verifier.c 92.8 KB
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/* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com
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 * Copyright (c) 2016 Facebook
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 *
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
 * modify it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public
 * License as published by the Free Software Foundation.
 *
 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
 * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
 * General Public License for more details.
 */
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/bpf.h>
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#include <linux/bpf_verifier.h>
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#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <net/netlink.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
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#include <linux/stringify.h>
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/* bpf_check() is a static code analyzer that walks eBPF program
 * instruction by instruction and updates register/stack state.
 * All paths of conditional branches are analyzed until 'bpf_exit' insn.
 *
 * The first pass is depth-first-search to check that the program is a DAG.
 * It rejects the following programs:
 * - larger than BPF_MAXINSNS insns
 * - if loop is present (detected via back-edge)
 * - unreachable insns exist (shouldn't be a forest. program = one function)
 * - out of bounds or malformed jumps
 * The second pass is all possible path descent from the 1st insn.
 * Since it's analyzing all pathes through the program, the length of the
 * analysis is limited to 32k insn, which may be hit even if total number of
 * insn is less then 4K, but there are too many branches that change stack/regs.
 * Number of 'branches to be analyzed' is limited to 1k
 *
 * On entry to each instruction, each register has a type, and the instruction
 * changes the types of the registers depending on instruction semantics.
 * If instruction is BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_5), then type of R5 is
 * copied to R1.
 *
 * All registers are 64-bit.
 * R0 - return register
 * R1-R5 argument passing registers
 * R6-R9 callee saved registers
 * R10 - frame pointer read-only
 *
 * At the start of BPF program the register R1 contains a pointer to bpf_context
 * and has type PTR_TO_CTX.
 *
 * Verifier tracks arithmetic operations on pointers in case:
 *    BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
 *    BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -20),
 * 1st insn copies R10 (which has FRAME_PTR) type into R1
 * and 2nd arithmetic instruction is pattern matched to recognize
 * that it wants to construct a pointer to some element within stack.
 * So after 2nd insn, the register R1 has type PTR_TO_STACK
 * (and -20 constant is saved for further stack bounds checking).
 * Meaning that this reg is a pointer to stack plus known immediate constant.
 *
 * Most of the time the registers have UNKNOWN_VALUE type, which
 * means the register has some value, but it's not a valid pointer.
 * (like pointer plus pointer becomes UNKNOWN_VALUE type)
 *
 * When verifier sees load or store instructions the type of base register
 * can be: PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_CTX, FRAME_PTR. These are three pointer
 * types recognized by check_mem_access() function.
 *
 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE means that this register is pointing to 'map element value'
 * and the range of [ptr, ptr + map's value_size) is accessible.
 *
 * registers used to pass values to function calls are checked against
 * function argument constraints.
 *
 * ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY is one of such argument constraints.
 * It means that the register type passed to this function must be
 * PTR_TO_STACK and it will be used inside the function as
 * 'pointer to map element key'
 *
 * For example the argument constraints for bpf_map_lookup_elem():
 *   .ret_type = RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL,
 *   .arg1_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR,
 *   .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY,
 *
 * ret_type says that this function returns 'pointer to map elem value or null'
 * function expects 1st argument to be a const pointer to 'struct bpf_map' and
 * 2nd argument should be a pointer to stack, which will be used inside
 * the helper function as a pointer to map element key.
 *
 * On the kernel side the helper function looks like:
 * u64 bpf_map_lookup_elem(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5)
 * {
 *    struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) r1;
 *    void *key = (void *) (unsigned long) r2;
 *    void *value;
 *
 *    here kernel can access 'key' and 'map' pointers safely, knowing that
 *    [key, key + map->key_size) bytes are valid and were initialized on
 *    the stack of eBPF program.
 * }
 *
 * Corresponding eBPF program may look like:
 *    BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),  // after this insn R2 type is FRAME_PTR
 *    BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), // after this insn R2 type is PTR_TO_STACK
 *    BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, map_fd),      // after this insn R1 type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP
 *    BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
 * here verifier looks at prototype of map_lookup_elem() and sees:
 * .arg1_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR and R1->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, which is ok,
 * Now verifier knows that this map has key of R1->map_ptr->key_size bytes
 *
 * Then .arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY and R2->type == PTR_TO_STACK, ok so far,
 * Now verifier checks that [R2, R2 + map's key_size) are within stack limits
 * and were initialized prior to this call.
 * If it's ok, then verifier allows this BPF_CALL insn and looks at
 * .ret_type which is RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, so it sets
 * R0->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL which means bpf_map_lookup_elem() function
 * returns ether pointer to map value or NULL.
 *
 * When type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL passes through 'if (reg != 0) goto +off'
 * insn, the register holding that pointer in the true branch changes state to
 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and the same register changes state to CONST_IMM in the false
 * branch. See check_cond_jmp_op().
 *
 * After the call R0 is set to return type of the function and registers R1-R5
 * are set to NOT_INIT to indicate that they are no longer readable.
 */

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/* verifier_state + insn_idx are pushed to stack when branch is encountered */
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struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem {
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	/* verifer state is 'st'
	 * before processing instruction 'insn_idx'
	 * and after processing instruction 'prev_insn_idx'
	 */
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	struct bpf_verifier_state st;
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	int insn_idx;
	int prev_insn_idx;
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	struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *next;
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};

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#define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS	65536
#define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STACK	1024

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struct bpf_call_arg_meta {
	struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
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	bool raw_mode;
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	bool pkt_access;
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	int regno;
	int access_size;
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};

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/* verbose verifier prints what it's seeing
 * bpf_check() is called under lock, so no race to access these global vars
 */
static u32 log_level, log_size, log_len;
static char *log_buf;

static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock);

/* log_level controls verbosity level of eBPF verifier.
 * verbose() is used to dump the verification trace to the log, so the user
 * can figure out what's wrong with the program
 */
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static __printf(1, 2) void verbose(const char *fmt, ...)
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{
	va_list args;

	if (log_level == 0 || log_len >= log_size - 1)
		return;

	va_start(args, fmt);
	log_len += vscnprintf(log_buf + log_len, log_size - log_len, fmt, args);
	va_end(args);
}

