commit 6565c182094f69e4ffdece337d395eb7ec760efc upstream.

Quoted from
commit 3da40c7b ("ext4: only call ext4_truncate when size <= isize")

" At LSF we decided that if we truncate up from isize we shouldn't trim
  fallocated blocks that were fallocated with KEEP_SIZE and are past the
 new i_size.  This patch fixes ext4 to do this. "

And generic/092 of fstest have covered this case for long time, however
is_quota_modification() didn't adjust based on that rule, so that in
below condition, we will lose to quota block change:
- fallocate blocks beyond EOF
- remount
- truncate(file_path, file_size)

Fix it.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190911093650.35329-1-yuchao0@huawei.com
Fixes: 3da40c7b ("ext4: only call ext4_truncate when size <= isize")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NChao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit c1e8220bd316d8ae8e524df39534b8a412a45d5e upstream.

If a program attempts to punch a hole on an inline data file, we need
to convert it to a normal file first.

This was detected using ext4/032 using the adv configuration.  Simple
reproducer:

mke2fs -Fq -t ext4 -O inline_data /dev/vdc
mount /vdc
echo "" > /vdc/testfile
xfs_io -c 'truncate 33554432' /vdc/testfile
xfs_io -c 'fpunch 0 1048576' /vdc/testfile
umount /vdc
e2fsck -fy /dev/vdc

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit e3d550c2c4f2f3dba469bc3c4b83d9332b4e99e1 upstream.

Really enable warning when CONFIG_EXT4_DEBUG is set and fix missing
first argument.  This was introduced in commit ff95ec22 ("ext4:
add warning to ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio") and splitting
extents inside endio would trigger it.

Fixes: ff95ec22 ("ext4: add warning to ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio")
Signed-off-by: NRakesh Pandit <rakesh@tuxera.com>
Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 8619e5bdeee8b2c685d686281f2d2a6017c4bc15 upstream.

syzbot found that a thread can stall for minutes inside read_mem() or
write_mem() after that thread was killed by SIGKILL [1]. Reading from
iomem areas of /dev/mem can be slow, depending on the hardware.
While reading 2GB at one read() is legal, delaying termination of killed
thread for minutes is bad. Thus, allow reading/writing /dev/mem and
/dev/kmem to be preemptible and killable.

  [ 1335.912419][T20577] read_mem: sz=4096 count=2134565632
  [ 1335.943194][T20577] read_mem: sz=4096 count=2134561536
  [ 1335.978280][T20577] read_mem: sz=4096 count=2134557440
  [ 1336.011147][T20577] read_mem: sz=4096 count=2134553344
  [ 1336.041897][T20577] read_mem: sz=4096 count=2134549248

Theoretically, reading/writing /dev/mem and /dev/kmem can become
"interruptible". But this patch chose "killable". Future patch will make
them "interruptible" so that we can revert to "killable" if some program
regressed.

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a0e3436829698d5824231251fad9d8e998f94f5eSigned-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzbot+8ab2d0f39fb79fe6ca40@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1566825205-10703-1-git-send-email-penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jpSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit c1d3ad84eae35414b6b334790048406bd6301b12 upstream.

Currently frame registrations are not purged, even when changing the
interface type.  This can lead to potentially weird situations where
frames possibly not allowed on a given interface type remain registered
due to the type switching happening after registration.

The kernel currently relies on userspace apps to actually purge the
registrations themselves, this is not something that the kernel should
rely on.

Add a call to cfg80211_mlme_purge_registrations() to forcefully remove
any registrations left over prior to switching the iftype.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NDenis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190828211110.15005-1-denkenz@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 480523feae581ab714ba6610388a3b4619a2f695 upstream.

Since commit 4ad23a97 ("MD: use per-cpu counter for
writes_pending"), set_in_sync() is substantially more expensive: it
can wait for a full RCU grace period which can be 10s of milliseconds.

So we should only call it when the cost is justified.

md_check_recovery() currently calls set_in_sync() every time it finds
anything to do (on non-external active arrays).  For an array
performing resync or recovery, this will be quite often.
Each call will introduce a delay to the md thread, which can noticeable
affect IO submission latency.

In md_check_recovery() we only need to call set_in_sync() if
'safemode' was non-zero at entry, meaning that there has been not
recent IO.  So we save this "safemode was nonzero" state, and only
call set_in_sync() if it was non-zero.

This measurably reduces mean and maximum IO submission latency during
resync/recovery.
Reported-and-tested-by: NJack Wang <jinpu.wang@cloud.ionos.com>
Fixes: 4ad23a97 ("MD: use per-cpu counter for writes_pending")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v4.12+)
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NSong Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 9d4b45d6af442237560d0bb5502a012baa5234b7 upstream.

Until revalidate_disk() has completed, the size of a new md array will
appear to be zero.
So we shouldn't report, through array_state, that the array is active
until that time.
udev rules check array_state to see if the array is ready.  As soon as
it appear to be zero, fsck can be run.  If it find the size to be
zero, it will fail.

So add a new flag to provide an interlock between do_md_run() and
array_state_show().  This flag is set while do_md_run() is active and
it prevents array_state_show() from reporting that the array is
active.

Before do_md_run() is called, ->pers will be NULL so array is
definitely not active.
After do_md_run() is called, revalidate_disk() will have run and the
array will be completely ready.

We also move various sysfs_notify*() calls out of md_run() into
do_md_run() after MD_NOT_READY is cleared.  This ensure the
information is ready before the notification is sent.

Prior to v4.12, array_state_show() was called with the
mddev->reconfig_mutex held, which provided exclusion with do_md_run().

Note that MD_NOT_READY cleared twice.  This is deliberate to cover
both success and error paths with minimal noise.

Fixes: b7b17c9b ("md: remove mddev_lock() from md_attr_show()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v4.12++)
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NSong Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 143f6e733b73051cd22dcb80951c6c929da413ce upstream.

7471fb77 ("md/raid6: Fix anomily when recovering a single device in
RAID6.") avoids rereading P when it can be computed from other members.
However, this misses the chance to re-write the right data to P. This
patch sets R5_ReadError if the re-read fails.

Also, when re-read is skipped, we also missed the chance to reset
rdev->read_errors to 0. It can fail the disk when there are many read
errors on P member disk (other disks don't have read error)

V2: upper layer read request don't read parity/Q data. So there is no
need to consider such situation.

This is Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>

Fixes: 7471fb77 ("md/raid6: Fix anomily when recovering a single device in RAID6.")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #4.4+
Signed-off-by: NXiao Ni <xni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSong Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 13fc1d271a2e3ab8a02071e711add01fab9271f6 upstream.

There is a race between setting up a qgroup rescan worker and completing
a qgroup rescan worker that can lead to callers of the qgroup rescan wait
ioctl to either not wait for the rescan worker to complete or to hang
forever due to missing wake ups. The following diagram shows a sequence
of steps that illustrates the race.

