1. 05 3月, 2018 1 次提交
  2. 24 1月, 2018 1 次提交
  3. 16 1月, 2018 2 次提交
    • E
      ipv6: ip6_make_skb() needs to clear cork.base.dst · 95ef498d
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      In my last patch, I missed fact that cork.base.dst was not initialized
      in ip6_make_skb() :
      
      If ip6_setup_cork() returns an error, we might attempt a dst_release()
      on some random pointer.
      
      Fixes: 862c03ee ("ipv6: fix possible mem leaks in ipv6_make_skb()")
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      95ef498d
    • M
      ipv6: fix udpv6 sendmsg crash caused by too small MTU · 749439bf
      Mike Maloney 提交于
      The logic in __ip6_append_data() assumes that the MTU is at least large
      enough for the headers.  A device's MTU may be adjusted after being
      added while sendmsg() is processing data, resulting in
      __ip6_append_data() seeing any MTU.  For an mtu smaller than the size of
      the fragmentation header, the math results in a negative 'maxfraglen',
      which causes problems when refragmenting any previous skb in the
      skb_write_queue, leaving it possibly malformed.
      
      Instead sendmsg returns EINVAL when the mtu is calculated to be less
      than IPV6_MIN_MTU.
      
      Found by syzkaller:
      kernel BUG at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2064!
      invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
      Dumping ftrace buffer:
         (ftrace buffer empty)
      Modules linked in:
      CPU: 1 PID: 14216 Comm: syz-executor5 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc4+ #2
      Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
      task: ffff8801d0b68580 task.stack: ffff8801ac6b8000
      RIP: 0010:__skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2064 [inline]
      RIP: 0010:__ip6_make_skb+0x18cf/0x1f70 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1617
      RSP: 0018:ffff8801ac6bf570 EFLAGS: 00010216
      RAX: 0000000000010000 RBX: 0000000000000028 RCX: ffffc90003cce000
      RDX: 00000000000001b8 RSI: ffffffff839df06f RDI: ffff8801d9478ca0
      RBP: ffff8801ac6bf780 R08: ffff8801cc3f1dbc R09: 0000000000000000
      R10: ffff8801ac6bf7a0 R11: 43cb4b7b1948a9e7 R12: ffff8801cc3f1dc8
      R13: ffff8801cc3f1d40 R14: 0000000000001036 R15: dffffc0000000000
      FS:  00007f43d740c700(0000) GS:ffff8801dc100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
      CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
      CR2: 00007f7834984000 CR3: 00000001d79b9000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
      DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
      DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
      Call Trace:
       ip6_finish_skb include/net/ipv6.h:911 [inline]
       udp_v6_push_pending_frames+0x255/0x390 net/ipv6/udp.c:1093
       udpv6_sendmsg+0x280d/0x31a0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1363
       inet_sendmsg+0x11f/0x5e0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:762
       sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline]
       sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643
       SYSC_sendto+0x352/0x5a0 net/socket.c:1750
       SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1718
       entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
      RIP: 0033:0x4512e9
      RSP: 002b:00007f43d740bc08 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
      RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000007180a8 RCX: 00000000004512e9
      RDX: 000000000000002e RSI: 0000000020d08000 RDI: 0000000000000005
      RBP: 0000000000000086 R08: 00000000209c1000 R09: 000000000000001c
      R10: 0000000000040800 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: 00000000004b9c69
      R13: 00000000ffffffff R14: 0000000000000005 R15: 00000000202c2000
      Code: 9e 01 fe e9 c5 e8 ff ff e8 7f 9e 01 fe e9 4a ea ff ff 48 89 f7 e8 52 9e 01 fe e9 aa eb ff ff e8 a8 b6 cf fd 0f 0b e8 a1 b6 cf fd <0f> 0b 49 8d 45 78 4d 8d 45 7c 48 89 85 78 fe ff ff 49 8d 85 ba
      RIP: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2064 [inline] RSP: ffff8801ac6bf570
      RIP: __ip6_make_skb+0x18cf/0x1f70 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1617 RSP: ffff8801ac6bf570
      Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
      Signed-off-by: NMike Maloney <maloney@google.com>
      Reviewed-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      749439bf
  4. 11 1月, 2018 1 次提交
  5. 09 1月, 2018 1 次提交
  6. 27 12月, 2017 1 次提交
  7. 22 12月, 2017 1 次提交
    • S
      net: reevalulate autoflowlabel setting after sysctl setting · 513674b5
      Shaohua Li 提交于
      sysctl.ip6.auto_flowlabels is default 1. In our hosts, we set it to 2.
      If sockopt doesn't set autoflowlabel, outcome packets from the hosts are
      supposed to not include flowlabel. This is true for normal packet, but
      not for reset packet.
      
