1. 04 2月, 2018 1 次提交
  2. 05 1月, 2018 3 次提交
    • T
      x86/kaslr: Fix the vaddr_end mess · 1dddd251
      Thomas Gleixner 提交于
      vaddr_end for KASLR is only documented in the KASLR code itself and is
      adjusted depending on config options. So it's not surprising that a change
      of the memory layout causes KASLR to have the wrong vaddr_end. This can map
      arbitrary stuff into other areas causing hard to understand problems.
      
      Remove the whole ifdef magic and define the start of the cpu_entry_area to
      be the end of the KASLR vaddr range.
      
      Add documentation to that effect.
      
      Fixes: 92a0f81d ("x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it out of the fixmap")
      Reported-by: NBenjamin Gilbert <benjamin.gilbert@coreos.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Tested-by: NBenjamin Gilbert <benjamin.gilbert@coreos.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>,
      Cc: Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@gmail.com>
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801041320360.1771@nanos
      1dddd251
    • T
      x86/mm: Map cpu_entry_area at the same place on 4/5 level · f2078904
      Thomas Gleixner 提交于
      There is no reason for 4 and 5 level pagetables to have a different
      layout. It just makes determining vaddr_end for KASLR harder than
      necessary.
      
      Fixes: 92a0f81d ("x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it out of the fixmap")
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Benjamin Gilbert <benjamin.gilbert@coreos.com>
      Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>,
      Cc: Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@gmail.com>
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801041320360.1771@nanos
      f2078904
    • A
      x86/mm: Set MODULES_END to 0xffffffffff000000 · f5a40711
      Andrey Ryabinin 提交于
      Since f06bdd40 ("x86/mm: Adapt MODULES_END based on fixmap section size")
      kasan_mem_to_shadow(MODULES_END) could be not aligned to a page boundary.
      
      So passing page unaligned address to kasan_populate_zero_shadow() have two
      possible effects:
      
      1) It may leave one page hole in supposed to be populated area. After commit
        21506525 ("x86/kasan/64: Teach KASAN about the cpu_entry_area") that
        hole happens to be in the shadow covering fixmap area and leads to crash:
      
       BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffffbffffe8ee04
       RIP: 0010:check_memory_region+0x5c/0x190
      
       Call Trace:
        <NMI>
        memcpy+0x1f/0x50
        ghes_copy_tofrom_phys+0xab/0x180
        ghes_read_estatus+0xfb/0x280
        ghes_notify_nmi+0x2b2/0x410
        nmi_handle+0x115/0x2c0
        default_do_nmi+0x57/0x110
        do_nmi+0xf8/0x150
        end_repeat_nmi+0x1a/0x1e
      
      Note, the crash likely disappeared after commit 92a0f81d, which
      changed kasan_populate_zero_shadow() call the way it was before
      commit 21506525.
      
      2) Attempt to load module near MODULES_END will fail, because
         __vmalloc_node_range() called from kasan_module_alloc() will hit the
         WARN_ON(!pte_none(*pte)) in the vmap_pte_range() and bail out with error.
      
      To fix this we need to make kasan_mem_to_shadow(MODULES_END) page aligned
      which means that MODULES_END should be 8*PAGE_SIZE aligned.
      
      The whole point of commit f06bdd40 was to move MODULES_END down if
      NR_CPUS is big, so the cpu_entry_area takes a lot of space.
      But since 92a0f81d ("x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it out of the fixmap")
      the cpu_entry_area is no longer in fixmap, so we could just set
      MODULES_END to a fixed 8*PAGE_SIZE aligned address.
      
      Fixes: f06bdd40 ("x86/mm: Adapt MODULES_END based on fixmap section size")
      Reported-by: NJakub Kicinski <kubakici@wp.pl>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171228160620.23818-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
      f5a40711
  3. 02 1月, 2018 2 次提交
  4. 28 12月, 2017 1 次提交
  5. 24 12月, 2017 4 次提交
    • A
      x86/pti: Put the LDT in its own PGD if PTI is on · f55f0501
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      With PTI enabled, the LDT must be mapped in the usermode tables somewhere.
      The LDT is per process, i.e. per mm.
      
      An earlier approach mapped the LDT on context switch into a fixmap area,
      but that's a big overhead and exhausted the fixmap space when NR_CPUS got
      big.
      
      Take advantage of the fact that there is an address space hole which
      provides a completely unused pgd. Use this pgd to manage per-mm LDT
      mappings.
      