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/* string representation of 'enum bpf_reg_type' */
static const char * const reg_type_str[] = {
	[NOT_INIT]		= "?",
	[UNKNOWN_VALUE]		= "inv",
	[PTR_TO_CTX]		= "ctx",
	[CONST_PTR_TO_MAP]	= "map_ptr",
	[PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE]	= "map_value",
	[PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL] = "map_value_or_null",
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	[PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ]	= "map_value_adj",
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	[FRAME_PTR]		= "fp",
	[PTR_TO_STACK]		= "fp",
	[CONST_IMM]		= "imm",
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	[PTR_TO_PACKET]		= "pkt",
	[PTR_TO_PACKET_END]	= "pkt_end",
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};

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#define __BPF_FUNC_STR_FN(x) [BPF_FUNC_ ## x] = __stringify(bpf_ ## x)
static const char * const func_id_str[] = {
	__BPF_FUNC_MAPPER(__BPF_FUNC_STR_FN)
};
#undef __BPF_FUNC_STR_FN

static const char *func_id_name(int id)
{
	BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(func_id_str) != __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID);

	if (id >= 0 && id < __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID && func_id_str[id])
		return func_id_str[id];
	else
		return "unknown";
}

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static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state)
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{
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	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
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	enum bpf_reg_type t;
	int i;

	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
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		reg = &state->regs[i];
		t = reg->type;
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		if (t == NOT_INIT)
			continue;
		verbose(" R%d=%s", i, reg_type_str[t]);
		if (t == CONST_IMM || t == PTR_TO_STACK)
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			verbose("%lld", reg->imm);
		else if (t == PTR_TO_PACKET)
			verbose("(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)",
				reg->id, reg->off, reg->range);
		else if (t == UNKNOWN_VALUE && reg->imm)
			verbose("%lld", reg->imm);
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		else if (t == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP || t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE ||
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			 t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL ||
			 t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ)
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			verbose("(ks=%d,vs=%d,id=%u)",
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				reg->map_ptr->key_size,
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				reg->map_ptr->value_size,
				reg->id);
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		if (reg->min_value != BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE)
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			verbose(",min_value=%lld",
				(long long)reg->min_value);
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		if (reg->max_value != BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE)
			verbose(",max_value=%llu",
				(unsigned long long)reg->max_value);
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	}
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	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
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		if (state->stack_slot_type[i] == STACK_SPILL)
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			verbose(" fp%d=%s", -MAX_BPF_STACK + i,
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				reg_type_str[state->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE].type]);
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	}
	verbose("\n");
}

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static const char *const bpf_class_string[] = {
	[BPF_LD]    = "ld",
	[BPF_LDX]   = "ldx",
	[BPF_ST]    = "st",
	[BPF_STX]   = "stx",
	[BPF_ALU]   = "alu",
	[BPF_JMP]   = "jmp",
	[BPF_RET]   = "BUG",
	[BPF_ALU64] = "alu64",
};

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static const char *const bpf_alu_string[16] = {
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	[BPF_ADD >> 4]  = "+=",
	[BPF_SUB >> 4]  = "-=",
	[BPF_MUL >> 4]  = "*=",
	[BPF_DIV >> 4]  = "/=",
	[BPF_OR  >> 4]  = "|=",
	[BPF_AND >> 4]  = "&=",
	[BPF_LSH >> 4]  = "<<=",
	[BPF_RSH >> 4]  = ">>=",
	[BPF_NEG >> 4]  = "neg",
	[BPF_MOD >> 4]  = "%=",
	[BPF_XOR >> 4]  = "^=",
	[BPF_MOV >> 4]  = "=",
	[BPF_ARSH >> 4] = "s>>=",
	[BPF_END >> 4]  = "endian",
};

static const char *const bpf_ldst_string[] = {
	[BPF_W >> 3]  = "u32",
	[BPF_H >> 3]  = "u16",
	[BPF_B >> 3]  = "u8",
	[BPF_DW >> 3] = "u64",
};

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static const char *const bpf_jmp_string[16] = {
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	[BPF_JA >> 4]   = "jmp",
	[BPF_JEQ >> 4]  = "==",
	[BPF_JGT >> 4]  = ">",
	[BPF_JGE >> 4]  = ">=",
	[BPF_JSET >> 4] = "&",
	[BPF_JNE >> 4]  = "!=",
	[BPF_JSGT >> 4] = "s>",
	[BPF_JSGE >> 4] = "s>=",
	[BPF_CALL >> 4] = "call",
	[BPF_EXIT >> 4] = "exit",
};

static void print_bpf_insn(struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
	u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);

	if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
		if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X)
			verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %sr%d\n",
				insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
				insn->dst_reg,
				bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
				class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
				insn->src_reg);
		else
			verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %s%d\n",
				insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
				insn->dst_reg,
				bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
				class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
				insn->imm);
	} else if (class == BPF_STX) {
		if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM)
			verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = r%d\n",
				insn->code,
				bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
				insn->dst_reg,
				insn->off, insn->src_reg);
		else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD)
			verbose("(%02x) lock *(%s *)(r%d %+d) += r%d\n",
				insn->code,
				bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
				insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
				insn->src_reg);
		else
			verbose("BUG_%02x\n", insn->code);
	} else if (class == BPF_ST) {
		if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
			verbose("BUG_st_%02x\n", insn->code);
			return;
		}
		verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = %d\n",
			insn->code,
			bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
			insn->dst_reg,
			insn->off, insn->imm);
	} else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
		if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
			verbose("BUG_ldx_%02x\n", insn->code);
			return;
		}
		verbose("(%02x) r%d = *(%s *)(r%d %+d)\n",
			insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
			bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
			insn->src_reg, insn->off);
	} else if (class == BPF_LD) {
		if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS) {
			verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[%d]\n",
				insn->code,
				bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
				insn->imm);
		} else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND) {
			verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[r%d + %d]\n",
				insn->code,
				bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
				insn->src_reg, insn->imm);
		} else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IMM) {
			verbose("(%02x) r%d = 0x%x\n",
				insn->code, insn->dst_reg, insn->imm);
		} else {
			verbose("BUG_ld_%02x\n", insn->code);
			return;
		}
	} else if (class == BPF_JMP) {
		u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);

		if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
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			verbose("(%02x) call %s#%d\n", insn->code,
				func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm);
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		} else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) {
			verbose("(%02x) goto pc%+d\n",
				insn->code, insn->off);
		} else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT)) {
			verbose("(%02x) exit\n", insn->code);
		} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
			verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s r%d goto pc%+d\n",
				insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
				bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
				insn->src_reg, insn->off);
		} else {
			verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s 0x%x goto pc%+d\n",
				insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
				bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
				insn->imm, insn->off);
		}
	} else {
		verbose("(%02x) %s\n", insn->code, bpf_class_string[class]);
	}
}

