1. 24 1月, 2017 5 次提交
  2. 18 1月, 2017 1 次提交
  3. 17 1月, 2017 2 次提交
    • D
      KVM: x86: fix fixing of hypercalls · ce2e852e
      Dmitry Vyukov 提交于
      emulator_fix_hypercall() replaces hypercall with vmcall instruction,
      but it does not handle GP exception properly when writes the new instruction.
      It can return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT without setting exception information.
      This leads to incorrect emulation and triggers
      WARN_ON(ctxt->exception.vector > 0x1f) in x86_emulate_insn()
      as discovered by syzkaller fuzzer:
      
      WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 18646 at arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:5558
      Call Trace:
       warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:582
       x86_emulate_insn+0x16a5/0x4090 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:5572
       x86_emulate_instruction+0x403/0x1cc0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:5618
       emulate_instruction arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h:1127 [inline]
       handle_exception+0x594/0xfd0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:5762
       vmx_handle_exit+0x2b7/0x38b0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:8625
       vcpu_enter_guest arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6888 [inline]
       vcpu_run arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6947 [inline]
      
      Set exception information when write in emulator_fix_hypercall() fails.
      Signed-off-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
      Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: syzkaller@googlegroups.com
      Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      ce2e852e
    • Z
      perf/x86/intel: Handle exclusive threadid correctly on CPU hotplug · 4e71de79
      Zhou Chengming 提交于
      The CPU hotplug function intel_pmu_cpu_starting() sets
      cpu_hw_events.excl_thread_id unconditionally to 1 when the shared exclusive
      counters data structure is already availabe for the sibling thread.
      
      This works during the boot process because the first sibling gets threadid
      0 assigned and the second sibling which shares the data structure gets 1.
      
      But when the first thread of the core is offlined and onlined again it
      shares the data structure with the second thread and gets exclusive thread
      id 1 assigned as well.
      
      Prevent this by checking the threadid of the already online thread.
      
      [ tglx: Rewrote changelog ]
      Signed-off-by: NZhou Chengming <zhouchengming1@huawei.com>
      Cc: NuoHan Qiao <qiaonuohan@huawei.com>
      Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
      Cc: peterz@infradead.org
      Cc: kan.liang@intel.com
      Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com
      Cc: eranian@google.com
      Cc: qiaonuohan@huawei.com
      Cc: davidcc@google.com
      Cc: guohanjun@huawei.com
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1484536871-3131-1-git-send-email-zhouchengming1@huawei.comSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      ---					---
       arch/x86/events/intel/core.c |    7 +++++--
       1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
      4e71de79
  4. 14 1月, 2017 5 次提交
    • P
      efi/x86: Prune invalid memory map entries and fix boot regression · 0100a3e6
      Peter Jones 提交于
      Some machines, such as the Lenovo ThinkPad W541 with firmware GNET80WW
      (2.28), include memory map entries with phys_addr=0x0 and num_pages=0.
      
      These machines fail to boot after the following commit,
      
        commit 8e80632f ("efi/esrt: Use efi_mem_reserve() and avoid a kmalloc()")
      
      Fix this by removing such bogus entries from the memory map.
      
      Furthermore, currently the log output for this case (with efi=debug)
      looks like:
      
       [    0.000000] efi: mem45: [Reserved           |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  ] range=[0x0000000000000000-0xffffffffffffffff] (0MB)
      
      This is clearly wrong, and also not as informative as it could be.  This
      patch changes it so that if we find obviously invalid memory map
      entries, we print an error and skip those entries.  It also detects the
      display of the address range calculation overflow, so the new output is:
      
       [    0.000000] efi: [Firmware Bug]: Invalid EFI memory map entries:
       [    0.000000] efi: mem45: [Reserved           |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  ] range=[0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000000] (invalid)
      
      It also detects memory map sizes that would overflow the physical
      address, for example phys_addr=0xfffffffffffff000 and
      num_pages=0x0200000000000001, and prints:
      
