Recently, in commit 13aa93c70e71 ("random: add and use memzero_explicit()
for clearing data"), we have found that GCC may optimize some memset()
cases away when it detects a stack variable is not being used anymore
and going out of scope. This can happen, for example, in cases when we
are clearing out sensitive information such as keying material or any
e.g. intermediate results from crypto computations, etc.

With the help of Coccinelle, we can figure out and fix such occurences
in the crypto subsytem as well. Julia Lawall provided the following
Coccinelle program:

  @@
  type T;
  identifier x;
  @@

  T x;
  ... when exists
      when any
  -memset
  +memzero_explicit
     (&x,
  -0,
     ...)
  ... when != x
      when strict

  @@
  type T;
  identifier x;
  @@

  T x[...];
  ... when exists
      when any
  -memset
  +memzero_explicit
     (x,
  -0,
     ...)
  ... when != x
      when strict

Therefore, make use of the drop-in replacement memzero_explicit() for
exactly such cases instead of using memset().
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: NHannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>

Replaced the use of a Variable Length Array In Struct (VLAIS) with a C99
compliant equivalent. This patch allocates the appropriate amount of memory
using a char array using the SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK macro.

The new code can be compiled with both gcc and clang.
Signed-off-by: NJan-Simon Möller <dl9pf@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: NBehan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com>
Reviewed-by: NMark Charlebois <charlebm@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: pageexec@freemail.hu

Replaced the use of a Variable Length Array In Struct (VLAIS) with a C99
compliant equivalent. This patch allocates the appropriate amount of memory
using a char array using the SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK macro.

The new code can be compiled with both gcc and clang.
Signed-off-by: NJan-Simon Möller <dl9pf@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: NBehan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com>
Reviewed-by: NMark Charlebois <charlebm@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: pageexec@freemail.hu

Previous version of KEYS used to output last 4 bytes of fingerprint.
Now it outputs 8 last bytes of raw subject, which does not make any
visual meaning at all. This patch restores old behavior.
Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

The 'id:' prefix must be stripped for asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id() to be
able to process ca_keyid.
Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

Earlier KEYS code used pure subject key identifiers (fingerprint)
for searching keys. Latest merged code removed that and broke
compatibility with integrity subsytem signatures and original
format of module signatures.

This patch returns back partial matching on SKID.
Reported-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

Bring back the functionality whereby an asymmetric key can be matched with a
partial match on one of its IDs.

Whilst we're at it, allow for the possibility of having an increased number of
IDs.
Reported-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

Module signing matches keys by comparing against the key description exactly.
However, the way the key description gets constructed got changed to be
composed of the subject name plus the certificate serial number instead of the
subject name and the subjectKeyId.  I changed this to avoid problems with
certificates that don't *have* a subjectKeyId.

Instead, if available, use the raw subjectKeyId to form the key description
and only use the serial number if the subjectKeyId doesn't exist.
Reported-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

If hexlen is odd then function returns an error.
Use IS_ERR to check for error, otherwise invalid pointer
is used and kernel gives oops:

