1. 18 11月, 2015 1 次提交
  2. 17 11月, 2015 2 次提交
    • A
      arm64: simplify dma_get_ops · 1dccb598
      Arnd Bergmann 提交于
      Including linux/acpi.h from asm/dma-mapping.h causes tons of compile-time
      warnings, e.g.
      
       drivers/isdn/mISDN/dsp_ecdis.h:43:0: warning: "FALSE" redefined
       drivers/isdn/mISDN/dsp_ecdis.h:44:0: warning: "TRUE" redefined
       drivers/net/fddi/skfp/h/targetos.h:62:0: warning: "TRUE" redefined
       drivers/net/fddi/skfp/h/targetos.h:63:0: warning: "FALSE" redefined
      
      However, it looks like the dependency should not even there as
      I do not see why __generic_dma_ops() cares about whether we have
      an ACPI based system or not.
      
      The current behavior is to fall back to the global dma_ops when
      a device has not set its own dma_ops, but only for DT based systems.
      This seems dangerous, as a random device might have different
      requirements regarding IOMMU or coherency, so we should really
      never have that fallback and just forbid DMA when we have not
      initialized DMA for a device.
      
      This removes the global dma_ops variable and the special-casing
      for ACPI, and just returns the dma ops that got set for the
      device, or the dummy_dma_ops if none were present.
      
      The original code has apparently been copied from arm32 where we
      rely on it for ISA devices things like the floppy controller, but
      we should have no such devices on ARM64.
      Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      [catalin.marinas@arm.com: removed acpi_disabled check in arch_setup_dma_ops()]
      Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      1dccb598
    • A
      arm64: mm: use correct mapping granularity under DEBUG_RODATA · 4fee9f36
      Ard Biesheuvel 提交于
      When booting a 64k pages kernel that is built with CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
      and resides at an offset that is not a multiple of 512 MB, the rounding
      that occurs in __map_memblock() and fixup_executable() results in
      incorrect regions being mapped.
      
      The following snippet from /sys/kernel/debug/kernel_page_tables shows
      how, when the kernel is loaded 2 MB above the base of DRAM at 0x40000000,
      the first 2 MB of memory (which may be inaccessible from non-secure EL1
      or just reserved by the firmware) is inadvertently mapped into the end of
      the module region.
      
        ---[ Modules start ]---
        0xfffffdffffe00000-0xfffffe0000000000     2M RW NX ... UXN MEM/NORMAL
        ---[ Modules end ]---
        ---[ Kernel Mapping ]---
        0xfffffe0000000000-0xfffffe0000090000   576K RW NX ... UXN MEM/NORMAL
        0xfffffe0000090000-0xfffffe0000200000  1472K ro x  ... UXN MEM/NORMAL
        0xfffffe0000200000-0xfffffe0000800000     6M ro x  ... UXN MEM/NORMAL
        0xfffffe0000800000-0xfffffe0000810000    64K ro x  ... UXN MEM/NORMAL
        0xfffffe0000810000-0xfffffe0000a00000  1984K RW NX ... UXN MEM/NORMAL
        0xfffffe0000a00000-0xfffffe00ffe00000  4084M RW NX ... UXN MEM/NORMAL
      
      The same issue is likely to occur on 16k pages kernels whose load
      address is not a multiple of 32 MB (i.e., SECTION_SIZE). So round to
      SWAPPER_BLOCK_SIZE instead of SECTION_SIZE.
      
      Fixes: da141706 ("arm64: add better page protections to arm64")
      Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
      Acked-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
      Acked-by: NLaura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
      Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.0+
      Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      4fee9f36
  3. 16 11月, 2015 1 次提交
  4. 12 11月, 2015 1 次提交
  5. 09 11月, 2015 2 次提交
  6. 08 11月, 2015 1 次提交
  7. 07 11月, 2015 1 次提交
    • M
      mm, page_alloc: distinguish between being unable to sleep, unwilling to sleep... · d0164adc
      Mel Gorman 提交于
      mm, page_alloc: distinguish between being unable to sleep, unwilling to sleep and avoiding waking kswapd
      
      __GFP_WAIT has been used to identify atomic context in callers that hold
      spinlocks or are in interrupts.  They are expected to be high priority and
      have access one of two watermarks lower than "min" which can be referred
      to as the "atomic reserve".  __GFP_HIGH users get access to the first
      lower watermark and can be called the "high priority reserve".
      
      Over time, callers had a requirement to not block when fallback options
      were available.  Some have abused __GFP_WAIT leading to a situation where
      an optimisitic allocation with a fallback option can access atomic
      reserves.
      
      This patch uses __GFP_ATOMIC to identify callers that are truely atomic,
      cannot sleep and have no alternative.  High priority users continue to use
      __GFP_HIGH.  __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM identifies callers that can sleep and
      are willing to enter direct reclaim.  __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM to identify
      callers that want to wake kswapd for background reclaim.  __GFP_WAIT is
      redefined as a caller that is willing to enter direct reclaim and wake
      kswapd for background reclaim.
      