       [    0.000000] efi: [Firmware Bug]: Invalid EFI memory map entries:
       [    0.000000] efi: mem45: [Reserved           |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  ] range=[phys_addr=0xfffffffffffff000-0x20ffffffffffffffff] (invalid)
      
      It then removes these entries from the memory map.
      Signed-off-by: NPeter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
      [ardb: refactor for clarity with no functional changes, avoid PAGE_SHIFT]
      Signed-off-by: NMatt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
      [Matt: Include bugzilla info in commit log]
      Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.9+
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=191121Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      0100a3e6
    • J
      perf/x86: Reject non sampling events with precise_ip · 18e7a45a
      Jiri Olsa 提交于
      As Peter suggested [1] rejecting non sampling PEBS events,
      because they dont make any sense and could cause bugs
      in the NMI handler [2].
      
        [1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103094059.GC3093@worktop
        [2] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1482931866-6018-3-git-send-email-jolsa@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NJiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
      Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
      Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Vince Weaver <vince@deater.net>
      Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103142454.GA26251@kravaSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      18e7a45a
    • J
      perf/x86/intel: Account interrupts for PEBS errors · 475113d9
      Jiri Olsa 提交于
      It's possible to set up PEBS events to get only errors and not
      any data, like on SNB-X (model 45) and IVB-EP (model 62)
      via 2 perf commands running simultaneously:
      
          taskset -c 1 ./perf record -c 4 -e branches:pp -j any -C 10
      
      This leads to a soft lock up, because the error path of the
      intel_pmu_drain_pebs_nhm() does not account event->hw.interrupt
      for error PEBS interrupts, so in case you're getting ONLY
      errors you don't have a way to stop the event when it's over
      the max_samples_per_tick limit:
      
        NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#22 stuck for 22s! [perf_fuzzer:5816]
        ...
        RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81159232>]  [<ffffffff81159232>] smp_call_function_single+0xe2/0x140
        ...
        Call Trace:
         ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xf5/0x1b0
         ? perf_cgroup_attach+0x70/0x70
         perf_install_in_context+0x199/0x1b0
         ? ctx_resched+0x90/0x90
         SYSC_perf_event_open+0x641/0xf90
         SyS_perf_event_open+0x9/0x10
         do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x1f0
         entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
      
      Add perf_event_account_interrupt() which does the interrupt
      and frequency checks and call it from intel_pmu_drain_pebs_nhm()'s
      error path.
      
      We keep the pending_kill and pending_wakeup logic only in the
      __perf_event_overflow() path, because they make sense only if
      there's any data to deliver.
      Signed-off-by: NJiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
      Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
      Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Vince Weaver <vince@deater.net>
      Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1482931866-6018-2-git-send-email-jolsa@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      475113d9
    • T
      x86/mpx: Use compatible types in comparison to fix sparse error · 45382862
      Tobias Klauser 提交于
      info->si_addr is of type void __user *, so it should be compared against
      something from the same address space.
      
      This fixes the following sparse error:
      
        arch/x86/mm/mpx.c:296:27: error: incompatible types in comparison expression (different address spaces)
      Signed-off-by: NTobias Klauser <tklauser@distanz.ch>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      45382862
    • L
      x86/tsc: Add the Intel Denverton Processor to native_calibrate_tsc() · 695085b4
      Len Brown 提交于
      The Intel Denverton microserver uses a 25 MHz TSC crystal,
      so we can derive its exact [*] TSC frequency
      using CPUID and some arithmetic, eg.:
      
        TSC: 1800 MHz (25000000 Hz * 216 / 3 / 1000000)
      
      [*] 'exact' is only as good as the crystal, which should be +/- 20ppm
      Signed-off-by: NLen Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/306899f94804aece6d8fa8b4223ede3b48dbb59c.1484287748.git.len.brown@intel.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      695085b4
  5. 12 1月, 2017 8 次提交
    • P
      KVM: x86: fix emulation of "MOV SS, null selector" · 33ab9110
      Paolo Bonzini 提交于
      This is CVE-2017-2583.  On Intel this causes a failed vmentry because
      SS's type is neither 3 nor 7 (even though the manual says this check is
      only done for usable SS, and the dmesg splat says that SS is unusable!).
      On AMD it's worse: svm.c is confused and sets CPL to 0 in the vmcb.
      