        CPU 1                                                         CPU 2                                  CPU 3

 btrfs_ioctl_quota_rescan()
  btrfs_qgroup_rescan()
   qgroup_rescan_init()
    mutex_lock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock)
    spin_lock(&fs_info->qgroup_lock)

    fs_info->qgroup_flags |=
      BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_RESCAN

    init_completion(
      &fs_info->qgroup_rescan_completion)

    fs_info->qgroup_rescan_running = true

    mutex_unlock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock)
    spin_unlock(&fs_info->qgroup_lock)

    btrfs_init_work()
     --> starts the worker

                                                        btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker()
                                                         mutex_lock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock)

                                                         fs_info->qgroup_flags &=
                                                           ~BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_RESCAN

                                                         mutex_unlock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock)

                                                         starts transaction, updates qgroup status
                                                         item, etc

                                                                                                           btrfs_ioctl_quota_rescan()
                                                                                                            btrfs_qgroup_rescan()
                                                                                                             qgroup_rescan_init()
                                                                                                              mutex_lock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock)
                                                                                                              spin_lock(&fs_info->qgroup_lock)

                                                                                                              fs_info->qgroup_flags |=
                                                                                                                BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_RESCAN

                                                                                                              init_completion(
                                                                                                                &fs_info->qgroup_rescan_completion)

                                                                                                              fs_info->qgroup_rescan_running = true

                                                                                                              mutex_unlock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock)
                                                                                                              spin_unlock(&fs_info->qgroup_lock)

                                                                                                              btrfs_init_work()
                                                                                                               --> starts another worker

                                                         mutex_lock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock)

                                                         fs_info->qgroup_rescan_running = false

                                                         mutex_unlock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock)

							 complete_all(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_completion)

Before the rescan worker started by the task at CPU 3 completes, if
another task calls btrfs_ioctl_quota_rescan(), it will get -EINPROGRESS
because the flag BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_RESCAN is set at
fs_info->qgroup_flags, which is expected and correct behaviour.

However if other task calls btrfs_ioctl_quota_rescan_wait() before the
rescan worker started by the task at CPU 3 completes, it will return
immediately without waiting for the new rescan worker to complete,
because fs_info->qgroup_rescan_running is set to false by CPU 2.

This race is making test case btrfs/171 (from fstests) to fail often:

  btrfs/171 9s ... - output mismatch (see /home/fdmanana/git/hub/xfstests/results//btrfs/171.out.bad)
#      --- tests/btrfs/171.out     2018-09-16 21:30:48.505104287 +0100
#      +++ /home/fdmanana/git/hub/xfstests/results//btrfs/171.out.bad      2019-09-19 02:01:36.938486039 +0100
#      @@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
#       QA output created by 171
#      +ERROR: quota rescan failed: Operation now in progress
#       Silence is golden
#      ...
#      (Run 'diff -u /home/fdmanana/git/hub/xfstests/tests/btrfs/171.out /home/fdmanana/git/hub/xfstests/results//btrfs/171.out.bad'  to see the entire diff)

That is because the test calls the btrfs-progs commands "qgroup quota
rescan -w", "qgroup assign" and "qgroup remove" in a sequence that makes
calls to the rescan start ioctl fail with -EINPROGRESS (note the "btrfs"
commands 'qgroup assign' and 'qgroup remove' often call the rescan start
ioctl after calling the qgroup assign ioctl,
btrfs_ioctl_qgroup_assign()), since previous waits didn't actually wait
for a rescan worker to complete.

Another problem the race can cause is missing wake ups for waiters,
since the call to complete_all() happens outside a critical section and
after clearing the flag BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_RESCAN. In the sequence
diagram above, if we have a waiter for the first rescan task (executed
by CPU 2), then fs_info->qgroup_rescan_completion.wait is not empty, and
if after the rescan worker clears BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_RESCAN and
before it calls complete_all() against
fs_info->qgroup_rescan_completion, the task at CPU 3 calls
init_completion() against fs_info->qgroup_rescan_completion which
re-initilizes its wait queue to an empty queue, therefore causing the
rescan worker at CPU 2 to call complete_all() against an empty queue,
never waking up the task waiting for that rescan worker.

Fix this by clearing BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_RESCAN and setting
fs_info->qgroup_rescan_running to false in the same critical section,
delimited by the mutex fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock, as well as doing the
call to complete_all() in that same critical section. This gives the
protection needed to avoid rescan wait ioctl callers not waiting for a
running rescan worker and the lost wake ups problem, since setting that
rescan flag and boolean as well as initializing the wait queue is done
already in a critical section delimited by that mutex (at
qgroup_rescan_init()).

Fixes: 57254b6e ("Btrfs: add ioctl to wait for qgroup rescan completion")
Fixes: d2c609b8 ("btrfs: properly track when rescan worker is running")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: NJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit d4e204948fe3e0dc8e1fbf3f8f3290c9c2823be3 upstream.

[BUG]
The following script can cause btrfs qgroup data space leak:

  mkfs.btrfs -f $dev
  mount $dev -o nospace_cache $mnt

  btrfs subv create $mnt/subv
  btrfs quota en $mnt
  btrfs quota rescan -w $mnt
  btrfs qgroup limit 128m $mnt/subv

  for (( i = 0; i < 3; i++)); do
          # Create 3 64M holes for latter fallocate to fail
          truncate -s 192m $mnt/subv/file
          xfs_io -c "pwrite 64m 4k" $mnt/subv/file > /dev/null
          xfs_io -c "pwrite 128m 4k" $mnt/subv/file > /dev/null
          sync

          # it's supposed to fail, and each failure will leak at least 64M
          # data space
          xfs_io -f -c "falloc 0 192m" $mnt/subv/file &> /dev/null
          rm $mnt/subv/file
          sync
  done

  # Shouldn't fail after we removed the file
  xfs_io -f -c "falloc 0 64m" $mnt/subv/file

[CAUSE]
Btrfs qgroup data reserve code allow multiple reservations to happen on
a single extent_changeset:
E.g:
	btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data(inode, &data_reserved, 0, SZ_1M);
	btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data(inode, &data_reserved, SZ_1M, SZ_2M);
	btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data(inode, &data_reserved, 0, SZ_4M);

Btrfs qgroup code has its internal tracking to make sure we don't
double-reserve in above example.

The only pattern utilizing this feature is in the main while loop of
btrfs_fallocate() function.

However btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data()'s error handling has a bug in that
on error it clears all ranges in the io_tree with EXTENT_QGROUP_RESERVED
flag but doesn't free previously reserved bytes.

This bug has a two fold effect:
- Clearing EXTENT_QGROUP_RESERVED ranges
  This is the correct behavior, but it prevents
  btrfs_qgroup_check_reserved_leak() to catch the leakage as the
  detector is purely EXTENT_QGROUP_RESERVED flag based.

- Leak the previously reserved data bytes.

The bug manifests when N calls to btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data are made and
the last one fails, leaking space reserved in the previous ones.

[FIX]
Also free previously reserved data bytes when btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data
fails.

Fixes: 52472553 ("btrfs: qgroup: Introduce btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data function")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: NQu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit bab32fc069ce8829c416e8737c119f62a57970f9 upstream.

[BUG]
Under the following case with qgroup enabled, if some error happened
after we have reserved delalloc space, then in error handling path, we
could cause qgroup data space leakage:

From btrfs_truncate_block() in inode.c:

	ret = btrfs_delalloc_reserve_space(inode, &data_reserved,
					   block_start, blocksize);
	if (ret)
		goto out;

 again:
	page = find_or_create_page(mapping, index, mask);
	if (!page) {
		btrfs_delalloc_release_space(inode, data_reserved,
					     block_start, blocksize, true);
		btrfs_delalloc_release_extents(BTRFS_I(inode), blocksize, true);
		ret = -ENOMEM;
		goto out;
	}

[CAUSE]
In the above case, btrfs_delalloc_reserve_space() will call
btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data() and mark the io_tree range with
EXTENT_QGROUP_RESERVED flag.

