Loops per jiffy is calculated by multiplying tsc_khz with 1e3 and then
dividing it by HZ.

Both tsc_khz and the temporary variable holding the multiplication result
are of type unsigned long, so on 32bit the result is truncated to the lower
32bit.

Use u64 as type for the temporary variable and cast tsc_khz to it before
multiplying.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog and removed pointless braces ]

Fixes: cf7a63ef ("x86/tsc: Calibrate tsc only once")
Signed-off-by: NChuanhua Lei <chuanhua.lei@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: yixin.zhu@linux.intel.com
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@microsoft.com>
Cc: Rajvi Jingar <rajvi.jingar@intel.com>
Cc: Dou Liyang <douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536228203-18701-1-git-send-email-chuanhua.lei@linux.intel.com

Handle the case where microcode gets loaded on the BSP's hyperthread
sibling first and the boot_cpu_data's microcode revision doesn't get
updated because of early exit due to the siblings sharing a microcode
engine.

For that, simply write the updated revision on all CPUs unconditionally.
Signed-off-by: NFilippo Sironi <sironi@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: prarit@redhat.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1533050970-14385-1-git-send-email-sironi@amazon.de

When preparing an MCE record for logging, boot_cpu_data.microcode is used
to read out the microcode revision on the box.

However, on systems where late microcode update has happened, the microcode
revision output in a MCE log record is wrong because
boot_cpu_data.microcode is not updated when the microcode gets updated.

But, the microcode revision saved in boot_cpu_data's microcode member
should be kept up-to-date, regardless, for consistency.

Make it so.

Fixes: fa94d0c6 ("x86/MCE: Save microcode revision in machine check records")
Signed-off-by: NPrarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: sironi@amazon.de
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180731112739.32338-1-prarit@redhat.com

show_opcodes() is used both for dumping kernel instructions and for dumping
user instructions. If userspace causes #PF by jumping to a kernel address,
show_opcodes() can be reached with regs->ip controlled by the user,
pointing to kernel code. Make sure that userspace can't trick us into
dumping kernel memory into dmesg.

Fixes: 7cccf072 ("x86/dumpstack: Add a show_ip() function")
Signed-off-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180828154901.112726-1-jannh@google.com

text_poke() and text_poke_bp() must be called with text_mutex held.

Put proper lockdep anotation in place instead of just mentioning the
requirement in a comment.
Reported-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: NMasami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1808280853520.25787@cbobk.fhfr.pm

Reset the KASAN shadow state of the task stack before rewinding RSP.
Without this, a kernel oops will leave parts of the stack poisoned, and
code running under do_exit() can trip over such poisoned regions and cause
nonsensical false-positive KASAN reports about stack-out-of-bounds bugs.

This does not wipe the exception stacks; if an oops happens on an exception
stack, it might result in random KASAN false-positives from other tasks
afterwards. This is probably relatively uninteresting, since if the kernel
oopses on an exception stack, there are most likely bigger things to worry
about. It'd be more interesting if vmapped stacks and KASAN were
compatible, since then handle_stack_overflow() would oops from exception
stack context.

Fixes: 2deb4be2 ("x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit()")
Signed-off-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180828184033.93712-1-jannh@google.com

On Nehalem and newer core CPUs the CPU cache internally uses 44 bits
physical address space. The L1TF workaround is limited by this internal
cache address width, and needs to have one bit free there for the
mitigation to work.

Older client systems report only 36bit physical address space so the range
check decides that L1TF is not mitigated for a 36bit phys/32GB system with
some memory holes.

But since these actually have the larger internal cache width this warning
is bogus because it would only really be needed if the system had more than
43bits of memory.

Add a new internal x86_cache_bits field. Normally it is the same as the
physical bits field reported by CPUID, but for Nehalem and newerforce it to
be at least 44bits.

Change the L1TF memory size warning to use the new cache_bits field to
avoid bogus warnings and remove the bogus comment about memory size.

Fixes: 17dbca11 ("x86/speculation/l1tf: Add sysfs reporting for l1tf")
Reported-by: NGeorge Anchev <studio@anchev.net>
Reported-by: NChristopher Snowhill <kode54@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Michael Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: vbabka@suse.cz
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180824170351.34874-1-andi@firstfloor.org

The check for Spectre microcodes does not check for family 6, only the
model numbers.