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static int pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *prev_insn_idx)
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{
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	struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem;
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	int insn_idx;

	if (env->head == NULL)
		return -1;

	memcpy(&env->cur_state, &env->head->st, sizeof(env->cur_state));
	insn_idx = env->head->insn_idx;
	if (prev_insn_idx)
		*prev_insn_idx = env->head->prev_insn_idx;
	elem = env->head->next;
	kfree(env->head);
	env->head = elem;
	env->stack_size--;
	return insn_idx;
}

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static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
					     int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx)
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{
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	struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem;
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	elem = kmalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL);
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	if (!elem)
		goto err;

	memcpy(&elem->st, &env->cur_state, sizeof(env->cur_state));
	elem->insn_idx = insn_idx;
	elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx;
	elem->next = env->head;
	env->head = elem;
	env->stack_size++;
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	if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STACK) {
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		verbose("BPF program is too complex\n");
		goto err;
	}
	return &elem->st;
err:
	/* pop all elements and return */
	while (pop_stack(env, NULL) >= 0);
	return NULL;
}

#define CALLER_SAVED_REGS 6
static const int caller_saved[CALLER_SAVED_REGS] = {
	BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_5
};

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static void init_reg_state(struct bpf_reg_state *regs)
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{
	int i;

	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
		regs[i].type = NOT_INIT;
		regs[i].imm = 0;
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		regs[i].min_value = BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE;
		regs[i].max_value = BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE;
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	}

	/* frame pointer */
	regs[BPF_REG_FP].type = FRAME_PTR;

	/* 1st arg to a function */
	regs[BPF_REG_1].type = PTR_TO_CTX;
}

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static void mark_reg_unknown_value(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
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{
	BUG_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG);
	regs[regno].type = UNKNOWN_VALUE;
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	regs[regno].id = 0;
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	regs[regno].imm = 0;
}

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static void reset_reg_range_values(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
{
	regs[regno].min_value = BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE;
	regs[regno].max_value = BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE;
}

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enum reg_arg_type {
	SRC_OP,		/* register is used as source operand */
	DST_OP,		/* register is used as destination operand */
	DST_OP_NO_MARK	/* same as above, check only, don't mark */
};

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static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno,
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			 enum reg_arg_type t)
{
	if (regno >= MAX_BPF_REG) {
		verbose("R%d is invalid\n", regno);
		return -EINVAL;
	}

	if (t == SRC_OP) {
		/* check whether register used as source operand can be read */
		if (regs[regno].type == NOT_INIT) {
			verbose("R%d !read_ok\n", regno);
			return -EACCES;
		}
	} else {
		/* check whether register used as dest operand can be written to */
		if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) {
			verbose("frame pointer is read only\n");
			return -EACCES;
		}
		if (t == DST_OP)
			mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, regno);
	}
	return 0;
}

static int bpf_size_to_bytes(int bpf_size)
{
	if (bpf_size == BPF_W)
		return 4;
	else if (bpf_size == BPF_H)
		return 2;
	else if (bpf_size == BPF_B)
		return 1;
	else if (bpf_size == BPF_DW)
		return 8;
	else
		return -EINVAL;
}

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static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type)
{
	switch (type) {
	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL:
	case PTR_TO_STACK:
	case PTR_TO_CTX:
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	case PTR_TO_PACKET:
	case PTR_TO_PACKET_END:
534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541
	case FRAME_PTR:
	case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP:
		return true;
	default:
		return false;
	}
}

542 543 544
/* check_stack_read/write functions track spill/fill of registers,
 * stack boundary and alignment are checked in check_mem_access()
 */
545 546
static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off,
			     int size, int value_regno)
547 548
{
	int i;
549 550 551
	/* caller checked that off % size == 0 and -MAX_BPF_STACK <= off < 0,
	 * so it's aligned access and [off, off + size) are within stack limits
	 */
552 553

	if (value_regno >= 0 &&
554
	    is_spillable_regtype(state->regs[value_regno].type)) {
555 556

		/* register containing pointer is being spilled into stack */
557
		if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
558 559 560 561 562
			verbose("invalid size of register spill\n");
			return -EACCES;
		}

		/* save register state */
563 564
		state->spilled_regs[(MAX_BPF_STACK + off) / BPF_REG_SIZE] =
			state->regs[value_regno];
565

566 567 568
		for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
			state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] = STACK_SPILL;
	} else {
569
		/* regular write of data into stack */
570
		state->spilled_regs[(MAX_BPF_STACK + off) / BPF_REG_SIZE] =
571
			(struct bpf_reg_state) {};
572 573 574

		for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
			state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] = STACK_MISC;
575 576 577 578
	}
	return 0;
}

579
static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off, int size,
580 581
			    int value_regno)
{
582
	u8 *slot_type;
583 584
	int i;

585
	slot_type = &state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off];
586

587 588
	if (slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL) {
		if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
589 590 591
			verbose("invalid size of register spill\n");
			return -EACCES;
		}
592 593
		for (i = 1; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
			if (slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL) {
594 595 596 597 598 599 600
				verbose("corrupted spill memory\n");
				return -EACCES;
			}
		}

		if (value_regno >= 0)
			/* restore register state from stack */
601 602
			state->regs[value_regno] =
				state->spilled_regs[(MAX_BPF_STACK + off) / BPF_REG_SIZE];
603 604 605
		return 0;
	} else {
		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
606
			if (slot_type[i] != STACK_MISC) {
607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619
				verbose("invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
					off, i, size);
				return -EACCES;
			}
		}
		if (value_regno >= 0)
			/* have read misc data from the stack */
			mark_reg_unknown_value(state->regs, value_regno);
		return 0;
	}
}

/* check read/write into map element returned by bpf_map_lookup_elem() */
620
static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632
			    int size)
{
	struct bpf_map *map = env->cur_state.regs[regno].map_ptr;

	if (off < 0 || off + size > map->value_size) {
		verbose("invalid access to map value, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
			map->value_size, off, size);
		return -EACCES;
	}
	return 0;
}

A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
633 634
#define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff

635
static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
636 637
				       const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
				       enum bpf_access_type t)
638
{
639
	switch (env->prog->type) {
640 641 642 643 644
	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN:
	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT:
		/* dst_input() and dst_output() can't write for now */
		if (t == BPF_WRITE)
			return false;
645 646
	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS:
	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT:
647
	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP:
648
	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT:
649 650 651 652
		if (meta)
			return meta->pkt_access;

		env->seen_direct_write = true;
653 654 655 656 657 658
		return true;
	default:
		return false;
	}
}

659
static int check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
660 661
			       int size)
{
662 663
	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &regs[regno];
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
664

665
	off += reg->off;
666
	if (off < 0 || size <= 0 || off + size > reg->range) {
667 668
		verbose("invalid access to packet, off=%d size=%d, R%d(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)\n",
			off, size, regno, reg->id, reg->off, reg->range);
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
669 670 671 672 673
		return -EACCES;
	}
	return 0;
}

674
/* check access to 'struct bpf_context' fields */
675
static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off, int size,
676
			    enum bpf_access_type t, enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type)
677
{
678 679 680 681
	/* for analyzer ctx accesses are already validated and converted */
	if (env->analyzer_ops)
		return 0;

682
	if (env->prog->aux->ops->is_valid_access &&
683
	    env->prog->aux->ops->is_valid_access(off, size, t, reg_type)) {
684 685 686
		/* remember the offset of last byte accessed in ctx */
		if (env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset < off + size)
			env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset = off + size;
687
		return 0;
688
	}
689 690 691 692 693

	verbose("invalid bpf_context access off=%d size=%d\n", off, size);
	return -EACCES;
}

694
static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
695 696 697 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707
{
	if (env->allow_ptr_leaks)
		return false;

	switch (env->cur_state.regs[regno].type) {
	case UNKNOWN_VALUE:
	case CONST_IMM:
		return false;
	default:
		return true;
	}
}

708 709
static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
			       struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int off, int size)
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
710
{
711
	if (reg->type != PTR_TO_PACKET && reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ) {
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
712
		if (off % size != 0) {
713 714
			verbose("misaligned access off %d size %d\n",
				off, size);
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730
			return -EACCES;
		} else {
			return 0;
		}
	}

	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS))
		/* misaligned access to packet is ok on x86,arm,arm64 */
		return 0;

	if (reg->id && size != 1) {
		verbose("Unknown packet alignment. Only byte-sized access allowed\n");
		return -EACCES;
	}

	/* skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGN-ed */
731 732
	if (reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
	    (NET_IP_ALIGN + reg->off + off) % size != 0) {
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
733 734 735 736 737 738 739
		verbose("misaligned packet access off %d+%d+%d size %d\n",
			NET_IP_ALIGN, reg->off, off, size);
		return -EACCES;
	}
	return 0;
}

740 741 742 743 744 745
/* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write)
 * if t==write, value_regno is a register which value is stored into memory
 * if t==read, value_regno is a register which will receive the value from memory
 * if t==write && value_regno==-1, some unknown value is stored into memory
 * if t==read && value_regno==-1, don't care what we read from memory
 */
746
static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
747 748 749
			    int bpf_size, enum bpf_access_type t,
			    int value_regno)
{
750 751
	struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno];
752 753
	int size, err = 0;

A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
754 755
	if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK)
		off += reg->imm;
756

757 758 759 760
	size = bpf_size_to_bytes(bpf_size);
	if (size < 0)
		return size;

A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
761 762 763
	err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size);
	if (err)
		return err;
764

765 766
	if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE ||
	    reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ) {
767 768 769 770 771
		if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
		    is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
			verbose("R%d leaks addr into map\n", value_regno);
			return -EACCES;
		}
772 773 774 775 776 777 778 779 780 781 782 783 784 785 786 787

		/* If we adjusted the register to this map value at all then we
		 * need to change off and size to min_value and max_value
		 * respectively to make sure our theoretical access will be
		 * safe.
		 */
		if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ) {
			if (log_level)
				print_verifier_state(state);
			env->varlen_map_value_access = true;
			/* The minimum value is only important with signed
			 * comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a
			 * value is 0.  If we are using signed variables for our
			 * index'es we need to make sure that whatever we use
			 * will have a set floor within our range.
			 */
788
			if (reg->min_value < 0) {
789 790 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810
				verbose("R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n",
					regno);
				return -EACCES;
			}
			err = check_map_access(env, regno, reg->min_value + off,
					       size);
			if (err) {
				verbose("R%d min value is outside of the array range\n",
					regno);
				return err;
			}

			/* If we haven't set a max value then we need to bail
			 * since we can't be sure we won't do bad things.
			 */
			if (reg->max_value == BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE) {
				verbose("R%d unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any array access into a map\n",
					regno);
				return -EACCES;
			}
			off += reg->max_value;
		}
811 812 813 814
		err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size);
		if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
			mark_reg_unknown_value(state->regs, value_regno);

A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
815
	} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) {
816 817
		enum bpf_reg_type reg_type = UNKNOWN_VALUE;

818 819 820 821 822
		if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
		    is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
			verbose("R%d leaks addr into ctx\n", value_regno);
			return -EACCES;
		}
823
		err = check_ctx_access(env, off, size, t, &reg_type);
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
824
		if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) {
825
			mark_reg_unknown_value(state->regs, value_regno);
826 827
			/* note that reg.[id|off|range] == 0 */
			state->regs[value_regno].type = reg_type;
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
828
		}
829

A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
830
	} else if (reg->type == FRAME_PTR || reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
831 832 833 834
		if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) {
			verbose("invalid stack off=%d size=%d\n", off, size);
			return -EACCES;
		}
835 836 837 838 839 840 841
		if (t == BPF_WRITE) {
			if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks &&
			    state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off] == STACK_SPILL &&
			    size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
				verbose("attempt to corrupt spilled pointer on stack\n");
				return -EACCES;
			}
842
			err = check_stack_write(state, off, size, value_regno);
843
		} else {
844
			err = check_stack_read(state, off, size, value_regno);
845
		}
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
846
	} else if (state->regs[regno].type == PTR_TO_PACKET) {
847
		if (t == BPF_WRITE && !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, t)) {
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
848 849 850
			verbose("cannot write into packet\n");
			return -EACCES;
		}
851 852 853 854 855
		if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
		    is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
			verbose("R%d leaks addr into packet\n", value_regno);
			return -EACCES;
		}
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
856 857 858
		err = check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size);
		if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
			mark_reg_unknown_value(state->regs, value_regno);
859 860
	} else {
		verbose("R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n",
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
861
			regno, reg_type_str[reg->type]);
862 863
		return -EACCES;
	}
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872

	if (!err && size <= 2 && value_regno >= 0 && env->allow_ptr_leaks &&
	    state->regs[value_regno].type == UNKNOWN_VALUE) {
		/* 1 or 2 byte load zero-extends, determine the number of
		 * zero upper bits. Not doing it fo 4 byte load, since
		 * such values cannot be added to ptr_to_packet anyway.
		 */
		state->regs[value_regno].imm = 64 - size * 8;
	}
873 874 875
	return err;
}

876
static int check_xadd(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
877
{
878
	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
879 880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887 888 889 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 897 898 899 900 901 902 903 904 905 906 907 908 909 910 911
	int err;

	if ((BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W && BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) ||
	    insn->imm != 0) {
		verbose("BPF_XADD uses reserved fields\n");
		return -EINVAL;
	}

	/* check src1 operand */
	err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
	if (err)
		return err;

	/* check src2 operand */
	err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
	if (err)
		return err;

	/* check whether atomic_add can read the memory */
	err = check_mem_access(env, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
			       BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1);
	if (err)
		return err;

	/* check whether atomic_add can write into the same memory */
	return check_mem_access(env, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
				BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1);
}

/* when register 'regno' is passed into function that will read 'access_size'
 * bytes from that pointer, make sure that it's within stack boundary
 * and all elements of stack are initialized
 */
912
static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
913 914
				int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
				struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
915
{
916 917
	struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
918 919
	int off, i;

920 921 922 923 924 925 926 927 928
	if (regs[regno].type != PTR_TO_STACK) {
		if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 &&
		    regs[regno].type == CONST_IMM &&
		    regs[regno].imm  == 0)
			return 0;

		verbose("R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno,
			reg_type_str[regs[regno].type],
			reg_type_str[PTR_TO_STACK]);
929
		return -EACCES;
930
	}
931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939

	off = regs[regno].imm;
	if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 ||
	    access_size <= 0) {
		verbose("invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n",
			regno, off, access_size);
		return -EACCES;
	}

940 941 942 943 944 945
	if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
		meta->access_size = access_size;
		meta->regno = regno;
		return 0;
	}

946
	for (i = 0; i < access_size; i++) {
947
		if (state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] != STACK_MISC) {
948 949 950 951 952 953 954 955
			verbose("invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
				off, i, access_size);
			return -EACCES;
		}
	}
	return 0;
}

956
static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
957 958
			  enum bpf_arg_type arg_type,
			  struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
959
{
960
	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs, *reg = &regs[regno];
961
	enum bpf_reg_type expected_type, type = reg->type;
962 963
	int err = 0;

964
	if (arg_type == ARG_DONTCARE)
965 966
		return 0;

967
	if (type == NOT_INIT) {
968 969 970 971
		verbose("R%d !read_ok\n", regno);
		return -EACCES;
	}

972 973 974 975 976
	if (arg_type == ARG_ANYTHING) {
		if (is_pointer_value(env, regno)) {
			verbose("R%d leaks addr into helper function\n", regno);
			return -EACCES;
		}
977
		return 0;
978
	}
979

980 981
	if (type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
	    !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, meta, BPF_READ)) {
982
		verbose("helper access to the packet is not allowed\n");
983 984 985
		return -EACCES;
	}

986
	if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY ||
987 988
	    arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
		expected_type = PTR_TO_STACK;
989 990
		if (type != PTR_TO_PACKET && type != expected_type)
			goto err_type;
991 992
	} else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE ||
		   arg_type == ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO) {
993
		expected_type = CONST_IMM;
994 995
		if (type != expected_type)
			goto err_type;
996 997
	} else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR) {
		expected_type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
998 999
		if (type != expected_type)
			goto err_type;
1000 1001
	} else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) {
		expected_type = PTR_TO_CTX;
1002 1003
		if (type != expected_type)
			goto err_type;
1004 1005
	} else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_STACK ||
		   arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK) {
1006 1007 1008 1009 1010
		expected_type = PTR_TO_STACK;
		/* One exception here. In case function allows for NULL to be
		 * passed in as argument, it's a CONST_IMM type. Final test
		 * happens during stack boundary checking.
		 */
1011 1012 1013 1014
		if (type == CONST_IMM && reg->imm == 0)
			/* final test in check_stack_boundary() */;
		else if (type != PTR_TO_PACKET && type != expected_type)
			goto err_type;
1015
		meta->raw_mode = arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK;
1016 1017 1018 1019 1020 1021 1022
	} else {
		verbose("unsupported arg_type %d\n", arg_type);
		return -EFAULT;
	}

	if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR) {
		/* bpf_map_xxx(map_ptr) call: remember that map_ptr */
1023
		meta->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr;
1024 1025 1026 1027 1028
	} else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY) {
		/* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., key) call:
		 * check that [key, key + map->key_size) are within
		 * stack limits and initialized
		 */
1029
		if (!meta->map_ptr) {
1030 1031 1032 1033 1034 1035 1036 1037
			/* in function declaration map_ptr must come before
			 * map_key, so that it's verified and known before
			 * we have to check map_key here. Otherwise it means
			 * that kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier
			 */
			verbose("invalid map_ptr to access map->key\n");
			return -EACCES;
		}
1038 1039 1040 1041 1042 1043 1044
		if (type == PTR_TO_PACKET)
			err = check_packet_access(env, regno, 0,
						  meta->map_ptr->key_size);
		else
			err = check_stack_boundary(env, regno,
						   meta->map_ptr->key_size,
						   false, NULL);
1045 1046 1047 1048
	} else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
		/* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., value) call:
		 * check [value, value + map->value_size) validity
		 */
1049
		if (!meta->map_ptr) {
1050 1051 1052 1053
			/* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */
			verbose("invalid map_ptr to access map->value\n");
			return -EACCES;
		}
1054 1055 1056 1057 1058 1059 1060
		if (type == PTR_TO_PACKET)
			err = check_packet_access(env, regno, 0,
						  meta->map_ptr->value_size);
		else
			err = check_stack_boundary(env, regno,
						   meta->map_ptr->value_size,
						   false, NULL);
1061 1062 1063
	} else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE ||
		   arg_type == ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO) {
		bool zero_size_allowed = (arg_type == ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO);
1064 1065 1066 1067 1068 1069 1070 1071 1072 1073

		/* bpf_xxx(..., buf, len) call will access 'len' bytes
		 * from stack pointer 'buf'. Check it
		 * note: regno == len, regno - 1 == buf
		 */
		if (regno == 0) {
			/* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */
			verbose("ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE cannot be first argument\n");
			return -EACCES;
		}
1074 1075 1076 1077 1078
		if (regs[regno - 1].type == PTR_TO_PACKET)
			err = check_packet_access(env, regno - 1, 0, reg->imm);
		else
			err = check_stack_boundary(env, regno - 1, reg->imm,
						   zero_size_allowed, meta);
1079 1080 1081
	}

	return err;
1082 1083 1084 1085
err_type:
	verbose("R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno,
		reg_type_str[type], reg_type_str[expected_type]);
	return -EACCES;
1086 1087
}

1088 1089 1090 1091 1092
static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_map *map, int func_id)
{
	if (!map)
		return 0;

1093 1094 1095 1096 1097 1098 1099 1100 1101 1102 1103 1104 1105 1106 1107
	/* We need a two way check, first is from map perspective ... */
	switch (map->map_type) {
	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY:
		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call)
			goto error;
		break;
	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY:
		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read &&
		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output)
			goto error;
		break;
	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE:
		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stackid)
			goto error;
		break;
1108
	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY:
1109
		if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup &&
1110
		    func_id != BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup)
1111 1112
			goto error;
		break;
1113 1114 1115 1116 1117 1118 1119 1120 1121 1122 1123 1124 1125 1126 1127 1128 1129 1130 1131
	default:
		break;
	}

	/* ... and second from the function itself. */
	switch (func_id) {
	case BPF_FUNC_tail_call:
		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY)
			goto error;
		break;
	case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read:
	case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output:
		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY)
			goto error;
		break;
	case BPF_FUNC_get_stackid:
		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE)
			goto error;
		break;
1132
	case BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup:
1133
	case BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup:
1134 1135 1136
		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY)
			goto error;
		break;
1137 1138
	default:
		break;
1139 1140 1141
	}

	return 0;
1142
error:
1143 1144
	verbose("cannot pass map_type %d into func %s#%d\n",
		map->map_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
1145
	return -EINVAL;
1146 1147
}

1148 1149 1150 1151 1152 1153 1154 1155 1156 1157 1158 1159 1160 1161 1162 1163 1164 1165
static int check_raw_mode(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn)
{
	int count = 0;

	if (fn->arg1_type == ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK)
		count++;
	if (fn->arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK)
		count++;
	if (fn->arg3_type == ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK)
		count++;
	if (fn->arg4_type == ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK)
		count++;
	if (fn->arg5_type == ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK)
		count++;

	return count > 1 ? -EINVAL : 0;
}

1166
static void clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
1167
{
1168 1169
	struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg;
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
1170 1171 1172 1173 1174 1175 1176 1177 1178 1179 1180 1181 1182 1183 1184 1185 1186 1187 1188
	int i;

	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
		if (regs[i].type == PTR_TO_PACKET ||
		    regs[i].type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END)
			mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, i);

	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
		if (state->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL)
			continue;
		reg = &state->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE];
		if (reg->type != PTR_TO_PACKET &&
		    reg->type != PTR_TO_PACKET_END)
			continue;
		reg->type = UNKNOWN_VALUE;
		reg->imm = 0;
	}
}

1189
static int check_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id)
1190
{
1191
	struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
1192
	const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL;
1193 1194
	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
1195
	struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta;
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
1196
	bool changes_data;
1197 1198 1199 1200
	int i, err;

	/* find function prototype */
	if (func_id < 0 || func_id >= __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID) {
1201
		verbose("invalid func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
1202 1203 1204 1205 1206 1207 1208
		return -EINVAL;
	}

	if (env->prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto)
		fn = env->prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(func_id);

	if (!fn) {
1209
		verbose("unknown func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
1210 1211 1212 1213
		return -EINVAL;
	}

	/* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */
1214
	if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && fn->gpl_only) {
1215 1216 1217 1218
		verbose("cannot call GPL only function from proprietary program\n");
		return -EINVAL;
	}

1219
	changes_data = bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(fn->func);
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
1220

1221
	memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
1222
	meta.pkt_access = fn->pkt_access;
1223

1224 1225 1226 1227 1228
	/* We only support one arg being in raw mode at the moment, which
	 * is sufficient for the helper functions we have right now.
	 */
	err = check_raw_mode(fn);
	if (err) {
1229 1230
		verbose("kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n",
			func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
1231 1232 1233
		return err;
	}

1234
	/* check args */
1235
	err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_1, fn->arg1_type, &meta);
1236 1237
	if (err)
		return err;
1238
	err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_2, fn->arg2_type, &meta);
1239 1240
	if (err)
		return err;
1241
	err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_3, fn->arg3_type, &meta);
1242 1243
	if (err)
		return err;
1244
	err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_4, fn->arg4_type, &meta);
1245 1246
	if (err)
		return err;
1247
	err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_5, fn->arg5_type, &meta);
1248 1249 1250
	if (err)
		return err;

1251 1252 1253 1254 1255 1256 1257 1258 1259
	/* Mark slots with STACK_MISC in case of raw mode, stack offset
	 * is inferred from register state.
	 */
	for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) {
		err = check_mem_access(env, meta.regno, i, BPF_B, BPF_WRITE, -1);
		if (err)
			return err;
	}

1260 1261 1262 1263 1264 1265 1266 1267 1268 1269 1270 1271 1272 1273
	/* reset caller saved regs */
	for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
		reg = regs + caller_saved[i];
		reg->type = NOT_INIT;
		reg->imm = 0;
	}

	/* update return register */
	if (fn->ret_type == RET_INTEGER) {
		regs[BPF_REG_0].type = UNKNOWN_VALUE;
	} else if (fn->ret_type == RET_VOID) {
		regs[BPF_REG_0].type = NOT_INIT;
	} else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) {
		regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL;
1274
		regs[BPF_REG_0].max_value = regs[BPF_REG_0].min_value = 0;
1275 1276 1277 1278
		/* remember map_ptr, so that check_map_access()
		 * can check 'value_size' boundary of memory access
		 * to map element returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem()
		 */
1279
		if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) {
1280 1281 1282
			verbose("kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n");
			return -EINVAL;
		}
1283
		regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr;
1284
		regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
1285
	} else {
1286 1287
		verbose("unknown return type %d of func %s#%d\n",
			fn->ret_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
1288 1289
		return -EINVAL;
	}
1290