      This has a down side: the LDT isn't (currently) randomized, and an attack
      that can write the LDT is instant root due to call gates (thanks, AMD, for
      leaving call gates in AMD64 but designing them wrong so they're only useful
      for exploits).  This can be mitigated by making the LDT read-only or
      randomizing the mapping, either of which is strightforward on top of this
      patch.
      
      This will significantly slow down LDT users, but that shouldn't matter for
      important workloads -- the LDT is only used by DOSEMU(2), Wine, and very
      old libc implementations.
      
      [ tglx: Cleaned it up. ]
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      f55f0501
    • A
      x86/mm/64: Make a full PGD-entry size hole in the memory map · 9f449772
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      Shrink vmalloc space from 16384TiB to 12800TiB to enlarge the hole starting
      at 0xff90000000000000 to be a full PGD entry.
      
      A subsequent patch will use this hole for the pagetable isolation LDT
      alias.
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      9f449772
    • B
      x86/pti: Add the pti= cmdline option and documentation · 41f4c20b
      Borislav Petkov 提交于
      Keep the "nopti" optional for traditional reasons.
      
      [ tglx: Don't allow force on when running on XEN PV and made 'on'
      	printout conditional ]
      Requested-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171212133952.10177-1-bp@alien8.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      41f4c20b
    • T
      x86/mm/pti: Add infrastructure for page table isolation · aa8c6248
      Thomas Gleixner 提交于
      Add the initial files for kernel page table isolation, with a minimal init
      function and the boot time detection for this misfeature.
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      aa8c6248
  6. 23 12月, 2017 3 次提交
    • T
      x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it out of the fixmap · 92a0f81d
      Thomas Gleixner 提交于
      Put the cpu_entry_area into a separate P4D entry. The fixmap gets too big
      and 0-day already hit a case where the fixmap PTEs were cleared by
      cleanup_highmap().
      
      Aside of that the fixmap API is a pain as it's all backwards.
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      92a0f81d
    • P
      x86/doc: Remove obvious weirdnesses from the x86 MM layout documentation · e8ffe96e
      Peter Zijlstra 提交于
      Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      e8ffe96e
    • A
      x86/mm/64: Improve the memory map documentation · 5a7ccf47
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      The old docs had the vsyscall range wrong and were missing the fixmap.
      Fix both.
      
      There used to be 8 MB reserved for future vsyscalls, but that's long gone.
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      5a7ccf47
  7. 18 12月, 2017 1 次提交
  8. 16 12月, 2017 1 次提交
  9. 15 12月, 2017 1 次提交
  10. 13 12月, 2017 1 次提交
  11. 12 12月, 2017 2 次提交
    • S
      arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041 · 932b50c7
      Shanker Donthineni 提交于
      The ARM architecture defines the memory locations that are permitted
      to be accessed as the result of a speculative instruction fetch from
      an exception level for which all stages of translation are disabled.
      Specifically, the core is permitted to speculatively fetch from the
      4KB region containing the current program counter 4K and next 4K.
      
      When translation is changed from enabled to disabled for the running
      exception level (SCTLR_ELn[M] changed from a value of 1 to 0), the
      Falkor core may errantly speculatively access memory locations outside
      of the 4KB region permitted by the architecture. The errant memory
      access may lead to one of the following unexpected behaviors.
      
      1) A System Error Interrupt (SEI) being raised by the Falkor core due
         to the errant memory access attempting to access a region of memory
         that is protected by a slave-side memory protection unit.
      2) Unpredictable device behavior due to a speculative read from device
         memory. This behavior may only occur if the instruction cache is
         disabled prior to or coincident with translation being changed from
         enabled to disabled.
      
      The conditions leading to this erratum will not occur when either of the
      following occur:
       1) A higher exception level disables translation of a lower exception level
         (e.g. EL2 changing SCTLR_EL1[M] from a value of 1 to 0).
       2) An exception level disabling its stage-1 translation if its stage-2
          translation is enabled (e.g. EL1 changing SCTLR_EL1[M] from a value of 1
          to 0 when HCR_EL2[VM] has a value of 1).
      
      To avoid the errant behavior, software must execute an ISB immediately
      prior to executing the MSR that will change SCTLR_ELn[M] from 1 to 0.
      Signed-off-by: NShanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org>
      Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      932b50c7
    • I
      locking/lockdep: Remove the cross-release locking checks · e966eaee
      Ingo Molnar 提交于
      This code (CONFIG_LOCKDEP_CROSSRELEASE=y and CONFIG_LOCKDEP_COMPLETIONS=y),
      while it found a number of old bugs initially, was also causing too many
      false positives that caused people to disable lockdep - which is arguably
      a worse overall outcome.
      
