ceph: fix length validation in parse_reply_info()

"len" is read from network and thus needs validation.  Otherwise, given
a bogus "len" value, p+len could be an out-of-bounds pointer, which is
used in further parsing.
Signed-off-by: NXi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NSage Weil <sage@newdream.net>

fs/ceph/mds_client.c

@@ -262,6 +262,7 @@ static int parse_reply_info(struct ceph_msg *msg,
 	/* trace */
 	ceph_decode_32_safe(&p, end, len, bad);
 	if (len > 0) {
+		ceph_decode_need(&p, end, len, bad);
 		err = parse_reply_info_trace(&p, p+len, info, features);
 		if (err < 0)
 			goto out_bad;
@@ -270,6 +271,7 @@ static int parse_reply_info(struct ceph_msg *msg,
 	/* extra */
 	ceph_decode_32_safe(&p, end, len, bad);
 	if (len > 0) {
+		ceph_decode_need(&p, end, len, bad);
 		err = parse_reply_info_extra(&p, p+len, info, features);
 		if (err < 0)
 			goto out_bad;