security_xfrm_policy_alloc can be called in atomic context so the
allocation should be done with GFP_ATOMIC. Add an argument to let the
callers choose the appropriate way. In order to do so a gfp argument
needs to be added to the method xfrm_policy_alloc_security in struct
security_operations and to the internal function
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user. After that switch to GFP_ATOMIC in the atomic
callers and leave GFP_KERNEL as before for the rest.
The path that needed the gfp argument addition is:
security_xfrm_policy_alloc -> security_ops.xfrm_policy_alloc_security ->
all users of xfrm_policy_alloc_security (e.g. selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc) ->
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user (here the allocation used to be GFP_KERNEL only)

Now adding a gfp argument to selinux_xfrm_alloc_user requires us to also
add it to security_context_to_sid which is used inside and prior to this
patch did only GFP_KERNEL allocation. So add gfp argument to
security_context_to_sid and adjust all of its callers as well.

CC: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
CC: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
CC: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CC: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: LSM list <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
CC: SELinux list <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NNikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>

This fixes CVE-2014-0102.

The following command sequence produces an oops:

	keyctl new_session
	i=`keyctl newring _ses @s`
	keyctl link @s $i

The problem is that search_nested_keyrings() sees two keyrings that have
matching type and description, so keyring_compare_object() returns true.
s_n_k() then passes the key to the iterator function -
keyring_detect_cycle_iterator() - which *should* check to see whether this is
the keyring of interest, not just one with the same name.

Because assoc_array_find() will return one and only one match, I assumed that
the iterator function would only see an exact match or never be called - but
the iterator isn't only called from assoc_array_find()...

The oops looks something like this:

	kernel BUG at /data/fs/linux-2.6-fscache/security/keys/keyring.c:1003!
	invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
	...
	RIP: keyring_detect_cycle_iterator+0xe/0x1f
	...
	Call Trace:
	  search_nested_keyrings+0x76/0x2aa
	  __key_link_check_live_key+0x50/0x5f
	  key_link+0x4e/0x85
	  keyctl_keyring_link+0x60/0x81
	  SyS_keyctl+0x65/0xe4
	  tracesys+0xdd/0xe2

The fix is to make keyring_detect_cycle_iterator() check that the key it
has is the key it was actually looking for rather than calling BUG_ON().

A testcase has been included in the keyutils testsuite for this:

	http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/keyutils.git/commit/?id=891f3365d07f1996778ade0e3428f01878a1790bReported-by: NTommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

When writing policy via /sys/fs/selinux/policy I wrote the type and class
of filename trans rules in CPU endian instead of little endian.  On
x86_64 this works just fine, but it means that on big endian arch's like
ppc64 and s390 userspace reads the policy and converts it from
le32_to_cpu.  So the values are all screwed up.  Write the values in le
format like it should have been to start.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.

Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy.  In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.

Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo

Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled.  Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.

BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[  473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[  473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[  474.027196] Modules linked in:
[  474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G      D   I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[  474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[  474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[  474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>]  [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[  474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38  EFLAGS: 00010246
[  474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[  474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[  474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[  474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[  474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[  474.453816] FS:  00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[  474.489254] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[  474.556058] Stack:
[  474.584325]  ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[  474.618913]  ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[  474.653955]  ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[  474.690461] Call Trace:
[  474.723779]  [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[  474.778049]  [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[  474.811398]  [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[  474.843813]  [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[  474.875694]  [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[  474.907370]  [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[  474.938726]  [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[  474.970036]  [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[  475.000618]  [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[  475.030402]  [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[  475.061097]  [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[  475.094595]  [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[  475.148405]  [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[  475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[  475.255884] RIP  [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[  475.296120]  RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[  475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: NMatthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

The SELinux AF_NETLINK/NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG socket class was missing the
SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY definition which caused SELINUX_ERR messages when
the ss tool was run.