In the error handling path, we have the following call stack:
btrfs_delalloc_release_space()
|- btrfs_free_reserved_data_space()
   |- btrsf_qgroup_free_data()
      |- __btrfs_qgroup_release_data(reserved=@reserved, free=1)
         |- qgroup_free_reserved_data(reserved=@reserved)
            |- clear_record_extent_bits();
            |- freed += changeset.bytes_changed;

However due to a completion bug, qgroup_free_reserved_data() will clear
EXTENT_QGROUP_RESERVED flag in BTRFS_I(inode)->io_failure_tree, other
than the correct BTRFS_I(inode)->io_tree.
Since io_failure_tree is never marked with that flag,
btrfs_qgroup_free_data() will not free any data reserved space at all,
causing a leakage.

This type of error handling can only be triggered by errors outside of
qgroup code. So EDQUOT error from qgroup can't trigger it.

[FIX]
Fix the wrong target io_tree.
Reported-by: NJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Fixes: bc42bda2 ("btrfs: qgroup: Fix qgroup reserved space underflow by only freeing reserved ranges")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Reviewed-by: NNikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NQu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 6af112b11a4bc1b560f60a618ac9c1dcefe9836e upstream.

When doing any form of incremental send the parent and the child trees
need to be compared via btrfs_compare_trees. This  can result in long
loop chains without ever relinquishing the CPU. This causes softlockup
detector to trigger when comparing trees with a lot of items. Example
report:

watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 24s! [snapperd:16153]
CPU: 0 PID: 16153 Comm: snapperd Not tainted 5.2.9-1-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed (unreleased)
Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
pstate: 40000005 (nZcv daif -PAN -UAO)
pc : __ll_sc_arch_atomic_sub_return+0x14/0x20
lr : btrfs_release_extent_buffer_pages+0xe0/0x1e8 [btrfs]
sp : ffff00001273b7e0
Call trace:
 __ll_sc_arch_atomic_sub_return+0x14/0x20
 release_extent_buffer+0xdc/0x120 [btrfs]
 free_extent_buffer.part.0+0xb0/0x118 [btrfs]
 free_extent_buffer+0x24/0x30 [btrfs]
 btrfs_release_path+0x4c/0xa0 [btrfs]
 btrfs_free_path.part.0+0x20/0x40 [btrfs]
 btrfs_free_path+0x24/0x30 [btrfs]
 get_inode_info+0xa8/0xf8 [btrfs]
 finish_inode_if_needed+0xe0/0x6d8 [btrfs]
 changed_cb+0x9c/0x410 [btrfs]
 btrfs_compare_trees+0x284/0x648 [btrfs]
 send_subvol+0x33c/0x520 [btrfs]
 btrfs_ioctl_send+0x8a0/0xaf0 [btrfs]
 btrfs_ioctl+0x199c/0x2288 [btrfs]
 do_vfs_ioctl+0x4b0/0x820
 ksys_ioctl+0x84/0xb8
 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x28/0x38
 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x7c/0x188
 el0_svc_handler+0x34/0x90
 el0_svc+0x8/0xc

Fix this by adding a call to cond_resched at the beginning of the main
loop in btrfs_compare_trees.

Fixes: 7069830a ("Btrfs: add btrfs_compare_trees function")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: NJohannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NNikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit efad8a853ad2057f96664328a0d327a05ce39c76 upstream.

At ctree.c:get_old_root(), we are accessing a root's header owner field
after we have freed the respective extent buffer. This results in an
use-after-free that can lead to crashes, and when CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
is set, results in a stack trace like the following:

  [ 3876.799331] stack segment: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI
  [ 3876.799363] CPU: 0 PID: 15436 Comm: pool Not tainted 5.3.0-rc3-btrfs-next-54 #1
  [ 3876.799385] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-0-ga698c8995f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
  [ 3876.799433] RIP: 0010:btrfs_search_old_slot+0x652/0xd80 [btrfs]
  (...)
  [ 3876.799502] RSP: 0018:ffff9f08c1a2f9f0 EFLAGS: 00010286
  [ 3876.799518] RAX: ffff8dd300000000 RBX: ffff8dd85a7a9348 RCX: 000000038da26000
  [ 3876.799538] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffe522ce368980 RDI: 0000000000000246
  [ 3876.799559] RBP: dae1922adadad000 R08: 0000000008020000 R09: ffffe522c0000000
  [ 3876.799579] R10: ffff8dd57fd788c8 R11: 000000007511b030 R12: ffff8dd781ddc000
  [ 3876.799599] R13: ffff8dd9e6240578 R14: ffff8dd6896f7a88 R15: ffff8dd688cf90b8
  [ 3876.799620] FS:  00007f23ddd97700(0000) GS:ffff8dda20200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  [ 3876.799643] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  [ 3876.799660] CR2: 00007f23d4024000 CR3: 0000000710bb0005 CR4: 00000000003606f0
  [ 3876.799682] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  [ 3876.799703] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  [ 3876.799723] Call Trace:
  [ 3876.799735]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x49/0xc0
  [ 3876.799749]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x24/0x30
  [ 3876.799779]  resolve_indirect_refs+0x1eb/0xc80 [btrfs]
  [ 3876.799810]  find_parent_nodes+0x38d/0x1180 [btrfs]
  [ 3876.799841]  btrfs_check_shared+0x11a/0x1d0 [btrfs]
  [ 3876.799870]  ? extent_fiemap+0x598/0x6e0 [btrfs]
  [ 3876.799895]  extent_fiemap+0x598/0x6e0 [btrfs]
  [ 3876.799913]  do_vfs_ioctl+0x45a/0x700
  [ 3876.799926]  ksys_ioctl+0x70/0x80
  [ 3876.799938]  ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x20
  [ 3876.799953]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
  [ 3876.799965]  do_syscall_64+0x62/0x220
  [ 3876.799977]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
  [ 3876.799993] RIP: 0033:0x7f23e0013dd7
  (...)
  [ 3876.800056] RSP: 002b:00007f23ddd96ca8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
  [ 3876.800078] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f23d80210f8 RCX: 00007f23e0013dd7
  [ 3876.800099] RDX: 00007f23d80210f8 RSI: 00000000c020660b RDI: 0000000000000003
  [ 3876.800626] RBP: 000055fa2a2a2440 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f23ddd96d7c
  [ 3876.801143] R10: 00007f23d8022000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f23ddd96d80
  [ 3876.801662] R13: 00007f23ddd96d78 R14: 00007f23d80210f0 R15: 00007f23ddd96d80
  (...)
  [ 3876.805107] ---[ end trace e53161e179ef04f9 ]---

Fix that by saving the root's header owner field into a local variable
before freeing the root's extent buffer, and then use that local variable
when needed.

Fixes: 30b0463a ("Btrfs: fix accessing the root pointer in tree mod log functions")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.10+
Reviewed-by: NNikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NAnand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 3acd48507dc43eeeb0a1fe965b8bad91cab904a7 upstream.

Various notifications of type "BUG kmalloc-4096 () : Redzone
overwritten" have been observed recently in various parts of the kernel.
After some time, it has been made a relation with the use of BTRFS
filesystem and with SLUB_DEBUG turned on.

