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8014370f
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8014370f
编写于
6月 09, 2017
作者:
J
John Johansen
浏览文件
操作
浏览文件
下载
电子邮件补丁
差异文件
apparmor: move path_link mediation to using labels
Signed-off-by:
N
John Johansen
<
john.johansen@canonical.com
>
上级
aebd873e
变更
3
隐藏空白更改
内联
并排
Showing
3 changed file
with
59 addition
and
47 deletion
+59
-47
security/apparmor/file.c
security/apparmor/file.c
+57
-44
security/apparmor/include/file.h
security/apparmor/include/file.h
+1
-1
security/apparmor/lsm.c
security/apparmor/lsm.c
+1
-2
未找到文件。
security/apparmor/file.c
浏览文件 @
8014370f
...
...
@@ -370,66 +370,40 @@ static inline bool xindex_is_subset(u32 link, u32 target)
return
1
;
}
/**
* aa_path_link - Handle hard link permission check
* @profile: the profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
* @old_dentry: the target dentry (NOT NULL)
* @new_dir: directory the new link will be created in (NOT NULL)
* @new_dentry: the link being created (NOT NULL)
*
* Handle the permission test for a link & target pair. Permission
* is encoded as a pair where the link permission is determined
* first, and if allowed, the target is tested. The target test
* is done from the point of the link match (not start of DFA)
* making the target permission dependent on the link permission match.
*
* The subset test if required forces that permissions granted
* on link are a subset of the permission granted to target.
*
* Returns: %0 if allowed else error
*/
int
aa_path_link
(
struct
aa_profile
*
profile
,
struct
dentry
*
old_dentry
,
const
struct
path
*
new_dir
,
struct
dentry
*
new_dentry
)
static
int
profile_path_link
(
struct
aa_profile
*
profile
,
const
struct
path
*
link
,
char
*
buffer
,
const
struct
path
*
target
,
char
*
buffer2
,
struct
path_cond
*
cond
)
{
struct
path
link
=
{
.
mnt
=
new_dir
->
mnt
,
.
dentry
=
new_dentry
};
struct
path
target
=
{
.
mnt
=
new_dir
->
mnt
,
.
dentry
=
old_dentry
};
struct
path_cond
cond
=
{
d_backing_inode
(
old_dentry
)
->
i_uid
,
d_backing_inode
(
old_dentry
)
->
i_mode
};
char
*
buffer
=
NULL
,
*
buffer2
=
NULL
;
const
char
*
lname
,
*
tname
=
NULL
,
*
info
=
NULL
;
struct
aa_perms
lperms
,
perms
;
const
char
*
lname
,
*
tname
=
NULL
;
struct
aa_perms
lperms
=
{},
perms
;
const
char
*
info
=
NULL
;
u32
request
=
AA_MAY_LINK
;
unsigned
int
state
;
int
error
;
get_buffers
(
buffer
,
buffer2
);
lperms
=
nullperms
;
/* buffer freed below, lname is pointer in buffer */
error
=
aa_path_name
(
&
link
,
profile
->
path_flags
,
buffer
,
&
lname
,
&
info
,
profile
->
disconnected
);
error
=
path_name
(
OP_LINK
,
&
profile
->
label
,
link
,
profile
->
path_flags
,
buffer
,
&
lname
,
cond
,
AA_MAY_LINK
);
if
(
error
)
goto
audit
;
/* buffer2 freed below, tname is pointer in buffer2 */
error
=
aa_path_name
(
&
target
,
profile
->
path_flags
,
buffer2
,
&
tname
,
&
info
,
profile
->
disconnected
);
error
=
path_name
(
OP_LINK
,
&
profile
->
label
,
target
,
profile
->
path_flags
,
buffer2
,
&
tname
,
cond
,
AA_MAY_LINK
);
if
(
error
)
goto
audit
;
error
=
-
EACCES
;
/* aa_str_perms - handles the case of the dfa being NULL */
state
=
aa_str_perms
(
profile
->
file
.
dfa
,
profile
->
file
.
start
,
lname
,
&
cond
,
&
lperms
);
cond
,
&
lperms
);
if
(
!
(
lperms
.
allow
&
AA_MAY_LINK
))
goto
audit
;
/* test to see if target can be paired with link */
state
=
aa_dfa_null_transition
(
profile
->
file
.
dfa
,
state
);
aa_str_perms
(
profile
->
file
.
dfa
,
state
,
tname
,
&
cond
,
&
perms
);
aa_str_perms
(
profile
->
file
.
dfa
,
state
,
tname
,
cond
,
&
perms
);
/* force audit/quiet masks for link are stored in the second entry
* in the link pair.
