Kaike reported that in tests rdma hrtimers occasionaly stopped working. He
did great debugging, which provided enough context to decode the problem.

CPU 3			     	      	     CPU 2

idle
start sched_timer expires = 712171000000
 queue->next = sched_timer
					    start rdmavt timer. expires = 712172915662
					    lock(baseof(CPU3))
tick_nohz_stop_tick()
tick = 716767000000			    timerqueue_add(tmr)

hrtimer_set_expires(sched_timer, tick);
  sched_timer->expires = 716767000000  <---- FAIL
					     if (tmr->expires < queue->next->expires)
hrtimer_start(sched_timer)		          queue->next = tmr;
lock(baseof(CPU3))
					     unlock(baseof(CPU3))
timerqueue_remove()
timerqueue_add()

ts->sched_timer is queued and queue->next is pointing to it, but then
ts->sched_timer.expires is modified.

This not only corrupts the ordering of the timerqueue RB tree, it also
makes CPU2 see the new expiry time of timerqueue->next->expires when
checking whether timerqueue->next needs to be updated. So CPU2 sees that
the rdma timer is earlier than timerqueue->next and sets the rdma timer as
new next.

Depending on whether it had also seen the new time at RB tree enqueue, it
might have queued the rdma timer at the wrong place and then after removing
the sched_timer the RB tree is completely hosed.

The problem was introduced with a commit which tried to solve inconsistency
between the hrtimer in the tick_sched data and the underlying hardware
clockevent. It split out hrtimer_set_expires() to store the new tick time
in both the NOHZ and the NOHZ + HIGHRES case, but missed the fact that in
the NOHZ + HIGHRES case the hrtimer might still be queued.

Use hrtimer_start(timer, tick...) for the NOHZ + HIGHRES case which sets
timer->expires after canceling the timer and move the hrtimer_set_expires()
invocation into the NOHZ only code path which is not affected as it merily
uses the hrtimer as next event storage so code pathes can be shared with
the NOHZ + HIGHRES case.

Fixes: d4af6d93 ("nohz: Fix spurious warning when hrtimer and clockevent get out of sync")
Reported-by: N"Wan Kaike" <kaike.wan@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: NFrederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: "Marciniszyn Mike" <mike.marciniszyn@intel.com>
Cc: Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Dalessandro Dennis" <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com>
Cc: "Fleck John" <john.fleck@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: "Weiny Ira" <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Cc: "linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org"
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1804241637390.1679@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1804242119210.1597@nanos.tec.linutronix.de

One of the classes of kernel stack content leaks[1] is exposing the
contents of prior heap or stack contents when a new process stack is
allocated.  Normally, those stacks are not zeroed, and the old contents
remain in place.  In the face of stack content exposure flaws, those
contents can leak to userspace.

Fixing this will make the kernel no longer vulnerable to these flaws, as
the stack will be wiped each time a stack is assigned to a new process.
There's not a meaningful change in runtime performance; it almost looks
like it provides a benefit.

Performing back-to-back kernel builds before:
	Run times: 157.86 157.09 158.90 160.94 160.80
	Mean: 159.12
	Std Dev: 1.54

and after:
	Run times: 159.31 157.34 156.71 158.15 160.81
	Mean: 158.46
	Std Dev: 1.46

Instead of making this a build or runtime config, Andy Lutomirski
recommended this just be enabled by default.

[1] A noisy search for many kinds of stack content leaks can be seen here:
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=linux+kernel+stack+leak

I did some more with perf and cycle counts on running 100,000 execs of
/bin/true.

before:
Cycles: 218858861551 218853036130 214727610969 227656844122 224980542841
Mean:  221015379122.60
Std Dev: 4662486552.47

after:
Cycles: 213868945060 213119275204 211820169456 224426673259 225489986348
Mean:  217745009865.40
Std Dev: 5935559279.99

It continues to look like it's faster, though the deviation is rather
wide, but I'm not sure what I could do that would be less noisy.  I'm
open to ideas!

