1. 04 6月, 2019 1 次提交
  2. 26 5月, 2019 1 次提交
  3. 22 5月, 2019 1 次提交
    • P
      sched/x86: Save [ER]FLAGS on context switch · 2ea1a37d
      Peter Zijlstra 提交于
      commit 6690e86be83ac75832e461c141055b5d601c0a6d upstream.
      
      Effectively reverts commit:
      
        2c7577a7 ("sched/x86_64: Don't save flags on context switch")
      
      Specifically because SMAP uses FLAGS.AC which invalidates the claim
      that the kernel has clean flags.
      
      In particular; while preemption from interrupt return is fine (the
      IRET frame on the exception stack contains FLAGS) it breaks any code
      that does synchonous scheduling, including preempt_enable().
      
      This has become a significant issue ever since commit:
      
        5b24a7a2 ("Add 'unsafe' user access functions for batched accesses")
      
      provided for means of having 'normal' C code between STAC / CLAC,
      exposing the FLAGS.AC state. So far this hasn't led to trouble,
      however fix it before it comes apart.
      Reported-by: NJulien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
      Acked-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: stable@kernel.org
      Fixes: 5b24a7a2 ("Add 'unsafe' user access functions for batched accesses")
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      2ea1a37d
  4. 15 5月, 2019 1 次提交
  5. 17 4月, 2019 1 次提交
  6. 06 4月, 2019 1 次提交
  7. 31 1月, 2019 1 次提交
  8. 29 12月, 2018 1 次提交
  9. 17 10月, 2018 2 次提交
  10. 14 10月, 2018 1 次提交
  11. 04 10月, 2018 1 次提交
  12. 03 10月, 2018 1 次提交
  13. 02 10月, 2018 1 次提交
    • A
      x86/vdso: Fix asm constraints on vDSO syscall fallbacks · 715bd9d1
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      The syscall fallbacks in the vDSO have incorrect asm constraints.
      They are not marked as writing to their outputs -- instead, they are
      marked as clobbering "memory", which is useless.  In particular, gcc
      is smart enough to know that the timespec parameter hasn't escaped,
      so a memory clobber doesn't clobber it.  And passing a pointer as an
      asm *input* does not tell gcc that the pointed-to value is changed.
      
      Add in the fact that the asm instructions weren't volatile, and gcc
      was free to omit them entirely unless their sole output (the return
      value) is used.  Which it is (phew!), but that stops happening with
      some upcoming patches.
      
      As a trivial example, the following code:
      
      void test_fallback(struct timespec *ts)
      {
      	vdso_fallback_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, ts);
      }
      
      compiles to:
      
      00000000000000c0 <test_fallback>:
        c0:   c3                      retq
      
      To add insult to injury, the RCX and R11 clobbers on 64-bit
      builds were missing.
      
      The "memory" clobber is also unnecessary -- no ordering with respect to
      other memory operations is needed, but that's going to be fixed in a
      separate not-for-stable patch.
      
      Fixes: 2aae950b ("x86_64: Add vDSO for x86-64 with gettimeofday/clock_gettime/getcpu")
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2c0231690551989d2fafa60ed0e7b5cc8b403908.1538422295.git.luto@kernel.org
      715bd9d1
  14. 21 8月, 2018 1 次提交
  15. 06 8月, 2018 1 次提交
    • A
      x86: vdso: Use $LD instead of $CC to link · 379d98dd
      Alistair Strachan 提交于
      The vdso{32,64}.so can fail to link with CC=clang when clang tries to find
      a suitable GCC toolchain to link these libraries with.
      
      /usr/bin/ld: arch/x86/entry/vdso/vclock_gettime.o:
        access beyond end of merged section (782)
      
      This happens because the host environment leaked into the cross compiler
      environment due to the way clang searches for suitable GCC toolchains.
      
      Clang is a retargetable compiler, and each invocation of it must provide
      --target=<something> --gcc-toolchain=<something> to allow it to find the
      correct binutils for cross compilation. These flags had been added to
      KBUILD_CFLAGS, but the vdso code uses CC and not KBUILD_CFLAGS (for various
      reasons) which breaks clang's ability to find the correct linker when cross
      compiling.
      
      Most of the time this goes unnoticed because the host linker is new enough
      to work anyway, or is incompatible and skipped, but this cannot be reliably
      assumed.
      
      This change alters the vdso makefile to just use LD directly, which
      bypasses clang and thus the searching problem. The makefile will just use
      ${CROSS_COMPILE}ld instead, which is always what we want. This matches the
      method used to link vmlinux.
      
