- 07 8月, 2019 4 次提交
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由 Zhenzhong Duan 提交于
[ Upstream commit b23e5844dfe78a80ba672793187d3f52e4b528d7 ] Commit 7457c0da024b ("x86/alternatives: Add int3_emulate_call() selftest") is used to ensure there is a gap setup in int3 exception stack which could be used for inserting call return address. This gap is missed in XEN PV int3 exception entry path, then below panic triggered: [ 0.772876] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 0.772886] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.2.0+ #11 [ 0.772893] RIP: e030:int3_magic+0x0/0x7 [ 0.772905] RSP: 3507:ffffffff82203e98 EFLAGS: 00000246 [ 0.773334] Call Trace: [ 0.773334] alternative_instructions+0x3d/0x12e [ 0.773334] check_bugs+0x7c9/0x887 [ 0.773334] ? __get_locked_pte+0x178/0x1f0 [ 0.773334] start_kernel+0x4ff/0x535 [ 0.773334] ? set_init_arg+0x55/0x55 [ 0.773334] xen_start_kernel+0x571/0x57a For 64bit PV guests, Xen's ABI enters the kernel with using SYSRET, with %rcx/%r11 on the stack. To convert back to "normal" looking exceptions, the xen thunks do 'xen_*: pop %rcx; pop %r11; jmp *'. E.g. Extracting 'xen_pv_trap xenint3' we have: xen_xenint3: pop %rcx; pop %r11; jmp xenint3 As xenint3 and int3 entry code are same except xenint3 doesn't generate a gap, we can fix it by using int3 and drop useless xenint3. Signed-off-by: NZhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Arnd Bergmann 提交于
[ Upstream commit 29e7e9664aec17b94a9c8c5a75f8d216a206aa3a ] clang warns about a few parts of the math-emu implementation where a 16-bit integer becomes negative during assignment: arch/x86/math-emu/poly_tan.c:88:35: error: implicit conversion from 'int' to 'short' changes value from 49216 to -16320 [-Werror,-Wconstant-conversion] (0x41 + EXTENDED_Ebias) | SIGN_Negative); ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ arch/x86/math-emu/fpu_emu.h:180:58: note: expanded from macro 'setexponent16' #define setexponent16(x,y) { (*(short *)&((x)->exp)) = (y); } ~ ^ arch/x86/math-emu/reg_constant.c:37:32: error: implicit conversion from 'int' to 'short' changes value from 49085 to -16451 [-Werror,-Wconstant-conversion] FPU_REG const CONST_PI2extra = MAKE_REG(NEG, -66, ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ arch/x86/math-emu/reg_constant.c:21:25: note: expanded from macro 'MAKE_REG' ((EXTENDED_Ebias+(e)) | ((SIGN_##s != 0)*0x8000)) } ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ arch/x86/math-emu/reg_constant.c:48:28: error: implicit conversion from 'int' to 'short' changes value from 65535 to -1 [-Werror,-Wconstant-conversion] FPU_REG const CONST_QNaN = MAKE_REG(NEG, EXP_OVER, 0x00000000, 0xC0000000); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ arch/x86/math-emu/reg_constant.c:21:25: note: expanded from macro 'MAKE_REG' ((EXTENDED_Ebias+(e)) | ((SIGN_##s != 0)*0x8000)) } ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The code is correct as is, so add a typecast to shut up the warnings. Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190712090816.350668-1-arnd@arndb.deSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Qian Cai 提交于
[ Upstream commit ec6335586953b0df32f83ef696002063090c7aef ] There are many compiler warnings like this, In file included from ./arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h:13, from ./arch/x86/include/asm/mmzone_64.h:11, from ./arch/x86/include/asm/mmzone.h:5, from ./include/linux/mmzone.h:969, from ./include/linux/gfp.h:6, from ./include/linux/mm.h:10, from arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c:34: arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c: In function 'check_timer': ./arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:37:11: warning: comparison of unsigned expression >= 0 is always true [-Wtype-limits] if ((v) <= apic_verbosity) \ ^~ arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c:2160:2: note: in expansion of macro 'apic_printk' apic_printk(APIC_QUIET, KERN_INFO "..TIMER: vector=0x%02X " ^~~~~~~~~~~ ./arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:37:11: warning: comparison of unsigned expression >= 0 is always true [-Wtype-limits] if ((v) <= apic_verbosity) \ ^~ arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c:2207:4: note: in expansion of macro 'apic_printk' apic_printk(APIC_QUIET, KERN_ERR "..MP-BIOS bug: " ^~~~~~~~~~~ APIC_QUIET is 0, so silence them by making apic_verbosity type int. Signed-off-by: NQian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1562621805-24789-1-git-send-email-cai@lca.pwSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Arnd Bergmann 提交于
[ Upstream commit a6a6d3b1f867d34ba5bd61aa7bb056b48ca67cff ] clang finds a contruct suspicious that converts an unsigned character to a signed integer and back, causing an overflow: arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c:4605:39: error: implicit conversion from 'int' to 'u8' (aka 'unsigned char') changes value from -205 to 51 [-Werror,-Wconstant-conversion] u8 wf = (pfec & PFERR_WRITE_MASK) ? ~w : 0; ~~ ^~ arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c:4607:38: error: implicit conversion from 'int' to 'u8' (aka 'unsigned char') changes value from -241 to 15 [-Werror,-Wconstant-conversion] u8 uf = (pfec & PFERR_USER_MASK) ? ~u : 0; ~~ ^~ arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c:4609:39: error: implicit conversion from 'int' to 'u8' (aka 'unsigned char') changes value from -171 to 85 [-Werror,-Wconstant-conversion] u8 ff = (pfec & PFERR_FETCH_MASK) ? ~x : 0; ~~ ^~ Add an explicit cast to tell clang that everything works as intended here. Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/95Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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- 31 7月, 2019 2 次提交