Add a family 6 check to avoid ambiguity with other families.

Fixes: a5b29663 ("x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes")
Signed-off-by: NAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180824170351.34874-2-andi@firstfloor.org

Two users have reported [1] that they have an "extremely unlikely" system
with more than MAX_PA/2 memory and L1TF mitigation is not effective.

Make the warning more helpful by suggesting the proper mem=X kernel boot
parameter to make it effective and a link to the L1TF document to help
decide if the mitigation is worth the unusable RAM.

[1] https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1105536Suggested-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NVlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/966571f0-9d7f-43dc-92c6-a10eec7a1254@suse.cz

If we don't use paravirt; don't play unnecessary and complicated games
to free page-tables.
Suggested-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: NRik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Currently memory_failure() returns zero if the error was handled. On
that result mce_unmap_kpfn() is called to zap the page out of the kernel
linear mapping to prevent speculative fetches of potentially poisoned
memory. However, in the case of dax mapped devmap pages the page may be
in active permanent use by the device driver, so it cannot be unmapped
from the kernel.

Instead of marking the page not present, marking the page UC should
be sufficient for preventing poison from being pre-fetched into the
cache. Convert mce_unmap_pfn() to set_mce_nospec() remapping the page as
UC, to hide it from speculative accesses.

Given that that persistent memory errors can be cleared by the driver,
include a facility to restore the page to cacheable operation,
clear_mce_nospec().

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <x86@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>

The consolidation of the start_thread() functions removed the export
unintentionally. This breaks binfmt handlers built as a module.

Add it back.

Fixes: e634d8fc ("x86-64: merge the standard and compat start_thread() functions")
Signed-off-by: NRian Hunter <rian@alum.mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180819230854.7275-1-rian@alum.mit.edu

The split of .system_keyring into .builtin_trusted_keys and
.secondary_trusted_keys broke kexec, thereby preventing kernels signed by
keys which are now in the secondary keyring from being kexec'd.

Fix this by passing VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING to
verify_pefile_signature().

Fixes: d3bfe841 ("certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically")
Signed-off-by: NYannik Sembritzki <yannik@sembritzki.me>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

allmodconfig+CONFIG_INTEL_KVM=n results in the following build error.

  ERROR: "l1tf_vmx_mitigation" [arch/x86/kvm/kvm.ko] undefined!

Fixes: 5b76a3cf ("KVM: VMX: Tell the nested hypervisor to skip L1D flush on vmentry")
Reported-by: NMeelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee>
Cc: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NGuenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Commit 5209654a (x86/ACPI/cstate: Allow ACPI C1 FFH MWAIT use on
AMD systems) forgot to update the ACPI C1 idle state description and
tools like turbostat display "ACPI FFH INTEL MWAIT 0x0" which is
quite confusing on an AMD system.

Drop the "INTEL" part from the ACPI C1 FFH MWAIT C-state description
to avoid confusion.

Fixes: 5209654a (x86/ACPI/cstate: Allow ACPI C1 FFH MWAIT use on AMD systems)
Signed-off-by: NPrarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
[ rjw: Subject & changelog ]
Signed-off-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>

The function has an inline "return false;" definition with CONFIG_SMP=n
but the "real" definition is also visible leading to "redefinition of
‘apic_id_is_primary_thread’" compiler error.

Guard it with #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
Signed-off-by: NVlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Fixes: 6a4d2657 ("x86/smp: Provide topology_is_primary_thread()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The kernel unnecessarily prevents late microcode loading when SMT is
disabled.  It should be safe to allow it if all the primary threads are
online.
Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

Nadav reported that on guests we're failing to rewrite the indirect
calls to CALLEE_SAVE paravirt functions. In particular the
pv_queued_spin_unlock() call is left unpatched and that is all over the
place. This obviously wrecks Spectre-v2 mitigation (for paravirt
guests) which relies on not actually having indirect calls around.

The reason is an incorrect clobber test in paravirt_patch_call(); this
function rewrites an indirect call with a direct call to the _SAME_
function, there is no possible way the clobbers can be different
because of this.

