With it gone, no need to preserve ceph_timespec in process_one_ticket()
either.
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NSage Weil <sage@redhat.com>

Back in 2013, commit 4b8e8b5d ("libceph: fix authorizer
invalidation") tried to fix authorizer invalidation issues by clearing
validity field.  However, nothing ever consults this field, so it
doesn't force us to request any new secrets in any way and therefore we
never get out of the exponential backoff mode:

    [  129.973812] libceph: osd2 192.168.122.1:6810 connect authorization failure
    [  130.706785] libceph: osd2 192.168.122.1:6810 connect authorization failure
    [  131.710088] libceph: osd2 192.168.122.1:6810 connect authorization failure
    [  133.708321] libceph: osd2 192.168.122.1:6810 connect authorization failure
    [  137.706598] libceph: osd2 192.168.122.1:6810 connect authorization failure
    ...

AFAICT this was the case at the time 4b8e8b5d was merged, too.

Using timespec solely as a bool isn't nice, so introduce a new have_key
flag, specifically for this purpose.
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NSage Weil <sage@redhat.com>

Session key is required when calculating message signature. Save the session
key in authorizer, this avoid lookup ticket handler for each message
Signed-off-by: NYan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>

There are a mix of function prototypes with and without extern
in the kernel sources.  Standardize on not using extern for
function prototypes.

Function prototypes don't need to be written with extern.
extern is assumed by the compiler.  Its use is as unnecessary as
using auto to declare automatic/local variables in a block.
Signed-off-by: NJoe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Currently the messenger calls out to a get_authorizer con op, which will
create a new authorizer if it doesn't yet have one.  In the meantime, when
we rotate our service keys, the authorizer doesn't get updated.  Eventually
it will be rejected by the server on a new connection attempt and get
invalidated, and we will then rebuild a new authorizer, but this is not
ideal.

Instead, if we do have an authorizer, call a new update_authorizer op that
will verify that the current authorizer is using the latest secret.  If it
is not, we will build a new one that does.  This avoids the transient
failure.

This fixes one of the sorry sequence of events for bug

	http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/4282Signed-off-by: NSage Weil <sage@inktank.com>
Reviewed-by: NAlex Elder <elder@inktank.com>

Use of "unsigned int" is preferred to bare "unsigned" in net tree.
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This factors out protocol and low-level storage parts of ceph into a
separate libceph module living in net/ceph and include/linux/ceph.  This
is mostly a matter of moving files around.  However, a few key pieces
of the interface change as well:

 - ceph_client becomes ceph_fs_client and ceph_client, where the latter
   captures the mon and osd clients, and the fs_client gets the mds client
   and file system specific pieces.
 - Mount option parsing and debugfs setup is correspondingly broken into
   two pieces.
 - The mon client gets a generic handler callback for otherwise unknown
   messages (mds map, in this case).
 - The basic supported/required feature bits can be expanded (and are by
   ceph_fs_client).

No functional change, aside from some subtle error handling cases that got
cleaned up in the refactoring process.
Signed-off-by: NSage Weil <sage@newdream.net>

The auth_x protocol implements support for a kerberos-like mutual
authentication infrastructure used by Ceph.  We do not simply use vanilla
kerberos because of scalability and performance issues when dealing with
a large cluster of nodes providing a single logical service.

Auth_x provides mutual authentication of client and server and protects
against replay and man in the middle attacks.  It does not encrypt
the full session over the wire, however, so data payload may still be
snooped.
Signed-off-by: NYehuda Sadeh <yehuda@hq.newdream.net>
Signed-off-by: NSage Weil <sage@newdream.net>