      If we disable cross-release by default but keep the code upstream then
      in practice the most likely outcome is that we'll allow the situation
      to degrade gradually, by allowing entropy to introduce more and more
      false positives, until it overwhelms maintenance capacity.
      
      Another bad side effect was that people were trying to work around
      the false positives by uglifying/complicating unrelated code. There's
      a marked difference between annotating locking operations and
      uglifying good code just due to bad lock debugging code ...
      
      This gradual decrease in quality happened to a number of debugging
      facilities in the kernel, and lockdep is pretty complex already,
      so we cannot risk this outcome.
      
      Either cross-release checking can be done right with no false positives,
      or it should not be included in the upstream kernel.
      
      ( Note that it might make sense to maintain it out of tree and go through
        the false positives every now and then and see whether new bugs were
        introduced. )
      
      Cc: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      e966eaee
  12. 11 12月, 2017 1 次提交
    • M
      ovl: don't follow redirects if redirect_dir=off · 438c84c2
      Miklos Szeredi 提交于
      Overlayfs is following redirects even when redirects are disabled. If this
      is unintentional (probably the majority of cases) then this can be a
      problem.  E.g. upper layer comes from untrusted USB drive, and attacker
      crafts a redirect to enable read access to otherwise unreadable
      directories.
      
      If "redirect_dir=off", then turn off following as well as creation of
      redirects.  If "redirect_dir=follow", then turn on following, but turn off
      creation of redirects (which is what "redirect_dir=off" does now).
      
      This is a backward incompatible change, so make it dependent on a config
      option.
      Reported-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
      438c84c2
  13. 07 12月, 2017 3 次提交
  14. 06 12月, 2017 2 次提交
  15. 04 12月, 2017 1 次提交
  16. 03 12月, 2017 1 次提交
  17. 02 12月, 2017 3 次提交
  18. 01 12月, 2017 1 次提交
    • P
      hwmon: (jc42) optionally try to disable the SMBUS timeout · 68615eb0
      Peter Rosin 提交于
      With a nxp,se97 chip on an atmel sama5d31 board, the I2C adapter driver
      is not always capable of avoiding the 25-35 ms timeout as specified by
      the SMBUS protocol. This may cause silent corruption of the last bit of
      any transfer, e.g. a one is read instead of a zero if the sensor chip
      times out. This also affects the eeprom half of the nxp-se97 chip, where
      this silent corruption was originally noticed. Other I2C adapters probably
      suffer similar issues, e.g. bit-banging comes to mind as risky...
      
      The SMBUS register in the nxp chip is not a standard Jedec register, but
      it is not special to the nxp chips either, at least the atmel chips
      have the same mechanism. Therefore, do not special case this on the
      manufacturer, it is opt-in via the device property anyway.
      
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+
      Signed-off-by: NPeter Rosin <peda@axentia.se>
      Acked-by: NRob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NGuenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
      68615eb0
  19. 30 11月, 2017 2 次提交
    • M
      media: docs: add documentation for frontend attach info · e61edeb1
      Mauro Carvalho Chehab 提交于
      Add to the media book the attachment kAPI for the DVB
      frontend drivers that have already some kernel-doc markup.
      Signed-off-by: NMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
      e61edeb1
    • M
      Revert "mm/page-writeback.c: print a warning if the vm dirtiness settings are illogical" · 90daf306
      Michal Hocko 提交于
      This reverts commit 0f6d24f8 ("mm/page-writeback.c: print a warning
      if the vm dirtiness settings are illogical") because it causes false
      positive warnings during OOM situations as noticed by Tetsuo Handa:
      