      This drops references to DISABLE_LTO; this option doesn't seem to be set
      anywhere, and not knowing what its possible values are, it's not clear how
      to convert it from CC to LD flag.
      Signed-off-by: NAlistair Strachan <astrachan@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Acked-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: kernel-team@android.com
      Cc: joel@joelfernandes.org
      Cc: Andi Kleen <andi.kleen@intel.com>
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180803173931.117515-1-astrachan@google.com
      379d98dd
  16. 24 7月, 2018 1 次提交
    • A
      x86/entry/64: Remove %ebx handling from error_entry/exit · b3681dd5
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      error_entry and error_exit communicate the user vs. kernel status of
      the frame using %ebx.  This is unnecessary -- the information is in
      regs->cs.  Just use regs->cs.
      
      This makes error_entry simpler and makes error_exit more robust.
      
      It also fixes a nasty bug.  Before all the Spectre nonsense, the
      xen_failsafe_callback entry point returned like this:
      
              ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK
              SAVE_C_REGS
              SAVE_EXTRA_REGS
              ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
              jmp     error_exit
      
      And it did not go through error_entry.  This was bogus: RBX
      contained garbage, and error_exit expected a flag in RBX.
      
      Fortunately, it generally contained *nonzero* garbage, so the
      correct code path was used.  As part of the Spectre fixes, code was
      added to clear RBX to mitigate certain speculation attacks.  Now,
      depending on kernel configuration, RBX got zeroed and, when running
      some Wine workloads, the kernel crashes.  This was introduced by:
      
          commit 3ac6d8c7 ("x86/entry/64: Clear registers for exceptions/interrupts, to reduce speculation attack surface")
      
      With this patch applied, RBX is no longer needed as a flag, and the
      problem goes away.
      
      I suspect that malicious userspace could use this bug to crash the
      kernel even without the offending patch applied, though.
      
      [ Historical note: I wrote this patch as a cleanup before I was aware
        of the bug it fixed. ]
      
      [ Note to stable maintainers: this should probably get applied to all
        kernels.  If you're nervous about that, a more conservative fix to
        add xorl %ebx,%ebx; incl %ebx before the jump to error_exit should
        also fix the problem. ]
      Reported-and-tested-by: NM. Vefa Bicakci <m.v.b@runbox.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
      Fixes: 3ac6d8c7 ("x86/entry/64: Clear registers for exceptions/interrupts, to reduce speculation attack surface")
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b5010a090d3586b2d6e06c7ad3ec5542d1241c45.1532282627.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      b3681dd5
  17. 21 7月, 2018 1 次提交
    • J
      x86/entry/32: Check for VM86 mode in slow-path check · d5e84c21
      Joerg Roedel 提交于
      The SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_STACK macro only checks for CPL == 0 to go down the
      slow and paranoid entry path. The problem is that this check also returns
      true when coming from VM86 mode. This is not a problem by itself, as the
      paranoid path handles VM86 stack-frames just fine, but it is not necessary
      as the normal code path handles VM86 mode as well (and faster).
      
      Extend the check to include VM86 mode. This also makes an optimization of
      the paranoid path possible.
      Signed-off-by: NJoerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
      Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
      Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
      Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
      Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
      Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
      Cc: joro@8bytes.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1532103744-31902-3-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
      d5e84c21
  18. 20 7月, 2018 12 次提交
    • J
      x86/entry/32: Add debug code to check entry/exit CR3 · 97193702
      Joerg Roedel 提交于
      Add code to check whether the kernel is entered and left with the correct
      CR3 and make it depend on CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY.  This is needed because there
      is no NX protection of user-addresses in the kernel-CR3 on x86-32 and that
      type of bug would not be detected otherwise.
      Signed-off-by: NJoerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Tested-by: NPavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
      Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
      Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
      Cc: joro@8bytes.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-40-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
      97193702
    • J
      x86/entry/32: Add PTI CR3 switches to NMI handler code · b65bef40
      Joerg Roedel 提交于
      The NMI handler is special, as it needs to leave with the same CR3 as it
      was entered with. This is required because the NMI can happen within kernel
      context but with user CR3 already loaded, i.e. after switching to user CR3
      but before returning to user space.
      Signed-off-by: NJoerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Tested-by: NPavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
      Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
      Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
      Cc: joro@8bytes.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-14-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
      b65bef40
    • J
      x86/entry/32: Add PTI cr3 switch to non-NMI entry/exit points · e464fb9f
      Joerg Roedel 提交于
      Add unconditional cr3 switches between user and kernel cr3 to all non-NMI
      entry and exit points.
      Signed-off-by: NJoerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Tested-by: NPavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
      Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
      Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
      Cc: joro@8bytes.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-13-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
      e464fb9f
    • J
      x86/entry/32: Simplify debug entry point · 929b44eb
      Joerg Roedel 提交于
      The common exception entry code now handles the entry-from-sysenter stack
      situation and makes sure to leave with the same stack as it entered the
      kernel.
      