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180221021659.GA37073@beastSigned-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Commit a9445e47 ("posix-cpu-timers: Make set_process_cpu_timer()
more robust") moved the check into the 'if' statement. Unfortunately,
it did so on the right side of an && which means that it may get short
circuited and never evaluated. This is easily reproduced with:

$ cat loop.c
void main() {
  struct rlimit res;
  /* set the CPU time limit */
  getrlimit(RLIMIT_CPU,&res);
  res.rlim_cur = 2;
  res.rlim_max = 2;
  setrlimit(RLIMIT_CPU,&res);

  while (1);
}

Which will hang forever instead of being killed. Fix this by pulling the
evaluation out of the if statement but checking the return value instead.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1568337
Fixes: a9445e47 ("posix-cpu-timers: Make set_process_cpu_timer() more robust")
Signed-off-by: NLaura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Max R . P . Grossmann" <m@max.pm>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180417215742.2521-1-labbott@redhat.com

The __current_kernel_time() function based on 'struct timespec' is no
longer recommended for new code, and the only user of this function has
been replaced by commit 6909e29f ("kdb: use __ktime_get_real_seconds
instead of __current_kernel_time").

Remove the obsolete interface.
Signed-off-by: NBaolin Wang <baolin.wang@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: arnd@arndb.de
Cc: sboyd@kernel.org
Cc: broonie@kernel.org
Cc: john.stultz@linaro.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1a9dbea7ee2cda7efe9ed330874075cf17fdbff6.1523596316.git.baolin.wang@linaro.org

Convert the clockevents driver from old-style printk() to pr_info() and
pr_cont(), to fix split kernel messages like below:

    Clockevents: could not switch to one-shot mode:
     dummy_timer is not functional.
Signed-off-by: NGeert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1522942018-14471-1-git-send-email-geert%2Brenesas@glider.be

If the get_callchain_buffers fails to allocate the buffer it will
decrease the nr_callchain_events right away.

There's no point of checking the allocation error for
nr_callchain_events > 1. Removing that check.
Signed-off-by: NJiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Tested-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180415092352.12403-3-jolsa@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

The syzbot hit KASAN bug in perf_callchain_store having the entry stored
behind the allocated bounds [1].

We miss the sample_max_stack check for the initial event that allocates
callchain buffers. This missing check allows to create an event with
sample_max_stack value bigger than the global sysctl maximum:

  # sysctl -a | grep perf_event_max_stack
  kernel.perf_event_max_stack = 127

  # perf record -vv -C 1 -e cycles/max-stack=256/ kill
  ...
  perf_event_attr:
    size                             112
    ...
    sample_max_stack                 256
  ------------------------------------------------------------
  sys_perf_event_open: pid -1  cpu 1  group_fd -1  flags 0x8 = 4

Note the '-C 1', which forces perf record to create just single event.
Otherwise it opens event for every cpu, then the sample_max_stack check
fails on the second event and all's fine.

The fix is to run the sample_max_stack check also for the first event
with callchains.

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152352732920874&w=2

Reported-by: syzbot+7c449856228b63ac951e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: NJiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Fixes: 97c79a38 ("perf core: Per event callchain limit")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180415092352.12403-2-jolsa@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

Return immediately when we find issue in the user stack checks. The
error value could get overwritten by following check for
PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR.
Signed-off-by: NJiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Fixes: 60e2364e ("perf: Add ability to sample machine state on interrupt")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180415092352.12403-1-jolsa@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

Store preempting context switch out event into Perf trace as a part of
PERF_RECORD_SWITCH[_CPU_WIDE] record.

Percentage of preempting and non-preempting context switches help
understanding the nature of workloads (CPU or IO bound) that are running
on a machine;

The event is treated as preemption one when task->state value of the
thread being switched out is TASK_RUNNING. Event type encoding is
implemented using PERF_RECORD_MISC_SWITCH_OUT_PREEMPT bit;
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/9ff84e83-a0ca-dd82-a6d0-cb951689be74@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

We might need to do some actions before the shadow variable is freed.
For example, we might need to remove it from a list or free some data
that it points to.

This is already possible now. The user can get the shadow variable
by klp_shadow_get(), do the necessary actions, and then call
klp_shadow_free().

This patch allows to do it a more elegant way. The user could implement
the needed actions in a callback that is passed to klp_shadow_free()
as a parameter. The callback usually does reverse operations to
the constructor callback that can be called by klp_shadow_*alloc().

It is especially useful for klp_shadow_free_all(). There we need to do
these extra actions for each found shadow variable with the given ID.

Note that the memory used by the shadow variable itself is still released
later by rcu callback. It is needed to protect internal structures that
keep all shadow variables. But the destructor is called immediately.
The shadow variable must not be access anyway after klp_shadow_free()
is called. The user is responsible to protect this any suitable way.