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由 Zhenzhong Duan 提交于
commit 517c3ba00916383af6411aec99442c307c23f684 upstream. X86_HYPER_NATIVE isn't accurate for checking if running on native platform, e.g. CONFIG_HYPERVISOR_GUEST isn't set or "nopv" is enabled. Checking the CPU feature bit X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR to determine if it's running on native platform is more accurate. This still doesn't cover the platforms on which X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR is unsupported, e.g. VMware, but there is nothing which can be done about this scenario. Fixes: 8a4b06d391b0 ("x86/speculation/mds: Add sysfs reporting for MDS") Signed-off-by: NZhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1564022349-17338-1-git-send-email-zhenzhong.duan@oracle.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Hans de Goede 提交于
commit d02f1aa39189e0619c3525d5cd03254e61bf606a upstream. Some Lenovo 2-in-1s with a detachable keyboard have a portrait screen but advertise a landscape resolution and pitch, resulting in a messed up display if the kernel tries to show anything on the efifb (because of the wrong pitch). Fix this by adding a new DMI match table for devices which need to have their width and height swapped. At first it was tried to use the existing table for overriding some of the efifb parameters, but some of the affected devices have variants with different LCD resolutions which will not work with hardcoded override values. Reference: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1730783Signed-off-by: NHans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190721152418.11644-1-hdegoede@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- 28 7月, 2019 2 次提交
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由 Jan Kiszka 提交于
commit cf64527bb33f6cec2ed50f89182fc4688d0056b6 upstream. Letting this pend may cause nested_get_vmcs12_pages to run against an invalid state, corrupting the effective vmcs of L1. This was triggerable in QEMU after a guest corruption in L2, followed by a L1 reset. Signed-off-by: NJan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Reviewed-by: NLiran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 7f7f1ba3 ("KVM: x86: do not load vmcs12 pages while still in SMM") Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于
commit 88dddc11a8d6b09201b4db9d255b3394d9bc9e57 upstream. If a KVM guest is reset while running a nested guest, free_nested will disable the shadow VMCS execution control in the vmcs01. However, on the next KVM_RUN vmx_vcpu_run would nevertheless try to sync the VMCS12 to the shadow VMCS which has since been freed. This causes a vmptrld of a NULL pointer on my machime, but Jan reports the host to hang altogether. Let's see how much this trivial patch fixes. Reported-by: NJan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- 26 7月, 2019 11 次提交
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由 Kim Phillips 提交于
commit 2f217d58a8a086d3399fecce39fb358848e799c4 upstream. Fill in the L3 performance event select register ThreadMask bitfield, to enable per hardware thread accounting. Signed-off-by: NKim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Gary Hook <Gary.Hook@amd.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Janakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Martin Liska <mliska@suse.cz> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190628215906.4276-2-kim.phillips@amd.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Kim Phillips 提交于
commit 16f4641166b10e199f0d7b68c2c5f004fef0bda3 upstream. The following commit: d7cbbe49 ("perf/x86/amd/uncore: Set ThreadMask and SliceMask for L3 Cache perf events") enables L3 PMC events for all threads and slices by writing 1's in 'ChL3PmcCfg' (L3 PMC PERF_CTL) register fields. Those bitfields overlap with high order event select bits in the Data Fabric PMC control register, however. So when a user requests raw Data Fabric events (-e amd_df/event=0xYYY/), the two highest order bits get inadvertently set, changing the counter select to events that don't exist, and for which no counts are read. This patch changes the logic to write the L3 masks only when dealing with L3 PMC counters. AMD Family 16h and below Northbridge (NB) counters were not affected. Signed-off-by: NKim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Gary Hook <Gary.Hook@amd.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Janakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Martin Liska <mliska@suse.cz> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Fixes: d7cbbe49 ("perf/x86/amd/uncore: Set ThreadMask and SliceMask for L3 Cache perf events") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190628215906.4276-1-kim.phillips@amd.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Kan Liang 提交于
