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  1. 07 5月, 2013 3 次提交
  3. 30 4月, 2013 1 次提交
  5. 26 4月, 2013 1 次提交
  7. 19 4月, 2013 1 次提交
  9. 18 4月, 2013 3 次提交
  11. 14 4月, 2013 1 次提交
  13. 13 4月, 2013 1 次提交
    • J
      Btrfs: make sure nbytes are right after log replay · 4bc4bee4
      由 Josef Bacik 提交于 
      While trying to track down a tree log replay bug I noticed that fsck was always
complaining about nbytes not being right for our fsynced file.  That is because
the new fsync stuff doesn't wait for ordered extents to complete, so the inodes
nbytes are not necessarily updated properly when we log it.  So to fix this we
need to set nbytes to whatever it is on the inode that is on disk, so when we
replay the extents we can just add the bytes that are being added as we replay
the extent.  This makes it work for the case that we have the wrong nbytes or
the case that we logged everything and nbytes is actually correct.  With this
I'm no longer getting nbytes errors out of btrfsck.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NJosef Bacik <jbacik@fusionio.com>
Signed-off-by: NChris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
      4bc4bee4
  15. 12 4月, 2013 1 次提交
    • T
      kthread: Prevent unpark race which puts threads on the wrong cpu · f2530dc7
      由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于 
      The smpboot threads rely on the park/unpark mechanism which binds per
cpu threads on a particular core. Though the functionality is racy:

CPU0	       	 	CPU1  	     	    CPU2
unpark(T)				    wake_up_process(T)
  clear(SHOULD_PARK)	T runs
			leave parkme() due to !SHOULD_PARK  
  bind_to(CPU2)		BUG_ON(wrong CPU)						    

We cannot let the tasks move themself to the target CPU as one of
those tasks is actually the migration thread itself, which requires
that it starts running on the target cpu right away.

The solution to this problem is to prevent wakeups in park mode which
are not from unpark(). That way we can guarantee that the association
of the task to the target cpu is working correctly.

Add a new task state (TASK_PARKED) which prevents other wakeups and
use this state explicitly for the unpark wakeup.

Peter noticed: Also, since the task state is visible to userspace and
all the parked tasks are still in the PID space, its a good hint in ps
and friends that these tasks aren't really there for the moment.

The migration thread has another related issue.

CPU0	      	     	 CPU1
Bring up CPU2
create_thread(T)
park(T)
 wait_for_completion()
			 parkme()
			 complete()
sched_set_stop_task()
			 schedule(TASK_PARKED)

The sched_set_stop_task() call is issued while the task is on the
runqueue of CPU1 and that confuses the hell out of the stop_task class
on that cpu. So we need the same synchronizaion before
sched_set_stop_task().
Reported-by: NDave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Reported-and-tested-by: NDave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Reported-and-tested-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: NPeter Ziljstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: dhillf@gmail.com
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LFD.2.02.1304091635430.21884@ionosSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      f2530dc7
  17. 11 4月, 2013 2 次提交
  19. 10 4月, 2013 4 次提交
  21. 06 4月, 2013 3 次提交
    • T
      NFSv4/4.1: Fix bugs in nfs4[01]_walk_client_list · 7b1f1fd1
      由 Trond Myklebust 提交于 
      It is unsafe to use list_for_each_entry_safe() here, because
when we drop the nn->nfs_client_lock, we pin the _current_ list
entry and ensure that it stays in the list, but we don't do the
same for the _next_ list entry. Use of list_for_each_entry() is
therefore the correct thing to do.

Also fix the refcounting in nfs41_walk_client_list().