Be aware that the destructor is called under klp_shadow_lock. It is
the same as for the contructor in klp_shadow_alloc().
Signed-off-by: NPetr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Acked-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NMiroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>

The existing API allows to pass a sample data to initialize the shadow
data. It works well when the data are position independent. But it fails
miserably when we need to set a pointer to the shadow structure itself.

Unfortunately, we might need to initialize the pointer surprisingly
often because of struct list_head. It is even worse because the list
might be hidden in other common structures, for example, struct mutex,
struct wait_queue_head.

For example, this was needed to fix races in ALSA sequencer. It required
to add mutex into struct snd_seq_client. See commit b3defb79
("ALSA: seq: Make ioctls race-free") and commit d15d662e
("ALSA: seq: Fix racy pool initializations")

This patch makes the API more safe. A custom constructor function and data
are passed to klp_shadow_*alloc() functions instead of the sample data.

Note that ctor_data are no longer a template for shadow->data. It might
point to any data that might be necessary when the constructor is called.

Also note that the constructor is called under klp_shadow_lock. It is
an internal spin_lock that synchronizes alloc() vs. get() operations,
see klp_shadow_get_or_alloc(). On one hand, this adds a risk of ABBA
deadlocks. On the other hand, it allows to do some operations safely.
For example, we could add the new structure into an existing list.
This must be done only once when the structure is allocated.
Reported-by: NNicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NPetr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Acked-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NMiroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>

This warning message is not very helpful, as the return value should
already show information about the error. Also, this message will
spam dmesg if the user space does testing in a loop, like:

    for x in {0..5}
    do
        echo p:xx xx+$x >> /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events
    done
Reported-by: NVince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: NSong Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: kernel-team@fb.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180413185513.3626052-1-songliubraving@fb.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

For s390 new kernels are loaded to fixed addresses in memory before they
are booted.  With the current code this is a problem as it assumes the
kernel will be loaded to an 'arbitrary' address.  In particular,
kexec_locate_mem_hole searches for a large enough memory region and sets
the load address (kexec_bufer->mem) to it.

Luckily there is a simple workaround for this problem.  By returning 1
in arch_kexec_walk_mem, kexec_locate_mem_hole is turned off.  This
allows the architecture to set kbuf->mem by hand.  While the trick works
fine for the kernel it does not for the purgatory as here the
architectures don't have access to its kexec_buffer.

Give architectures access to the purgatories kexec_buffer by changing
kexec_load_purgatory to take a pointer to it.  With this change
architectures have access to the buffer and can edit it as they need.

A nice side effect of this change is that we can get rid of the
purgatory_info->purgatory_load_address field.  As now the information
stored there can directly be accessed from kbuf->mem.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180321112751.22196-11-prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.comSigned-off-by: NPhilipp Rudo <prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NMartin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The current code uses the sh_offset field in purgatory_info->sechdrs to
store a pointer to the current load address of the section.  Depending
whether the section will be loaded or not this is either a pointer into
purgatory_info->purgatory_buf or kexec_purgatory.  This is not only a
violation of the ELF standard but also makes the code very hard to
understand as you cannot tell if the memory you are using is read-only
or not.

Remove this misuse and store the offset of the section in
pugaroty_info->purgatory_buf in sh_offset.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180321112751.22196-10-prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.comSigned-off-by: NPhilipp Rudo <prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The main loop currently uses quite a lot of variables to update the
section headers.  Some of them are unnecessary.  So clean them up a
little.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180321112751.22196-9-prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.comSigned-off-by: NPhilipp Rudo <prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

To update the entry point there is an extra loop over all section
headers although this can be done in the main loop.  So move it there
and eliminate the extra loop and variable to store the 'entry section
index'.

Also, in the main loop, move the usual case, i.e.  non-bss section, out
of the extra if-block.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180321112751.22196-8-prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.comSigned-off-by: NPhilipp Rudo <prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NMartin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

When inspecting __kexec_load_purgatory you find that it has two tasks

	1) setting up the kexec_buffer for the new kernel and,
	2) setting up pi->sechdrs for the final load address.