[   22.809700] BUG kmalloc-4096 (Tainted: G        W        ): Redzone overwritten

[   22.810286] INFO: 0xbe1a5921-0xfbfc06cd. First byte 0x0 instead of 0xcc
[   22.810866] INFO: Allocated in __load_free_space_cache+0x588/0x780 [btrfs] age=22 cpu=0 pid=224
[   22.811193] 	__slab_alloc.constprop.26+0x44/0x70
[   22.811345] 	kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xf0/0x2ec
[   22.811588] 	__load_free_space_cache+0x588/0x780 [btrfs]
[   22.811848] 	load_free_space_cache+0xf4/0x1b0 [btrfs]
[   22.812090] 	cache_block_group+0x1d0/0x3d0 [btrfs]
[   22.812321] 	find_free_extent+0x680/0x12a4 [btrfs]
[   22.812549] 	btrfs_reserve_extent+0xec/0x220 [btrfs]
[   22.812785] 	btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x178/0x5f4 [btrfs]
[   22.813032] 	__btrfs_cow_block+0x150/0x5d4 [btrfs]
[   22.813262] 	btrfs_cow_block+0x194/0x298 [btrfs]
[   22.813484] 	commit_cowonly_roots+0x44/0x294 [btrfs]
[   22.813718] 	btrfs_commit_transaction+0x63c/0xc0c [btrfs]
[   22.813973] 	close_ctree+0xf8/0x2a4 [btrfs]
[   22.814107] 	generic_shutdown_super+0x80/0x110
[   22.814250] 	kill_anon_super+0x18/0x30
[   22.814437] 	btrfs_kill_super+0x18/0x90 [btrfs]
[   22.814590] INFO: Freed in proc_cgroup_show+0xc0/0x248 age=41 cpu=0 pid=83
[   22.814841] 	proc_cgroup_show+0xc0/0x248
[   22.814967] 	proc_single_show+0x54/0x98
[   22.815086] 	seq_read+0x278/0x45c
[   22.815190] 	__vfs_read+0x28/0x17c
[   22.815289] 	vfs_read+0xa8/0x14c
[   22.815381] 	ksys_read+0x50/0x94
[   22.815475] 	ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x38

Commit 69d24804 ("btrfs: use copy_page for copying pages instead of
memcpy") changed the way bitmap blocks are copied. But allthough bitmaps
have the size of a page, they were allocated with kzalloc().

Most of the time, kzalloc() allocates aligned blocks of memory, so
copy_page() can be used. But when some debug options like SLAB_DEBUG are
activated, kzalloc() may return unaligned pointer.

On powerpc, memcpy(), copy_page() and other copying functions use
'dcbz' instruction which provides an entire zeroed cacheline to avoid
memory read when the intention is to overwrite a full line. Functions
like memcpy() are writen to care about partial cachelines at the start
and end of the destination, but copy_page() assumes it gets pages. As
pages are naturally cache aligned, copy_page() doesn't care about
partial lines. This means that when copy_page() is called with a
misaligned pointer, a few leading bytes are zeroed.

To fix it, allocate bitmaps through kmem_cache instead of using kzalloc()
The cache pool is created with PAGE_SIZE alignment constraint.
Reported-by: NErhard F. <erhard_f@mailbox.org>
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=204371
Fixes: 69d24804 ("btrfs: use copy_page for copying pages instead of memcpy")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: NChristophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ rename to btrfs_free_space_bitmap ]
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 5c2e9f346b815841f9bed6029ebcb06415caf640 upstream.

When filtering xattr list for reading, presence of trusted xattr
results in a security audit log.  However, if there is other content
no errno will be set, and if there isn't, the errno will be -ENODATA
and not -EPERM as is usually associated with a lack of capability.
The check does not block the request to list the xattrs present.

Switch to ns_capable_noaudit to reflect a more appropriate check.
Signed-off-by: NMark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-team@android.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.18+
Fixes: a082c6f6 ("ovl: filter trusted xattr for non-admin")
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 97f024b9171e74c4443bbe8a8dce31b917f97ac5 upstream.

if ovl_encode_real_fh() fails, no memory was allocated
and the error in the error-valued pointer should be returned.

Fixes: 9b6faee0 ("ovl: check ERR_PTR() return value from ovl_encode_fh()")
Signed-off-by: NDing Xiang <dingxiang@cmss.chinamobile.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.16+
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 3e7a02d47872081f4b6234a9f72500f1d10f060c upstream.

In some cases to work around server bugs or performance
problems it can be helpful to be able to disable requesting
SMB2.1/SMB3 leases on a particular mount (not to all servers
and all shares we are mounted to). Add new mount parm
"nolease" which turns off requesting leases on directory
or file opens.  Currently the only way to disable leases is
globally through a module load parameter. This is more
granular.
Suggested-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NRonnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 8d6996630c03d7ceeabe2611378fea5ca1c3f1b3 upstream.

We got a null pointer deference BUG_ON in blk_mq_rq_timed_out()
as following:

[  108.825472] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000040
[  108.827059] PGD 0 P4D 0
[  108.827313] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[  108.827657] CPU: 6 PID: 198 Comm: kworker/6:1H Not tainted 5.3.0-rc8+ #431
[  108.829503] Workqueue: kblockd blk_mq_timeout_work
[  108.829913] RIP: 0010:blk_mq_check_expired+0x258/0x330
[  108.838191] Call Trace:
[  108.838406]  bt_iter+0x74/0x80
[  108.838665]  blk_mq_queue_tag_busy_iter+0x204/0x450
[  108.839074]  ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70
[  108.839405]  ? blk_mq_stop_hw_queue+0x40/0x40
[  108.839823]  ? blk_mq_stop_hw_queue+0x40/0x40
[  108.840273]  ? syscall_return_via_sysret+0xf/0x7f
[  108.840732]  blk_mq_timeout_work+0x74/0x200
[  108.841151]  process_one_work+0x297/0x680
[  108.841550]  worker_thread+0x29c/0x6f0
[  108.841926]  ? rescuer_thread+0x580/0x580
[  108.842344]  kthread+0x16a/0x1a0
[  108.842666]  ? kthread_flush_work+0x170/0x170
[  108.843100]  ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40

The bug is caused by the race between timeout handle and completion for
flush request.

When timeout handle function blk_mq_rq_timed_out() try to read
'req->q->mq_ops', the 'req' have completed and reinitiated by next
flush request, which would call blk_rq_init() to clear 'req' as 0.

After commit 12f5b931 ("blk-mq: Remove generation seqeunce"),
normal requests lifetime are protected by refcount. Until 'rq->ref'
drop to zero, the request can really be free. Thus, these requests
cannot been reused before timeout handle finish.

However, flush request has defined .end_io and rq->end_io() is still
called even if 'rq->ref' doesn't drop to zero. After that, the 'flush_rq'
can be reused by the next flush request handle, resulting in null
pointer deference BUG ON.

We fix this problem by covering flush request with 'rq->ref'.
If the refcount is not zero, flush_end_io() return and wait the
last holder recall it. To record the request status, we add a new
entry 'rq_status', which will be used in flush_end_io().

Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Keith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com>
Cc: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.18+
Reviewed-by: NMing Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NBob Liu <bob.liu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NYufen Yu <yuyufen@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

-------
v2:
 - move rq_status from struct request to struct blk_flush_queue
v3:
 - remove unnecessary '{}' pair.
v4:
 - let spinlock to protect 'fq->rq_status'
v5:
 - move rq_status after flush_running_idx member of struct blk_flush_queue
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

commit a7542b87607560d0b89e7ff81d870bd6ff8835cb upstream.

While testing VF spawn/destroy the following panic occurred.

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000029
[...]
Workqueue: i40e i40e_service_task [i40e]
RIP: 0010:i40e_sync_vsi_filters+0x6fd/0xc60 [i40e]
[...]
Call Trace:
 ? __switch_to_asm+0x35/0x70
 ? __switch_to_asm+0x41/0x70
 ? __switch_to_asm+0x35/0x70
 ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30
 i40e_sync_filters_subtask+0x56/0x70 [i40e]
 i40e_service_task+0x382/0x11b0 [i40e]
 ? __switch_to_asm+0x41/0x70
 ? __switch_to_asm+0x41/0x70
 process_one_work+0x1a7/0x3b0
 worker_thread+0x30/0x390
 ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
 kthread+0x112/0x130
 ? kthread_bind+0x30/0x30
 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40

Investigation revealed a race where pf->vf[vsi->vf_id].trusted may get
accessed by the watchdog via i40e_sync_filters_subtask() although
i40e_free_vfs() already free'd pf->vf.
To avoid this the call to i40e_sync_vsi_filters() in
i40e_sync_filters_subtask() needs to be guarded by __I40E_VF_DISABLE,
which is also used by i40e_free_vfs().

Note: put the __I40E_VF_DISABLE check after the
__I40E_MACVLAN_SYNC_PENDING check as the latter is more likely to
trigger.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NStefan Assmann <sassmann@kpanic.de>
Tested-by: NAndrew Bowers <andrewx.bowers@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit e55d9d9bfb69405bd7615c0f8d229d8fafb3e9b8 upstream.

Thomas has noticed the following NULL ptr dereference when using cgroup
v1 kmem limit:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008
PGD 0
P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 3 PID: 16923 Comm: gtk-update-icon Not tainted 4.19.51 #42
Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. Z97X-Gaming G1/Z97X-Gaming G1, BIOS F9 07/31/2015
RIP: 0010:create_empty_buffers+0x24/0x100
Code: cd 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 49 89 d4 ba 01 00 00 00 55 53 48 89 fb e8 97 fe ff ff 48 89 c5 48 89 c2 eb 03 48 89 ca <48> 8b 4a 08 4c 09 22 48 85 c9 75 f1 48 89 6a 08 48 8b 43 18 48 8d
RSP: 0018:ffff927ac1b37bf8 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: fffff2d4429fd740 RCX: 0000000100097149
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000082 RDI: ffff9075a99fbe00
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: fffff2d440949cc8 R09: 00000000000960c0
R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff907601f18360 R14: 0000000000002000 R15: 0000000000001000
FS:  00007fb55b288bc0(0000) GS:ffff90761f8c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000007aebc002 CR4: 00000000001606e0
Call Trace:
 create_page_buffers+0x4d/0x60
 __block_write_begin_int+0x8e/0x5a0
 ? ext4_inode_attach_jinode.part.82+0xb0/0xb0
 ? jbd2__journal_start+0xd7/0x1f0
 ext4_da_write_begin+0x112/0x3d0
 generic_perform_write+0xf1/0x1b0
 ? file_update_time+0x70/0x140
 __generic_file_write_iter+0x141/0x1a0
 ext4_file_write_iter+0xef/0x3b0
 __vfs_write+0x17e/0x1e0
 vfs_write+0xa5/0x1a0
 ksys_write+0x57/0xd0
 do_syscall_64+0x55/0x160
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Tetsuo then noticed that this is because the __memcg_kmem_charge_memcg
fails __GFP_NOFAIL charge when the kmem limit is reached.  This is a wrong
behavior because nofail allocations are not allowed to fail.  Normal
charge path simply forces the charge even if that means to cross the
limit.  Kmem accounting should be doing the same.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190906125608.32129-1-mhocko@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reported-by: NThomas Lindroth <thomas.lindroth@gmail.com>
Debugged-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Thomas Lindroth <thomas.lindroth@gmail.com>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit f9c645621a28e37813a1de96d9cbd89cde94a1e4 upstream.

Masoud Sharbiani noticed that commit 29ef680a ("memcg, oom: move
out_of_memory back to the charge path") broke memcg OOM called from
__xfs_filemap_fault() path.  It turned out that try_charge() is retrying
forever without making forward progress because mem_cgroup_oom(GFP_NOFS)
cannot invoke the OOM killer due to commit 3da88fb3 ("mm, oom:
move GFP_NOFS check to out_of_memory").

Allowing forced charge due to being unable to invoke memcg OOM killer will
lead to global OOM situation.  Also, just returning -ENOMEM will be risky
because OOM path is lost and some paths (e.g.  get_user_pages()) will leak
-ENOMEM.  Therefore, invoking memcg OOM killer (despite GFP_NOFS) will be
the only choice we can choose for now.

Until 29ef680a, we were able to invoke memcg OOM killer when
GFP_KERNEL reclaim failed [1].  But since 29ef680a, we need to
invoke memcg OOM killer when GFP_NOFS reclaim failed [2].  Although in the
past we did invoke memcg OOM killer for GFP_NOFS [3], we might get
pre-mature memcg OOM reports due to this patch.

[1]

 leaker invoked oom-killer: gfp_mask=0x6200ca(GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE), nodemask=(null), order=0, oom_score_adj=0
 CPU: 0 PID: 2746 Comm: leaker Not tainted 4.18.0+ #19
 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 04/13/2018
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x63/0x88
  dump_header+0x67/0x27a
  ? mem_cgroup_scan_tasks+0x91/0xf0
  oom_kill_process+0x210/0x410
  out_of_memory+0x10a/0x2c0
  mem_cgroup_out_of_memory+0x46/0x80
  mem_cgroup_oom_synchronize+0x2e4/0x310
  ? high_work_func+0x20/0x20
  pagefault_out_of_memory+0x31/0x76
  mm_fault_error+0x55/0x115
  ? handle_mm_fault+0xfd/0x220
  __do_page_fault+0x433/0x4e0
  do_page_fault+0x22/0x30
  ? page_fault+0x8/0x30
  page_fault+0x1e/0x30
 RIP: 0033:0x4009f0
 Code: 03 00 00 00 e8 71 fd ff ff 48 83 f8 ff 49 89 c6 74 74 48 89 c6 bf c0 0c 40 00 31 c0 e8 69 fd ff ff 45 85 ff 7e 21 31 c9 66 90 <41> 0f be 14 0e 01 d3 f7 c1 ff 0f 00 00 75 05 41 c6 04 0e 2a 48 83
 RSP: 002b:00007ffe29ae96f0 EFLAGS: 00010206
 RAX: 000000000000001b RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000001ce1000
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000007fffffe5 RDI: 0000000000000000
 RBP: 000000000000000c R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f94be09220d
 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000186a0
 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 00007f949d845000 R15: 0000000002800000
 Task in /leaker killed as a result of limit of /leaker
 memory: usage 524288kB, limit 524288kB, failcnt 158965
 memory+swap: usage 0kB, limit 9007199254740988kB, failcnt 0
 kmem: usage 2016kB, limit 9007199254740988kB, failcnt 0
 Memory cgroup stats for /leaker: cache:844KB rss:521136KB rss_huge:0KB shmem:0KB mapped_file:0KB dirty:132KB writeback:0KB inactive_anon:0KB active_anon:521224KB inactive_file:1012KB active_file:8KB unevictable:0KB
 Memory cgroup out of memory: Kill process 2746 (leaker) score 998 or sacrifice child
 Killed process 2746 (leaker) total-vm:536704kB, anon-rss:521176kB, file-rss:1208kB, shmem-rss:0kB
 oom_reaper: reaped process 2746 (leaker), now anon-rss:0kB, file-rss:0kB, shmem-rss:0kB