Therefore remove this clobber check. Also put WARNs on the other patch
failure case (not enough room for the instruction) which I've not seen
trigger in my (limited) testing.

Three live kernel image disassemblies for lock_sock_nested (as a small
function that illustrates the problem nicely). PRE is the current
situation for guests, POST is with this patch applied and NATIVE is with
or without the patch for !guests.

PRE:

(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
   0xffffffff817be970 <+0>:     push   %rbp
   0xffffffff817be971 <+1>:     mov    %rdi,%rbp
   0xffffffff817be974 <+4>:     push   %rbx
   0xffffffff817be975 <+5>:     lea    0x88(%rbp),%rbx
   0xffffffff817be97c <+12>:    callq  0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
   0xffffffff817be981 <+17>:    mov    %rbx,%rdi
   0xffffffff817be984 <+20>:    callq  0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
   0xffffffff817be989 <+25>:    mov    0x8c(%rbp),%eax
   0xffffffff817be98f <+31>:    test   %eax,%eax
   0xffffffff817be991 <+33>:    jne    0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
   0xffffffff817be993 <+35>:    movl   $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
   0xffffffff817be99d <+45>:    mov    %rbx,%rdi
   0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>:    callq  *0xffffffff822299e8
   0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>:    pop    %rbx
   0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>:    pop    %rbp
   0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>:    mov    $0x200,%esi
   0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>:    mov    $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
   0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>:    jmpq   0xffffffff81063ae0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
   0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>:    mov    %rbp,%rdi
   0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>:    callq  0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
   0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>:    jmp    0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.

POST:

(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
   0xffffffff817be970 <+0>:     push   %rbp
   0xffffffff817be971 <+1>:     mov    %rdi,%rbp
   0xffffffff817be974 <+4>:     push   %rbx
   0xffffffff817be975 <+5>:     lea    0x88(%rbp),%rbx
   0xffffffff817be97c <+12>:    callq  0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
   0xffffffff817be981 <+17>:    mov    %rbx,%rdi
   0xffffffff817be984 <+20>:    callq  0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
   0xffffffff817be989 <+25>:    mov    0x8c(%rbp),%eax
   0xffffffff817be98f <+31>:    test   %eax,%eax
   0xffffffff817be991 <+33>:    jne    0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
   0xffffffff817be993 <+35>:    movl   $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
   0xffffffff817be99d <+45>:    mov    %rbx,%rdi
   0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>:    callq  0xffffffff810a0c20 <__raw_callee_save___pv_queued_spin_unlock>
   0xffffffff817be9a5 <+53>:    xchg   %ax,%ax
   0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>:    pop    %rbx
   0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>:    pop    %rbp
   0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>:    mov    $0x200,%esi
   0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>:    mov    $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
   0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>:    jmpq   0xffffffff81063aa0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
   0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>:    mov    %rbp,%rdi
   0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>:    callq  0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
   0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>:    jmp    0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.

NATIVE:

(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
   0xffffffff817be970 <+0>:     push   %rbp
   0xffffffff817be971 <+1>:     mov    %rdi,%rbp
   0xffffffff817be974 <+4>:     push   %rbx
   0xffffffff817be975 <+5>:     lea    0x88(%rbp),%rbx
   0xffffffff817be97c <+12>:    callq  0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
   0xffffffff817be981 <+17>:    mov    %rbx,%rdi
   0xffffffff817be984 <+20>:    callq  0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
   0xffffffff817be989 <+25>:    mov    0x8c(%rbp),%eax
   0xffffffff817be98f <+31>:    test   %eax,%eax
   0xffffffff817be991 <+33>:    jne    0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
   0xffffffff817be993 <+35>:    movl   $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
   0xffffffff817be99d <+45>:    mov    %rbx,%rdi
   0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>:    movb   $0x0,(%rdi)
   0xffffffff817be9a3 <+51>:    nopl   0x0(%rax)
   0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>:    pop    %rbx
   0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>:    pop    %rbp
   0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>:    mov    $0x200,%esi
   0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>:    mov    $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
   0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>:    jmpq   0xffffffff81063ae0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
   0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>:    mov    %rbp,%rdi
   0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>:    callq  0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
   0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>:    jmp    0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.