The two tasks are independent of each other.  To improve readability
split up __kexec_load_purgatory into two functions, one for each task,
and call them directly from kexec_load_purgatory.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180321112751.22196-7-prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.comSigned-off-by: NPhilipp Rudo <prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

When the relocations are applied to the purgatory only the section the
relocations are applied to is writable.  The other sections, i.e.  the
symtab and .rel/.rela, are in read-only kexec_purgatory.  Highlight this
by marking the corresponding variables as 'const'.

While at it also change the signatures of arch_kexec_apply_relocations* to
take section pointers instead of just the index of the relocation section.
This removes the second lookup and sanity check of the sections in arch
code.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180321112751.22196-6-prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.comSigned-off-by: NPhilipp Rudo <prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The stripped purgatory does not contain a symtab.  So when looking for
symbols this is done in read-only kexec_purgatory.  Highlight this by
marking the corresponding variables as 'const'.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180321112751.22196-5-prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.comSigned-off-by: NPhilipp Rudo <prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The kexec_purgatory buffer is read-only.  Thus all pointers into
kexec_purgatory are read-only, too.  Point this out by explicitly
marking purgatory_info->ehdr as 'const' and update the comments in
purgatory_info.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180321112751.22196-4-prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.comSigned-off-by: NPhilipp Rudo <prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Before the purgatory is loaded several checks are done whether the ELF
file in kexec_purgatory is valid or not.  These checks are incomplete.
For example they don't check for the total size of the sections defined
in the section header table or if the entry point actually points into
the purgatory.

On the other hand the purgatory, although an ELF file on its own, is
part of the kernel.  Thus not trusting the purgatory means not trusting
the kernel build itself.

So remove all validity checks on the purgatory and just trust the kernel
build.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180321112751.22196-3-prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.comSigned-off-by: NPhilipp Rudo <prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

In the previous patches, commonly-used routines, exclude_mem_range() and
prepare_elf64_headers(), were carved out.  Now place them in kexec
common code.  A prefix "crash_" is given to each of their names to avoid
possible name collisions.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180306102303.9063-8-takahiro.akashi@linaro.orgSigned-off-by: NAKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Acked-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

As arch_kexec_kernel_image_{probe,load}(),
arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup() and arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig()
are almost duplicated among architectures, they can be commonalized with
an architecture-defined kexec_file_ops array.  So let's factor them out.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180306102303.9063-3-takahiro.akashi@linaro.orgSigned-off-by: NAKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Acked-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Patch series "kexec_file, x86, powerpc: refactoring for other
architecutres", v2.

This is a preparatory patchset for adding kexec_file support on arm64.

It was originally included in a arm64 patch set[1], but Philipp is also
working on their kexec_file support on s390[2] and some changes are now
conflicting.

So these common parts were extracted and put into a separate patch set
for better integration.  What's more, my original patch#4 was split into
a few small chunks for easier review after Dave's comment.

As such, the resulting code is basically identical with my original, and
the only *visible* differences are:

 - renaming of _kexec_kernel_image_probe() and  _kimage_file_post_load_cleanup()

 - change one of types of arguments at prepare_elf64_headers()

Those, unfortunately, require a couple of trivial changes on the rest
(#1, #6 to #13) of my arm64 kexec_file patch set[1].

Patch #1 allows making a use of purgatory optional, particularly useful
for arm64.

Patch #2 commonalizes arch_kexec_kernel_{image_probe, image_load,
verify_sig}() and arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup() across
architectures.

Patches #3-#7 are also intended to generalize parse_elf64_headers(),
along with exclude_mem_range(), to be made best re-use of.

[1] http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-arm-kernel/2018-February/561182.html
[2] http://lkml.iu.edu//hypermail/linux/kernel/1802.1/02596.html

This patch (of 7):

On arm64, crash dump kernel's usable memory is protected by *unmapping*
it from kernel virtual space unlike other architectures where the region
is just made read-only.  It is highly unlikely that the region is
accidentally corrupted and this observation rationalizes that digest
check code can also be dropped from purgatory.  The resulting code is so
simple as it doesn't require a bit ugly re-linking/relocation stuff,
i.e.  arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add().

Please see:

   http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-arm-kernel/2017-December/545428.html

All that the purgatory does is to shuffle arguments and jump into a new
kernel, while we still need to have some space for a hash value
(purgatory_sha256_digest) which is never checked against.

As such, it doesn't make sense to have trampline code between old kernel
and new kernel on arm64.

This patch introduces a new configuration, ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY, and
allows related code to be compiled in only if necessary.