      The reason is ipv6_pinfo.autoflowlabel is set in sock creation. Later if
      we change sysctl.ip6.auto_flowlabels, the ipv6_pinfo.autoflowlabel isn't
      changed, so the sock will keep the old behavior in terms of auto
      flowlabel. Reset packet is suffering from this problem, because reset
      packet is sent from a special control socket, which is created at boot
      time. Since sysctl.ipv6.auto_flowlabels is 1 by default, the control
      socket will always have its ipv6_pinfo.autoflowlabel set, even after
      user set sysctl.ipv6.auto_flowlabels to 1, so reset packset will always
      have flowlabel. Normal sock created before sysctl setting suffers from
      the same issue. We can't even turn off autoflowlabel unless we kill all
      socks in the hosts.
      
      To fix this, if IPV6_AUTOFLOWLABEL sockopt is used, we use the
      autoflowlabel setting from user, otherwise we always call
      ip6_default_np_autolabel() which has the new settings of sysctl.
      
      Note, this changes behavior a little bit. Before commit 42240901
      (ipv6: Implement different admin modes for automatic flow labels), the
      autoflowlabel behavior of a sock isn't sticky, eg, if sysctl changes,
      existing connection will change autoflowlabel behavior. After that
      commit, autoflowlabel behavior is sticky in the whole life of the sock.
      With this patch, the behavior isn't sticky again.
      
      Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
      Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
      Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@quantonium.net>
      Signed-off-by: NShaohua Li <shli@fb.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      513674b5
  8. 30 11月, 2017 1 次提交
    • D
      xfrm: Move dst->path into struct xfrm_dst · 0f6c480f
      David Miller 提交于
      The first member of an IPSEC route bundle chain sets it's dst->path to
      the underlying ipv4/ipv6 route that carries the bundle.
      
      Stated another way, if one were to follow the xfrm_dst->child chain of
      the bundle, the final non-NULL pointer would be the path and point to
      either an ipv4 or an ipv6 route.
      
      This is largely used to make sure that PMTU events propagate down to
      the correct ipv4 or ipv6 route.
      
      When we don't have the top of an IPSEC bundle 'dst->path == dst'.
      
      Move it down into xfrm_dst and key off of dst->xfrm.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Reviewed-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      0f6c480f
  9. 22 10月, 2017 1 次提交
    • E
      ipv6: flowlabel: do not leave opt->tot_len with garbage · 864e2a1f
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      When syzkaller team brought us a C repro for the crash [1] that
      had been reported many times in the past, I finally could find
      the root cause.
      
      If FlowLabel info is merged by fl6_merge_options(), we leave
      part of the opt_space storage provided by udp/raw/l2tp with random value
      in opt_space.tot_len, unless a control message was provided at sendmsg()
      time.
      
      Then ip6_setup_cork() would use this random value to perform a kzalloc()
      call. Undefined behavior and crashes.
      
      Fix is to properly set tot_len in fl6_merge_options()
      
      At the same time, we can also avoid consuming memory and cpu cycles
      to clear it, if every option is copied via a kmemdup(). This is the
      change in ip6_setup_cork().
      