Fixes: 63f70270 ("[PATCH] i386: PARAVIRT: add common patching machinery")
Fixes: 3010a066 ("x86/paravirt, objtool: Annotate indirect calls")
Reported-by: NNadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

Josh reported that the late SMT evaluation in cpu_smt_state_init() sets
cpu_smt_control to CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED in case that 'nosmt' was supplied
on the kernel command line as it cannot differentiate between SMT disabled
by BIOS and SMT soft disable via 'nosmt'. That wreckages the state and
makes the sysfs interface unusable.

Rework this so that during bringup of the non boot CPUs the availability of
SMT is determined in cpu_smt_allowed(). If a newly booted CPU is not a
'primary' thread then set the local cpu_smt_available marker and evaluate
this explicitely right after the initial SMP bringup has finished.

SMT evaulation on x86 is a trainwreck as the firmware has all the
information _before_ booting the kernel, but there is no interface to query
it.

Fixes: 73d5e2b4 ("cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS")
Reported-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

Commit d94a155c ("x86/cpu: Prevent cpuinfo_x86::x86_phys_bits
adjustment corruption") has moved the query and calculation of the
x86_virt_bits and x86_phys_bits fields of the cpuinfo_x86 struct
from the get_cpu_cap function to a new function named
get_cpu_address_sizes.

One of the call sites related to Xen PV VMs was unfortunately missed
in the aforementioned commit. This prevents successful boot-up of
kernel versions 4.17 and up in Xen PV VMs if CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL
is enabled, due to the following code path:

  enlighten_pv.c::xen_start_kernel
    mmu_pv.c::xen_reserve_special_pages
      page.h::__pa
        physaddr.c::__phys_addr
          physaddr.h::phys_addr_valid

phys_addr_valid uses boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits to validate physical
addresses. boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits is no longer populated before
the call to xen_reserve_special_pages due to the aforementioned commit
though, so the validation performed by phys_addr_valid fails, which
causes __phys_addr to trigger a BUG, preventing boot-up.
Signed-off-by: NM. Vefa Bicakci <m.v.b@runbox.com>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # for v4.17 and up
Fixes: d94a155c ("x86/cpu: Prevent cpuinfo_x86::x86_phys_bits adjustment corruption")
Signed-off-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>

Implement paravirtual apic hooks to enable PV IPIs for KVM if the "send IPI"
hypercall is available.  The hypercall lets a guest send IPIs, with
at most 128 destinations per hypercall in 64-bit mode and 64 vCPUs per
hypercall in 32-bit mode.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Add kvm hypervisor init time platform setup callback which
will be used to replace native apic hooks by pararvirtual
hooks.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

On a VM with only 1 vCPU, the locking fast path will always be
successful. In this case, there is no need to use the the PV qspinlock
code which has higher overhead on the unlock side than the native
qspinlock code.
Signed-off-by: NWaiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Bit 3 of ARCH_CAPABILITIES tells a hypervisor that L1D flush on vmentry is
not needed.  Add a new value to enum vmx_l1d_flush_state, which is used
either if there is no L1TF bug at all, or if bit 3 is set in ARCH_CAPABILITIES.
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

Three changes to the content of the sysfs file:

 - If EPT is disabled, L1TF cannot be exploited even across threads on the
   same core, and SMT is irrelevant.

 - If mitigation is completely disabled, and SMT is enabled, print "vulnerable"
   instead of "vulnerable, SMT vulnerable"

 - Reorder the two parts so that the main vulnerability state comes first
   and the detail on SMT is second.
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

The last missing piece to having vmx_l1d_flush() take interrupts after
VMEXIT into account is to set the kvm_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d per-cpu flag on
irq entry.

Issue calls to kvm_set_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d() from entering_irq(),
ipi_entering_ack_irq(), smp_reschedule_interrupt() and
uv_bau_message_interrupt().
Suggested-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NNicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

The next patch in this series will have to make the definition of
irq_cpustat_t available to entering_irq().

Inclusion of asm/hardirq.h into asm/apic.h would cause circular header
dependencies like

  asm/smp.h
    asm/apic.h
      asm/hardirq.h
        linux/irq.h
          linux/topology.h
            linux/smp.h
              asm/smp.h

or

  linux/gfp.h
    linux/mmzone.h
      asm/mmzone.h
        asm/mmzone_64.h
          asm/smp.h
            asm/apic.h
              asm/hardirq.h
                linux/irq.h
                  linux/irqdesc.h
                    linux/kobject.h
                      linux/sysfs.h
                        linux/kernfs.h
                          linux/idr.h
                            linux/gfp.h

and others.

This causes compilation errors because of the header guards becoming
effective in the second inclusion: symbols/macros that had been defined
before wouldn't be available to intermediate headers in the #include chain
anymore.

A possible workaround would be to move the definition of irq_cpustat_t
into its own header and include that from both, asm/hardirq.h and
asm/apic.h.

However, this wouldn't solve the real problem, namely asm/harirq.h
unnecessarily pulling in all the linux/irq.h cruft: nothing in
asm/hardirq.h itself requires it. Also, note that there are some other
archs, like e.g. arm64, which don't have that #include in their
asm/hardirq.h.

Remove the linux/irq.h #include from x86' asm/hardirq.h.

Fix resulting compilation errors by adding appropriate #includes to *.c
files as needed.

Note that some of these *.c files could be cleaned up a bit wrt. to their
set of #includes, but that should better be done from separate patches, if
at all.
Signed-off-by: NNicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

Peter is objecting to the direct PMU access in RDT. Right now the PMU usage
is broken anyway as it is not coordinated with perf.

Until this discussion settled, disable the PMU mechanics by simply
rejecting the type '2' measurement in the resctrl file.
Reported-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
CC: gavin.hindman@intel.com
Cc: jithu.joseph@intel.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com

Future Intel processors will support "Enhanced IBRS" which is an "always
on" mode i.e. IBRS bit in SPEC_CTRL MSR is enabled once and never
disabled.

From the specification [1]:

 "With enhanced IBRS, the predicted targets of indirect branches
  executed cannot be controlled by software that was executed in a less
  privileged predictor mode or on another logical processor. As a
  result, software operating on a processor with enhanced IBRS need not
  use WRMSR to set IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS after every transition to a more
  privileged predictor mode. Software can isolate predictor modes
  effectively simply by setting the bit once. Software need not disable
  enhanced IBRS prior to entering a sleep state such as MWAIT or HLT."

If Enhanced IBRS is supported by the processor then use it as the
preferred spectre v2 mitigation mechanism instead of Retpoline. Intel's
Retpoline white paper [2] states:

 "Retpoline is known to be an effective branch target injection (Spectre
  variant 2) mitigation on Intel processors belonging to family 6
  (enumerated by the CPUID instruction) that do not have support for
  enhanced IBRS. On processors that support enhanced IBRS, it should be
  used for mitigation instead of retpoline."

The reason why Enhanced IBRS is the recommended mitigation on processors
which support it is that these processors also support CET which
provides a defense against ROP attacks. Retpoline is very similar to ROP
techniques and might trigger false positives in the CET defense.

If Enhanced IBRS is selected as the mitigation technique for spectre v2,
the IBRS bit in SPEC_CTRL MSR is set once at boot time and never
cleared. Kernel also has to make sure that IBRS bit remains set after
VMEXIT because the guest might have cleared the bit. This is already
covered by the existing x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest() and
x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host() speculation control functions.

Enhanced IBRS still requires IBPB for full mitigation.

[1] Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf
[2] Retpoline-A-Branch-Target-Injection-Mitigation.pdf
Both documents are available at:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199511Originally-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: NSai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tim C Chen <tim.c.chen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1533148945-24095-1-git-send-email-sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com

Some Intel processors have an EPT feature whereby the accessed & dirty bits
in EPT entries can be updated by HW. MSR IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP exposes the
presence of this capability.

There is no point in trying to use that new feature bit in the VMX code as
VMX needs to read the MSR anyway to access other bits, but having the
feature bit for EPT_AD in place helps virtualization management as it
exposes "ept_ad" in /proc/cpuinfo/$proc/flags if the feature is present.