      The fix fabricates a data segment descriptor when SS is set to a null
      selector, so that CPL and SS.DPL are set correctly in the VMCS/vmcb.
      Furthermore, only allow setting SS to a NULL selector if SS.RPL < 3;
      this in turn ensures CPL < 3 because RPL must be equal to CPL.
      
      Thanks to Andy Lutomirski and Willy Tarreau for help in analyzing
      the bug and deciphering the manuals.
      Reported-by: NXiaohan Zhang <zhangxiaohan1@huawei.com>
      Fixes: 79d5b4c3
      Cc: stable@nongnu.org
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      33ab9110
    • W
      KVM: x86: fix NULL deref in vcpu_scan_ioapic · 546d87e5
      Wanpeng Li 提交于
      Reported by syzkaller:
      
          BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000001b0
          IP: _raw_spin_lock+0xc/0x30
          PGD 3e28eb067
          PUD 3f0ac6067
          PMD 0
          Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
          CPU: 0 PID: 2431 Comm: test Tainted: G           OE   4.10.0-rc1+ #3
          Call Trace:
           ? kvm_ioapic_scan_entry+0x3e/0x110 [kvm]
           kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x10a8/0x15f0 [kvm]
           ? pick_next_task_fair+0xe1/0x4e0
           ? kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0xea/0x260 [kvm]
           kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x33a/0x600 [kvm]
           ? hrtimer_try_to_cancel+0x29/0x130
           ? do_nanosleep+0x97/0xf0
           do_vfs_ioctl+0xa1/0x5d0
           ? __hrtimer_init+0x90/0x90
           ? do_nanosleep+0x5b/0xf0
           SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
           do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x180
           entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
          RIP: _raw_spin_lock+0xc/0x30 RSP: ffffa43688973cc0
      
      The syzkaller folks reported a NULL pointer dereference due to
      ENABLE_CAP succeeding even without an irqchip.  The Hyper-V
      synthetic interrupt controller is activated, resulting in a
      wrong request to rescan the ioapic and a NULL pointer dereference.
      
          #include <sys/ioctl.h>
          #include <sys/mman.h>
          #include <sys/types.h>
          #include <linux/kvm.h>
          #include <pthread.h>
          #include <stddef.h>
          #include <stdint.h>
          #include <stdlib.h>
          #include <string.h>
          #include <unistd.h>
      
          #ifndef KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC
          #define KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC 123
          #endif
      
          void* thr(void* arg)
          {
      	struct kvm_enable_cap cap;
      	cap.flags = 0;
      	cap.cap = KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC;
      	ioctl((long)arg, KVM_ENABLE_CAP, &cap);
      	return 0;
          }
      
          int main()
          {
      	void *host_mem = mmap(0, 0x1000, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
      			MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
      	int kvmfd = open("/dev/kvm", 0);
      	int vmfd = ioctl(kvmfd, KVM_CREATE_VM, 0);
      	struct kvm_userspace_memory_region memreg;
      	memreg.slot = 0;
      	memreg.flags = 0;
      	memreg.guest_phys_addr = 0;
      	memreg.memory_size = 0x1000;
      	memreg.userspace_addr = (unsigned long)host_mem;
      	host_mem[0] = 0xf4;
      	ioctl(vmfd, KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION, &memreg);
      	int cpufd = ioctl(vmfd, KVM_CREATE_VCPU, 0);
      	struct kvm_sregs sregs;
      	ioctl(cpufd, KVM_GET_SREGS, &sregs);
      	sregs.cr0 = 0;
      	sregs.cr4 = 0;
      	sregs.efer = 0;
      	sregs.cs.selector = 0;
      	sregs.cs.base = 0;
      	ioctl(cpufd, KVM_SET_SREGS, &sregs);
      	struct kvm_regs regs = { .rflags = 2 };
      	ioctl(cpufd, KVM_SET_REGS, &regs);
      	ioctl(vmfd, KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, 0);
      	pthread_t th;
      	pthread_create(&th, 0, thr, (void*)(long)cpufd);
      	usleep(rand() % 10000);
      	ioctl(cpufd, KVM_RUN, 0);
      	pthread_join(th, 0);
      	return 0;
          }
      
