1. 18 10月, 2007 35 次提交
  2. 17 10月, 2007 5 次提交
    • A
      security/ cleanups · cbfee345
      Adrian Bunk 提交于
      This patch contains the following cleanups that are now possible:
      - remove the unused security_operations->inode_xattr_getsuffix
      - remove the no longer used security_operations->unregister_security
      - remove some no longer required exit code
      - remove a bunch of no longer used exports
      Signed-off-by: NAdrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
      Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
      Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      cbfee345
    • S
      Implement file posix capabilities · b5376771
      Serge E. Hallyn 提交于
      Implement file posix capabilities.  This allows programs to be given a
      subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use
      setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.
      
      This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
      http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php.  For more information on how to use this
      patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at
      http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
      
      Changelog:
      	Nov 27:
      	Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton
      	(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and
      	security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)
      	Fix Kconfig dependency.
      	Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.
      
      	Nov 13:
      	Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from
      	capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.
      
      	Nov 13:
      	Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey
      	Dobriyan.
      
      	Nov 09:
      	Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
      	when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
      	up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
      	function.
      
      	Nov 08:
      	For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use
      	them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
      
      	Nov 07:
      	Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in
      	check_cap_sanity().
      
      	Nov 07:
      	Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since
      	capabilities are the default.
      	Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.
      	Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce
      	audit messages.
      
      	Nov 05:
      	Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
      	task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
      	cap support can be stacked.
      
      	Sep 05:
      	As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
      	for capability code.
      
      	Sep 01:
      	Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
      	task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
      	they called a program with some fscaps.
      
      	One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
      	ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
      	cpuset?
      
      	It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
      	allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check.  But since
      	it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
      	CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
      	fixing it might be tough.
      
      	     task_setscheduler
      		 note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task.  Are we ok with
      		     CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
      	     task_setioprio
      	     task_setnice
      		 sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
      		 process.  Need same checks as setrlimit
      
      	Aug 21:
      	Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
      	euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
      	might still have elevated caps.
      
      	Aug 15:
      	Handle endianness of xattrs.
      	Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
      	Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
      	set, else return -EPERM.
      	With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
      	doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
      	d_instantiate.
      
      	Aug 10:
      	Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
      	caching it at d_instantiate.
      
      [morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]
      [bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]
      Signed-off-by: NSerge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
      Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
      Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NAdrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      b5376771
    • A
      ifdef struct task_struct::security · 57c521ce
      Alexey Dobriyan 提交于
      For those who don't care about CONFIG_SECURITY.
      Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
      Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
      Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
      Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      57c521ce
    • J
      security: Convert LSM into a static interface · 20510f2f
      James Morris 提交于
      Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security
      module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the
      overall security architecture.
      
      Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API
      abuse.
      
      Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified
      at boot.
      
      The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed.
      
      In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM.  The modular interface
      is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure.  It is used only by out-of-tree
      modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and
      dangerous, e.g.  silently re-vectoring SELinux.
      
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups]
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix]
      [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc]
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      Acked-by: NChris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
      Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
      Acked-by: NArjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
      Signed-off-by: NRandy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      20510f2f
    • R
      Add section IDs to Documentation/DocBook/filesystems.tmpl · 5c3b4474
      Rob Landley 提交于
      Add recommended section IDs to Documentation/DocBook/filesystems.tmpl
      Signed-off-by: NRob Landley <rob@landley.net>
      Cc: "Randy.Dunlap" <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      5c3b4474