commit e4557c1a46b0d32746bd309e1941914b5a6912b4 upstream. If a user first sample a PEBS event on a fixed counter, then sample a non-PEBS event on the same fixed counter on Icelake, it will trigger spurious NMI. For example: perf record -e 'cycles:p' -a perf record -e 'cycles' -a The error message for spurious NMI: [June 21 15:38] Uhhuh. NMI received for unknown reason 30 on CPU 2. [ +0.000000] Do you have a strange power saving mode enabled? [ +0.000000] Dazed and confused, but trying to continue The bug was introduced by the following commit: commit 6f55967ad9d9 ("perf/x86/intel: Fix race in intel_pmu_disable_event()") The commit moves the intel_pmu_pebs_disable() after intel_pmu_disable_fixed(), which returns immediately. The related bit of PEBS_ENABLE MSR will never be cleared for the fixed counter. Then a non-PEBS event runs on the fixed counter, but the bit on PEBS_ENABLE is still set, which triggers spurious NMIs. Check and disable PEBS for fixed counters after intel_pmu_disable_fixed(). Reported-by: NYi, Ammy <ammy.yi@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: NJiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Fixes: 6f55967ad9d9 ("perf/x86/intel: Fix race in intel_pmu_disable_event()") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190625142135.22112-1-kan.liang@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 David Rientjes 提交于
commit e74bd96989dd42a51a73eddb4a5510a6f5e42ac3 upstream. When default_get_smp_config() is called with early == 1 and mpf->feature1 is non-zero, mpf is leaked because the return path does not do early_memunmap(). Fix this and share a common exit routine. Fixes: 5997efb9 ("x86/boot: Use memremap() to map the MPF and MPC data") Reported-by: NCfir Cohen <cfir@google.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1907091942570.28240@chino.kir.corp.google.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Like Xu 提交于
commit 6fc3977ccc5d3c22e851f2dce2d3ce2a0a843842 upstream. If a perf_event creation fails due to any reason of the host perf subsystem, it has no chance to log the corresponding event for guest which may cause abnormal sampling data in guest result. In debug mode, this message helps to understand the state of vPMC and we may not limit the number of occurrences but not in a spamming style. Suggested-by: NJoe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: NLike Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Masahiro Yamada 提交于
[ Upstream commit bc53d3d777f81385c1bb08b07bd1c06450ecc2c1 ] Without 'set -e', shell scripts continue running even after any error occurs. The missed 'set -e' is a typical bug in shell scripting. For example, when a disk space shortage occurs while this script is running, it actually ends up with generating a truncated capflags.c. Yet, mkcapflags.sh continues running and exits with 0. So, the build system assumes it has succeeded. It will not be re-generated in the next invocation of Make since its timestamp is newer than that of any of the source files. Add 'set -e' so that any error in this script is caught and propagated to the build system. Since 9c2af1c7 ("kbuild: add .DELETE_ON_ERROR special target"), make automatically deletes the target on any failure. So, the broken capflags.c will be deleted automatically. Signed-off-by: NMasahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190625072622.17679-1-yamada.masahiro@socionext.comSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Qian Cai 提交于
[ Upstream commit 1b7aebf0487613033aff26420e32fa2076d52846 ] cpuinfo_x86.x86_model is an unsigned type, so comparing against zero will generate a compilation warning: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cacheinfo.c: In function 'cacheinfo_amd_init_llc_id': arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cacheinfo.c:662:19: warning: comparison is always true \ due to limited range of data type [-Wtype-limits] Remove the unnecessary lower bound check. [ bp: Massage. ] Fixes: 68091ee7 ("x86/CPU/AMD: Calculate last level cache ID from number of sharing threads") Signed-off-by: NQian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Cc: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn> Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1560954773-11967-1-git-send-email-cai@lca.pwSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Peter Zijlstra 提交于
[ Upstream commit 69d927bba39517d0980462efc051875b7f4db185 ] Recent probing at the Linux Kernel Memory Model uncovered a 'surprise'. Strongly ordered architectures where the atomic RmW primitive implies full memory ordering and smp_mb__{before,after}_atomic() are a simple barrier() (such as x86) fail for: *x = 1; atomic_inc(u); smp_mb__after_atomic(); r0 = *y; Because, while the atomic_inc() implies memory order, it (surprisingly) does not provide a compiler barrier. This then allows the compiler to re-order like so: atomic_inc(u); *x = 1; smp_mb__after_atomic(); r0 = *y; Which the CPU is then allowed to re-order (under TSO rules) like: atomic_inc(u); r0 = *y; *x = 1; And this very much was not intended. Therefore strengthen the atomic RmW ops to include a compiler barrier. NOTE: atomic_{or,and,xor} and the bitops already had the compiler barrier. Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Kan Liang 提交于
[ Upstream commit 543ac280b3576c0009e8c0fcd4d6bfc9978d7bd0 ] Counting with invalid event coding for free-running counter may cause OOPs, e.g. uncore_iio_free_running_0/event=1/. Current code only validate the event with free-running event format, event=0xff,umask=0xXY. Non-free-running event format never be checked for the PMU with free-running counters. Add generic hw_config() to check and reject the invalid event coding for free-running PMU. Signed-off-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: acme@kernel.org Cc: eranian@google.com Fixes: 0f519f03 ("perf/x86/intel/uncore: Support IIO free-running counters on SKX") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1556672028-119221-2-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Aaron Lewis 提交于
