提交 b5c37fe6 编写于 作者: D Daniel Borkmann 提交者: David S. Miller

net: sctp: sctp_endpoint_free: zero out secret key data

On sctp_endpoint_destroy, previously used sensitive keying material
should be zeroed out before the memory is returned, as we already do
with e.g. auth keys when released.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
上级 6ba542a2
......@@ -249,6 +249,8 @@ void sctp_endpoint_free(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
/* Final destructor for endpoint. */
static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
{
int i;
SCTP_ASSERT(ep->base.dead, "Endpoint is not dead", return);
/* Free up the HMAC transform. */
......@@ -271,6 +273,9 @@ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
sctp_inq_free(&ep->base.inqueue);
sctp_bind_addr_free(&ep->base.bind_addr);
for (i = 0; i < SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS; ++i)
memset(&ep->secret_key[i], 0, SCTP_SECRET_SIZE);
/* Remove and free the port */
if (sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->bind_hash)
sctp_put_port(ep->base.sk);
......
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