- 16 2月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Dave Hansen 提交于
For protection keys, we need to understand whether protections should be enforced in software or not. In general, we enforce protections when working on our own task, but not when on others. We call these "current" and "remote" operations. This patch introduces a new get_user_pages() variant: get_user_pages_remote() Which is a replacement for when get_user_pages() is called on non-current tsk/mm. We also introduce a new gup flag: FOLL_REMOTE which can be used for the "__" gup variants to get this new behavior. The uprobes is_trap_at_addr() location holds mmap_sem and calls get_user_pages(current->mm) on an instruction address. This makes it a pretty unique gup caller. Being an instruction access and also really originating from the kernel (vs. the app), I opted to consider this a 'remote' access where protection keys will not be enforced. Without protection keys, this patch should not change any behavior. Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: jack@suse.cz Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210154.3F0E51EA@viggo.jf.intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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- 20 3月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Cong Wang 提交于
Acked-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NCong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
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- 28 9月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Commit bd03a3e4 "TOMOYO: Add policy namespace support." introduced policy namespace. But as of /sbin/modprobe is executed from initramfs/initrd, profiles for target domain's namespace is not defined because /sbin/tomoyo-init is not yet called. Reported-by: NJamie Nguyen <jamie@tomoyolinux.co.uk> Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 26 9月, 2011 2 次提交
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
When TOMOYO started using garbage collector at commit 847b173e "TOMOYO: Add garbage collector.", we waited for close() before kfree(). Thus, elements to be kfree()d were queued up using tomoyo_gc_list list. But it turned out that tomoyo_element_linked_by_gc() tends to choke garbage collector when certain pattern of entries are queued. Since garbage collector is no longer waiting for close() since commit 2e503bbb "TOMOYO: Fix lockdep warning.", we can remove tomoyo_gc_list list and tomoyo_element_linked_by_gc() by doing sequential processing. Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Commit efe836ab "TOMOYO: Add built-in policy support." introduced tomoyo_load_builtin_policy() but was by error called from nowhere. Commit b22b8b9f "TOMOYO: Rename meminfo to stat and show more statistics." introduced tomoyo_update_stat() but was by error not called from tomoyo_assign_domain(). Also, mark tomoyo_io_printf() and tomoyo_path_permission() static functions, as reported by "make namespacecheck". Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 19 9月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
I got an opinion that it is difficult to use exception policy's domain transition control directives because they need to match the pathname specified to "file execute" directives. For example, if "file execute /bin/\*\-ls\-cat" is given, corresponding domain transition control directive needs to be like "no_keep_domain /bin/\*\-ls\-cat from any". If we can specify like below, it will become more convenient. file execute /bin/ls keep exec.realpath="/bin/ls" exec.argv[0]="ls" file execute /bin/cat keep exec.realpath="/bin/cat" exec.argv[0]="cat" file execute /bin/\*\-ls\-cat child file execute /usr/sbin/httpd <apache> exec.realpath="/usr/sbin/httpd" exec.argv[0]="/usr/sbin/httpd" In above examples, "keep" works as if keep_domain is specified, "child" works as if "no_reset_domain" and "no_initialize_domain" and "no_keep_domain" are specified, "<apache>" causes domain transition to <apache> domain upon successful execve() operation. Moreover, we can also allow transition to different domains based on conditions like below example. <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd file execute /bin/bash <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd //batch-session exec.argc=2 exec.argv[1]="-c" file execute /bin/bash <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd //root-session task.uid=0 file execute /bin/bash <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd //nonroot-session task.uid!=0 Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 14 9月, 2011 3 次提交
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
There was a race window that the pathname which is subjected to "file execute" permission check when retrying via supervisor's decision because the pathname was recalculated upon retry. Though, there is an inevitable race window even without supervisor, for we have to calculate the symbolic link's pathname from "struct linux_binprm"->filename rather than from "struct linux_binprm"->file because we cannot back calculate the symbolic link's pathname from the dereferenced pathname. Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Add per-entry flag which controls generation of grant logs because Xen and KVM issues ioctl requests so frequently. For example, file ioctl /dev/null 0x5401 grant_log=no will suppress /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/audit even if preference says grant_log=yes . Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
This patch adds support for checking environment variable's names. Although TOMOYO already provides ability to check argv[]/envp[] passed to execve() requests, file execute /bin/sh exec.envp["LD_LIBRARY_PATH"]="bar" will reject execution of /bin/sh if environment variable LD_LIBRARY_PATH is not defined. To grant execution of /bin/sh if LD_LIBRARY_PATH is not defined, administrators have to specify like file execute /bin/sh exec.envp["LD_LIBRARY_PATH"]="/system/lib" file execute /bin/sh exec.envp["LD_LIBRARY_PATH"]=NULL . Since there are many environment variables whereas conditional checks are applied as "&&", it is difficult to cover all combinations. Therefore, this patch supports conditional checks that are applied as "||", by specifying like file execute /bin/sh misc env LD_LIBRARY_PATH exec.envp["LD_LIBRARY_PATH"]="/system/lib" which means "grant execution of /bin/sh if environment variable is not defined or is defined and its value is /system/lib". Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 14 7月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Update comments for scripts/kernel-doc and fix some of errors reported by scripts/checkpatch.pl . Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 11 7月, 2011 3 次提交
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Enable conditional ACL by passing object's pointers. Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
This patch adds support for permission checks using argv[]/envp[] of execve() request. Hooks are in the last patch of this pathset. Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
This patch adds support for permission checks using current thread's UID/GID etc. in addition to pathnames. Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 29 6月, 2011 7 次提交