      This patch fixes it by failing ENABLE_CAP if without an irqchip.
      Reported-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Fixes: 5c919412 (kvm/x86: Hyper-V synthetic interrupt controller)
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.5+
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
      Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      546d87e5
    • S
      KVM: x86: Introduce segmented_write_std · 129a72a0
      Steve Rutherford 提交于
      Introduces segemented_write_std.
      
      Switches from emulated reads/writes to standard read/writes in fxsave,
      fxrstor, sgdt, and sidt.  This fixes CVE-2017-2584, a longstanding
      kernel memory leak.
      
      Since commit 283c95d0 ("KVM: x86: emulate FXSAVE and FXRSTOR",
      2016-11-09), which is luckily not yet in any final release, this would
      also be an exploitable kernel memory *write*!
      Reported-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Fixes: 96051572
      Fixes: 283c95d0Suggested-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NSteve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      129a72a0
    • D
      KVM: x86: flush pending lapic jump label updates on module unload · cef84c30
      David Matlack 提交于
      KVM's lapic emulation uses static_key_deferred (apic_{hw,sw}_disabled).
      These are implemented with delayed_work structs which can still be
      pending when the KVM module is unloaded. We've seen this cause kernel
      panics when the kvm_intel module is quickly reloaded.
      
      Use the new static_key_deferred_flush() API to flush pending updates on
      module unload.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      cef84c30
    • J
      x86/entry: Fix the end of the stack for newly forked tasks · ff3f7e24
      Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
      When unwinding a task, the end of the stack is always at the same offset
      right below the saved pt_regs, regardless of which syscall was used to
      enter the kernel.  That convention allows the unwinder to verify that a
      stack is sane.
      
      However, newly forked tasks don't always follow that convention, as
      reported by the following unwinder warning seen by Dave Jones:
      
        WARNING: kernel stack frame pointer at ffffc90001443f30 in kworker/u8:8:30468 has bad value           (null)
      
      The warning was due to the following call chain:
      
        (ftrace handler)
        call_usermodehelper_exec_async+0x5/0x140
        ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
      
      The problem is that ret_from_fork() doesn't create a stack frame before
      calling other functions.  Fix that by carefully using the frame pointer
      macros.
      
      In addition to conforming to the end of stack convention, this also
      makes related stack traces more sensible by making it clear to the user
      that ret_from_fork() was involved.
      Reported-by: NDave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
      Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/8854cdaab980e9700a81e9ebf0d4238e4bbb68ef.1483978430.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      ff3f7e24
    • J
      x86/unwind: Include __schedule() in stack traces · 2c96b2fe
      Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
      In the following commit:
      
        0100301b ("sched/x86: Rewrite the switch_to() code")
      
      ... the layout of the 'inactive_task_frame' struct was designed to have
      a frame pointer header embedded in it, so that the unwinder could use
      the 'bp' and 'ret_addr' fields to report __schedule() on the stack (or
      ret_from_fork() for newly forked tasks which haven't actually run yet).
      
      Finish the job by changing get_frame_pointer() to return a pointer to
      inactive_task_frame's 'bp' field rather than 'bp' itself.  This allows
      the unwinder to start one frame higher on the stack, so that it properly
      reports __schedule().
      Reported-by: NMiroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
      Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/598e9f7505ed0aba86e8b9590aa528c6c7ae8dcd.1483978430.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      2c96b2fe
    • J
      x86/unwind: Disable KASAN checks for non-current tasks · 84936118
      Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
      There are a handful of callers to save_stack_trace_tsk() and
      show_stack() which try to unwind the stack of a task other than current.
      In such cases, it's remotely possible that the task is running on one
      CPU while the unwinder is reading its stack from another CPU, causing
      the unwinder to see stack corruption.
      