Finally, ensure that the nfs_client has finished being initialised
and, in the case of NFSv4.1, that the session is set up.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [>= 3.7]
      7b1f1fd1
    • T
      NFSv4: Fix a memory leak in nfs4_discover_server_trunking · b193d59a
      由 Trond Myklebust 提交于 
      When we assign a new rpc_client to clp->cl_rpcclient, we need to destroy
the old one.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [>=3.7]
      b193d59a
    • B
      GFS2: Issue discards in 512b sectors · b2c87cae
      由 Bob Peterson 提交于 
      This patch changes GFS2's discard issuing code so that it calls
function sb_issue_discard rather than blkdev_issue_discard. The
code was calling blkdev_issue_discard and specifying the correct
sector offset and sector size, but blkdev_issue_discard expects
these values to be in terms of 512 byte sectors, even if the native
sector size for the device is different. Calling sb_issue_discard
with the BLOCK size instead ensures the correct block-to-512b-sector
translation. I verified that "minlen" is specified in blocks, so
comparing it to a number of blocks is correct.
Signed-off-by: NBob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
      b2c87cae
  23. 04 4月, 2013 5 次提交
  25. 02 4月, 2013 1 次提交
    • A
      loop: prevent bdev freeing while device in use · c1681bf8
      由 Anatol Pomozov 提交于 
      struct block_device lifecycle is defined by its inode (see fs/block_dev.c) -
block_device allocated first time we access /dev/loopXX and deallocated on
bdev_destroy_inode. When we create the device "losetup /dev/loopXX afile"
we want that block_device stay alive until we destroy the loop device
with "losetup -d".

But because we do not hold /dev/loopXX inode its counter goes 0, and
inode/bdev can be destroyed at any moment. Usually it happens at memory
pressure or when user drops inode cache (like in the test below). When later in
loop_clr_fd() we want to use bdev we have use-after-free error with following
stack:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000280
  bd_set_size+0x10/0xa0
  loop_clr_fd+0x1f8/0x420 [loop]
  lo_ioctl+0x200/0x7e0 [loop]
  lo_compat_ioctl+0x47/0xe0 [loop]
  compat_blkdev_ioctl+0x341/0x1290
  do_filp_open+0x42/0xa0
  compat_sys_ioctl+0xc1/0xf20
  do_sys_open+0x16e/0x1d0
  sysenter_dispatch+0x7/0x1a

To prevent use-after-free we need to grab the device in loop_set_fd()
and put it later in loop_clr_fd().

The issue is reprodusible on current Linus head and v3.3. Here is the test:

  dd if=/dev/zero of=loop.file bs=1M count=1
  while [ true ]; do
    losetup /dev/loop0 loop.file
    echo 2 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
    losetup -d /dev/loop0
  done

[ Doing bdgrab/bput in loop_set_fd/loop_clr_fd is safe, because every
  time we call loop_set_fd() we check that loop_device->lo_state is
  Lo_unbound and set it to Lo_bound If somebody will try to set_fd again
  it will get EBUSY.  And if we try to loop_clr_fd() on unbound loop
  device we'll get ENXIO.

  loop_set_fd/loop_clr_fd (and any other loop ioctl) is called under
  loop_device->lo_ctl_mutex. ]
Signed-off-by: NAnatol Pomozov <anatol.pomozov@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      c1681bf8
  27. 30 3月, 2013 1 次提交
  29. 29 3月, 2013 1 次提交
  31. 28 3月, 2013 9 次提交
  33. 27 3月, 2013 2 次提交
    • E
      userns: Restrict when proc and sysfs can be mounted · 87a8ebd6
      由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于 
      Only allow unprivileged mounts of proc and sysfs if they are already
mounted when the user namespace is created.

proc and sysfs are interesting because they have content that is
per namespace, and so fresh mounts are needed when new namespaces
are created while at the same time proc and sysfs have content that
is shared between every instance.

Respect the policy of who may see the shared content of proc and sysfs
by only allowing new mounts if there was an existing mount at the time
the user namespace was created.

In practice there are only two interesting cases: proc and sysfs are
mounted at their usual places, proc and sysfs are not mounted at all
(some form of mount namespace jail).

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      87a8ebd6
    • E
      vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces · 132c94e3
      由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于 
      As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.

Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.

When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.

This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      132c94e3