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  1. 18 10月, 2016 26 次提交
  3. 17 10月, 2016 5 次提交
  5. 16 10月, 2016 1 次提交
    • J
      ipvlan: constify l3mdev_ops structure · ab530f63
      由 Julia Lawall 提交于 
      This l3mdev_ops structure is only stored in the l3mdev_ops field of a
net_device structure.  This field is declared const, so the l3mdev_ops
structure can be declared as const also.  Additionally drop the
__read_mostly annotation.

The semantic patch that adds const is as follows:
(http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/)

// <smpl>
@r disable optional_qualifier@
identifier i;
position p;
@@
static struct l3mdev_ops i@p = { ... };

@ok@
identifier r.i;
struct net_device *e;
position p;
@@
e->l3mdev_ops = &i@p;

@bad@
position p != {r.p,ok.p};
identifier r.i;
struct l3mdev_ops e;
@@
e@i@p

@depends on !bad disable optional_qualifier@
identifier r.i;
@@
static
+const
 struct l3mdev_ops i = { ... };
// </smpl>

The effect on the layout of the .o file is shown by the following output
of the size command, first before then after the transformation:

   text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
   7364     466      52    7882    1eca drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.o
   7412     434      52    7898    1eda drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.o
Signed-off-by: NJulia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      ab530f63
  7. 15 10月, 2016 6 次提交
  9. 14 10月, 2016 2 次提交
    • M
      qed: Fix possible race when reading firmware return code. · d5df7688
      由 Manish Chopra 提交于 
      While handling SPQ ramrod completion, there is a possible race
where driver might not read updated fw return code based on
ramrod completion done. This patch ensures that fw return code
is written first and then completion done flag is updated
using appropriate memory barriers.
Signed-off-by: NManish Chopra <manish.chopra@caviumnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: NYuval Mintz <Yuval.Mintz@caviumnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      d5df7688
    • Y
      qed: Handle malicious VFs events · 7eff82b0
      由 Yuval Mintz 提交于 
      Malicious VFs might be caught in several different methods:
  - Misusing their bar permission and being blocked by hardware.
  - Misusing their fastpath logic and being blocked by firmware.
  - Misusing their interaction with their PF via hw-channel,
    and being blocked by PF driver.

On the first two items, firmware would indicate to driver that
the VF is to be considered malicious, but would sometime still
allow the VF to communicate with the PF [depending on the exact
nature of the malicious activity done by the VF].
The current existing logic on the PF side lacks handling of such events,
and might allow the PF to perform some incorrect configuration on behalf
of a VF that was previously indicated as malicious.

The new scheme is simple -
Once the PF determines a VF is malicious it would:
 a. Ignore any further requests on behalf of the VF-driver.
 b. Prevent any configurations initiated by the hyperuser for
    the malicious VF, as firmware isn't willing to serve such.

The malicious indication would be cleared upon the VF flr,
after which it would become usable once again.
Signed-off-by: NYuval Mintz <Yuval.Mintz@caviumnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      7eff82b0