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Gather string constants to one file in order to make the object size smaller. Use unsigned type where appropriate. read()/write() returns ssize_t. Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Mauras Olivier reported that it is difficult to use TOMOYO in LXC environments, for TOMOYO cannot distinguish between environments outside the container and environments inside the container since LXC environments are created using pivot_root(). To address this problem, this patch introduces policy namespace. Each policy namespace has its own set of domain policy, exception policy and profiles, which are all independent of other namespaces. This independency allows users to develop policy without worrying interference among namespaces. Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
ACL group allows administrator to globally grant not only "file read" permission but also other permissions. Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Convert "allow_..." style directives to "file ..." style directives. By converting to the latter style, we can pack policy like "file read/write/execute /path/to/file". Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Use structure for passing ACL line, in preparation for supporting policy namespace and conditional parameters. Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Use common structure for ACL with "struct list_head" + "atomic_t". Use array/struct where possible. Remove is_group from "struct tomoyo_name_union"/"struct tomoyo_number_union". Pass "struct file"->private_data rather than "struct file". Update some of comments. Bring tomoyo_same_acl_head() from common.h to domain.c . Bring tomoyo_invalid()/tomoyo_valid() from common.h to util.c . Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
In order to synchronize with TOMOYO 1.8's syntax, (1) Remove special handling for allow_read/write permission. (2) Replace deny_rewrite/allow_rewrite permission with allow_append permission. (3) Remove file_pattern keyword. (4) Remove allow_read permission from exception policy. (5) Allow creating domains in enforcing mode without calling supervisor. (6) Add permission check for opening directory for reading. (7) Add permission check for stat() operation. (8) Make "cat < /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain" behave as if "cat /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain". Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 02 8月, 2010 19 次提交
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Commit c9e69318 "TOMOYO: Allow wildcard for execute permission." changed execute permission and domainname to accept wildcards. But tomoyo_find_next_domain() was using pathname passed to execve() rather than pathname specified by the execute permission. As a result, processes were not able to transit to domains which contain wildcards in their domainnames. This patch passes pathname specified by the execute permission back to tomoyo_find_next_domain() so that processes can transit to domains which contain wildcards in their domainnames. Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Use shorter name in order to make it easier to fit 80 columns limit. Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Use common code for "initialize_domain"/"no_initialize_domain"/"keep_domain"/ "no_keep_domain" keywords. Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Some programs behave differently depending on argv[0] passed to execve(). TOMOYO has "alias" keyword in order to allow administrators to define different domains if requested pathname passed to execve() is a symlink. But "alias" keyword is incomplete because this keyword assumes that requested pathname and argv[0] are identical. Thus, remove "alias" keyword (by this patch) and add syntax for checking argv[0] (by future patches). Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Now lists are accessible via array index. Aggregate reader functions using index. Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Assign list id and make the lists as array of "struct list_head". Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Use shorter name in order to make it easier to fix 80 columns limit. Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
We can use callback function since parameters are passed via "const struct tomoyo_request_info". Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
tomoyo_file_perm() and tomoyo_path_permission() are similar. We can embed tomoyo_file_perm() into tomoyo_path_permission(). Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Use common code for elements using "struct list_head" + "bool" structure. Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Use common "struct list_head" + "bool" structure. Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Use common "struct list_head" + "bool" + "u8" structure and use common code for elements using that structure. Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
This patch allows users to change access control mode for per-operation basis. This feature comes from non LSM version of TOMOYO which is designed for permitting users to use SELinux and TOMOYO at the same time. SELinux does not care filename in a directory whereas TOMOYO does. Change of filename can change how the file is used. For example, renaming index.txt to .htaccess will change how the file is used. Thus, letting SELinux to enforce read()/write()/mmap() etc. restriction and letting TOMOYO to enforce rename() restriction is an example usage of this feature. What is unfortunate for me is that currently LSM does not allow users to use SELinux and LSM version of TOMOYO at the same time... Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
This patch allows users to aggregate programs which provide similar functionality (e.g. /usr/bin/vi and /usr/bin/emacs ). Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Some applications create and execute programs dynamically. We need to accept wildcard for execute permission because such programs contain random suffix in their filenames. This patch loosens up regulation of string parameters. Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Allow pathnames longer than 4000 bytes. Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
security/tomoyo/common.c became too large to read. Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Since the behavior of the system is restricted by policy, we may need to update policy when you update packages. We need to update policy in the following cases. * The pathname of files has changed. * The dependency of files has changed. * The access permissions required has increased. The ideal way to update policy is to rebuild from the scratch using learning mode. But it is not desirable to change from enforcing mode to other mode if the system has once entered in production state. Suppose MAC could support per-application enforcing mode, the MAC becomes useless if an application that is not running in enforcing mode was cracked. For example, the whole system becomes vulnerable if only HTTP server application is running in learning mode to rebuild policy for the application. So, in TOMOYO Linux, updating policy is done while the system is running in enforcing mode. This patch implements "interactive enforcing mode" which allows administrators to judge whether to accept policy violation in enforcing mode or not. A demo movie is available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b9q1Jo25LPA . Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Use "struct tomoyo_request_info" instead of passing individual arguments. Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 10 5月, 2010 1 次提交
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由 Tetsuo Handa 提交于
Use stack memory for pending entry to reduce kmalloc() which will be kfree()d. Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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