[takahiro.akashi@linaro.org: fix trivial screwup]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180309093346.GF25863@linaro.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180306102303.9063-2-takahiro.akashi@linaro.orgSigned-off-by: NAKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Acked-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Since commit 6326fec1 ("mm: Use owner_priv bit for PageSwapCache,
valid when PageSwapBacked"), PG_swapcache is an alias for
PG_owner_priv_1, which may be also used for other purposes.

To know whether the bit indeed has the PG_swapcache meaning, it is
necessary to check PG_swapbacked, hence this bit must be exported.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180410161345.142e142d@ezekiel.suse.czSigned-off-by: NPetr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Xunlei Pang <xlpang@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "Marc-Andr Lureau" <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

We've got a bug report indicating a kernel panic at booting on an x86-32
system, and it turned out to be the invalid PCI resource assigned after
reallocation.  __find_resource() first aligns the resource start address
and resets the end address with start+size-1 accordingly, then checks
whether it's contained.  Here the end address may overflow the integer,
although resource_contains() still returns true because the function
validates only start and end address.  So this ends up with returning an
invalid resource (start > end).

There was already an attempt to cover such a problem in the commit
47ea91b4 ("Resource: fix wrong resource window calculation"), but
this case is an overseen one.

This patch adds the validity check of the newly calculated resource for
avoiding the integer overflow problem.

Bugzilla: http://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1086739
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/s5hpo37d5l8.wl-tiwai@suse.de
Fixes: 23c570a6 ("resource: ability to resize an allocated resource")
Signed-off-by: NTakashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Reported-by: NMichael Henders <hendersm@shaw.ca>
Tested-by: NMichael Henders <hendersm@shaw.ca>
Reviewed-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Non-root user cannot create kprobe or uprobe through the text-based
interface (kprobe_events, uprobe_events),so they should not be able
to create probes via perf_event_open() either.
Reported-by: NVince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: NSong Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: 33ea4b24 ("perf/core: Implement the 'perf_uprobe' PMU")
Fixes: e12f03d7 ("perf/core: Implement the 'perf_kprobe' PMU")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/C0B2EFB5-C403-4BDB-9046-C14B3EE66999@fb.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

This results in no change in structure size on 64-bit machines as it
fits in the padding between the gfp_t and the void *.  32-bit machines
will grow the structure from 8 to 12 bytes.  Almost all radix trees are
protected with (at least) a spinlock, so as they are converted from
radix trees to xarrays, the data structures will shrink again.

Initialising the spinlock requires a name for the benefit of lockdep, so
RADIX_TREE_INIT() now needs to know the name of the radix tree it's
initialising, and so do IDR_INIT() and IDA_INIT().

Also add the xa_lock() and xa_unlock() family of wrappers to make it
easier to use the lock.  If we could rely on -fplan9-extensions in the
compiler, we could avoid all of this syntactic sugar, but that wasn't
added until gcc 4.6.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180313132639.17387-8-willy@infradead.orgSigned-off-by: NMatthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Cc: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Kdoc comments are added to the do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv_param and
do_proc_douintvec_minmax_conv_param structures thare are used internally
for range checking.

The error codes returned by proc_dointvec_minmax() and
proc_douintvec_minmax() are also documented.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1519926220-7453-3-git-send-email-longman@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NWaiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: NLuis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

As using an unsafe module parameter is, by its very definition, an
expected user action, emitting a warning is overkill.  Nothing has yet
gone wrong, and we add a taint flag for any future oops should something
actually go wrong.  So instead of having a user controllable pr_warn,
downgrade it to a pr_notice for "a normal, but significant condition".

We make use of unsafe kernel parameters in igt
(https://cgit.freedesktop.org/drm/igt-gpu-tools/) (we have not yet
succeeded in removing all such debugging options), which generates a
warning and taints the kernel.  The warning is unhelpful as we then need
to filter it out again as we check that every test themselves do not
provoke any kernel warnings.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180226151919.9674-1-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk
Fixes: 91f9d330 ("module: make it possible to have unsafe, tainting module params")
Signed-off-by: NChris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Acked-by: NJani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Jean Delvare <khali@linux-fr.org>
Cc: Li Zhong <zhong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Petri Latvala <petri.latvala@intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Fix sizeof argument to be the same as the data variable name.  Probably
a copy/paste error.

Mostly harmless since both variables are unsigned int.