[ Upstream commit cbb99c0f588737ec98c333558922ce47e9a95827 ] Add the CPUID enumeration for Intel's de-feature bits to accommodate passing these de-features through to kvm guests. These de-features are (from SDM vol 1, section 8.1.8): - X86_FEATURE_FDP_EXCPTN_ONLY: If CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0H):EBX[bit 6] = 1, the data pointer (FDP) is updated only for the x87 non-control instructions that incur unmasked x87 exceptions. - X86_FEATURE_ZERO_FCS_FDS: If CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0H):EBX[bit 13] = 1, the processor deprecates FCS and FDS; it saves each as 0000H. Signed-off-by: NAaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: marcorr@google.com Cc: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com> Cc: pshier@google.com Cc: Robert Hoo <robert.hu@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190605220252.103406-1-aaronlewis@google.comSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Rajneesh Bhardwaj 提交于
[ Upstream commit e32d045cd4ba06b59878323e434bad010e78e658 ] Add the CPUID model number of Ice Lake Neural Network Processor for Deep Learning Inference (ICL-NNPI) to the Intel family list. Ice Lake NNPI uses model number 0x9D and this will be documented in a future version of Intel Software Development Manual. Signed-off-by: NRajneesh Bhardwaj <rajneesh.bhardwaj@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: bp@suse.de Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org Cc: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com> Cc: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Cc: Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org> Cc: Linux PM <linux-pm@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190606012419.13250-1-rajneesh.bhardwaj@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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- 21 7月, 2019 7 次提交
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由 Jiri Slaby 提交于
[ Upstream commit 1cbec37b3f9cff074a67bef4fc34b30a09958a0a ] common_spurious is currently ENDed erroneously. common_interrupt is used in its ENDPROC. So fix this mistake. Found by my asm macros rewrite patchset. Fixes: f8a8fe61fec8 ("x86/irq: Seperate unused system vectors from spurious entry again") Signed-off-by: NJiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190709063402.19847-1-jslaby@suse.czSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
commit f8a8fe61fec8006575699559ead88b0b833d5cad upstream Quite some time ago the interrupt entry stubs for unused vectors in the system vector range got removed and directly mapped to the spurious interrupt vector entry point. Sounds reasonable, but it's subtly broken. The spurious interrupt vector entry point pushes vector number 0xFF on the stack which makes the whole logic in __smp_spurious_interrupt() pointless. As a consequence any spurious interrupt which comes from a vector != 0xFF is treated as a real spurious interrupt (vector 0xFF) and not acknowledged. That subsequently stalls all interrupt vectors of equal and lower priority, which brings the system to a grinding halt. This can happen because even on 64-bit the system vector space is not guaranteed to be fully populated. A full compile time handling of the unused vectors is not possible because quite some of them are conditonally populated at runtime. Bring the entry stubs back, which wastes 160 bytes if all stubs are unused, but gains the proper handling back. There is no point to selectively spare some of the stubs which are known at compile time as the required code in the IDT management would be way larger and convoluted. Do not route the spurious entries through common_interrupt and do_IRQ() as the original code did. Route it to smp_spurious_interrupt() which evaluates the vector number and acts accordingly now that the real vector numbers are handed in. Fixup the pr_warn so the actual spurious vector (0xff) is clearly distiguished from the other vectors and also note for the vectored case whether it was pending in the ISR or not. "Spurious APIC interrupt (vector 0xFF) on CPU#0, should never happen." "Spurious interrupt vector 0xed on CPU#1. Acked." "Spurious interrupt vector 0xee on CPU#1. Not pending!." Fixes: 2414e021 ("x86: Avoid building unused IRQ entry stubs") Reported-by: NJan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190628111440.550568228@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
commit b7107a67f0d125459fe41f86e8079afd1a5e0b15 upstream Since the rework of the vector management, warnings about spurious interrupts have been reported. Robert provided some more information and did an initial analysis. The following situation leads to these warnings: CPU 0 CPU 1 IO_APIC interrupt is raised sent to CPU1 Unable to handle immediately (interrupts off, deep idle delay) mask() ... free() shutdown() synchronize_irq() clear_vector() do_IRQ() -> vector is clear Before the rework the vector entries of legacy interrupts were statically assigned and occupied precious vector space while most of them were unused. Due to that the above situation was handled silently because the vector was handled and the core handler of the assigned interrupt descriptor noticed that it is shut down and returned. While this has been usually observed with legacy interrupts, this situation is not limited to them. Any other interrupt source, e.g. MSI, can cause the same issue. After adding proper synchronization for level triggered interrupts, this can only happen for edge triggered interrupts where the IO-APIC obviously cannot provide information about interrupts in flight. While the spurious warning is actually harmless in this case it worries users and driver developers. Handle it gracefully by marking the vector entry as VECTOR_SHUTDOWN instead of VECTOR_UNUSED when the vector is freed up. If that above late handling happens the spurious detector will not complain and switch the entry to VECTOR_UNUSED. Any subsequent spurious interrupt on that line will trigger the spurious warning as before. Fixes: 464d1230 ("x86/vector: Switch IOAPIC to global reservation mode") Reported-by: NRobert Hodaszi <Robert.Hodaszi@digi.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>- Tested-by: NRobert Hodaszi <Robert.Hodaszi@digi.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190628111440.459647741@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