      So there is no need anymore for the special handling in the debug entry
      code.
      Signed-off-by: NJoerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Tested-by: NPavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
      Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
      Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
      Cc: joro@8bytes.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-12-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
      929b44eb
    • J
      x86/entry/32: Handle Entry from Kernel-Mode on Entry-Stack · b92a165d
      Joerg Roedel 提交于
      It is possible that the kernel is entered from kernel-mode and on the
      entry-stack. The most common way this happens is when an exception is
      triggered while loading the user-space segment registers on the
      kernel-to-userspace exit path.
      
      The segment loading needs to be done after the entry-stack switch, because
      the stack-switch needs kernel %fs for per_cpu access.
      
      When this happens, make sure to leave the kernel with the entry-stack
      again, so that the interrupted code-path runs on the right stack when
      switching to the user-cr3.
      
      Detect this condition on kernel-entry by checking CS.RPL and %esp, and if
      it happens, copy over the complete content of the entry stack to the
      task-stack.  This needs to be done because once the exception handler is
      entereed, the task might be scheduled out or even migrated to a different
      CPU, so this cannot rely on the entry-stack contents. Leave a marker in the
      stack-frame to detect this condition on the exit path.
      
      On the exit path the copy is reversed, copy all of the remaining task-stack
      back to the entry-stack and switch to it.
      Signed-off-by: NJoerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Tested-by: NPavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
      Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
      Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
      Cc: joro@8bytes.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-11-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
      b92a165d
    • J
      x86/entry/32: Introduce SAVE_ALL_NMI and RESTORE_ALL_NMI · 8b376fae
      Joerg Roedel 提交于
      These macros will be used in the NMI handler code and replace plain
      SAVE_ALL and RESTORE_REGS there.
      
      The NMI-specific CR3-switch will be added to these macros later.
      Signed-off-by: NJoerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Tested-by: NPavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
      Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
      Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
      Cc: joro@8bytes.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-10-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
      8b376fae
    • J
      x86/entry/32: Leave the kernel via trampoline stack · e5862d05
      Joerg Roedel 提交于
      Switch back to the trampoline stack before returning to userspace.
      Signed-off-by: NJoerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Tested-by: NPavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
      Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
      Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
      Cc: joro@8bytes.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-9-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
      e5862d05
    • J
      x86/entry/32: Enter the kernel via trampoline stack · 45d7b255
      Joerg Roedel 提交于
      Use the entry-stack as a trampoline to enter the kernel. The entry-stack is
      already in the cpu_entry_area and will be mapped to userspace when PTI is
      enabled.
      Signed-off-by: NJoerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Tested-by: NPavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
      Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
      Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
      Cc: joro@8bytes.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-8-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
      45d7b255
    • J
      x86/entry/32: Split off return-to-kernel path · 0d2eb73b
      Joerg Roedel 提交于
      Use a separate return path when returning to the kernel.
      
      This allows to put the PTI cr3-switch and the switch to the entry-stack
      into the return-to-user path without further checking.
      Signed-off-by: NJoerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Tested-by: NPavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
      Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
      Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
      Cc: joro@8bytes.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-7-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
      0d2eb73b
    • J
      x86/entry/32: Unshare NMI return path · 8e676ced
      Joerg Roedel 提交于
      NMI will no longer use most of the shared return path, because NMI needs
      special handling when the CR3 switches for PTI are added. Prepare for that
      change.
      Signed-off-by: NJoerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Tested-by: NPavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
      Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
      Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
      Cc: joro@8bytes.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-6-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
      8e676ced
    • J
      x86/entry/32: Put ESPFIX code into a macro · 46eabca2
      Joerg Roedel 提交于
      This makes it easier to split up the shared iret code path.
      Signed-off-by: NJoerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Tested-by: NPavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
      Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
      Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
      Cc: joro@8bytes.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-5-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
      46eabca2
    • J
      x86/entry/32: Rename TSS_sysenter_sp0 to TSS_entry2task_stack · ae2e565b
      Joerg Roedel 提交于
      The stack address doesn't need to be stored in tss.sp0 if the stack is
      switched manually like on sysenter. Rename the offset so that it still
      makes sense when its location is changed in later patches.
      