      These cases seem to be mostly harmless.  The unwinder has checks which
      prevent it from following bad pointers beyond the bounds of the stack.
      So it's not really a bug as long as the caller understands that
      unwinding another task will not always succeed.
      
      In such cases, it's possible that the unwinder may read a KASAN-poisoned
      region of the stack.  Account for that by using READ_ONCE_NOCHECK() when
      reading the stack of another task.
      
      Use READ_ONCE() when reading the stack of the current task, since KASAN
      warnings can still be useful for finding bugs in that case.
      Reported-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4c575eb288ba9f73d498dfe0acde2f58674598f1.1483978430.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      84936118
    • J
      x86/unwind: Silence warnings for non-current tasks · 900742d8
      Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
      There are a handful of callers to save_stack_trace_tsk() and
      show_stack() which try to unwind the stack of a task other than current.
      In such cases, it's remotely possible that the task is running on one
      CPU while the unwinder is reading its stack from another CPU, causing
      the unwinder to see stack corruption.
      
      These cases seem to be mostly harmless.  The unwinder has checks which
      prevent it from following bad pointers beyond the bounds of the stack.
      So it's not really a bug as long as the caller understands that
      unwinding another task will not always succeed.
      
      Since stack "corruption" on another task's stack isn't necessarily a
      bug, silence the warnings when unwinding tasks other than current.
      Reported-by: NDave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
      Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/00d8c50eea3446c1524a2a755397a3966629354c.1483978430.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      900742d8
  6. 11 1月, 2017 3 次提交
  7. 10 1月, 2017 5 次提交
  8. 09 1月, 2017 2 次提交
  9. 07 1月, 2017 1 次提交
    • N
      x86/efi: Don't allocate memmap through memblock after mm_init() · 20b1e22d
      Nicolai Stange 提交于
      With the following commit:
      
        4bc9f92e ("x86/efi-bgrt: Use efi_mem_reserve() to avoid copying image data")
      
      ...  efi_bgrt_init() calls into the memblock allocator through
      efi_mem_reserve() => efi_arch_mem_reserve() *after* mm_init() has been called.
      
      Indeed, KASAN reports a bad read access later on in efi_free_boot_services():
      
        BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in efi_free_boot_services+0xae/0x24c
                  at addr ffff88022de12740
        Read of size 4 by task swapper/0/0
        page:ffffea0008b78480 count:0 mapcount:-127
        mapping:          (null) index:0x1 flags: 0x5fff8000000000()
        [...]
        Call Trace:
         dump_stack+0x68/0x9f
         kasan_report_error+0x4c8/0x500
         kasan_report+0x58/0x60
         __asan_load4+0x61/0x80
         efi_free_boot_services+0xae/0x24c
         start_kernel+0x527/0x562
         x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x26
         x86_64_start_kernel+0x157/0x17a
         start_cpu+0x5/0x14
      
      The instruction at the given address is the first read from the memmap's
      memory, i.e. the read of md->type in efi_free_boot_services().
      
      Note that the writes earlier in efi_arch_mem_reserve() don't splat because
      they're done through early_memremap()ed addresses.
      
      So, after memblock is gone, allocations should be done through the "normal"
      page allocator. Introduce a helper, efi_memmap_alloc() for this. Use
      it from efi_arch_mem_reserve(), efi_free_boot_services() and, for the sake
      of consistency, from efi_fake_memmap() as well.
      