      [1]
      kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
      kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
      general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
      Dumping ftrace buffer:
         (ftrace buffer empty)
      Modules linked in:
      CPU: 0 PID: 6613 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc4+ #127
      Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
      task: ffff8801cb64a100 task.stack: ffff8801cc350000
      RIP: 0010:ip6_setup_cork+0x274/0x15c0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1168
      RSP: 0018:ffff8801cc357550 EFLAGS: 00010203
      RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8801cc357748 RCX: 0000000000000010
      RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffffffff842bd1d9 RDI: 0000000000000014
      RBP: ffff8801cc357620 R08: ffff8801cb17f380 R09: ffff8801cc357b10
      R10: ffff8801cb64a100 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8801cc357ab0
      R13: ffff8801cc357b10 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8801c3bbf0c0
      FS:  00007f9c5c459700(0000) GS:ffff8801db200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
      CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
      CR2: 0000000020324000 CR3: 00000001d1cf2000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
      DR0: 0000000020001010 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
      DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
      Call Trace:
       ip6_make_skb+0x282/0x530 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1729
       udpv6_sendmsg+0x2769/0x3380 net/ipv6/udp.c:1340
       inet_sendmsg+0x11f/0x5e0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:762
       sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline]
       sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643
       SYSC_sendto+0x358/0x5a0 net/socket.c:1750
       SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1718
       entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
      RIP: 0033:0x4520a9
      RSP: 002b:00007f9c5c458c08 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
      RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000718000 RCX: 00000000004520a9
      RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020fd1000 RDI: 0000000000000016
      RBP: 0000000000000086 R08: 0000000020e0afe4 R09: 000000000000001c
      R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: 00000000004bb1ee
      R13: 00000000ffffffff R14: 0000000000000016 R15: 0000000000000029
      Code: e0 07 83 c0 03 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 ea 0f 00 00 48 8d 79 04 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 45 8b 74 24 04 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 14 02 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85
      RIP: ip6_setup_cork+0x274/0x15c0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1168 RSP: ffff8801cc357550
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Reported-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      864e2a1f
  10. 11 8月, 2017 1 次提交
  11. 26 7月, 2017 1 次提交
    • S
      ipv6: Don't increase IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS twice in ip6_fragment() · afce615a
      Stefano Brivio 提交于
      RFC 2465 defines ipv6IfStatsOutFragFails as:
      
      	"The number of IPv6 datagrams that have been discarded
      	 because they needed to be fragmented at this output
      	 interface but could not be."
      
      The existing implementation, instead, would increase the counter
      twice in case we fail to allocate room for single fragments:
      once for the fragment, once for the datagram.
      
      This didn't look intentional though. In one of the two affected
      affected failure paths, the double increase was simply a result
      of a new 'goto fail' statement, introduced to avoid a skb leak.
      The other path appears to be affected since at least 2.6.12-rc2.
      Reported-by: NSabrina Dubroca <sdubroca@redhat.com>
      Fixes: 1d325d21 ("ipv6: ip6_fragment: fix headroom tests and skb leak")
      Signed-off-by: NStefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      afce615a
  12. 18 7月, 2017 1 次提交
  13. 01 7月, 2017 1 次提交
  14. 24 6月, 2017 1 次提交
    • M
      net: account for current skb length when deciding about UFO · a5cb659b
      Michal Kubeček 提交于
      Our customer encountered stuck NFS writes for blocks starting at specific
      offsets w.r.t. page boundary caused by networking stack sending packets via
      UFO enabled device with wrong checksum. The problem can be reproduced by
      composing a long UDP datagram from multiple parts using MSG_MORE flag:
      
        sendto(sd, buff, 1000, MSG_MORE, ...);
        sendto(sd, buff, 1000, MSG_MORE, ...);
        sendto(sd, buff, 3000, 0, ...);
      
      Assume this packet is to be routed via a device with MTU 1500 and
      NETIF_F_UFO enabled. When second sendto() gets into __ip_append_data(),
      this condition is tested (among others) to decide whether to call
      ip_ufo_append_data():
      
        ((length + fragheaderlen) > mtu) || (skb && skb_is_gso(skb))
      
      At the moment, we already have skb with 1028 bytes of data which is not
      marked for GSO so that the test is false (fragheaderlen is usually 20).
      Thus we append second 1000 bytes to this skb without invoking UFO. Third
      sendto(), however, has sufficient length to trigger the UFO path so that we
      end up with non-UFO skb followed by a UFO one. Later on, udp_send_skb()
      uses udp_csum() to calculate the checksum but that assumes all fragments
      have correct checksum in skb->csum which is not true for UFO fragments.
      