 # ss
 Netid  State  Recv-Q Send-Q  Local Address:Port   Peer Address:Port
 u_str  ESTAB  0      0                  * 14189             * 14190
 u_str  ESTAB  0      0                  * 14145             * 14144
 u_str  ESTAB  0      0                  * 14151             * 14150
 {...}
 # ausearch -m SELINUX_ERR
 ----
 time->Thu Jan 23 11:11:16 2014
 type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1390493476.445:374):
  arch=c000003e syscall=44 success=yes exit=40
  a0=3 a1=7fff03aa11f0 a2=28 a3=0 items=0 ppid=1852 pid=1895
  auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0
  tty=pts0 ses=1 comm="ss" exe="/usr/sbin/ss"
  subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
 type=SELINUX_ERR msg=audit(1390493476.445:374):
  SELinux:  unrecognized netlink message type=20 for sclass=32
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

Binaries compiled for arm may run on arm64 if CONFIG_COMPAT is
selected.  Set LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR to 32768 if ARM64 && COMPAT to
prevent selinux failures launching 32-bit static executables that
are mapped at 0x8000.
Signed-off-by: NColin Cross <ccross@android.com>
Acked-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

Remove the call to audit_log() (which call audit_log_start()) and deal with
the errors in the caller, logging only once if the condition is met.  Calling
audit_log_start() in this location makes buffer allocation and locking more
complicated in the calling tree (audit_filter_user()).
Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

Two of the conditions in selinux_audit_rule_match() should never happen and
the third indicates a race that should be retried.  Remove the calls to
audit_log() (which call audit_log_start()) and deal with the errors in the
caller, logging only once if the condition is met.  Calling audit_log_start()
in this location makes buffer allocation and locking more complicated in the
calling tree (audit_filter_user()).
Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

While running stress tests on adding and deleting ftrace instances I hit
this bug:

  BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020
  IP: selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
  PGD 63681067 PUD 7ddbe067 PMD 0
  Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT
  CPU: 0 PID: 5634 Comm: ftrace-test-mki Not tainted 3.13.0-rc4-test-00033-gd2a6dde-dirty #20
  Hardware name:                  /DG965MQ, BIOS MQ96510J.86A.0372.2006.0605.1717 06/05/2006
  task: ffff880078375800 ti: ffff88007ddb0000 task.ti: ffff88007ddb0000
  RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d8bc5>]  [<ffffffff812d8bc5>] selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
  RSP: 0018:ffff88007ddb1c48  EFLAGS: 00010246
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000800000 RCX: ffff88006dd43840
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000081 RDI: ffff88006ee46000
  RBP: ffff88007ddb1c88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88007ddb1c54
  R10: 6e6576652f6f6f66 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: 0000000000000081 R14: ffff88006ee46000 R15: 0000000000000000
  FS:  00007f217b5b6700(0000) GS:ffffffff81e21000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033^M
  CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 000000006a0fe000 CR4: 00000000000007f0
  Call Trace:
    security_inode_permission+0x1c/0x30
    __inode_permission+0x41/0xa0
    inode_permission+0x18/0x50
    link_path_walk+0x66/0x920
    path_openat+0xa6/0x6c0
    do_filp_open+0x43/0xa0
    do_sys_open+0x146/0x240
    SyS_open+0x1e/0x20
    system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
  Code: 84 a1 00 00 00 81 e3 00 20 00 00 89 d8 83 c8 02 40 f6 c6 04 0f 45 d8 40 f6 c6 08 74 71 80 cf 02 49 8b 46 38 4c 8d 4d cc 45 31 c0 <0f> b7 50 20 8b 70 1c 48 8b 41 70 89 d9 8b 78 04 e8 36 cf ff ff
  RIP  selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
  CR2: 0000000000000020

Investigating, I found that the inode->i_security was NULL, and the
dereference of it caused the oops.

in selinux_inode_permission():

	isec = inode->i_security;

	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);

Note, the crash came from stressing the deletion and reading of debugfs
files.  I was not able to recreate this via normal files.  But I'm not
sure they are safe.  It may just be that the race window is much harder
to hit.

What seems to have happened (and what I have traced), is the file is
being opened at the same time the file or directory is being deleted.
As the dentry and inode locks are not held during the path walk, nor is
the inodes ref counts being incremented, there is nothing saving these
structures from being discarded except for an rcu_read_lock().

The rcu_read_lock() protects against freeing of the inode, but it does
not protect freeing of the inode_security_struct.  Now if the freeing of
the i_security happens with a call_rcu(), and the i_security field of
the inode is not changed (it gets freed as the inode gets freed) then
there will be no issue here.  (Linus Torvalds suggested not setting the
field to NULL such that we do not need to check if it is NULL in the
permission check).

Note, this is a hack, but it fixes the problem at hand.  A real fix is
to restructure the destroy_inode() to call all the destructor handlers
from the RCU callback.  But that is a major job to do, and requires a
lot of work.  For now, we just band-aid this bug with this fix (it
works), and work on a more maintainable solution in the future.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109101932.0508dec7@gandalf.local.home
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109182756.17abaaa8@gandalf.local.home

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Hello.