[ tglx: Amended changelog ]
Signed-off-by: NPeter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Shier <pshier@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180801180657.138051-1-pshier@google.com

Fixes the following sparse warning:

arch/x86/kernel/pci-iommu_table.c:63:37: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer
Signed-off-by: Nzhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1532162004-24670-1-git-send-email-zhongjiang@huawei.com

The article "Spectre Returns! Speculation Attacks using the Return Stack 
Buffer" [1] describes two new (sub-)variants of spectrev2-like attacks, 
making use solely of the RSB contents even on CPUs that don't fallback to 
BTB on RSB underflow (Skylake+).

Mitigate userspace-userspace attacks by always unconditionally filling RSB on
context switch when the generic spectrev2 mitigation has been enabled.

[1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1807.07940.pdfSigned-off-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NTim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1807261308190.997@cbobk.fhfr.pm

There is nothing arch-specific about PCI or dma-debug, so call
dma_debug_add_bus() from the PCI core just after registering the bus type.

Most of dma-debug is already generic; this just adds reporting of pending
dma-allocations on driver unload for arches other than powerpc, sh, and
x86.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NBjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Acked-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc)

There is inconsistent indenting in calibrate_APIC_clock() and
activate_managed(). Remove the surplus TAB.
Signed-off-by: NYi Wang <wang.yi59@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NJiang Biao <jiang.biao2@zte.com.cn>
Acked-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com
Cc: jgross@suse.com
Cc: ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com
Cc: len.brown@intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: zhong.weidong@zte.com.cn
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1532672103-32250-1-git-send-email-wang.yi59@zte.com.cn

parse_mem_block_size() and mem_block_size are only used during init. Mark
them accordingly.

Fixes: d7609f42 ("x86/platform/UV: Add kernel parameter to set memory block size")
Signed-off-by: NDou Liyang <douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: Mike Travis <mike.travis@hpe.com>
Cc: Andrew Banman <andrew.banman@hpe.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180730075947.23023-1-douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com

kvm_get_preset_lpj() is only called from kvmclock_init(), so mark it __init
as well.
Signed-off-by: NDou Liyang <douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
Cc: <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc:   Radim Krčmář<rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc:  <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180730075421.22830-3-douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com

Split out suplicated code from tsc_early_init() and tsc_init() into a
common helper and fixup some comment typos.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog and renamed function ]
Signed-off-by: NDou Liyang <douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
Cc: <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180730075421.22830-2-douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com

Fuzzing the PTI-x86-32 code with trinity showed unhandled
kernel paging request oops-messages that looked a lot like
silent data corruption.

Lot's of debugging and testing lead to the kexec-32bit code,
which is still allocating 4k PGDs when PTI is enabled. But
since it uses native_set_pud() to build the page-table, it
will unevitably call into __pti_set_user_pgtbl(), which
writes beyond the allocated 4k page.

Use PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER to allocate PGDs in the kexec code
to fix the issue.
Signed-off-by: NJoerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: NDavid H. Gutteridge <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: joro@8bytes.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1532533683-5988-4-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org

Whilst the notion of an upstream DMA restriction is most commonly seen
in PCI host bridges saddled with a 32-bit native interface, a more
general version of the same issue can exist on complex SoCs where a bus
or point-to-point interconnect link from a device's DMA master interface
to another component along the path to memory (often an IOMMU) may carry
fewer address bits than the interfaces at both ends nominally support.
In order to properly deal with this, the first step is to expand the
dma_32bit_limit flag into an arbitrary mask.

To minimise the impact on existing code, we'll make sure to only
consider this new mask valid if set. That makes sense anyway, since a
mask of zero would represent DMA not being wired up at all, and that
would be better handled by not providing valid ops in the first place.
Signed-off-by: NRobin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Acked-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

This allows the default behavior to be controlled by a kernel config
option instead of changing the commandline for the kernel to include
"iommu.passthrough=on" or "iommu=pt" on machines where this is desired.

Likewise, for machines where this config option is enabled, it can be
disabled at boot time with "iommu.passthrough=off" or "iommu=nopt".

Also corrected iommu=pt documentation for IA-64, since it has no code that
parses iommu= at all.
Signed-off-by: NOlof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Signed-off-by: NJoerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>