      When checking against MTU, we need to add skb->len to length of new segment
      if we already have a partially filled skb and fragheaderlen only if there
      isn't one.
      
      In the IPv6 case, skb can only be null if this is the first segment so that
      we have to use headersize (length of the first IPv6 header) rather than
      fragheaderlen (length of IPv6 header of further fragments) for skb == NULL.
      
      Fixes: e89e9cf5 ("[IPv4/IPv6]: UFO Scatter-gather approach")
      Fixes: e4c5e13a ("ipv6: Should use consistent conditional judgement for
      	ip6 fragment between __ip6_append_data and ip6_finish_output")
      Signed-off-by: NMichal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
      Acked-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      a5cb659b
  15. 18 6月, 2017 1 次提交
  16. 16 6月, 2017 1 次提交
    • J
      networking: make skb_push & __skb_push return void pointers · d58ff351
      Johannes Berg 提交于
      It seems like a historic accident that these return unsigned char *,
      and in many places that means casts are required, more often than not.
      
      Make these functions return void * and remove all the casts across
      the tree, adding a (u8 *) cast only where the unsigned char pointer
      was used directly, all done with the following spatch:
      
          @@
          expression SKB, LEN;
          typedef u8;
          identifier fn = { skb_push, __skb_push, skb_push_rcsum };
          @@
          - *(fn(SKB, LEN))
          + *(u8 *)fn(SKB, LEN)
      
          @@
          expression E, SKB, LEN;
          identifier fn = { skb_push, __skb_push, skb_push_rcsum };
          type T;
          @@
          - E = ((T *)(fn(SKB, LEN)))
          + E = fn(SKB, LEN)
      
          @@
          expression SKB, LEN;
          identifier fn = { skb_push, __skb_push, skb_push_rcsum };
          @@
          - fn(SKB, LEN)[0]
          + *(u8 *)fn(SKB, LEN)
      
      Note that the last part there converts from push(...)[0] to the
      more idiomatic *(u8 *)push(...).
      Signed-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      d58ff351
  17. 11 6月, 2017 1 次提交
  18. 10 6月, 2017 1 次提交
  19. 22 5月, 2017 1 次提交
  20. 18 5月, 2017 2 次提交
    • D
      ipv6: Check ip6_find_1stfragopt() return value properly. · 7dd7eb95
      David S. Miller 提交于
      Do not use unsigned variables to see if it returns a negative
      error or not.
      
      Fixes: 2423496a ("ipv6: Prevent overrun when parsing v6 header options")
      Reported-by: NJulia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      7dd7eb95
    • C
      ipv6: Prevent overrun when parsing v6 header options · 2423496a
      Craig Gallek 提交于
      The KASAN warning repoted below was discovered with a syzkaller
      program.  The reproducer is basically:
        int s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, NEXTHDR_HOP);
        send(s, &one_byte_of_data, 1, MSG_MORE);
        send(s, &more_than_mtu_bytes_data, 2000, 0);
      
      The socket() call sets the nexthdr field of the v6 header to
      NEXTHDR_HOP, the first send call primes the payload with a non zero
      byte of data, and the second send call triggers the fragmentation path.
      
      The fragmentation code tries to parse the header options in order
      to figure out where to insert the fragment option.  Since nexthdr points
      to an invalid option, the calculation of the size of the network header
      can made to be much larger than the linear section of the skb and data
      is read outside of it.
      
      This fix makes ip6_find_1stfrag return an error if it detects
      running out-of-bounds.
      