        Node 0 active_anon:3525940kB inactive_anon:8372kB active_file:216kB inactive_file:1872kB unevictable:0kB isolated(anon):0kB isolated(file):0kB mapped:2504kB dirty:52kB writeback:0kB shmem:8660kB shmem_thp: 0kB shmem_pmdmapped: 0kB anon_thp: 636928kB writeback_tmp:0kB unstable:0kB all_unreclaimable? yes
        Node 0 DMA free:14848kB min:284kB low:352kB high:420kB active_anon:992kB inactive_anon:0kB active_file:0kB inactive_file:0kB unevictable:0kB writepending:0kB present:15988kB managed:15904kB mlocked:0kB kernel_stack:0kB pagetables:24kB bounce:0kB free_pcp:0kB local_pcp:0kB free_cma:0kB
        lowmem_reserve[]: 0 2687 3645 3645
        Node 0 DMA32 free:53004kB min:49608kB low:62008kB high:74408kB active_anon:2712648kB inactive_anon:0kB active_file:0kB inactive_file:0kB unevictable:0kB writepending:0kB present:3129216kB managed:2773132kB mlocked:0kB kernel_stack:96kB pagetables:5096kB bounce:0kB free_pcp:0kB local_pcp:0kB free_cma:0kB
        lowmem_reserve[]: 0 0 958 958
        Node 0 Normal free:17140kB min:17684kB low:22104kB high:26524kB active_anon:812300kB inactive_anon:8372kB active_file:1228kB inactive_file:1868kB unevictable:0kB writepending:52kB present:1048576kB managed:981224kB mlocked:0kB kernel_stack:3520kB pagetables:8552kB bounce:0kB free_pcp:120kB local_pcp:120kB free_cma:0kB
        lowmem_reserve[]: 0 0 0 0
        [...]
        Out of memory: Kill process 8459 (a.out) score 999 or sacrifice child
        Killed process 8459 (a.out) total-vm:4180kB, anon-rss:88kB, file-rss:0kB, shmem-rss:0kB
        oom_reaper: reaped process 8459 (a.out), now anon-rss:0kB, file-rss:0kB, shmem-rss:0kB
        vm direct limit must be set greater than background limit.
      
      The problem is that both thresh and bg_thresh will be 0 if
      available_memory is less than 4 pages when evaluating
      global_dirtyable_memory.
      
      While this might be worked around the whole point of the warning is
      dubious at best.  We do rely on admins to do sensible things when
      changing tunable knobs.  Dirty memory writeback knobs are not any
      special in that regards so revert the warning rather than adding more
      hacks to work this around.
      
      Debugged by Yafang Shao.
      
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171127091939.tahb77nznytcxw55@dhcp22.suse.cz
      Fixes: 0f6d24f8 ("mm/page-writeback.c: print a warning if the vm dirtiness settings are illogical")
      Signed-off-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
      Reported-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
      Cc: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
      Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      90daf306
  20. 29 11月, 2017 3 次提交
    • T
      vsprintf: add printk specifier %px · 7b1924a1
      Tobin C. Harding 提交于
      printk specifier %p now hashes all addresses before printing. Sometimes
      we need to see the actual unmodified address. This can be achieved using
      %lx but then we face the risk that if in future we want to change the
      way the Kernel handles printing of pointers we will have to grep through
      the already existent 50 000 %lx call sites. Let's add specifier %px as a
      clear, opt-in, way to print a pointer and maintain some level of
      isolation from all the other hex integer output within the Kernel.
      
      Add printk specifier %px to print the actual unmodified address.
      Signed-off-by: NTobin C. Harding <me@tobin.cc>
      7b1924a1
    • T
      printk: hash addresses printed with %p · ad67b74d
      Tobin C. Harding 提交于
      Currently there exist approximately 14 000 places in the kernel where
      addresses are being printed using an unadorned %p. This potentially
      leaks sensitive information regarding the Kernel layout in memory. Many
      of these calls are stale, instead of fixing every call lets hash the
      address by default before printing. This will of course break some
      users, forcing code printing needed addresses to be updated.
      
      Code that _really_ needs the address will soon be able to use the new
      printk specifier %px to print the address.
      
      For what it's worth, usage of unadorned %p can be broken down as
      follows (thanks to Joe Perches).
      
      $ git grep -E '%p[^A-Za-z0-9]' | cut -f1 -d"/" | sort | uniq -c
         1084 arch
           20 block
           10 crypto
           32 Documentation
         8121 drivers
         1221 fs
          143 include
          101 kernel
           69 lib
          100 mm
         1510 net
           40 samples
            7 scripts
           11 security
          166 sound
          152 tools
            2 virt
      
      Add function ptr_to_id() to map an address to a 32 bit unique
      identifier. Hash any unadorned usage of specifier %p and any malformed
      specifiers.
      Signed-off-by: NTobin C. Harding <me@tobin.cc>
      ad67b74d
    • T
      docs: correct documentation for %pK · 553d8e8b
      Tobin C. Harding 提交于
      Current documentation indicates that %pK prints a leading '0x'. This is
      not the case.
      
      Correct documentation for printk specifier %pK.
      Signed-off-by: NTobin C. Harding <me@tobin.cc>
      553d8e8b
  21. 28 11月, 2017 2 次提交
  22. 22 11月, 2017 1 次提交