提交 9d1bb39c 编写于 作者: J Jeremy Linton 提交者: Greg Kroah-Hartman

arm64: Always enable spectre-v2 vulnerability detection

[ Upstream commit 8c1e3d2bb44cbb998cb28ff9a18f105fee7f1eb3 ]

Ensure we are always able to detect whether or not the CPU is affected
by Spectre-v2, so that we can later advertise this to userspace.
Signed-off-by: NJeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: NAndre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Tested-by: NStefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com>
Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
上级 b1a33cfd
...@@ -87,7 +87,6 @@ cpu_enable_trap_ctr_access(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused) ...@@ -87,7 +87,6 @@ cpu_enable_trap_ctr_access(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
atomic_t arm64_el2_vector_last_slot = ATOMIC_INIT(-1); atomic_t arm64_el2_vector_last_slot = ATOMIC_INIT(-1);
#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
#include <asm/mmu_context.h> #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h> #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
...@@ -225,11 +224,11 @@ static int detect_harden_bp_fw(void) ...@@ -225,11 +224,11 @@ static int detect_harden_bp_fw(void)
((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) == MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1)) ((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) == MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1))
cb = qcom_link_stack_sanitization; cb = qcom_link_stack_sanitization;
install_bp_hardening_cb(cb, smccc_start, smccc_end); if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR))
install_bp_hardening_cb(cb, smccc_start, smccc_end);
return 1; return 1;
} }
#endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */
DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required); DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required);
...@@ -513,7 +512,6 @@ multi_entry_cap_cpu_enable(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry) ...@@ -513,7 +512,6 @@ multi_entry_cap_cpu_enable(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
caps->cpu_enable(caps); caps->cpu_enable(caps);
} }
#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
/* /*
* List of CPUs that do not need any Spectre-v2 mitigation at all. * List of CPUs that do not need any Spectre-v2 mitigation at all.
*/ */
...@@ -545,6 +543,12 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope) ...@@ -545,6 +543,12 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
if (!need_wa) if (!need_wa)
return false; return false;
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR)) {
pr_warn_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by kernel configuration\n");
__hardenbp_enab = false;
return false;
}
/* forced off */ /* forced off */
if (__nospectre_v2) { if (__nospectre_v2) {
pr_info_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by command line option\n"); pr_info_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
...@@ -556,7 +560,6 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope) ...@@ -556,7 +560,6 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
return (need_wa > 0); return (need_wa > 0);
} }
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS
...@@ -715,13 +718,11 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = { ...@@ -715,13 +718,11 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
ERRATA_MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73), ERRATA_MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73),
}, },
#endif #endif
#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
{ {
.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM, .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
.matches = check_branch_predictor, .matches = check_branch_predictor,
}, },
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS
{ {
.desc = "EL2 vector hardening", .desc = "EL2 vector hardening",
......
Markdown is supported
0% .
You are about to add 0 people to the discussion. Proceed with caution.
先完成此消息的编辑!
想要评论请 注册