      [   42.361487] ==================================================================
      [   42.364412] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
      [   42.365471] Read of size 840 at addr ffff88000969e798 by task ip6_fragment-oo/3789
      [   42.366469]
      [   42.366696] CPU: 1 PID: 3789 Comm: ip6_fragment-oo Not tainted 4.11.0+ #41
      [   42.367628] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
      [   42.368824] Call Trace:
      [   42.369183]  dump_stack+0xb3/0x10b
      [   42.369664]  print_address_description+0x73/0x290
      [   42.370325]  kasan_report+0x252/0x370
      [   42.370839]  ? ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
      [   42.371396]  check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0
      [   42.371978]  memcpy+0x23/0x50
      [   42.372395]  ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
      [   42.372920]  ? nf_ct_expect_unregister_notifier+0x110/0x110
      [   42.373681]  ? ip6_copy_metadata+0x7f0/0x7f0
      [   42.374263]  ? ip6_forward+0x2e30/0x2e30
      [   42.374803]  ip6_finish_output+0x584/0x990
      [   42.375350]  ip6_output+0x1b7/0x690
      [   42.375836]  ? ip6_finish_output+0x990/0x990
      [   42.376411]  ? ip6_fragment+0x3730/0x3730
      [   42.376968]  ip6_local_out+0x95/0x160
      [   42.377471]  ip6_send_skb+0xa1/0x330
      [   42.377969]  ip6_push_pending_frames+0xb3/0xe0
      [   42.378589]  rawv6_sendmsg+0x2051/0x2db0
      [   42.379129]  ? rawv6_bind+0x8b0/0x8b0
      [   42.379633]  ? _copy_from_user+0x84/0xe0
      [   42.380193]  ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290
      [   42.380878]  ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x162/0x930
      [   42.381427]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa3/0x120
      [   42.382074]  ? sock_has_perm+0x1f6/0x290
      [   42.382614]  ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x167/0x930
      [   42.383173]  ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660
      [   42.383727]  inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
      [   42.384226]  ? inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
      [   42.384748]  ? inet_recvmsg+0x540/0x540
      [   42.385263]  sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110
      [   42.385758]  SYSC_sendto+0x217/0x380
      [   42.386249]  ? SYSC_connect+0x310/0x310
      [   42.386783]  ? __might_fault+0x110/0x1d0
      [   42.387324]  ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660
      [   42.387880]  ? __fget_light+0xa1/0x1f0
      [   42.388403]  ? __fdget+0x18/0x20
      [   42.388851]  ? sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0
      [   42.389472]  ? SyS_setsockopt+0x17f/0x260
      [   42.390021]  ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0xbe
      [   42.390650]  SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50
      [   42.391103]  entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
      [   42.391731] RIP: 0033:0x7fbbb711e383
      [   42.392217] RSP: 002b:00007ffff4d34f28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
      [   42.393235] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fbbb711e383
      [   42.394195] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00007ffff4d34f60 RDI: 0000000000000003
      [   42.395145] RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: 00007ffff4d34f40 R09: 0000000000000018
      [   42.396056] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400aad
      [   42.396598] R13: 0000000000000066 R14: 00007ffff4d34ee0 R15: 00007fbbb717af00
      [   42.397257]
      [   42.397411] Allocated by task 3789:
      [   42.397702]  save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
      [   42.398005]  save_stack+0x46/0xd0
