sctp: frag_point sanity check

[ Upstream commit afd0a8006e98b1890908f81746c94ca5dae29d7c ]

If for some reason an association's fragmentation point is zero,
sctp_datamsg_from_user will try to endlessly try to divide a message
into zero-sized chunks. This eventually causes kernel panic due to
running out of memory.

Although this situation is quite unlikely, it has occurred before as
reported. I propose to add this simple last-ditch sanity check due to
the severity of the potential consequences.
Signed-off-by: NJakub Audykowicz <jakub.audykowicz@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: NMarcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

include/net/sctp/sctp.h

@@ -620,4 +620,9 @@ static inline bool sctp_transport_pmtu_check(struct sctp_transport *t)
 	return false;
 }
 
+static inline __u32 sctp_min_frag_point(struct sctp_sock *sp, __u16 datasize)
+{
+	return sctp_mtu_payload(sp, SCTP_DEFAULT_MINSEGMENT, datasize);
+}
+
 #endif /* __net_sctp_h__ */

net/sctp/chunk.c

@@ -191,6 +191,12 @@ struct sctp_datamsg *sctp_datamsg_from_user(struct sctp_association *asoc,
 	 * the packet
 	 */
 	max_data = asoc->frag_point;
+	if (unlikely(!max_data)) {
+		max_data = sctp_min_frag_point(sctp_sk(asoc->base.sk),
+					       sctp_datachk_len(&asoc->stream));
+		pr_warn_ratelimited("%s: asoc:%p frag_point is zero, forcing max_data to default minimum (%Zu)",
+				    __func__, asoc, max_data);
+	}
 
 	/* If the the peer requested that we authenticate DATA chunks
 	 * we need to account for bundling of the AUTH chunks along with

net/sctp/socket.c

@@ -3328,8 +3328,7 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_maxseg(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval, unsigned
 		__u16 datasize = asoc ? sctp_datachk_len(&asoc->stream) :
 				 sizeof(struct sctp_data_chunk);
 
-		min_len = sctp_mtu_payload(sp, SCTP_DEFAULT_MINSEGMENT,
-					   datasize);
+		min_len = sctp_min_frag_point(sp, datasize);
 		max_len = SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN - datasize;
 
 		if (val < min_len || val > max_len)