I got below leak with linux-3.10.0-54.0.1.el7.x86_64 .

[  681.903890] kmemleak: 5538 new suspected memory leaks (see /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak)

Below is a patch, but I don't know whether we need special handing for undoing
ebitmap_set_bit() call.
----------
>>From fe97527a90fe95e2239dfbaa7558f0ed559c0992 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2014 16:30:21 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] SELinux: Fix memory leak upon loading policy

Commit 2463c26d "SELinux: put name based create rules in a hashtable" did not
check return value from hashtab_insert() in filename_trans_read(). It leaks
memory if hashtab_insert() returns error.

  unreferenced object 0xffff88005c9160d0 (size 8):
    comm "systemd", pid 1, jiffies 4294688674 (age 235.265s)
    hex dump (first 8 bytes):
      57 0b 00 00 6b 6b 6b a5                          W...kkk.
    backtrace:
      [<ffffffff816604ae>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0
      [<ffffffff811cba5e>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x12e/0x360
      [<ffffffff812aec5d>] policydb_read+0xd1d/0xf70
      [<ffffffff812b345c>] security_load_policy+0x6c/0x500
      [<ffffffff812a623c>] sel_write_load+0xac/0x750
      [<ffffffff811eb680>] vfs_write+0xc0/0x1f0
      [<ffffffff811ec08c>] SyS_write+0x4c/0xa0
      [<ffffffff81690419>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
      [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff

However, we should not return EEXIST error to the caller, or the systemd will
show below message and the boot sequence freezes.

  systemd[1]: Failed to load SELinux policy. Freezing.
Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

This patch removes the 'size_limit' argument from
ima_eventdigest_init_common(). Since the 'd' field will never include
the hash algorithm as prefix and the 'd-ng' will always have it, we can
use the hash algorithm to differentiate the two cases in the modified
function (it is equal to HASH_ALGO__LAST in the first case, the opposite
in the second).
Signed-off-by: NRoberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Replace the '-1' value with HASH_ALGO__LAST in ima_eventdigest_init()
as the called function ima_eventdigest_init_common() expects an unsigned
char.

Fix commit:
  4d7aeee7 ima: define new template ima-ng and template fields d-ng and n-ng
Signed-off-by: NRoberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Replace HASH_ALGO__LAST with HASH_ALGO_SHA1 as the initial value of
the hash algorithm so that the prefix 'sha1:' is added to violation
digests.

Fix commit:
  4d7aeee7 ima: define new template ima-ng and template fields d-ng and n-ng
Signed-off-by: NRoberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.13.x
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Eric Paris politely points out:

    Inside smack_file_receive() it seems like you are initting the audit
    field with LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK.  And then use
    smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path().

    Seems like LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH would make more sense.  (and depending
    on how it's used fix a crash...)

He is correct. This puts things in order.

Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.gitSigned-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

The mount restrictions imposed by Smack rely heavily on the
use of the filesystem "floor", which is the label that all
processes writing to the filesystem must have access to. It
turns out that while the "floor" notion is sound, it has yet
to be fully implemented and has never been used.

The sb_mount and sb_umount hooks only make sense if the
filesystem floor is used actively, and it isn't. They can
be reintroduced if a rational restriction comes up. Until
then, they get removed.

The sb_kern_mount hook is required for the option processing.
It is too permissive in the case of unprivileged mounts,
effectively bypassing the CAP_MAC_ADMIN restrictions if
any of the smack options are specified. Unprivileged mounts
are no longer allowed to set Smack filesystem options.
Additionally, the root and default values are set to the
label of the caller, in keeping with the policy that objects
get the label of their creator.

Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.gitSigned-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

smk_write_change_rule() is calling capable rather than
the more correct smack_privileged(). This allows for setting
rules in violation of the onlycap facility. This is the
simple repair.

Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.gitSigned-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

The syslog control requires that the calling proccess
have the floor ("_") Smack label. Tizen does not run any
processes except for kernel helpers with the floor label.
This changes allows the admin to configure a specific
label for syslog. The default value is the star ("*")
label, effectively removing the restriction. The value
can be set using smackfs/syslog for anyone who wants
a more restrictive behavior.

Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.gitSigned-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

selinux_setprocattr() does ptrace_parent(p) under task_lock(p),
but task_struct->alloc_lock doesn't pin ->parent or ->ptrace,
this looks confusing and triggers the "suspicious RCU usage"
warning because ptrace_parent() does rcu_dereference_check().