      [   42.398267]  kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
      [   42.398548]  kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
      [   42.398848]  __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xcb/0x380
      [   42.399224]  __kmalloc_reserve.isra.32+0x41/0xe0
      [   42.399654]  __alloc_skb+0xf8/0x580
      [   42.400003]  sock_wmalloc+0xab/0xf0
      [   42.400346]  __ip6_append_data.isra.41+0x2472/0x33d0
      [   42.400813]  ip6_append_data+0x1a8/0x2f0
      [   42.401122]  rawv6_sendmsg+0x11ee/0x2db0
      [   42.401505]  inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
      [   42.401860]  sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110
      [   42.402209]  ___sys_sendmsg+0x7cb/0x930
      [   42.402582]  __sys_sendmsg+0xd9/0x190
      [   42.402941]  SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50
      [   42.403273]  entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
      [   42.403718]
      [   42.403871] Freed by task 1794:
      [   42.404146]  save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
      [   42.404515]  save_stack+0x46/0xd0
      [   42.404827]  kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0
      [   42.405167]  kfree+0xe8/0x2b0
      [   42.405462]  skb_free_head+0x74/0xb0
      [   42.405806]  skb_release_data+0x30e/0x3a0
      [   42.406198]  skb_release_all+0x4a/0x60
      [   42.406563]  consume_skb+0x113/0x2e0
      [   42.406910]  skb_free_datagram+0x1a/0xe0
      [   42.407288]  netlink_recvmsg+0x60d/0xe40
      [   42.407667]  sock_recvmsg+0xd7/0x110
      [   42.408022]  ___sys_recvmsg+0x25c/0x580
      [   42.408395]  __sys_recvmsg+0xd6/0x190
      [   42.408753]  SyS_recvmsg+0x2d/0x50
      [   42.409086]  entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
      [   42.409513]
      [   42.409665] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88000969e780
      [   42.409665]  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
      [   42.410846] The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of
      [   42.410846]  512-byte region [ffff88000969e780, ffff88000969e980)
      [   42.411941] The buggy address belongs to the page:
      [   42.412405] page:ffffea000025a780 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:          (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
      [   42.413298] flags: 0x100000000008100(slab|head)
      [   42.413729] raw: 0100000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001800c000c
      [   42.414387] raw: ffffea00002a9500 0000000900000007 ffff88000c401280 0000000000000000
      [   42.415074] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
      [   42.415604]
      [   42.415757] Memory state around the buggy address:
      [   42.416222]  ffff88000969e880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      [   42.416904]  ffff88000969e900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      [   42.417591] >ffff88000969e980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
      [   42.418273]                    ^
      [   42.418588]  ffff88000969ea00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
      [   42.419273]  ffff88000969ea80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
      [   42.419882] ==================================================================
      Reported-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NCraig Gallek <kraig@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      2423496a
  21. 14 3月, 2017 1 次提交
    • F
      ipv6: avoid write to a possibly cloned skb · 79e49503
      Florian Westphal 提交于
      ip6_fragment, in case skb has a fraglist, checks if the
      skb is cloned.  If it is, it will move to the 'slow path' and allocates
      new skbs for each fragment.
      