      Note that for the latter, the memmap allocations cease to be page aligned.
      This isn't needed though.
      Tested-by: NDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NNicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
      Reviewed-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
      Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.9
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
      Cc: Mika Penttilä <mika.penttila@nextfour.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
      Fixes: 4bc9f92e ("x86/efi-bgrt: Use efi_mem_reserve() to avoid copying image data")
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170105125130.2815-1-nicstange@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      20b1e22d
  10. 06 1月, 2017 1 次提交
  11. 05 1月, 2017 5 次提交
  12. 30 12月, 2016 2 次提交
    • H
      crypto: aesni - Fix failure when built-in with modular pcbc · 07825f0a
      Herbert Xu 提交于
      If aesni is built-in but pcbc is built as a module, then aesni
      will fail completely because when it tries to register the pcbc
      variant of aes the pcbc template is not available.
      
      This patch fixes this by modifying the pcbc presence test so that
      if aesni is built-in then pcbc must also be built-in for it to be
      used by aesni.
      
      Fixes: 85671860 ("crypto: aesni - Convert to skcipher")
      Reported-by: NStephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de>
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      07825f0a
    • L
      mm: optimize PageWaiters bit use for unlock_page() · b91e1302
      Linus Torvalds 提交于
      In commit 62906027 ("mm: add PageWaiters indicating tasks are
      waiting for a page bit") Nick Piggin made our page locking no longer
      unconditionally touch the hashed page waitqueue, which not only helps
      performance in general, but is particularly helpful on NUMA machines
      where the hashed wait queues can bounce around a lot.
      
      However, the "clear lock bit atomically and then test the waiters bit"
      sequence turns out to be much more expensive than it needs to be,
      because you get a nasty stall when trying to access the same word that
      just got updated atomically.
      
      On architectures where locking is done with LL/SC, this would be trivial
      to fix with a new primitive that clears one bit and tests another
      atomically, but that ends up not working on x86, where the only atomic
      operations that return the result end up being cmpxchg and xadd.  The
      atomic bit operations return the old value of the same bit we changed,
      not the value of an unrelated bit.
      
      On x86, we could put the lock bit in the high bit of the byte, and use
      "xadd" with that bit (where the overflow ends up not touching other
      bits), and look at the other bits of the result.  However, an even
      simpler model is to just use a regular atomic "and" to clear the lock
      bit, and then the sign bit in eflags will indicate the resulting state
      of the unrelated bit #7.
      
      So by moving the PageWaiters bit up to bit #7, we can atomically clear
      the lock bit and test the waiters bit on x86 too.  And architectures
      with LL/SC (which is all the usual RISC suspects), the particular bit
      doesn't matter, so they are fine with this approach too.
      
      This avoids the extra access to the same atomic word, and thus avoids
      the costly stall at page unlock time.
      
      The only downside is that the interface ends up being a bit odd and
      specialized: clear a bit in a byte, and test the sign bit.  Nick doesn't
      love the resulting name of the new primitive, but I'd rather make the
      name be descriptive and very clear about the limitation imposed by
      trying to work across all relevant architectures than make it be some
      generic thing that doesn't make the odd semantics explicit.
      
      So this introduces the new architecture primitive
      
          clear_bit_unlock_is_negative_byte();
      
      and adds the trivial implementation for x86.  We have a generic
      non-optimized fallback (that just does a "clear_bit()"+"test_bit(7)"
      combination) which can be overridden by any architecture that can do
      better.  According to Nick, Power has the same hickup x86 has, for
      example, but some other architectures may not even care.
      
      All these optimizations mean that my page locking stress-test (which is
      just executing a lot of small short-lived shell scripts: "make test" in
      the git source tree) no longer makes our page locking look horribly bad.
      Before all these optimizations, just the unlock_page() costs were just
      over 3% of all CPU overhead on "make test".  After this, it's down to
      0.66%, so just a quarter of the cost it used to be.
      
      (The difference on NUMA is bigger, but there this micro-optimization is
      likely less noticeable, since the big issue on NUMA was not the accesses
      to 'struct page', but the waitqueue accesses that were already removed
      by Nick's earlier commit).
      Acked-by: NNick Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
      Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andrew Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      b91e1302