1291
	err = check_map_func_compatibility(meta.map_ptr, func_id);
1292 1293
	if (err)
		return err;
1294

A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
1295 1296 1297 1298 1299
	if (changes_data)
		clear_all_pkt_pointers(env);
	return 0;
}

1300 1301
static int check_packet_ptr_add(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
				struct bpf_insn *insn)
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
1302
{
1303 1304 1305 1306
	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
	struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
	struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = &regs[insn->src_reg];
	struct bpf_reg_state tmp_reg;
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
1307 1308 1309 1310 1311 1312 1313 1314 1315 1316 1317 1318 1319 1320 1321 1322 1323 1324 1325 1326 1327 1328
	s32 imm;

	if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
		/* pkt_ptr += imm */
		imm = insn->imm;

add_imm:
		if (imm <= 0) {
			verbose("addition of negative constant to packet pointer is not allowed\n");
			return -EACCES;
		}
		if (imm >= MAX_PACKET_OFF ||
		    imm + dst_reg->off >= MAX_PACKET_OFF) {
			verbose("constant %d is too large to add to packet pointer\n",
				imm);
			return -EACCES;
		}
		/* a constant was added to pkt_ptr.
		 * Remember it while keeping the same 'id'
		 */
		dst_reg->off += imm;
	} else {
1329 1330 1331 1332 1333 1334 1335 1336 1337 1338 1339 1340 1341
		if (src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) {
			/* R6=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=62) R7=imm22; r7 += r6 */
			tmp_reg = *dst_reg;  /* save r7 state */
			*dst_reg = *src_reg; /* copy pkt_ptr state r6 into r7 */
			src_reg = &tmp_reg;  /* pretend it's src_reg state */
			/* if the checks below reject it, the copy won't matter,
			 * since we're rejecting the whole program. If all ok,
			 * then imm22 state will be added to r7
			 * and r7 will be pkt(id=0,off=22,r=62) while
			 * r6 will stay as pkt(id=0,off=0,r=62)
			 */
		}

A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
1342 1343 1344 1345 1346 1347 1348 1349 1350 1351 1352 1353 1354 1355 1356 1357 1358 1359 1360 1361 1362 1363 1364
		if (src_reg->type == CONST_IMM) {
			/* pkt_ptr += reg where reg is known constant */
			imm = src_reg->imm;
			goto add_imm;
		}
		/* disallow pkt_ptr += reg
		 * if reg is not uknown_value with guaranteed zero upper bits
		 * otherwise pkt_ptr may overflow and addition will become
		 * subtraction which is not allowed
		 */
		if (src_reg->type != UNKNOWN_VALUE) {
			verbose("cannot add '%s' to ptr_to_packet\n",
				reg_type_str[src_reg->type]);
			return -EACCES;
		}
		if (src_reg->imm < 48) {
			verbose("cannot add integer value with %lld upper zero bits to ptr_to_packet\n",
				src_reg->imm);
			return -EACCES;
		}
		/* dst_reg stays as pkt_ptr type and since some positive
		 * integer value was added to the pointer, increment its 'id'
		 */
1365
		dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
1366 1367 1368 1369 1370 1371 1372 1373

		/* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range and off to zero */
		dst_reg->off = 0;
		dst_reg->range = 0;
	}
	return 0;
}

1374
static int evaluate_reg_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
1375
{
1376 1377
	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
	struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
1378 1379 1380 1381 1382 1383 1384 1385 1386
	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
	s64 imm_log2;

	/* for type == UNKNOWN_VALUE:
	 * imm > 0 -> number of zero upper bits
	 * imm == 0 -> don't track which is the same as all bits can be non-zero
	 */

	if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
1387
		struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = &regs[insn->src_reg];
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
1388 1389 1390 1391 1392 1393 1394 1395 1396 1397 1398 1399 1400 1401 1402 1403 1404 1405 1406 1407 1408 1409 1410 1411 1412 1413 1414 1415 1416 1417 1418 1419 1420 1421 1422 1423 1424 1425 1426 1427 1428 1429 1430 1431 1432 1433 1434 1435 1436 1437 1438 1439 1440 1441 1442 1443 1444 1445 1446 1447 1448 1449 1450 1451 1452 1453 1454 1455 1456 1457 1458 1459 1460 1461 1462 1463 1464 1465 1466 1467 1468 1469 1470 1471 1472 1473 1474 1475

		if (src_reg->type == UNKNOWN_VALUE && src_reg->imm > 0 &&
		    dst_reg->imm && opcode == BPF_ADD) {
			/* dreg += sreg
			 * where both have zero upper bits. Adding them
			 * can only result making one more bit non-zero
			 * in the larger value.
			 * Ex. 0xffff (imm=48) + 1 (imm=63) = 0x10000 (imm=47)
			 *     0xffff (imm=48) + 0xffff = 0x1fffe (imm=47)
			 */
			dst_reg->imm = min(dst_reg->imm, src_reg->imm);
			dst_reg->imm--;
			return 0;
		}
		if (src_reg->type == CONST_IMM && src_reg->imm > 0 &&
		    dst_reg->imm && opcode == BPF_ADD) {
			/* dreg += sreg
			 * where dreg has zero upper bits and sreg is const.
			 * Adding them can only result making one more bit
			 * non-zero in the larger value.
			 */
			imm_log2 = __ilog2_u64((long long)src_reg->imm);
			dst_reg->imm = min(dst_reg->imm, 63 - imm_log2);
			dst_reg->imm--;
			return 0;
		}
		/* all other cases non supported yet, just mark dst_reg */
		dst_reg->imm = 0;
		return 0;
	}