      This patch then converts a number of sites
      
      o __GFP_ATOMIC is used by callers that are high priority and have memory
        pools for those requests. GFP_ATOMIC uses this flag.
      
      o Callers that have a limited mempool to guarantee forward progress clear
        __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM but keep __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM. bio allocations fall
        into this category where kswapd will still be woken but atomic reserves
        are not used as there is a one-entry mempool to guarantee progress.
      
      o Callers that are checking if they are non-blocking should use the
        helper gfpflags_allow_blocking() where possible. This is because
        checking for __GFP_WAIT as was done historically now can trigger false
        positives. Some exceptions like dm-crypt.c exist where the code intent
        is clearer if __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM is used instead of the helper due to
        flag manipulations.
      
      o Callers that built their own GFP flags instead of starting with GFP_KERNEL
        and friends now also need to specify __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM.
      
      The first key hazard to watch out for is callers that removed __GFP_WAIT
      and was depending on access to atomic reserves for inconspicuous reasons.
      In some cases it may be appropriate for them to use __GFP_HIGH.
      
      The second key hazard is callers that assembled their own combination of
      GFP flags instead of starting with something like GFP_KERNEL.  They may
      now wish to specify __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM.  It's almost certainly harmless
      if it's missed in most cases as other activity will wake kswapd.
      Signed-off-by: NMel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
      Acked-by: NVlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
      Acked-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
      Acked-by: NJohannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
      Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
      Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
      Cc: Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      d0164adc
  8. 30 10月, 2015 1 次提交
  9. 29 10月, 2015 1 次提交
  10. 21 10月, 2015 1 次提交
    • S
      arm64: Delay cpu feature capability checks · dbb4e152
      Suzuki K. Poulose 提交于
      At the moment we run through the arm64_features capability list for
      each CPU and set the capability if one of the CPU supports it. This
      could be problematic in a heterogeneous system with differing capabilities.
      Delay the CPU feature checks until all the enabled CPUs are up(i.e,
      smp_cpus_done(), so that we can make better decisions based on the
      overall system capability. Once we decide and advertise the capabilities
      the alternatives can be applied. From this state, we cannot roll back
      a feature to disabled based on the values from a new hotplugged CPU,
      due to the runtime patching and other reasons. So, for all new CPUs,
      we need to make sure that they have the established system capabilities.
      Failing which, we bring the CPU down, preventing it from turning online.
      Once the capabilities are decided, any new CPU booting up goes through
      verification to ensure that it has all the enabled capabilities and also
      invokes the respective enable() method on the CPU.
      
      The CPU errata checks are not delayed and is still executed per-CPU
      to detect the respective capabilities. If we ever come across a non-errata
      capability that needs to be checked on each-CPU, we could introduce them via
      a new capability table(or introduce a flag), which can be processed per CPU.
      
      The next patch will make the feature checks use the system wide
      safe value of a feature register.
      
      NOTE: The enable() methods associated with the capability is scheduled
      on all the CPUs (which is the only use case at the moment). If we need
      a different type of 'enable()' which only needs to be run once on any CPU,
      we should be able to handle that when needed.
      Signed-off-by: NSuzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
      Tested-by: NDave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
      [catalin.marinas@arm.com: static variable and coding style fixes]
      Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      dbb4e152
  11. 20 10月, 2015 2 次提交
  12. 15 10月, 2015 2 次提交
  13. 13 10月, 2015 4 次提交
    • W
      arm64: kasan: fix issues reported by sparse · 83040123
      Will Deacon 提交于
      Sparse reports some new issues introduced by the kasan patches:
      
        arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c:91:13: warning: no previous prototype for
        'kasan_early_init' [-Wmissing-prototypes] void __init kasan_early_init(void)
                   ^
        arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c:91:13: warning: symbol 'kasan_early_init'
        was not declared. Should it be static? [sparse]
      
      This patch resolves the problem by adding a prototype for
      kasan_early_init and marking the function as asmlinkage, since it's only
      called from head.S.
      Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Acked-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      83040123
    • L
      ARM64: kasan: print memory assignment · ee7f881b
      Linus Walleij 提交于
      This prints out the virtual memory assigned to KASan in the
      boot crawl along with other memory assignments, if and only
      if KASan is activated.
      