[2]

 leaker invoked oom-killer: gfp_mask=0x600040(GFP_NOFS), nodemask=(null), order=0, oom_score_adj=0
 CPU: 1 PID: 2746 Comm: leaker Not tainted 4.18.0+ #20
 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 04/13/2018
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x63/0x88
  dump_header+0x67/0x27a
  ? mem_cgroup_scan_tasks+0x91/0xf0
  oom_kill_process+0x210/0x410
  out_of_memory+0x109/0x2d0
  mem_cgroup_out_of_memory+0x46/0x80
  try_charge+0x58d/0x650
  ? __radix_tree_replace+0x81/0x100
  mem_cgroup_try_charge+0x7a/0x100
  __add_to_page_cache_locked+0x92/0x180
  add_to_page_cache_lru+0x4d/0xf0
  iomap_readpages_actor+0xde/0x1b0
  ? iomap_zero_range_actor+0x1d0/0x1d0
  iomap_apply+0xaf/0x130
  iomap_readpages+0x9f/0x150
  ? iomap_zero_range_actor+0x1d0/0x1d0
  xfs_vm_readpages+0x18/0x20 [xfs]
  read_pages+0x60/0x140
  __do_page_cache_readahead+0x193/0x1b0
  ondemand_readahead+0x16d/0x2c0
  page_cache_async_readahead+0x9a/0xd0
  filemap_fault+0x403/0x620
  ? alloc_set_pte+0x12c/0x540
  ? _cond_resched+0x14/0x30
  __xfs_filemap_fault+0x66/0x180 [xfs]
  xfs_filemap_fault+0x27/0x30 [xfs]
  __do_fault+0x19/0x40
  __handle_mm_fault+0x8e8/0xb60
  handle_mm_fault+0xfd/0x220
  __do_page_fault+0x238/0x4e0
  do_page_fault+0x22/0x30
  ? page_fault+0x8/0x30
  page_fault+0x1e/0x30
 RIP: 0033:0x4009f0
 Code: 03 00 00 00 e8 71 fd ff ff 48 83 f8 ff 49 89 c6 74 74 48 89 c6 bf c0 0c 40 00 31 c0 e8 69 fd ff ff 45 85 ff 7e 21 31 c9 66 90 <41> 0f be 14 0e 01 d3 f7 c1 ff 0f 00 00 75 05 41 c6 04 0e 2a 48 83
 RSP: 002b:00007ffda45c9290 EFLAGS: 00010206
 RAX: 000000000000001b RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000001a1e000
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000007fffffe5 RDI: 0000000000000000
 RBP: 000000000000000c R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f6d061ff20d
 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000186a0
 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 00007f6ce59b2000 R15: 0000000002800000
 Task in /leaker killed as a result of limit of /leaker
 memory: usage 524288kB, limit 524288kB, failcnt 7221
 memory+swap: usage 0kB, limit 9007199254740988kB, failcnt 0
 kmem: usage 1944kB, limit 9007199254740988kB, failcnt 0
 Memory cgroup stats for /leaker: cache:3632KB rss:518232KB rss_huge:0KB shmem:0KB mapped_file:0KB dirty:0KB writeback:0KB inactive_anon:0KB active_anon:518408KB inactive_file:3908KB active_file:12KB unevictable:0KB
 Memory cgroup out of memory: Kill process 2746 (leaker) score 992 or sacrifice child
 Killed process 2746 (leaker) total-vm:536704kB, anon-rss:518264kB, file-rss:1188kB, shmem-rss:0kB
 oom_reaper: reaped process 2746 (leaker), now anon-rss:0kB, file-rss:0kB, shmem-rss:0kB

[3]

 leaker invoked oom-killer: gfp_mask=0x50, order=0, oom_score_adj=0
 leaker cpuset=/ mems_allowed=0
 CPU: 1 PID: 3206 Comm: leaker Not tainted 3.10.0-957.27.2.el7.x86_64 #1
 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 04/13/2018
 Call Trace:
  [<ffffffffaf364147>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
  [<ffffffffaf35eb6a>] dump_header+0x90/0x229
  [<ffffffffaedbb456>] ? find_lock_task_mm+0x56/0xc0
  [<ffffffffaee32a38>] ? try_get_mem_cgroup_from_mm+0x28/0x60
  [<ffffffffaedbb904>] oom_kill_process+0x254/0x3d0
  [<ffffffffaee36c36>] mem_cgroup_oom_synchronize+0x546/0x570
  [<ffffffffaee360b0>] ? mem_cgroup_charge_common+0xc0/0xc0
  [<ffffffffaedbc194>] pagefault_out_of_memory+0x14/0x90
  [<ffffffffaf35d072>] mm_fault_error+0x6a/0x157
  [<ffffffffaf3717c8>] __do_page_fault+0x3c8/0x4f0
  [<ffffffffaf371925>] do_page_fault+0x35/0x90
  [<ffffffffaf36d768>] page_fault+0x28/0x30
 Task in /leaker killed as a result of limit of /leaker
 memory: usage 524288kB, limit 524288kB, failcnt 20628
 memory+swap: usage 524288kB, limit 9007199254740988kB, failcnt 0
 kmem: usage 0kB, limit 9007199254740988kB, failcnt 0
 Memory cgroup stats for /leaker: cache:840KB rss:523448KB rss_huge:0KB mapped_file:0KB swap:0KB inactive_anon:0KB active_anon:523448KB inactive_file:464KB active_file:376KB unevictable:0KB
 Memory cgroup out of memory: Kill process 3206 (leaker) score 970 or sacrifice child
 Killed process 3206 (leaker) total-vm:536692kB, anon-rss:523304kB, file-rss:412kB, shmem-rss:0kB

Bisected by Masoud Sharbiani.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/cbe54ed1-b6ba-a056-8899-2dc42526371d@i-love.sakura.ne.jp
Fixes: 3da88fb3 ("mm, oom: move GFP_NOFS check to out_of_memory") [necessary after 29ef680a]
Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reported-by: NMasoud Sharbiani <msharbiani@apple.com>
Tested-by: NMasoud Sharbiani <msharbiani@apple.com>
Acked-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[4.19+]
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit f0b444b349e33ae0d3dd93e25ca365482a5d17d4 upstream.

In function sweep_bh_for_rgrps, which is a helper for punch_hole,
it uses variable buf_in_tr to keep track of when it needs to commit
pending block frees on a partial delete that overflows the
transaction created for the delete. The problem is that the
variable was initialized at the start of function sweep_bh_for_rgrps
but it was never cleared, even when starting a new transaction.

This patch reinitializes the variable when the transaction is
ended, so the next transaction starts out with it cleared.

Fixes: d552a2b9 ("GFS2: Non-recursive delete")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: NBob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 51677dfcc17f88ed754143df670ff064eae67f84 upstream.

