提交 fb8585fc 编写于 作者: R Roel Kluin 提交者: David S. Miller

ctcm: avoid wraparound in length of incoming data

Since the receive code should tolerate any incoming garbage, it
should be protected against a potential wraparound when manipulating
length values within incoming data.
block_len is unsigned, so a too large subtraction will cause a
wraparound.
Signed-off-by: NRoel Kluin <roel.kluin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NUrsula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
上级 3a05d140
......@@ -410,9 +410,8 @@ static void chx_rx(fsm_instance *fi, int event, void *arg)
priv->stats.rx_length_errors++;
goto again;
}
block_len -= 2;
if (block_len > 0) {
*((__u16 *)skb->data) = block_len;
if (block_len > 2) {
*((__u16 *)skb->data) = block_len - 2;
ctcm_unpack_skb(ch, skb);
}
again:
......
......@@ -105,7 +105,8 @@ void ctcm_unpack_skb(struct channel *ch, struct sk_buff *pskb)
return;
}
pskb->protocol = ntohs(header->type);
if (header->length <= LL_HEADER_LENGTH) {
if ((header->length <= LL_HEADER_LENGTH) ||
(len <= LL_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
if (!(ch->logflags & LOG_FLAG_ILLEGALSIZE)) {
CTCM_DBF_TEXT_(ERROR, CTC_DBF_ERROR,
"%s(%s): Illegal packet size %d(%d,%d)"
......
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