[  132.816522] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at
ffffffffffffffea
[  132.819902] IP: [<ffffffff812bfc20>] asymmetric_key_id_same+0x14/0x36
[  132.820302] PGD 1a12067 PUD 1a14067 PMD 0
[  132.820302] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[  132.820302] Modules linked in: bridge(E) stp(E) llc(E) evdev(E)
serio_raw(E) i2c_piix4(E) button(E) fuse(E)
[  132.820302] CPU: 0 PID: 2993 Comm: cat Tainted: G            E
3.16.0-kds+ #2847
[  132.820302] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[  132.820302] task: ffff88004249a430 ti: ffff880056640000 task.ti:
ffff880056640000
[  132.820302] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812bfc20>]  [<ffffffff812bfc20>]
asymmetric_key_id_same+0x14/0x36
[  132.820302] RSP: 0018:ffff880056643930  EFLAGS: 00010246
[  132.820302] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffffffffea RCX:
ffff880056643ae0
[  132.820302] RDX: 000000000000005e RSI: ffffffffffffffea RDI:
ffff88005bac9300
[  132.820302] RBP: ffff880056643948 R08: 0000000000000003 R09:
00000007504aa01a
[  132.820302] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12:
ffff88005d68ca40
[  132.820302] R13: 0000000000000101 R14: 0000000000000000 R15:
ffff88005bac5280
[  132.820302] FS:  00007f67a153c740(0000) GS:ffff88005da00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[  132.820302] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[  132.820302] CR2: ffffffffffffffea CR3: 000000002e663000 CR4:
00000000000006f0
[  132.820302] Stack:
[  132.820302]  ffffffff812bfc66 ffff880056643ae0 ffff88005bac5280
ffff880056643958
[  132.820302]  ffffffff812bfc9d ffff880056643980 ffffffff812971d9
ffff88005ce930c1
[  132.820302]  ffff88005ce930c0 0000000000000000 ffff8800566439c8
ffffffff812fb753
[  132.820302] Call Trace:
[  132.820302]  [<ffffffff812bfc66>] ? asymmetric_match_key_ids+0x24/0x42
[  132.820302]  [<ffffffff812bfc9d>] asymmetric_key_cmp+0x19/0x1b
[  132.820302]  [<ffffffff812971d9>] keyring_search_iterator+0x74/0xd7
[  132.820302]  [<ffffffff812fb753>] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x67/0xd2
[  132.820302]  [<ffffffff81297165>] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20
[  132.820302]  [<ffffffff812fbaa1>] assoc_array_iterate+0x19/0x1e
[  132.820302]  [<ffffffff81297332>] search_nested_keyrings+0xf6/0x2b6
[  132.820302]  [<ffffffff810728da>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x91/0xa2
[  132.820302]  [<ffffffff810860d2>] ? mark_held_locks+0x58/0x6e
[  132.820302]  [<ffffffff810a137d>] ? current_kernel_time+0x77/0xb8
[  132.820302]  [<ffffffff81297871>] keyring_search_aux+0xe1/0x14c
[  132.820302]  [<ffffffff812977fc>] ? keyring_search_aux+0x6c/0x14c
[  132.820302]  [<ffffffff8129796b>] keyring_search+0x8f/0xb6
[  132.820302]  [<ffffffff812bfc84>] ? asymmetric_match_key_ids+0x42/0x42
[  132.820302]  [<ffffffff81297165>] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20
[  132.820302]  [<ffffffff812ab9e3>] asymmetric_verify+0xa4/0x214
[  132.820302]  [<ffffffff812ab90e>] integrity_digsig_verify+0xb1/0xe2
[  132.820302]  [<ffffffff812abe41>] ? evm_verifyxattr+0x6a/0x7a
[  132.820302]  [<ffffffff812b0390>] ima_appraise_measurement+0x160/0x370
[  132.820302]  [<ffffffff81161db2>] ? d_absolute_path+0x5b/0x7a
[  132.820302]  [<ffffffff812ada30>] process_measurement+0x322/0x404
Reported-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

Like SHA1, use get_unaligned_be*() on the raw input data.
Reported-by: NBob Picco <bob.picco@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

As it stands, the code to generate an asymmetric key ID prechecks the hex
string it is given whilst determining the length, before it allocates the
buffer for hex2bin() to translate into - which mean that checking the result of
hex2bin() is redundant.

Unfortunately, hex2bin() is marked as __must_check, which means that the
following warning may be generated if the return value isn't checked:

	crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c: In function
	asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id:
	crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:110: warning: ignoring return
	value of hex2bin, declared with attribute warn_unused_result

The warning can't be avoided by casting the result to void.

Instead, use strlen() to check the length of the string and ignore the fact
that the string might not be entirely valid hex until after the allocation has
been done - in which case we can use the result of hex2bin() for this.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

The X.509 certificate list in a PKCS#7 message is optional.  To save space, we
can omit the inclusion of any X.509 certificates if we are sure that we can
look the relevant public key up by the serial number and issuer given in a
signed info block.

This also supports use of a signed info block for which we can't find a
matching X.509 cert in the certificate list, though it be populated.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>

Provide better handling of unsupported crypto when verifying a PKCS#7 message.
If we can't bridge the gap between a pair of X.509 certs or between a signed
info block and an X.509 cert because it involves some crypto we don't support,
that's not necessarily the end of the world as there may be other ways points
at which we can intersect with a ring of trusted keys.