commit dfe0cf8b51b07e56ded571e3de0a4a9382517231 upstream When an interrupt is shut down in free_irq() there might be an inflight interrupt pending in the IO-APIC remote IRR which is not yet serviced. That means the interrupt has been sent to the target CPUs local APIC, but the target CPU is in a state which delays the servicing. So free_irq() would proceed to free resources and to clear the vector because synchronize_hardirq() does not see an interrupt handler in progress. That can trigger a spurious interrupt warning, which is harmless and just confuses users, but it also can leave the remote IRR in a stale state because once the handler is invoked the interrupt resources might be freed already and therefore acknowledgement is not possible anymore. Implement the irq_get_irqchip_state() callback for the IO-APIC irq chip. The callback is invoked from free_irq() via __synchronize_hardirq(). Check the remote IRR bit of the interrupt and return 'in flight' if it is set and the interrupt is configured in level mode. For edge mode the remote IRR has no meaning. As this is only meaningful for level triggered interrupts this won't cure the potential spurious interrupt warning for edge triggered interrupts, but the edge trigger case does not result in stale hardware state. This has to be addressed at the vector/interrupt entry level seperately. Fixes: 464d1230 ("x86/vector: Switch IOAPIC to global reservation mode") Reported-by: NRobert Hodaszi <Robert.Hodaszi@digi.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190628111440.370295517@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Kirill A. Shutemov 提交于
[ Upstream commit c1887159eb48ba40e775584cfb2a443962cf1a05 ] __startup_64() uses fixup_pointer() to access global variables in a position-independent fashion. Access to next_early_pgt was wrapped into the helper, but one instance in the 5-level paging branch was missed. GCC generates a R_X86_64_PC32 PC-relative relocation for the access which doesn't trigger the issue, but Clang emmits a R_X86_64_32S which leads to an invalid memory access and system reboot. Fixes: 187e91fe ("x86/boot/64/clang: Use fixup_pointer() to access 'next_early_pgt'") Signed-off-by: NKirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190620112422.29264-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Kirill A. Shutemov 提交于
[ Upstream commit 81c7ed296dcd02bc0b4488246d040e03e633737a ] A kernel which boots in 5-level paging mode crashes in a small percentage of cases if KASLR is enabled. This issue was tracked down to the case when the kernel image unpacks in a way that it crosses an 1G boundary. The crash is caused by an overrun of the PMD page table in __startup_64() and corruption of P4D page table allocated next to it. This particular issue is not visible with 4-level paging as P4D page tables are not used. But the P4D and the PUD calculation have similar problems. The PMD index calculation is wrong due to operator precedence, which fails to confine the PMDs in the PMD array on wrap around. The P4D calculation for 5-level paging and the PUD calculation calculate the first index correctly, but then blindly increment it which causes the same issue when a kernel image is located across a 512G and for 5-level paging across a 46T boundary. This wrap around mishandling was introduced when these parts moved from assembly to C. Restore it to the correct behaviour. Fixes: c88d7150 ("x86/boot/64: Rewrite startup_64() in C") Signed-off-by: NKirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190620112345.28833-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Colin Ian King 提交于
[ Upstream commit ea136a112d89bade596314a1ae49f748902f4727 ] The left shift of unsigned int cpu_khz will overflow for large values of cpu_khz, so cast it to a long long before shifting it to avoid overvlow. For example, this can happen when cpu_khz is 4194305, i.e. ~4.2 GHz. Addresses-Coverity: ("Unintentional integer overflow") Fixes: 8c3ba8d0 ("x86, apic: ack all pending irqs when crashed/on kexec") Signed-off-by: NColin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190619181446.13635-1-colin.king@canonical.comSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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- 14 7月, 2019 3 次提交
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由 Dianzhang Chen 提交于
commit 993773d11d45c90cb1c6481c2638c3d9f092ea5b upstream. The index to access the threads tls array is controlled by userspace via syscall: sys_ptrace(), hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. The index can be controlled from: ptrace -> arch_ptrace -> do_get_thread_area. Fix this by sanitizing the user supplied index before using it to access the p->thread.tls_array. Signed-off-by: NDianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1561524630-3642-1-git-send-email-dianzhangchen0@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Dianzhang Chen 提交于
