user pointer would mean seccomp itself would be unable to trivially
      filter the seccomp syscall itself.
      Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Reviewed-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
      Reviewed-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      48dc92b9
  28. 19 3月, 2014 1 次提交
  29. 20 12月, 2013 2 次提交
    • K
      stackprotector: Introduce CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG · 8779657d
      Kees Cook 提交于
      This changes the stack protector config option into a choice of
      "None", "Regular", and "Strong":
      
         CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE
         CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR
         CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG
      
      "Regular" means the old CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y option.
      
      "Strong" is a new mode introduced by this patch. With "Strong" the
      kernel is built with -fstack-protector-strong (available in
      gcc 4.9 and later). This option increases the coverage of the stack
      protector without the heavy performance hit of -fstack-protector-all.
      
      For reference, the stack protector options available in gcc are:
      
      -fstack-protector-all:
        Adds the stack-canary saving prefix and stack-canary checking
        suffix to _all_ function entry and exit. Results in substantial
        use of stack space for saving the canary for deep stack users
        (e.g. historically xfs), and measurable (though shockingly still
        low) performance hit due to all the saving/checking. Really not
        suitable for sane systems, and was entirely removed as an option
        from the kernel many years ago.
      
      -fstack-protector:
        Adds the canary save/check to functions that define an 8
        (--param=ssp-buffer-size=N, N=8 by default) or more byte local
        char array. Traditionally, stack overflows happened with
        string-based manipulations, so this was a way to find those
        functions. Very few total functions actually get the canary; no
        measurable performance or size overhead.
      
      -fstack-protector-strong
        Adds the canary for a wider set of functions, since it's not
        just those with strings that have ultimately been vulnerable to
        stack-busting. With this superset, more functions end up with a
        canary, but it still remains small compared to all functions
        with only a small change in performance. Based on the original
        design document, a function gets the canary when it contains any
        of:
      
          - local variable's address used as part of the right hand side
            of an assignment or function argument
          - local variable is an array (or union containing an array),
            regardless of array type or length
          - uses register local variables
      
        https://docs.google.com/a/google.com/document/d/1xXBH6rRZue4f296vGt9YQcuLVQHeE516stHwt8M9xyU
      
      Find below a comparison of "size" and "objdump" output when built with
      gcc-4.9 in three configurations:
      
        - defconfig
      	11430641 kernel text size
      	36110 function bodies
      
        - defconfig + CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR
      	11468490 kernel text size (+0.33%)
      	1015 of 36110 functions are stack-protected (2.81%)
      
        - defconfig + CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG via this patch
      	11692790 kernel text size (+2.24%)
      	7401 of 36110 functions are stack-protected (20.5%)
      
      With -strong, ARM's compressed boot code now triggers stack
      protection, so a static guard was added. Since this is only used
      during decompression and was never used before, the exposure
      here is very small. Once it switches to the full kernel, the
      stack guard is back to normal.
      
      Chrome OS has been using -fstack-protector-strong for its kernel
      builds for the last 8 months with no problems.
      Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
      Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
      Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
      Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
      Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
      Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
      Cc: Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@linaro.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
      Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
      Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1387481759-14535-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
      [ Improved the changelog and descriptions some more. ]
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      8779657d
    • K
      stackprotector: Unify the HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR logic between architectures · 19952a92
      Kees Cook 提交于
      Instead of duplicating the CC_STACKPROTECTOR Kconfig and
      Makefile logic in each architecture, switch to using
      HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR and keep everything in one place. This
      retains the x86-specific bug verification scripts.
      Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
      Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
      Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
      Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
      Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
      Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
      Cc: Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@linaro.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
      Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
      Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1387481759-14535-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      19952a92