Instead, only produce ENOPKG immediately if all the signed info blocks in a
PKCS#7 message require unsupported crypto to bridge to the first X.509 cert.
Otherwise, we defer the generation of ENOPKG until we get ENOKEY during trust
validation.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>

Make use of the new match string preparsing to overhaul key identification
when searching for asymmetric keys.  The following changes are made:

 (1) Use the previously created asymmetric_key_id struct to hold the following
     key IDs derived from the X.509 certificate or PKCS#7 message:

	id: serial number + issuer
	skid: subjKeyId + subject
	authority: authKeyId + issuer

 (2) Replace the hex fingerprint attached to key->type_data[1] with an
     asymmetric_key_ids struct containing the id and the skid (if present).

 (3) Make the asymmetric_type match data preparse select one of two searches:

     (a) An iterative search for the key ID given if prefixed with "id:".  The
     	 prefix is expected to be followed by a hex string giving the ID to
     	 search for.  The criterion key ID is checked against all key IDs
     	 recorded on the key.

     (b) A direct search if the key ID is not prefixed with "id:".  This will
     	 look for an exact match on the key description.

 (4) Make x509_request_asymmetric_key() take a key ID.  This is then converted
     into "id:<hex>" and passed into keyring_search() where match preparsing
     will turn it back into a binary ID.

 (5) X.509 certificate verification then takes the authority key ID and looks
     up a key that matches it to find the public key for the certificate
     signature.

 (6) PKCS#7 certificate verification then takes the id key ID and looks up a
     key that matches it to find the public key for the signed information
     block signature.

Additional changes:

 (1) Multiple subjKeyId and authKeyId values on an X.509 certificate cause the
     cert to be rejected with -EBADMSG.

 (2) The 'fingerprint' ID is gone.  This was primarily intended to convey PGP
     public key fingerprints.  If PGP is supported in future, this should
     generate a key ID that carries the fingerprint.

 (3) Th ca_keyid= kernel command line option is now converted to a key ID and
     used to match the authority key ID.  Possibly this should only match the
     actual authKeyId part and not the issuer as well.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>

Implement the first step in using binary key IDs for asymmetric keys rather
than hex string keys.

The previously added match data preparsing will be able to convert hex
criterion strings into binary which can then be compared more rapidly.

Further, we actually want more then one ID string per public key.  The problem
is that X.509 certs refer to other X.509 certs by matching Issuer + AuthKeyId
to Subject + SubjKeyId, but PKCS#7 messages match against X.509 Issuer +
SerialNumber.

This patch just provides facilities for a later patch to make use of.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>

Make the key matching functions pointed to by key_match_data::cmp return bool
rather than int.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>

A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type.  This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.

The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>

Remove key_type::def_lookup_type as it's no longer used.  The information now
defaults to KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT but may be overridden by
type->match_preparse().
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>

Preparse the match data.  This provides several advantages:

 (1) The preparser can reject invalid criteria up front.

 (2) The preparser can convert the criteria to binary data if necessary (the
     asymmetric key type really wants to do binary comparison of the key IDs).

 (3) The preparser can set the type of search to be performed.  This means
     that it's not then a one-off setting in the key type.

 (4) The preparser can set an appropriate comparator function.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>

Fix the parser cleanup code to drain parsed out X.509 certs in the case that
the decode fails and we jump to error_decode.

The function is rearranged so that the same cleanup code is used in the success
case as the error case - just that the message descriptor under construction is
only released if it is still pointed to by the context struct at that point.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>

The code to free a signed info block is repeated several times, so move the
code to do it into a function of its own.  This gives us a place to add clean
ups for stuff that gets added to pkcs7_signed_info.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>

Add a missing static (found by checker).
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>

The drbg_healthcheck() contained a test to call the DRBG with an
uninitialized DRBG cipher handle. As this is an inappropriate use of the
kernel crypto API to try to generate random numbers before
initialization, checks verifying for an initialized DRBG have been
removed in previous patches.

Now, the drbg_healthcheck test must also be removed.