For various reasons, at least with x86 EFI firmwares, the xoffset and
yoffset in the BGRT info are not always reliable.

Extensive testing has shown that when the info is correct, the
BGRT image is always exactly centered horizontally (the yoffset variable
is more variable and not always predictable).

This commit simplifies / improves the bgrt_sanity_check to simply
check that the BGRT image is exactly centered horizontally and skips
(re)drawing it when it is not.

This fixes the BGRT image sometimes being drawn in the wrong place.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 88fe4ceb ("efifb: BGRT: Do not copy the boot graphics for non native resolutions")
Signed-off-by: NHans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>,
Signed-off-by: NBartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190721131918.10115-1-hdegoede@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 55576cf1853798e86f620766e23b604c9224c19c upstream.

The kernel has no way of knowing when we have finished instantiating
drivers, between deferred probe and systems that build key drivers as
modules we might be doing this long after userspace has booted. This has
always been a bit of an issue with regulator_init_complete since it can
power off hardware that's not had it's driver loaded which can result in
user visible effects, the main case is powering off displays. Practically
speaking it's not been an issue in real systems since most systems that
use the regulator API are embedded and build in key drivers anyway but
with Arm laptops coming on the market it's becoming more of an issue so
let's do something about it.

In the absence of any better idea just defer the powering off for 30s
after late_initcall(), this is obviously a hack but it should mask the
issue for now and it's no more arbitrary than late_initcall() itself.
Ideally we'd have some heuristics to detect if we're on an affected
system and tune or skip the delay appropriately, and there may be some
need for a command line option to be added.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190904124250.25844-1-broonie@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NMark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Tested-by: NLee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit f18ddc13af981ce3c7b7f26925f099e7c6929aba upstream.

ENOTSUPP is not supposed to be returned to userspace. This was found on an
OpenPower machine, where the RTC does not support set_alarm.

On that system, a clock_nanosleep(CLOCK_REALTIME_ALARM, ...) results in
"524 Unknown error 524"

Replace it with EOPNOTSUPP which results in the expected "95 Operation not
supported" error.

Fixes: 1c6b39ad (alarmtimers: Return -ENOTSUPP if no RTC device is present)
Signed-off-by: NThadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190903171802.28314-1-cascardo@canonical.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 03e61929c0d227ed3e1c322fc3804216ea298b7e upstream.

150MHz is a fundamental limitation of RK3328 Soc, w/o this limitation,
eMMC, for instance, will run into 200MHz clock rate in HS200 mode, which
makes the RK3328 boards not always boot properly. By adding it in
rk3328.dtsi would also obviate the worry of missing it when adding new
boards.

Fixes: 52e02d37 ("arm64: dts: rockchip: add core dtsi file for RK3328 SoCs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Cc: Liang Chen <cl@rock-chips.com>
Signed-off-by: NShawn Lin <shawn.lin@rock-chips.com>
Signed-off-by: NHeiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 51696d346c49c6cf4f29e9b20d6e15832a2e3408 upstream.

05f2d2f8 ("arm64: tlbflush: Introduce __flush_tlb_kernel_pgtable")
added a new TLB invalidation helper which is used when freeing
intermediate levels of page table used for kernel mappings, but is
missing the required ISB instruction after completion of the TLBI
instruction.

Add the missing barrier.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 05f2d2f8 ("arm64: tlbflush: Introduce __flush_tlb_kernel_pgtable")
Reviewed-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit d0b7a302d58abe24ed0f32a0672dd4c356bb73db upstream.

This reverts commit 24fe1b0e.

Commit 24fe1b0e ("arm64: Remove unnecessary ISBs from
set_{pte,pmd,pud}") removed ISB instructions immediately following updates
to the page table, on the grounds that they are not required by the
architecture and a DSB alone is sufficient to ensure that subsequent data
accesses use the new translation:

  DDI0487E_a, B2-128:

  | ... no instruction that appears in program order after the DSB
  | instruction can alter any state of the system or perform any part of
  | its functionality until the DSB completes other than:
  |
  | * Being fetched from memory and decoded
  | * Reading the general-purpose, SIMD and floating-point,
  |   Special-purpose, or System registers that are directly or indirectly
  |   read without causing side-effects.

However, the same document also states the following:

  DDI0487E_a, B2-125:

  | DMB and DSB instructions affect reads and writes to the memory system
  | generated by Load/Store instructions and data or unified cache
  | maintenance instructions being executed by the PE. Instruction fetches
  | or accesses caused by a hardware translation table access are not
  | explicit accesses.

which appears to claim that the DSB alone is insufficient.  Unfortunately,
some CPU designers have followed the second clause above, whereas in Linux
we've been relying on the first. This means that our mapping sequence:

	MOV	X0, <valid pte>
	STR	X0, [Xptep]	// Store new PTE to page table
	DSB	ISHST
	LDR	X1, [X2]	// Translates using the new PTE

can actually raise a translation fault on the load instruction because the
translation can be performed speculatively before the page table update and
then marked as "faulting" by the CPU. For user PTEs, this is ok because we
can handle the spurious fault, but for kernel PTEs and intermediate table
entries this results in a panic().

Revert the offending commit to reintroduce the missing barriers.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 24fe1b0e ("arm64: Remove unnecessary ISBs from set_{pte,pmd,pud}")
Reviewed-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit b7005d4ef4f3aa2dc24019ffba03a322557ac43d upstream.

This fixes a kernel panic on memcpy when
FORTIFY_SOURCE is enabled.

The initial smp implementation on commit aa7eb2bb
("arm: zynq: Add smp support")
used memcpy, which worked fine until commit ee333554
("ARM: 8749/1: Kconfig: Add ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE")
enabled overflow checks at runtime, producing a read
overflow panic.

The computed size of memcpy args are:
- p_size (dst): 4294967295 = (size_t) -1
- q_size (src): 1
- size (len): 8

Additionally, the memory is marked as __iomem, so one of
the memcpy_* functions should be used for read/write.

Fixes: aa7eb2bb ("arm: zynq: Add smp support")
Signed-off-by: NLuis Araneda <luaraneda@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NMichal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 16986074035cc0205472882a00d404ed9d213313 upstream.

S3C6410 system restart is triggered by watchdog reset.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 9f55342c ("ARM: dts: s3c64xx: Fix infinite interrupt in soft mode")
Signed-off-by: NLihua Yao <ylhuajnu@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: NKrzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 810f3b860850148788fc1ed8a6f5f807199fed65 upstream.

If ipc->ops.reply_msg_match is NULL, we may end up using uninitialized
mask value.

reported by smatch:
sound/soc/intel/common/sst-ipc.c:266 sst_ipc_reply_find_msg() error: uninitialized symbol 'mask'.
Signed-off-by: NAmadeusz Sławiński <amadeuszx.slawinski@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190827141712.21015-3-amadeuszx.slawinski@linux.intel.comReviewed-by: NPierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 17d29ff98fd4b70e9ccdac5e95e18a087e2737ef upstream.

For copying from __iomem, we should use __ioread32_copy.

reported by sparse:
sound/soc/intel/skylake/skl-debug.c:437:34: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces)
sound/soc/intel/skylake/skl-debug.c:437:34:    expected void [noderef] <asn:2> *to
sound/soc/intel/skylake/skl-debug.c:437:34:    got unsigned char *
sound/soc/intel/skylake/skl-debug.c:437:51: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces)
sound/soc/intel/skylake/skl-debug.c:437:51:    expected void const *from
sound/soc/intel/skylake/skl-debug.c:437:51:    got void [noderef] <asn:2> *[assigned] fw_reg_addr
Signed-off-by: NAmadeusz Sławiński <amadeuszx.slawinski@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190827141712.21015-2-amadeuszx.slawinski@linux.intel.comReviewed-by: NPierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 855a06da37a773fd073d51023ac9d07988c87da8 upstream.

oem_table_id is 8 chars long, so we need to limit it, otherwise it
may print some unprintable characters into dmesg.
Signed-off-by: NAmadeusz Sławiński <amadeuszx.slawinski@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190827141712.21015-7-amadeuszx.slawinski@linux.intel.comReviewed-by: NPierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NMark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 7be3cb019db1cbd5fd5ffe6d64a23fefa4b6f229 upstream.

When brk was moved for binaries without an interpreter, it should have
been limited to ET_DYN only. In other words, the special case was an
ET_DYN that lacks an INTERP, not just an executable that lacks INTERP.
The bug manifested for giant static executables, where the brk would end
up in the middle of the text area on 32-bit architectures.
Reported-and-tested-by: NRichard Kojedzinszky <richard@kojedz.in>
Fixes: bbdc6076d2e5 ("binfmt_elf: move brk out of mmap when doing direct loader exec")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 14e3cdbb00a885eedc95c0cf8eda8fe28d26d6b4 upstream.

A bugfix introduce a link failure in configurations without CONFIG_MODULES:

In file included from drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/pctv452e.c:20:0:
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/pctv452e.c: In function 'pctv452e_frontend_attach':
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stb0899_drv.h:151:36: error: weak declaration of 'stb0899_attach' being applied to a already existing, static definition

The problem is that the !IS_REACHABLE() declaration of stb0899_attach()
is a 'static inline' definition that clashes with the weak definition.

I further observed that the bugfix was only done for one of the five users
of stb0899_attach(), the other four still have the problem.  This reverts
the bugfix and instead addresses the problem by not dropping the reference
count when calling '->detach()', instead we call this function directly
in dvb_frontend_put() before dropping the kref on the front-end.

I first submitted this in early 2018, and after some discussion it
was apparently discarded.  While there is a long-term plan in place,
that plan is obviously not nearing completion yet, and the current
kernel is still broken unless this patch is applied.

Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10140175/
Link: https://patchwork.linuxtv.org/patch/54831/

Cc: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@gmail.com>
Cc: Wolfgang Rohdewald <wolfgang@rohdewald.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f686c143 ("[media] stb0899: move code to "detach" callback")
Fixes: 6cdeaed3 ("media: dvb_usb_pctv452e: module refcount changes were unbalanced")
Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: NSean Young <sean@mess.org>
Signed-off-by: NMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 7e0bb5828311f811309bed5749528ca04992af2f upstream.

Like a bunch of other MSI laptops the MS-1039 uses a 0c45:627b
SN9C201 + OV7660 webcam which is mounted upside down.

Add it to the sn9c20x flip_dmi_table to deal with this.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NRui Salvaterra <rsalvaterra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NHans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NHans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: NMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 16cfacc8085782dab8e365979356ce1ca87fd6cc upstream.

Manually generate the PDPTR reserved bit mask when explicitly loading
PDPTRs.  The reserved bits that are being tracked by the MMU reflect the
current paging mode, which is unlikely to be PAE paging in the vast
majority of flows that use load_pdptrs(), e.g. CR0 and CR4 emulation,
__set_sregs(), etc...  This can cause KVM to incorrectly signal a bad
PDPTR, or more likely, miss a reserved bit check and subsequently fail
a VM-Enter due to a bad VMCS.GUEST_PDPTR.

Add a one off helper to generate the reserved bits instead of sharing
code across the MMU's calculations and the PDPTR emulation.  The PDPTR
reserved bits are basically set in stone, and pushing a helper into
the MMU's calculation adds unnecessary complexity without improving
readability.

Oppurtunistically fix/update the comment for load_pdptrs().

Note, the buggy commit also introduced a deliberate functional change,
"Also remove bit 5-6 from rsvd_bits_mask per latest SDM.", which was
effectively (and correctly) reverted by commit cd9ae5fe ("KVM: x86:
Fix page-tables reserved bits").  A bit of SDM archaeology shows that
the SDM from late 2008 had a bug (likely a copy+paste error) where it
listed bits 6:5 as AVL and A for PDPTEs used for 4k entries but reserved
for 2mb entries.  I.e. the SDM contradicted itself, and bits 6:5 are and
always have been reserved.

Fixes: 20c466b5 ("KVM: Use rsvd_bits_mask in load_pdptrs()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Reported-by: NDoug Reiland <doug.reiland@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NPeter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit c8848cee74ff05638e913582a476bde879c968ad upstream.

x86_emulate_instruction() takes into account ctxt->have_exception flag
during instruction decoding, but in practice this flag is never set in
x86_decode_insn().

Fixes: 6ea6e843 ("KVM: x86: inject exceptions produced by x86_decode_insn")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Denis Lunev <den@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Denis Plotnikov <dplotnikov@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: NJan Dakinevich <jan.dakinevich@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 8530a79c5a9f4e29e6ffb35ec1a79d81f4968ec8 upstream.

inject_emulated_exception() returns true if and only if nested page
fault happens. However, page fault can come from guest page tables
walk, either nested or not nested. In both cases we should stop an
attempt to read under RIP and give guest to step over its own page
fault handler.

This is also visible when an emulated instruction causes a #GP fault
and the VMware backdoor is enabled.  To handle the VMware backdoor,
KVM intercepts #GP faults; with only the next patch applied,
x86_emulate_instruction() injects a #GP but returns EMULATE_FAIL
instead of EMULATE_DONE.   EMULATE_FAIL causes handle_exception_nmi()
(or gp_interception() for SVM) to re-inject the original #GP because it
thinks emulation failed due to a non-VMware opcode.  This patch prevents
the issue as x86_emulate_instruction() will return EMULATE_DONE after
injecting the #GP.

Fixes: 6ea6e843 ("KVM: x86: inject exceptions produced by x86_decode_insn")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Denis Lunev <den@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Denis Plotnikov <dplotnikov@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: NJan Dakinevich <jan.dakinevich@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 5fa1659105fac63e0f3c199b476025c2e04111ce upstream.

The HP Dino PCI controller chip can be used in two variants: as on-board
controller (e.g. in B160L), or on an Add-On card ("Card-Mode") to bridge
PCI components to systems without a PCI bus, e.g. to a HSC/GSC bus.  One
such Add-On card is the HP HSC-PCI Card which has one or more DEC Tulip
PCI NIC chips connected to the on-card Dino PCI controller.

Dino in Card-Mode has a big disadvantage: All PCI memory accesses need
to go through the DINO_MEM_DATA register, so Linux drivers will not be
able to use the ioremap() function. Without ioremap() many drivers will
not work, one example is the tulip driver which then simply crashes the
kernel if it tries to access the ports on the HP HSC card.

This patch disables the HP HSC card if it finds one, and as such
fixes the kernel crash on a HP D350/2 machine.
Signed-off-by: NHelge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Noticed-by: NPhil Scarr <phil.scarr@pm.me>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>