commit 31a2fbb390fee4231281b939e1979e810f945415 upstream. The index to access the threads ptrace_bps is controlled by userspace via syscall: sys_ptrace(), hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. The index can be controlled from: ptrace -> arch_ptrace -> ptrace_get_debugreg. Fix this by sanitizing the user supplied index before using it access thread->ptrace_bps. Signed-off-by: NDianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1561476617-3759-1-git-send-email-dianzhangchen0@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Alexei Starovoitov 提交于
[ Upstream commit fe8d9571dc50232b569242fac7ea6332a654f186 ] Since commit 177366bf the %rbp stopped pointing to %rbp of the previous stack frame. That broke frame pointer based stack unwinding. This commit is a partial revert of it. Note that the location of tail_call_cnt is fixed, since the verifier enforces MAX_BPF_STACK stack size for programs with tail calls. Fixes: 177366bf ("bpf: change x86 JITed program stack layout") Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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- 10 7月, 2019 5 次提交
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由 Wanpeng Li 提交于
commit bb34e690e9340bc155ebed5a3d75fc63ff69e082 upstream. Thomas reported that: | Background: | | In preparation of supporting IPI shorthands I changed the CPU offline | code to software disable the local APIC instead of just masking it. | That's done by clearing the APIC_SPIV_APIC_ENABLED bit in the APIC_SPIV | register. | | Failure: | | When the CPU comes back online the startup code triggers occasionally | the warning in apic_pending_intr_clear(). That complains that the IRRs | are not empty. | | The offending vector is the local APIC timer vector who's IRR bit is set | and stays set. | | It took me quite some time to reproduce the issue locally, but now I can | see what happens. | | It requires apicv_enabled=0, i.e. full apic emulation. With apicv_enabled=1 | (and hardware support) it behaves correctly. | | Here is the series of events: | | Guest CPU | | goes down | | native_cpu_disable() | | apic_soft_disable(); | | play_dead() | | .... | | startup() | | if (apic_enabled()) | apic_pending_intr_clear() <- Not taken | | enable APIC | | apic_pending_intr_clear() <- Triggers warning because IRR is stale | | When this happens then the deadline timer or the regular APIC timer - | happens with both, has fired shortly before the APIC is disabled, but the | interrupt was not serviced because the guest CPU was in an interrupt | disabled region at that point. | | The state of the timer vector ISR/IRR bits: | | ISR IRR | before apic_soft_disable() 0 1 | after apic_soft_disable() 0 1 | | On startup 0 1 | | Now one would assume that the IRR is cleared after the INIT reset, but this | happens only on CPU0. | | Why? | | Because our CPU0 hotplug is just for testing to make sure nothing breaks | and goes through an NMI wakeup vehicle because INIT would send it through | the boots-trap code which is not really working if that CPU was not | physically unplugged. | | Now looking at a real world APIC the situation in that case is: | | ISR IRR | before apic_soft_disable() 0 1 | after apic_soft_disable() 0 1 | | On startup 0 0 | | Why? | | Once the dying CPU reenables interrupts the pending interrupt gets | delivered as a spurious interupt and then the state is clear. | | While that CPU0 hotplug test case is surely an esoteric issue, the APIC | emulation is still wrong, Even if the play_dead() code would not enable | interrupts then the pending IRR bit would turn into an ISR .. interrupt | when the APIC is reenabled on startup. From SDM 10.4.7.2 Local APIC State After It Has Been Software Disabled * Pending interrupts in the IRR and ISR registers are held and require masking or handling by the CPU. In Thomas's testing, hardware cpu will not respect soft disable LAPIC when IRR has already been set or APICv posted-interrupt is in flight, so we can skip soft disable APIC checking when clearing IRR and set ISR, continue to respect soft disable APIC when attempting to set IRR. Reported-by: NRong Chen <rong.a.chen@intel.com> Reported-by: NFeng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com> Reported-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Rong Chen <rong.a.chen@intel.com> Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于
commit 3f16a5c318392cbb5a0c7a3d19dff8c8ef3c38ee upstream. This warning can be triggered easily by userspace, so it should certainly not cause a panic if panic_on_warn is set. Reported-by: syzbot+c03f30b4f4c46bdf8575@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Suggested-by: NAlexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: NAlexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Kirill A. Shutemov 提交于
[ Upstream commit 45b13b424faafb81c8c44541f093a682fdabdefc ] RDMSR in the trampoline code overwrites EDX but that register is used to indicate whether 5-level paging has to be enabled and if clobbered, leads to failure to boot on a 5-level paging machine. Preserve EDX on the stack while we are dealing with EFER. Fixes: b677dfae5aa1 ("x86/boot/compressed/64: Set EFER.LME=1 in 32-bit trampoline before returning to long mode") Reported-by: NKyle D Pelton <kyle.d.pelton@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NKirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190206115253.1907-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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由 Petr Mladek 提交于