      However, right before entering the slowpath loop, it updates the
      nexthdr value of the last ipv6 extension header to NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT,
      to account for the fragment header that will be inserted in the new
      ipv6-fragment skbs.
      
      In case original skb is cloned this munges nexthdr value of another
      skb.  Avoid this by doing the nexthdr update for each of the new fragment
      skbs separately.
      
      This was observed with tcpdump on a bridge device where netfilter ipv6
      reassembly is active:  tcpdump shows malformed fragment headers as
      the l4 header (icmpv6, tcp, etc). is decoded as a fragment header.
      
      Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
      Reported-by: NAndreas Karis <akaris@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NFlorian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      79e49503
  22. 10 3月, 2017 1 次提交
    • A
      udp: avoid ufo handling on IP payload compression packets · 4b3b45ed
      Alexey Kodanev 提交于
      commit c146066a ("ipv4: Don't use ufo handling on later transformed
      packets") and commit f89c56ce ("ipv6: Don't use ufo handling on
      later transformed packets") added a check that 'rt->dst.header_len' isn't
      zero in order to skip UFO, but it doesn't include IPcomp in transport mode
      where it equals zero.
      
      Packets, after payload compression, may not require further fragmentation,
      and if original length exceeds MTU, later compressed packets will be
      transmitted incorrectly. This can be reproduced with LTP udp_ipsec.sh test
      on veth device with enabled UFO, MTU is 1500 and UDP payload is 2000:
      
      * IPv4 case, offset is wrong + unnecessary fragmentation
          udp_ipsec.sh -p comp -m transport -s 2000 &
          tcpdump -ni ltp_ns_veth2
          ...
          IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 45203, offset 0, flags [+],
            proto Compressed IP (108), length 49)
            10.0.0.2 > 10.0.0.1: IPComp(cpi=0x1000)
          IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 45203, offset 1480, flags [none],
            proto UDP (17), length 21) 10.0.0.2 > 10.0.0.1: ip-proto-17
      
      * IPv6 case, sending small fragments
          udp_ipsec.sh -6 -p comp -m transport -s 2000 &
          tcpdump -ni ltp_ns_veth2
          ...
          IP6 (flowlabel 0x6b9ba, hlim 64, next-header Compressed IP (108)
            payload length: 37) fd00::2 > fd00::1: IPComp(cpi=0x1000)
          IP6 (flowlabel 0x6b9ba, hlim 64, next-header Compressed IP (108)
            payload length: 21) fd00::2 > fd00::1: IPComp(cpi=0x1000)
      
      Fix it by checking 'rt->dst.xfrm' pointer to 'xfrm_state' struct, skip UFO
      if xfrm is set. So the new check will include both cases: IPcomp and IPsec.
      
      Fixes: c146066a ("ipv4: Don't use ufo handling on later transformed packets")
      Fixes: f89c56ce ("ipv6: Don't use ufo handling on later transformed packets")
      Signed-off-by: NAlexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      4b3b45ed
  23. 19 2月, 2017 1 次提交
  24. 15 2月, 2017 1 次提交
  25. 12 2月, 2017 1 次提交
  26. 08 2月, 2017 2 次提交
  27. 31 1月, 2017 1 次提交
  28. 27 1月, 2017 1 次提交
  29. 30 12月, 2016 1 次提交
    • Z
      ipv6: Should use consistent conditional judgement for ip6 fragment between... · e4c5e13a
      Zheng Li 提交于
      ipv6: Should use consistent conditional judgement for ip6 fragment between __ip6_append_data and ip6_finish_output
      
      There is an inconsistent conditional judgement between __ip6_append_data
      and ip6_finish_output functions, the variable length in __ip6_append_data
      just include the length of application's payload and udp6 header, don't
      include the length of ipv6 header, but in ip6_finish_output use
      (skb->len > ip6_skb_dst_mtu(skb)) as judgement, and skb->len include the
      length of ipv6 header.
      
      That causes some particular application's udp6 payloads whose length are
      between (MTU - IPv6 Header) and MTU were fragmented by ip6_fragment even
      though the rst->dev support UFO feature.
      
      Add the length of ipv6 header to length in __ip6_append_data to keep
      consistent conditional judgement as ip6_finish_output for ip6 fragment.
      Signed-off-by: NZheng Li <james.z.li@ericsson.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      e4c5e13a
  30. 26 11月, 2016 1 次提交
    • D
      net: ipv4, ipv6: run cgroup eBPF egress programs · 33b48679
      Daniel Mack 提交于
      If the cgroup associated with the receiving socket has an eBPF
      programs installed, run them from ip_output(), ip6_output() and
      ip_mc_output(). From mentioned functions we have two socket contexts
      as per 7026b1dd ("netfilter: Pass socket pointer down through
      okfn()."). We explicitly need to use sk instead of skb->sk here,
      since otherwise the same program would run multiple times on egress
      when encap devices are involved, which is not desired in our case.
      
      eBPF programs used in this context are expected to either return 1 to
      let the packet pass, or != 1 to drop them. The programs have access to
      the skb through bpf_skb_load_bytes(), and the payload starts at the
      network headers (L3).
      
      Note that cgroup_bpf_run_filter() is stubbed out as static inline nop
      for !CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF, and is otherwise guarded by a static key if
      the feature is unused.
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel Mack <daniel@zonque.org>
      Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      33b48679
  31. 20 11月, 2016 1 次提交
    • A
      net: fix bogus cast in skb_pagelen() and use unsigned variables · c72d8cda
      Alexey Dobriyan 提交于
      1) cast to "int" is unnecessary:
         u8 will be promoted to int before decrementing,
         small positive numbers fit into "int", so their values won't be changed
         during promotion.
      
