io_uring: don't touch ctx in setup after ring fd install

commit 044c1ab399afbe9f2ebef49a3204ef1509826dc7 upstream.

syzkaller reported an issue where it looks like a malicious app can
trigger a use-after-free of reading the ctx ->sq_array and ->rings
value right after having installed the ring fd in the process file
table.

Defer ring fd installation until after we're done reading those
values.

Fixes: 75b28affdd6a ("io_uring: allocate the two rings together")
Reported-by: syzbot+6f03d895a6cd0d06187f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: NXiaoguang Wang <xiaoguang.wang@linux.alibaba.com>

fs/io_uring.c

@@ -3829,10 +3829,6 @@ static int io_uring_create(unsigned entries, struct io_uring_params *p)
 	if (ret)
 		goto err;
 
-	ret = io_uring_get_fd(ctx);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto err;
-
 	memset(&p->sq_off, 0, sizeof(p->sq_off));
 	p->sq_off.head = offsetof(struct io_rings, sq.head);
 	p->sq_off.tail = offsetof(struct io_rings, sq.tail);
@@ -3850,6 +3846,14 @@ static int io_uring_create(unsigned entries, struct io_uring_params *p)
 	p->cq_off.overflow = offsetof(struct io_rings, cq_overflow);
 	p->cq_off.cqes = offsetof(struct io_rings, cqes);
 
+	/*
+	 * Install ring fd as the very last thing, so we don't risk someone
+	 * having closed it before we finish setup
+	 */
+	ret = io_uring_get_fd(ctx);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto err;
+
 	p->features = IORING_FEAT_SINGLE_MMAP;
 	return ret;
 err: