In the functions compat_get_bitmap() and compat_put_bitmap() the
variable nr_compat_longs stores how many compat_ulong_t words should be
copied in a loop.

The copy loop itself is this:
  if (nr_compat_longs-- > 0) {
      if (__get_user(um, umask)) return -EFAULT;
  } else {
      um = 0;
  }

Since nr_compat_longs gets unconditionally decremented in each loop and
since it's type is unsigned this could theoretically lead to out of
bounds accesses to userspace if nr_compat_longs wraps around to
(unsigned)(-1).

Although the callers currently do not trigger out-of-bounds accesses, we
should better implement the loop in a safe way to completely avoid such
warp-arounds.
Signed-off-by: NHelge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>