kvm: mmu: track read permission explicitly for shadow EPT page tables

To support execute only mappings on behalf of L1 hypervisors,
reuse ACC_USER_MASK to signify if the L1 hypervisor has the R bit
set.

For the nested EPT case, we assumed that the U bit was always set
since there was no equivalent in EPT page tables.  Strictly
speaking, this was not necessary because handle_ept_violation
never set PFERR_USER_MASK in the error code (uf=0 in the
parlance of update_permission_bitmask).  We now have to set
both U and UF correctly, respectively in FNAME(gpte_access)
and in handle_ept_violation.

Also in handle_ept_violation bit 3 of the exit qualification is
not enough to detect a present PTE; all three bits 3-5 have to
be checked.
Signed-off-by: NBandan Das <bsd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c

@@ -2522,6 +2522,12 @@ static int set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep,
 	if (set_mmio_spte(vcpu, sptep, gfn, pfn, pte_access))
 		return 0;
 
+	/*
+	 * For the EPT case, shadow_present_mask is 0 if hardware
+	 * supports exec-only page table entries.  In that case,
+	 * ACC_USER_MASK and shadow_user_mask are used to represent
+	 * read access.  See FNAME(gpte_access) in paging_tmpl.h.
+	 */
 	spte |= shadow_present_mask;
 	if (!speculative)
 		spte |= shadow_accessed_mask;
@@ -3915,9 +3921,7 @@ static void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 				 *   clearer.
 				 */
 				smap = cr4_smap && u && !uf && !ff;
-			} else
-				/* Not really needed: no U/S accesses on ept  */
-				u = 1;
+			}
 
 			fault = (ff && !x) || (uf && !u) || (wf && !w) ||
 				(smapf && smap);

arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h

@@ -181,13 +181,19 @@ static bool FNAME(prefetch_invalid_gpte)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	return true;
 }
 
+/*
+ * For PTTYPE_EPT, a page table can be executable but not readable
+ * on supported processors. Therefore, set_spte does not automatically
+ * set bit 0 if execute only is supported. Here, we repurpose ACC_USER_MASK
+ * to signify readability since it isn't used in the EPT case
+ */
 static inline unsigned FNAME(gpte_access)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gpte)
 {
 	unsigned access;
 #if PTTYPE == PTTYPE_EPT
 	access = ((gpte & VMX_EPT_WRITABLE_MASK) ? ACC_WRITE_MASK : 0) |
 		((gpte & VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK) ? ACC_EXEC_MASK : 0) |
-		ACC_USER_MASK;
+		((gpte & VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK) ? ACC_USER_MASK : 0);
 #else
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(ACC_EXEC_MASK != PT_PRESENT_MASK);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(ACC_EXEC_MASK != 1);

arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c

@@ -6117,12 +6117,14 @@ static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	gpa = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);
 	trace_kvm_page_fault(gpa, exit_qualification);
 
-	/* It is a write fault? */
-	error_code = exit_qualification & PFERR_WRITE_MASK;
+	/* it is a read fault? */
+	error_code = (exit_qualification << 2) & PFERR_USER_MASK;
+	/* it is a write fault? */
+	error_code |= exit_qualification & PFERR_WRITE_MASK;
 	/* It is a fetch fault? */
 	error_code |= (exit_qualification << 2) & PFERR_FETCH_MASK;
 	/* ept page table is present? */
-	error_code |= (exit_qualification >> 3) & PFERR_PRESENT_MASK;
+	error_code |= (exit_qualification & 0x38) != 0;
 
 	vcpu->arch.exit_qualification = exit_qualification;
 
@@ -6469,11 +6471,12 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void)
 	vmx_disable_intercept_msr_write_x2apic(0x83f);
 
 	if (enable_ept) {
-		kvm_mmu_set_mask_ptes(0ull,
+		kvm_mmu_set_mask_ptes(VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK,
 			(enable_ept_ad_bits) ? VMX_EPT_ACCESS_BIT : 0ull,
 			(enable_ept_ad_bits) ? VMX_EPT_DIRTY_BIT : 0ull,
-			0ull, VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK);
-			0ull, VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK, VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK);
+			0ull, VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK,
+			cpu_has_vmx_ept_execute_only() ?
+				      0ull : VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK);
 		ept_set_mmio_spte_mask();
 		kvm_enable_tdp();
 	} else