Changes V2: Added patch marker to email subject line.
Signed-off-by: NStephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Signed-off-by: NTed Percival <ted@tedp.id.au>
Acked-by: NTim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

On archs with PAGE_SIZE >= 64 KiB the function skcipher_alloc_sgl()
fails with -ENOMEM no matter what user space actually requested.
This is caused by the fact sock_kmalloc call inside the function tried
to allocate more memory than allowed by the default kernel socket buffer
size (kernel param net.core.optmem_max).
Signed-off-by: NOndrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Printing in base signature handling should have a prefix, so set pr_fmt().
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

Relax the check on the length of the PKCS#7 cert as it appears that the PE
file wrapper size gets rounded up to the nearest 8.

The debugging output looks like this:

	PEFILE: ==> verify_pefile_signature()
	PEFILE: ==> pefile_parse_binary()
	PEFILE: checksum @ 110
	PEFILE: header size = 200
	PEFILE: cert = 968 @547be0 [68 09 00 00 00 02 02 00 30 82 09 56 ]
	PEFILE: sig wrapper = { 968, 200, 2 }
	PEFILE: Signature data not PKCS#7

The wrapper is the first 8 bytes of the hex dump inside [].  This indicates a
length of 0x968 bytes, including the wrapper header - so 0x960 bytes of
payload.

The ASN.1 wrapper begins [ ... 30 82 09 56 ].  That indicates an object of size
0x956 - a four byte discrepency, presumably just padding for alignment
purposes.

So we just check that the ASN.1 container is no bigger than the payload and
reduce the recorded size appropriately.

Whilst we're at it, allow shorter PKCS#7 objects that manage to squeeze within
127 or 255 bytes.  It's just about conceivable if no X.509 certs are included
in the PKCS#7 message.
Reported-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NPeter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

The length of the name of an asymmetric key subtype must be stored in struct
asymmetric_key_subtype::name_len so that it can be matched by a search for
"<subkey_name>:<partial_fingerprint>".  Fix the public_key subtype to have
name_len set.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

This patch adds a simple test vector for the lz4 and lz4hc compression
algorithms.
Signed-off-by: NKOVACS Krisztian <hidden@sch.bme.hu>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The lz4 library has two functions for decompression, with slightly
different signatures and behaviour. The lz4_decompress_crypto() function
seemed to be using the one that assumes that the decompressed length is
known in advance.

This patch switches to the other decompression function and makes sure
that the length of the decompressed output is properly returned to the
caller.

The same issue was present in the lz4hc algorithm.

Coincidentally, this change also makes very basic lz4 and lz4hc
compression tests in testmgr pass.
Signed-off-by: NKOVACS Krisztian <hidden@sch.bme.hu>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The SHA-512 NEON works just fine under big endian, so remove the Kconfig
condition preventing it from being selected if CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN is
set.
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NRussell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>

This tweaks the SHA-1 NEON code slightly so it works correctly under big
endian, and removes the Kconfig condition preventing it from being
selected if CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN is set.
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NRussell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>

The sparse tool complained that the cpu_to_be[32|64] functions return
__be[32|64] instead of __u32 or __u64. The patch replaces the __u32 and
__u64 with __be32 and __be64.
Reported-by: Nkbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NStephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

CC: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
CC: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NFengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

During creation of the DRBG shadow state, it is ensured that the DRBG
state structure is already allocated. Thus, a sanity check for verifying
that the structure is allocated is removed.
Signed-off-by: NStephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

SP800-90A mandates several hard-coded values. The old drbg_cores allows
the setting of these values per DRBG implementation. However, due to the
hard requirement of SP800-90A, these values are now returned globally
for each DRBG.

The ability to set such values per DRBG is therefore removed.
Signed-off-by: NStephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The drbg_make_shadow function contains sanity checks which are not
needed as the function is invoked at times where it is ensured that the
checked-for variables are available.
Signed-off-by: NStephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

When allocating V, C, the zeroization is only needed when
allocating a new instance of the DRBG, i.e. when performing an
initial seeding. For all other allocations, the memcpy implemented in
drbg_copy_drbg ensures that the memory is filled with the correct
information.
Signed-off-by: NStephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Remove memset(0) which is not needed due to the kzalloc of the memory.
Signed-off-by: NStephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The crypto_init and crypto_fini functions are always implemented. Thus,
there is no need for a protecting check.
Signed-off-by: NStephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>