Fixes kernel bugzilla #197371:
  Possible access to unintended variable in "kernel/sysctl.c" line 1339
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=197371

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e0d0531f-361e-ef5f-8499-32743ba907e1@infradead.orgSigned-off-by: NRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reported-by: NPetru Mihancea <petrum@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

So "struct uts_namespace" can enjoy fine-grained SLAB debugging and
usercopy protection.

I'd prefer shorter name "utsns" but there is "user_namespace" already.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180228215158.GA23146@avx2Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Since the randstruct plugin can intentionally produce extremely unusual
kernel structure layouts (even performance pathological ones), some
maintainers want to be able to trivially determine if an Oops is coming
from a randstruct-built kernel, so as to keep their sanity when
debugging.  This adds the new flag and initializes taint_mask
immediately when built with randstruct.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1519084390-43867-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.orgSigned-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

This consolidates the taint bit documentation into a single place with
both numeric and letter values.  Additionally adds the missing TAINT_AUX
documentation.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1519084390-43867-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.orgSigned-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

This converts to using indexed initializers instead of comments, adds a
comment on why the taint flags can't be an enum, and make sure that no
one forgets to update the taint_flags when adding new bits.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1519084390-43867-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.orgSigned-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

There's some inconsistency with what to set the output parameter filterp
when passing to create_filter(..., struct event_filter **filterp).

Whatever filterp points to, should be NULL when calling this function. The
create_filter() calls create_filter_start() with a pointer to a local
"filter" variable that is set to NULL. The create_filter_start() has a
WARN_ON() if the passed in pointer isn't pointing to a value set to NULL.

Ideally, create_filter() should pass the filterp variable it received to
create_filter_start() and not hide it as with a local variable, this allowed
create_filter() to fail, and not update the passed in filter, and the caller
of create_filter() then tried to free filter, which was never initialized to
anything, causing memory corruption.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/00000000000032a0c30569916870@google.com

Fixes: 80765597 ("tracing: Rewrite filter logic to be simpler and faster")
Reported-by: syzbot+dadcc936587643d7f568@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

Simplify probes_seq_show() function. No change in output
before and after patch.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180315082756.9050-2-ravi.bangoria@linux.vnet.ibm.comAcked-by: NMasami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NRavi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

tu->offset is unsigned long, not a pointer, thus %lx should
be used to print it, not the %px.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180315082756.9050-1-ravi.bangoria@linux.vnet.ibm.com

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: NMasami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Fixes: 0e4d819d ("trace_uprobe: Display correct offset in uprobe_events")
Suggested-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NRavi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

uprobes cannot successfully attach to binaries located in a directory
mounted with overlayfs.

To verify, create directories for mounting overlayfs
(upper,lower,work,merge), move some binary into merge/ and use readelf
to obtain some known instruction of the binary. I used /bin/true and the
entry instruction(0x13b0):

	$ mount -t overlay overlay -o lowerdir=lower,upperdir=upper,workdir=work merge
	$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
	$ echo 'p:true_entry PATH_TO_MERGE/merge/true:0x13b0' > uprobe_events
	$ echo 1 > events/uprobes/true_entry/enable

This returns 'bash: echo: write error: Input/output error' and dmesg
tells us 'event trace: Could not enable event true_entry'

This change makes create_trace_uprobe() look for the real inode of a
dentry. In the case of normal filesystems, this simplifies to just
returning the inode. In the case of overlayfs(and similar fs) we will
obtain the underlying dentry and corresponding inode, upon which uprobes
can successfully register.

Running the example above with the patch applied, we can see that the
uprobe is enabled and will output to trace as expected.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180410231030.2720-1-hmclauchlan@fb.comReviewed-by: NJosef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: NMasami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: NSrikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NHoward McLauchlan <hmclauchlan@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

It is useless to re-invent the ARRAY_SIZE macro so let's use it instead
of DATA_CNT.

Found with Coccinelle with the following semantic patch:
@r depends on (org || report)@
type T;
T[] E;
position p;
@@
(
 (sizeof(E)@p /sizeof(*E))
|
 (sizeof(E)@p /sizeof(E[...]))
|
 (sizeof(E)@p /sizeof(T))
)

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016012250.26453-1-jeremy.lefaure@lse.epita.frSigned-off-by: NJérémy Lefaure <jeremy.lefaure@lse.epita.fr>
[ Removed useless include of kernel.h ]
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>