         Once everything is int including loop counters, signedness doesn't
         matter: 32-bit operations will stay 32-bit operations.
      
         But! Someone tried to make this loop smart by making everything of
         the same type apparently in an attempt to optimise it.
         Do the optimization, just differently.
         Do the cast where it matters. :^)
      
      2) frag size is unsigned entity and sum of fragments sizes is also
         unsigned.
      
      Make everything unsigned, leave no MOVSX instruction behind.
      
      	add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 0/3 up/down: 0/-4 (-4)
      	function                                     old     new   delta
      	skb_cow_data                                 835     834      -1
      	ip_do_fragment                              2549    2548      -1
      	ip6_fragment                                3130    3128      -2
      	Total: Before=154865032, After=154865028, chg -0.00%
      Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      c72d8cda
  32. 10 11月, 2016 1 次提交
  33. 01 11月, 2016 1 次提交
    • J
      ipv6: Don't use ufo handling on later transformed packets · f89c56ce
      Jakub Sitnicki 提交于
      Similar to commit c146066a ("ipv4: Don't use ufo handling on later
      transformed packets"), don't perform UFO on packets that will be IPsec
      transformed. To detect it we rely on the fact that headerlen in
      dst_entry is non-zero only for transformation bundles (xfrm_dst
      objects).
      
      Unwanted segmentation can be observed with a NETIF_F_UFO capable device,
      such as a dummy device:
      
        DEV=dum0 LEN=1493
      
        ip li add $DEV type dummy
        ip addr add fc00::1/64 dev $DEV nodad
        ip link set $DEV up
        ip xfrm policy add dir out src fc00::1 dst fc00::2 \
           tmpl src fc00::1 dst fc00::2 proto esp spi 1
        ip xfrm state add src fc00::1 dst fc00::2 \
           proto esp spi 1 enc 'aes' 0x0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b
      
        tcpdump -n -nn -i $DEV -t &
        socat /dev/zero,readbytes=$LEN udp6:[fc00::2]:$LEN
      
      tcpdump output before:
      
        IP6 fc00::1 > fc00::2: frag (0|1448) ESP(spi=0x00000001,seq=0x1), length 1448
        IP6 fc00::1 > fc00::2: frag (1448|48)
        IP6 fc00::1 > fc00::2: ESP(spi=0x00000001,seq=0x2), length 88
      
      ... and after:
      
        IP6 fc00::1 > fc00::2: frag (0|1448) ESP(spi=0x00000001,seq=0x1), length 1448
        IP6 fc00::1 > fc00::2: frag (1448|80)
      
      Fixes: e89e9cf5 ("[IPv4/IPv6]: UFO Scatter-gather approach")
      Signed-off-by: NJakub Sitnicki <jkbs@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: NHannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      f89c56ce
  34. 11 9月, 2016 3 次提交
  35. 31 8月, 2016 1 次提交
    • R
      net: lwtunnel: Handle fragmentation · 14972cbd
      Roopa Prabhu 提交于
      Today mpls iptunnel lwtunnel_output redirect expects the tunnel
      output function to handle fragmentation. This is ok but can be
      avoided if we did not do the mpls output redirect too early.
      ie we could wait until ip fragmentation is done and then call
      mpls output for each ip fragment.
      
      To make this work we will need,
      1) the lwtunnel state to carry encap headroom
      2) and do the redirect to the encap output handler on the ip fragment
      (essentially do the output redirect after fragmentation)
      
      This patch adds tunnel headroom in lwtstate to make sure we
      account for tunnel data in mtu calculations during fragmentation
      and adds new xmit redirect handler to redirect to lwtunnel xmit func
      after ip fragmentation.
      
      This includes IPV6 and some mtu fixes and testing from David Ahern.
      Signed-off-by: NRoopa Prabhu <roopa@cumulusnetworks.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      14972cbd