commit d5b844a2cf507fc7642c9ae80a9d585db3065c28 upstream. The commit 9f255b632bf12c4dd7 ("module: Fix livepatch/ftrace module text permissions race") causes a possible deadlock between register_kprobe() and ftrace_run_update_code() when ftrace is using stop_machine(). The existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (text_mutex){+.+.}: validate_chain.isra.21+0xb32/0xd70 __lock_acquire+0x4b8/0x928 lock_acquire+0x102/0x230 __mutex_lock+0x88/0x908 mutex_lock_nested+0x32/0x40 register_kprobe+0x254/0x658 init_kprobes+0x11a/0x168 do_one_initcall+0x70/0x318 kernel_init_freeable+0x456/0x508 kernel_init+0x22/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x34 kernel_thread_starter+0x0/0xc -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}: check_prev_add+0x90c/0xde0 validate_chain.isra.21+0xb32/0xd70 __lock_acquire+0x4b8/0x928 lock_acquire+0x102/0x230 cpus_read_lock+0x62/0xd0 stop_machine+0x2e/0x60 arch_ftrace_update_code+0x2e/0x40 ftrace_run_update_code+0x40/0xa0 ftrace_startup+0xb2/0x168 register_ftrace_function+0x64/0x88 klp_patch_object+0x1a2/0x290 klp_enable_patch+0x554/0x980 do_one_initcall+0x70/0x318 do_init_module+0x6e/0x250 load_module+0x1782/0x1990 __s390x_sys_finit_module+0xaa/0xf0 system_call+0xd8/0x2d0 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(text_mutex); lock(cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem); lock(text_mutex); lock(cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem); It is similar problem that has been solved by the commit 2d1e38f5 ("kprobes: Cure hotplug lock ordering issues"). Many locks are involved. To be on the safe side, text_mutex must become a low level lock taken after cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem. This can't be achieved easily with the current ftrace design. For example, arm calls set_all_modules_text_rw() already in ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare(), see arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c. This functions is called: + outside stop_machine() from ftrace_run_update_code() + without stop_machine() from ftrace_module_enable() Fortunately, the problematic fix is needed only on x86_64. It is the only architecture that calls set_all_modules_text_rw() in ftrace path and supports livepatching at the same time. Therefore it is enough to move text_mutex handling from the generic kernel/trace/ftrace.c into arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c: ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare() ftrace_arch_code_modify_post_process() This patch basically reverts the ftrace part of the problematic commit 9f255b632bf12c4dd7 ("module: Fix livepatch/ftrace module text permissions race"). And provides x86_64 specific-fix. Some refactoring of the ftrace code will be needed when livepatching is implemented for arm or nds32. These architectures call set_all_modules_text_rw() and use stop_machine() at the same time. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190627081334.12793-1-pmladek@suse.com Fixes: 9f255b632bf12c4dd7 ("module: Fix livepatch/ftrace module text permissions race") Acked-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reported-by: NMiroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: NMiroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NPetr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> [ As reviewed by Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>, removed return value of ftrace_run_update_code() as it is a void function. ] Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Kan Liang 提交于
[ Upstream commit e35faeb64146f2015f2aec14b358ae508e4066db ] Add the CPUID model numbers of Icelake (ICL) desktop and server processors to the Intel family list. [ Qiuxu: Sort the macros by model number. ] Signed-off-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com> Cc: Rajneesh Bhardwaj <rajneesh.bhardwaj@linux.intel.com> Cc: rui.zhang@intel.com Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190603134122.13853-1-kan.liang@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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- 03 7月, 2019 4 次提交
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由 Sean Christopherson 提交于
commit b6b80c78af838bef17501416d5d383fedab0010a upstream. SVM's Nested Page Tables (NPT) reuses x86 paging for the host-controlled page walk. For 32-bit KVM, this means PAE paging is used even when TDP is enabled, i.e. the PAE root array needs to be allocated. Fixes: ee6268ba ("KVM: x86: Skip pae_root shadow allocation if tdp enabled") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: NJiri Palecek <jpalecek@web.de> Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Palecek <jpalecek@web.de> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Reinette Chatre 提交于
commit 32f010deab575199df4ebe7b6aec20c17bb7eccd upstream. While the DOC at the beginning of lib/bitmap.c explicitly states that "The number of valid bits in a given bitmap does _not_ need to be an exact multiple of BITS_PER_LONG.", some of the bitmap operations do indeed access BITS_PER_LONG portions of the provided bitmap no matter the size of the provided bitmap. For example, if find_first_bit() is provided with an 8 bit bitmap the operation will access BITS_PER_LONG bits from the provided bitmap. While the operation ensures that these extra bits do not affect the result, the memory is still accessed. The capacity bitmasks (CBMs) are typically stored in u32 since they can never exceed 32 bits. A few instances exist where a bitmap_* operation is performed on a CBM by simply pointing the bitmap operation to the stored u32 value. The consequence of this pattern is that some bitmap_* operations will access out-of-bounds memory when interacting with the provided CBM. This same issue has previously been addressed with commit 49e00eee ("x86/intel_rdt: Fix out-of-bounds memory access in CBM tests") but at that time not all instances of the issue were fixed. Fix this by using an unsigned long to store the capacity bitmask data that is passed to bitmap functions. Fixes: e6519011 ("x86/intel_rdt: Introduce "bit_usage" to display cache allocations details") Fixes: f4e80d67 ("x86/intel_rdt: Resctrl files reflect pseudo-locked information") Fixes: 95f0b77e ("x86/intel_rdt: Initialize new resource group with sane defaults") Signed-off-by: NReinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/58c9b6081fd9bf599af0dfc01a6fdd335768efef.1560975645.git.reinette.chatre@intel.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