...
...
@@ -440,6 +414,7 @@ int aa_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *old_dentry,
if
(
!
(
perms
.
allow
&
AA_MAY_LINK
))
{
info
=
"target restricted"
;
lperms
=
perms
;
goto
audit
;
}
...
...
@@ -447,10 +422,10 @@ int aa_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *old_dentry,
if
(
!
(
perms
.
allow
&
AA_LINK_SUBSET
))
goto
done_tests
;
/* Do link perm subset test requiring allowed permission on link are
a
* subset of the allowed permissions on target.
/* Do link perm subset test requiring allowed permission on link are
*
a
subset of the allowed permissions on target.
*/
aa_str_perms
(
profile
->
file
.
dfa
,
profile
->
file
.
start
,
tname
,
&
cond
,
aa_str_perms
(
profile
->
file
.
dfa
,
profile
->
file
.
start
,
tname
,
cond
,
&
perms
);
/* AA_MAY_LINK is not considered in the subset test */
...
...
@@ -472,8 +447,46 @@ int aa_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *old_dentry,
error
=
0
;
audit:
error
=
aa_audit_file
(
profile
,
&
lperms
,
OP_LINK
,
request
,
lname
,
tname
,
NULL
,
cond
.
uid
,
info
,
error
);
return
aa_audit_file
(
profile
,
&
lperms
,
OP_LINK
,
request
,
lname
,
tname
,
NULL
,
cond
->
uid
,
info
,
error
);
}
/**
* aa_path_link - Handle hard link permission check
* @label: the label being enforced (NOT NULL)
* @old_dentry: the target dentry (NOT NULL)
* @new_dir: directory the new link will be created in (NOT NULL)
* @new_dentry: the link being created (NOT NULL)
*
* Handle the permission test for a link & target pair. Permission
* is encoded as a pair where the link permission is determined
* first, and if allowed, the target is tested. The target test
* is done from the point of the link match (not start of DFA)
* making the target permission dependent on the link permission match.
*
* The subset test if required forces that permissions granted
* on link are a subset of the permission granted to target.
*
* Returns: %0 if allowed else error
*/
int
aa_path_link
(
struct
aa_label
*
label
,
struct
dentry
*
old_dentry
,
const
struct
path
*
new_dir
,
struct
dentry
*
new_dentry
)
{
struct
path
link
=
{
new_dir
->
mnt
,
new_dentry
};
struct
path
target
=
{
new_dir
->
mnt
,
old_dentry
};
struct
path_cond
cond
=
{
d_backing_inode
(
old_dentry
)
->
i_uid
,
d_backing_inode
(
old_dentry
)
->
i_mode
};
char
*
buffer
=
NULL
,
*
buffer2
=
NULL
;
struct
aa_profile
*
profile
;
int
error
;
/* buffer freed below, lname is pointer in buffer */
get_buffers
(
buffer
,
buffer2
);
error
=
fn_for_each_confined
(
label
,
profile
,
profile_path_link
(
profile
,
&
link
,
buffer
,
&
target
,
buffer2
,
&
cond
));
put_buffers
(
buffer
,
buffer2
);
return
error
;
...
...
security/apparmor/include/file.h
浏览文件 @
8014370f
...
...
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ int aa_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
const
struct
path
*
path
,
int
flags
,
u32
request
,
struct
path_cond
*
cond
);
int
aa_path_link
(
struct
aa_
profile
*
profile
,
struct
dentry
*
old_dentry
,
int
aa_path_link
(
struct
aa_
label
*
label
,
struct
dentry
*
old_dentry
,
const
struct
path
*
new_dir
,
struct
dentry
*
new_dentry
);
int
aa_file_perm
(
const
char
*
op
,
struct
aa_label
*
label
,
struct
file
*
file
,
...
...
security/apparmor/lsm.c
浏览文件 @
8014370f
...
...
@@ -332,8 +332,7 @@ static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_
label
=
begin_current_label_crit_section
();
if
(
!
unconfined
(
label
))
error
=
aa_path_link
(
labels_profile
(
label
),
old_dentry
,
new_dir
,
new_dentry
);
error
=
aa_path_link
(
label
,
old_dentry
,
new_dir
,
new_dentry
);
end_current_label_crit_section
(
label
);
return
error
;
...
...
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