      This stackk will also be used for all kernel-entry points, not just
      sysenter. Reflect that and the fact that it is the offset to the task-stack
      location in the name as well.
      Signed-off-by: NJoerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Tested-by: NPavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
      Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
      Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: keescook@google.com
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com>
      Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca>
      Cc: joro@8bytes.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-3-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
      ae2e565b
  19. 18 7月, 2018 1 次提交
  20. 03 7月, 2018 2 次提交
  21. 27 6月, 2018 1 次提交
  22. 26 6月, 2018 1 次提交
  23. 23 6月, 2018 1 次提交
    • W
      rseq: Avoid infinite recursion when delivering SIGSEGV · 784e0300
      Will Deacon 提交于
      When delivering a signal to a task that is using rseq, we call into
      __rseq_handle_notify_resume() so that the registers pushed in the
      sigframe are updated to reflect the state of the restartable sequence
      (for example, ensuring that the signal returns to the abort handler if
      necessary).
      
      However, if the rseq management fails due to an unrecoverable fault when
      accessing userspace or certain combinations of RSEQ_CS_* flags, then we
      will attempt to deliver a SIGSEGV. This has the potential for infinite
      recursion if the rseq code continuously fails on signal delivery.
      
      Avoid this problem by using force_sigsegv() instead of force_sig(), which
      is explicitly designed to reset the SEGV handler to SIG_DFL in the case
      of a recursive fault. In doing so, remove rseq_signal_deliver() from the
      internal rseq API and have an optional struct ksignal * parameter to
      rseq_handle_notify_resume() instead.
      Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Acked-by: NMathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
      Cc: peterz@infradead.org
      Cc: paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com
      Cc: boqun.feng@gmail.com
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1529664307-983-1-git-send-email-will.deacon@arm.com
      784e0300
  24. 21 6月, 2018 1 次提交
  25. 16 6月, 2018 1 次提交
  26. 14 6月, 2018 1 次提交
    • L
      Kbuild: rename CC_STACKPROTECTOR[_STRONG] config variables · 050e9baa
      Linus Torvalds 提交于
      The changes to automatically test for working stack protector compiler
      support in the Kconfig files removed the special STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO
      option that picked the strongest stack protector that the compiler
      supported.
      
      That was all a nice cleanup - it makes no sense to have the AUTO case
      now that the Kconfig phase can just determine the compiler support
      directly.
      
      HOWEVER.
      
      It also meant that doing "make oldconfig" would now _disable_ the strong
      stackprotector if you had AUTO enabled, because in a legacy config file,
      the sane stack protector configuration would look like
      
        CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
        # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE is not set
        # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR is not set
        # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set
        CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO=y
      
      and when you ran this through "make oldconfig" with the Kbuild changes,
      it would ask you about the regular CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR (that had
      been renamed from CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR to just
      CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR), but it would think that the STRONG version
      used to be disabled (because it was really enabled by AUTO), and would
      disable it in the new config, resulting in:
      
        CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
        CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y
        CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
        # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set
        CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y
      
      That's dangerously subtle - people could suddenly find themselves with
      the weaker stack protector setup without even realizing.
      
      The solution here is to just rename not just the old RECULAR stack
      protector option, but also the strong one.  This does that by just
      removing the CC_ prefix entirely for the user choices, because it really
      is not about the compiler support (the compiler support now instead
      automatially impacts _visibility_ of the options to users).
      
      This results in "make oldconfig" actually asking the user for their
      choice, so that we don't have any silent subtle security model changes.
      The end result would generally look like this:
      
        CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
        CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y
        CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR=y
        CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y
        CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y
      
      where the "CC_" versions really are about internal compiler
      infrastructure, not the user selections.
      Acked-by: NMasahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      050e9baa
  27. 06 6月, 2018 1 次提交
    • M
      x86: Wire up restartable sequence system call · 05c17ced
      Mathieu Desnoyers 提交于
      Wire up the rseq system call on x86 32/64.
      
      This provides an ABI improving the speed of a user-space getcpu
      operation on x86 by removing the need to perform a function call, "lsl"
      instruction, or system call on the fast path, as well as improving the
      speed of user-space operations on per-cpu data.
      Signed-off-by: NMathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Joel Fernandes <joelaf@google.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      Cc: Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
      Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Chris Lameter <cl@linux.com>
      Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
      Cc: Andrew Hunter <ahh@google.com>
      Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
      Cc: "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
      Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
      Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
      Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
      Cc: Ben Maurer <bmaurer@fb.com>
      Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180602124408.8430-8-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
      05c17ced