And in theory this is wrong, spin_lock()->preempt_disable()
doesn't necessarily imply rcu_read_lock() we need to access
the ->parent.
Reported-by: NEvan McNabb <emcnabb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

Fix a broken networking check. Return an error if peer recv fails.  If
secmark is active and the packet recv succeeds the peer recv error is
ignored.
Signed-off-by: NChad Hanson <chanson@trustedcs.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

Smack prohibits processes from using the star ("*") and web ("@") labels
because we don't want files with those labels getting created implicitly.
All setting of those labels should be done explicitly. The trouble is that
there is no check for these labels in the processing of SMACK64EXEC. That
is repaired.

Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.gitSigned-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

selinux_setprocattr() does ptrace_parent(p) under task_lock(p),
but task_struct->alloc_lock doesn't pin ->parent or ->ptrace,
this looks confusing and triggers the "suspicious RCU usage"
warning because ptrace_parent() does rcu_dereference_check().

And in theory this is wrong, spin_lock()->preempt_disable()
doesn't necessarily imply rcu_read_lock() we need to access
the ->parent.
Reported-by: NEvan McNabb <emcnabb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

Remove duplicated include.
Signed-off-by: NWei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

This reverts commit 102aefdd.

Tom London reports that it causes sync() to hang on Fedora rawhide:

  https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1033965

and Josh Boyer bisected it down to this commit.  Reverting the commit in
the rawhide kernel fixes the problem.

Eric Paris root-caused it to incorrect subtype matching in that commit
breaking fuse, and has a tentative patch, but by now we're better off
retrying this in 3.14 rather than playing with it any more.
Reported-by: NTom London <selinux@gmail.com>
Bisected-by: NJosh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Anand Avati <avati@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Revert "selinux: consider filesystem subtype in policies"

This reverts commit 102aefdd.

Explanation from Eric Paris:

	SELinux policy can specify if it should use a filesystem's
	xattrs or not.  In current policy we have a specification that
	fuse should not use xattrs but fuse.glusterfs should use
	xattrs.  This patch has a bug in which non-glusterfs
	filesystems would match the rule saying fuse.glusterfs should
	use xattrs.  If both fuse and the particular filesystem in
	question are not written to handle xattr calls during the mount
	command, they will deadlock.

	I have fixed the bug to do proper matching, however I believe a
	revert is still the correct solution.  The reason I believe
	that is because the code still does not work.  The s_subtype is
	not set until after the SELinux hook which attempts to match on
	the ".gluster" portion of the rule.  So we cannot match on the
	rule in question.  The code is useless.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

Due to difficulty in arriving at the proper security label for
TCP SYN-ACK packets in selinux_ip_postroute(), we need to check packets
while/before they are undergoing XFRM transforms instead of waiting
until afterwards so that we can determine the correct security label.
Reported-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

Previously selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid() would only check for labeled
IPsec security labels on inbound packets, this patch enables it to
check both inbound and outbound traffic for labeled IPsec security
labels.
Reported-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

In selinux_ip_postroute() we perform access checks based on the
packet's security label.  For locally generated traffic we get the
packet's security label from the associated socket; this works in all
cases except for TCP SYN-ACK packets.  In the case of SYN-ACK packet's
the correct security label is stored in the connection's request_sock,
not the server's socket.  Unfortunately, at the point in time when
selinux_ip_postroute() is called we can't query the request_sock
directly, we need to recreate the label using the same logic that
originally labeled the associated request_sock.

See the inline comments for more explanation.
Reported-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Tested-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

In selinux_ip_output() we always label packets based on the parent
socket.  While this approach works in almost all cases, it doesn't
work in the case of TCP SYN-ACK packets when the correct label is not
the label of the parent socket, but rather the label of the larval
socket represented by the request_sock struct.

Unfortunately, since the request_sock isn't queued on the parent
socket until *after* the SYN-ACK packet is sent, we can't lookup the
request_sock to determine the correct label for the packet; at this
point in time the best we can do is simply pass/NF_ACCEPT the packet.
It must be said that simply passing the packet without any explicit
labeling action, while far from ideal, is not terrible as the SYN-ACK
packet will inherit any IP option based labeling from the initial
connection request so the label *should* be correct and all our
access controls remain in place so we shouldn't have to worry about
information leaks.
Reported-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Tested-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

Fix a broken networking check. Return an error if peer recv fails.  If
secmark is active and the packet recv succeeds the peer recv error is
ignored.
Signed-off-by: NChad Hanson <chanson@trustedcs.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

This is a regression caused by f7112e6c. When either subject or
object is not found the answer for access should be no. This
patch fixes the situation. '0' is written back instead of failing
with -EINVAL.

v2: cosmetic style fixes
Signed-off-by: NJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>

Due to difficulty in arriving at the proper security label for
TCP SYN-ACK packets in selinux_ip_postroute(), we need to check packets
while/before they are undergoing XFRM transforms instead of waiting
until afterwards so that we can determine the correct security label.
Reported-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

Previously selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid() would only check for labeled
IPsec security labels on inbound packets, this patch enables it to
check both inbound and outbound traffic for labeled IPsec security
labels.
Reported-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

In preparation of conversion to kernfs, cgroup file handling is
updated so that it can be easily mapped to kernfs.  This patch
replaces cftype->read_seq_string() with cftype->seq_show() which is
not limited to single_open() operation and will map directcly to
kernfs seq_file interface.

The conversions are mechanical.  As ->seq_show() doesn't have @css and
@cft, the functions which make use of them are converted to use
seq_css() and seq_cft() respectively.  In several occassions, e.f. if
it has seq_string in its name, the function name is updated to fit the
new method better.

This patch does not introduce any behavior changes.
Signed-off-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NAristeu Rozanski <arozansk@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Acked-by: NDaniel Wagner <daniel.wagner@bmw-carit.de>
Acked-by: NLi Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>

Free 'ctx_str' when necessary.
Signed-off-by: NGeyslan G. Bem <geyslan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

We don't need to inspect the packet to determine if the packet is an
IPv4 packet arriving on an IPv6 socket when we can query the
request_sock directly.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

In selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid() we leverage a cached NetLabel
secattr whenever possible.  However, we never check to ensure that
the desired SID matches the cached NetLabel secattr.  This patch
checks the SID against the secattr before use and only uses the
cached secattr when the SID values match.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

In selinux_ip_postroute() we perform access checks based on the
packet's security label.  For locally generated traffic we get the
packet's security label from the associated socket; this works in all
cases except for TCP SYN-ACK packets.  In the case of SYN-ACK packet's
the correct security label is stored in the connection's request_sock,
not the server's socket.  Unfortunately, at the point in time when
selinux_ip_postroute() is called we can't query the request_sock
directly, we need to recreate the label using the same logic that
originally labeled the associated request_sock.

See the inline comments for more explanation.
Reported-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Tested-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

In selinux_ip_output() we always label packets based on the parent
socket.  While this approach works in almost all cases, it doesn't
work in the case of TCP SYN-ACK packets when the correct label is not
the label of the parent socket, but rather the label of the larval
socket represented by the request_sock struct.

Unfortunately, since the request_sock isn't queued on the parent
socket until *after* the SYN-ACK packet is sent, we can't lookup the
request_sock to determine the correct label for the packet; at this
point in time the best we can do is simply pass/NF_ACCEPT the packet.
It must be said that simply passing the packet without any explicit
labeling action, while far from ideal, is not terrible as the SYN-ACK
packet will inherit any IP option based labeling from the initial
connection request so the label *should* be correct and all our
access controls remain in place so we shouldn't have to worry about
information leaks.
Reported-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Tested-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

The new templates management mechanism records information associated
to an event into an array of 'ima_field_data' structures and makes it
available through the 'template_data' field of the 'ima_template_entry'
structure (the element of the measurements list created by IMA).

Since 'ima_field_data' contains dynamically allocated data (which length
varies depending on the data associated to a selected template field),
it is not enough to just free the memory reserved for a
'ima_template_entry' structure if something goes wrong.

This patch creates the new function ima_free_template_entry() which
walks the array of 'ima_field_data' structures, frees the memory
referenced by the 'data' pointer and finally the space reserved for
the 'ima_template_entry' structure. Further, it replaces existing kfree()
that have a pointer to an 'ima_template_entry' structure as argument
with calls to the new function.

Fixes: a71dc65d: ima: switch to new template management mechanism
Signed-off-by: NRoberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>

7bc5f447 (ima: define new function ima_alloc_init_template() to
API) moved the initialization of 'entry' in ima_add_boot_aggregate() a
bit more below, after the if (ima_used_chip).

So, 'entry' is not initialized while being inside this if-block. So, we
should not attempt to free it.

Found by Coverity (CID: 1131971)

Fixes: 7bc5f447 (ima: define new function ima_alloc_init_template() to API)
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>