commit 5423f5ce5ca410b3646f355279e4e937d452e622 upstream. A recent change moved the microcode loader hotplug callback into the early startup phase which is running with interrupts disabled. It missed that the callbacks invoke sysfs functions which might sleep causing nice 'might sleep' splats with proper debugging enabled. Split the callbacks and only load the microcode in the early startup phase and move the sysfs handling back into the later threaded and preemptible bringup phase where it was before. Fixes: 78f4e932f776 ("x86/microcode, cpuhotplug: Add a microcode loader CPU hotplug callback") Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1906182228350.1766@nanos.tec.linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Alejandro Jimenez 提交于
commit c1f7fec1eb6a2c86d01bc22afce772c743451d88 upstream. The bits set in x86_spec_ctrl_mask are used to calculate the guest's value of SPEC_CTRL that is written to the MSR before VMENTRY, and control which mitigations the guest can enable. In the case of SSBD, unless the host has enabled SSBD always on mode (by passing "spec_store_bypass_disable=on" in the kernel parameters), the SSBD bit is not set in the mask and the guest can not properly enable the SSBD always on mitigation mode. This has been confirmed by running the SSBD PoC on a guest using the SSBD always on mitigation mode (booted with kernel parameter "spec_store_bypass_disable=on"), and verifying that the guest is vulnerable unless the host is also using SSBD always on mode. In addition, the guest OS incorrectly reports the SSB vulnerability as mitigated. Always set the SSBD bit in x86_spec_ctrl_mask when the host CPU supports it, allowing the guest to use SSBD whether or not the host has chosen to enable the mitigation in any of its modes. Fixes: be6fcb54 ("x86/bugs: Rework spec_ctrl base and mask logic") Signed-off-by: NAlejandro Jimenez <alejandro.j.jimenez@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: NLiam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NMark Kanda <mark.kanda@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: rkrcmar@redhat.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1560187210-11054-1-git-send-email-alejandro.j.jimenez@oracle.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- 25 6月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 James Morse 提交于
commit 87d3aa28f345bea77c396855fa5d5fec4c24461f upstream. When a new control group is created __init_one_rdt_domain() walks all the other closids to calculate the sets of used and unused bits. If it discovers a pseudo_locksetup group, it breaks out of the loop. This means any later closid doesn't get its used bits added to used_b. These bits will then get set in unused_b, and added to the new control group's configuration, even if they were marked as exclusive for a later closid. When encountering a pseudo_locksetup group, we should continue. This is because "a resource group enters 'pseudo-locked' mode after the schemata is written while the resource group is in 'pseudo-locksetup' mode." When we find a pseudo_locksetup group, its configuration is expected to be overwritten, we can skip it. Fixes: dfe9674b ("x86/intel_rdt: Enable entering of pseudo-locksetup mode") Signed-off-by: NJames Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: NReinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: H Peter Avin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190603172531.178830-1-james.morse@arm.com [Dropped comment due to lack of space] Signed-off-by: NJames Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- 22 6月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Frank van der Linden 提交于
[ Upstream commit 2ac44ab608705948564791ce1d15d43ba81a1e38 ] For F17h AMD CPUs, the CPB capability ('Core Performance Boost') is forcibly set, because some versions of that chip incorrectly report that they do not have it. However, a hypervisor may filter out the CPB capability, for good reasons. For example, KVM currently does not emulate setting the CPB bit in MSR_K7_HWCR, and unchecked MSR access errors will be thrown when trying to set it as a guest: unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0xc0010015 (tried to write 0x0000000001000011) at rIP: 0xffffffff890638f4 (native_write_msr+0x4/0x20) Call Trace: boost_set_msr+0x50/0x80 [acpi_cpufreq] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x86/0x560 sort_range+0x20/0x20 cpuhp_thread_fun+0xb0/0x110 smpboot_thread_fn+0xef/0x160 kthread+0x113/0x130 kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 To avoid this issue, don't forcibly set the CPB capability for a CPU when running under a hypervisor. Signed-off-by: NFrank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com> Acked-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com Fixes: 0237199186e7 ("x86/CPU/AMD: Set the CPB bit unconditionally on F17h") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190522221745.GA15789@dev-dsk-fllinden-2c-c1893d73.us-west-2.amazon.com [ Minor edits to the changelog. ] Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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