      Example dmesg from the Juno Development board:
      
      Memory: 1691156K/2080768K available (5465K kernel code, 444K rwdata,
      2160K rodata, 340K init, 217K bss, 373228K reserved, 16384K cma-reserved)
      Virtual kernel memory layout:
          kasan   : 0xffffff8000000000 - 0xffffff9000000000   (    64 GB)
          vmalloc : 0xffffff9000000000 - 0xffffffbdbfff0000   (   182 GB)
          vmemmap : 0xffffffbdc0000000 - 0xffffffbfc0000000   (     8 GB maximum)
                    0xffffffbdc2000000 - 0xffffffbdc3fc0000   (    31 MB actual)
          fixed   : 0xffffffbffabfd000 - 0xffffffbffac00000   (    12 KB)
          PCI I/O : 0xffffffbffae00000 - 0xffffffbffbe00000   (    16 MB)
          modules : 0xffffffbffc000000 - 0xffffffc000000000   (    64 MB)
          memory  : 0xffffffc000000000 - 0xffffffc07f000000   (  2032 MB)
            .init : 0xffffffc0007f5000 - 0xffffffc00084a000   (   340 KB)
            .text : 0xffffffc000080000 - 0xffffffc0007f45b4   (  7634 KB)
            .data : 0xffffffc000850000 - 0xffffffc0008bf200   (   445 KB)
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      ee7f881b
    • A
      arm64: add KASAN support · 39d114dd
      Andrey Ryabinin 提交于
      This patch adds arch specific code for kernel address sanitizer
      (see Documentation/kasan.txt).
      
      1/8 of kernel addresses reserved for shadow memory. There was no
      big enough hole for this, so virtual addresses for shadow were
      stolen from vmalloc area.
      
      At early boot stage the whole shadow region populated with just
      one physical page (kasan_zero_page). Later, this page reused
      as readonly zero shadow for some memory that KASan currently
      don't track (vmalloc).
      After mapping the physical memory, pages for shadow memory are
      allocated and mapped.
      
      Functions like memset/memmove/memcpy do a lot of memory accesses.
      If bad pointer passed to one of these function it is important
      to catch this. Compiler's instrumentation cannot do this since
      these functions are written in assembly.
      KASan replaces memory functions with manually instrumented variants.
      Original functions declared as weak symbols so strong definitions
      in mm/kasan/kasan.c could replace them. Original functions have aliases
      with '__' prefix in name, so we could call non-instrumented variant
      if needed.
      Some files built without kasan instrumentation (e.g. mm/slub.c).
      Original mem* function replaced (via #define) with prefixed variants
      to disable memory access checks for such files.
      Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
      Tested-by: NLinus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
      Reviewed-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      39d114dd
    • A
      arm64: move PGD_SIZE definition to pgalloc.h · fd2203dd
      Andrey Ryabinin 提交于
      This will be used by KASAN latter.
      Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      fd2203dd
  14. 12 10月, 2015 1 次提交
  15. 09 10月, 2015 2 次提交
  16. 07 10月, 2015 5 次提交
  17. 05 10月, 2015 1 次提交
    • M
      arm64: readahead: fault retry breaks mmap file read random detection · 569ba74a
      Mark Salyzyn 提交于
      This is the arm64 portion of commit 45cac65b ("readahead: fault
      retry breaks mmap file read random detection"), which was absent from
      the initial port and has since gone unnoticed. The original commit says:
      
      > .fault now can retry.  The retry can break state machine of .fault.  In
      > filemap_fault, if page is miss, ra->mmap_miss is increased.  In the second
      > try, since the page is in page cache now, ra->mmap_miss is decreased.  And
      > these are done in one fault, so we can't detect random mmap file access.
      >
      > Add a new flag to indicate .fault is tried once.  In the second try, skip
      > ra->mmap_miss decreasing.  The filemap_fault state machine is ok with it.
      
      With this change, Mark reports that:
      
      > Random read improves by 250%, sequential read improves by 40%, and
      > random write by 400% to an eMMC device with dm crypto wrapped around it.
      
      Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@kernel.org>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
      Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NMark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
      Signed-off-by: NRiley Andrews <riandrews@android.com>
      Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      569ba74a
  18. 14 9月, 2015 1 次提交
  19. 20 8月, 2015 1 次提交
  20. 08 8月, 2015 1 次提交
  21. 05 8月, 2015 1 次提交
    • W
      arm64: mm: ensure patched kernel text is fetched from PoU · 8ec41987
      Will Deacon 提交于
      The arm64 booting document requires that the bootloader has cleaned the
      kernel image to the PoC. However, when a CPU re-enters the kernel due to
      either a CPU hotplug "on" event or resuming from a low-power state (e.g.
      cpuidle), the kernel text may in-fact be dirty at the PoU due to things
      like alternative patching or even module loading.
      
      Thanks to I-cache speculation with the MMU off, stale instructions could
      be fetched prior to enabling the MMU, potentially leading to crashes
      when executing regions of code that have been modified at runtime.
      
      This patch addresses the issue by ensuring that the local I-cache is
      invalidated immediately after a CPU has enabled its MMU but before
      jumping out of the identity mapping. Any stale instructions fetched from
      the PoC will then be discarded and refetched correctly from the PoU.
      Patching kernel text executed prior to the MMU being enabled is
      prohibited, so the early entry code will always be clean.
      Reviewed-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
      Tested-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      8ec41987
  22. 03 8月, 2015 1 次提交
  23. 28 7月, 2015 2 次提交
  24. 27 7月, 2015 4 次提交