	/* sign extend 32-bit imm into 64-bit to make sure that
	 * negative values occupy bit 63. Note ilog2() would have
	 * been incorrect, since sizeof(insn->imm) == 4
	 */
	imm_log2 = __ilog2_u64((long long)insn->imm);

	if (dst_reg->imm && opcode == BPF_LSH) {
		/* reg <<= imm
		 * if reg was a result of 2 byte load, then its imm == 48
		 * which means that upper 48 bits are zero and shifting this reg
		 * left by 4 would mean that upper 44 bits are still zero
		 */
		dst_reg->imm -= insn->imm;
	} else if (dst_reg->imm && opcode == BPF_MUL) {
		/* reg *= imm
		 * if multiplying by 14 subtract 4
		 * This is conservative calculation of upper zero bits.
		 * It's not trying to special case insn->imm == 1 or 0 cases
		 */
		dst_reg->imm -= imm_log2 + 1;
	} else if (opcode == BPF_AND) {
		/* reg &= imm */
		dst_reg->imm = 63 - imm_log2;
	} else if (dst_reg->imm && opcode == BPF_ADD) {
		/* reg += imm */
		dst_reg->imm = min(dst_reg->imm, 63 - imm_log2);
		dst_reg->imm--;
	} else if (opcode == BPF_RSH) {
		/* reg >>= imm
		 * which means that after right shift, upper bits will be zero
		 * note that verifier already checked that
		 * 0 <= imm < 64 for shift insn
		 */
		dst_reg->imm += insn->imm;
		if (unlikely(dst_reg->imm > 64))
			/* some dumb code did:
			 * r2 = *(u32 *)mem;
			 * r2 >>= 32;
			 * and all bits are zero now */
			dst_reg->imm = 64;
	} else {
		/* all other alu ops, means that we don't know what will
		 * happen to the value, mark it with unknown number of zero bits
		 */
		dst_reg->imm = 0;
	}

	if (dst_reg->imm < 0) {
		/* all 64 bits of the register can contain non-zero bits
		 * and such value cannot be added to ptr_to_packet, since it
		 * may overflow, mark it as unknown to avoid further eval
		 */
		dst_reg->imm = 0;
	}
	return 0;
}

1476 1477
static int evaluate_reg_imm_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
				struct bpf_insn *insn)
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
1478
{
1479 1480 1481
	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
	struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
	struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = &regs[insn->src_reg];
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
1482 1483
	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);

1484 1485
	/* dst_reg->type == CONST_IMM here, simulate execution of 'add'/'or'
	 * insn. Don't care about overflow or negative values, just add them
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
1486 1487 1488 1489 1490 1491
	 */
	if (opcode == BPF_ADD && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K)
		dst_reg->imm += insn->imm;
	else if (opcode == BPF_ADD && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X &&
		 src_reg->type == CONST_IMM)
		dst_reg->imm += src_reg->imm;
1492 1493 1494 1495 1496
	else if (opcode == BPF_OR && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K)
		dst_reg->imm |= insn->imm;
	else if (opcode == BPF_OR && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X &&
		 src_reg->type == CONST_IMM)
		dst_reg->imm |= src_reg->imm;
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
1497 1498
	else
		mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, insn->dst_reg);
1499 1500 1501
	return 0;
}

1502 1503 1504 1505
static void check_reg_overflow(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
{
	if (reg->max_value > BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE)
		reg->max_value = BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE;
1506 1507
	if (reg->min_value < BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE ||
	    reg->min_value > BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE)
1508 1509 1510 1511 1512 1513 1514
		reg->min_value = BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE;
}

static void adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
				    struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs, *dst_reg;
1515 1516
	s64 min_val = BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE;
	u64 max_val = BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE;
1517 1518 1519 1520 1521 1522 1523 1524 1525 1526 1527 1528 1529 1530 1531 1532 1533 1534 1535 1536 1537 1538 1539 1540 1541 1542 1543 1544 1545 1546 1547 1548 1549
	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);

	dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
	if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
		check_reg_overflow(&regs[insn->src_reg]);
		min_val = regs[insn->src_reg].min_value;
		max_val = regs[insn->src_reg].max_value;

		/* If the source register is a random pointer then the
		 * min_value/max_value values represent the range of the known
		 * accesses into that value, not the actual min/max value of the
		 * register itself.  In this case we have to reset the reg range
		 * values so we know it is not safe to look at.
		 */
		if (regs[insn->src_reg].type != CONST_IMM &&
		    regs[insn->src_reg].type != UNKNOWN_VALUE) {
			min_val = BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE;
			max_val = BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE;
		}
	} else if (insn->imm < BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE &&
		   (s64)insn->imm > BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE) {
		min_val = max_val = insn->imm;
	}

	/* We don't know anything about what was done to this register, mark it
	 * as unknown.
	 */
	if (min_val == BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE &&
	    max_val == BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE) {
		reset_reg_range_values(regs, insn->dst_reg);
		return;
	}

1550 1551 1552 1553 1554 1555 1556 1557 1558
	/* If one of our values was at the end of our ranges then we can't just
	 * do our normal operations to the register, we need to set the values
	 * to the min/max since they are undefined.
	 */
	if (min_val == BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE)
		dst_reg->min_value = BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE;
	if (max_val == BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE)
		dst_reg->max_value = BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE;

1559 1560
	switch (opcode) {
	case BPF_ADD:
1561 1562 1563 1564
		if (dst_reg->min_value != BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE)
			dst_reg->min_value += min_val;
		if (dst_reg->max_value != BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE)
			dst_reg->max_value += max_val;
1565 1566
		break;
	case BPF_SUB:
1567 1568 1569 1570
		if (dst_reg->min_value != BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE)
			dst_reg->min_value -= min_val;
		if (dst_reg->max_value != BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE)
			dst_reg->max_value -= max_val;
1571 1572
		break;
	case BPF_MUL:
1573 1574 1575 1576
		if (dst_reg->min_value != BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE)
			dst_reg->min_value *= min_val;
		if (dst_reg->max_value != BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE)
			dst_reg->max_value *= max_val;
1577 1578
		break;
	case BPF_AND:
1579 1580 1581 1582 1583 1584 1585 1586
		/* Disallow AND'ing of negative numbers, ain't nobody got time
		 * for that.  Otherwise the minimum is 0 and the max is the max
		 * value we could AND against.
		 */
		if (min_val < 0)
			dst_reg->min_value = BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE;
		else
			dst_reg->min_value = 0;
1587 1588 1589 1590 1591 1592 1593 1594 1595
		dst_reg->max_value = max_val;
		break;
	case BPF_LSH:
		/* Gotta have special overflow logic here, if we're shifting
		 * more than MAX_RANGE then just assume we have an invalid
		 * range.
		 */
		if (min_val > ilog2(BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE))
			dst_reg->min_value = BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE;
1596
		else if (dst_reg->min_value != BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE)
1597 1598 1599 1600
			dst_reg->min_value <<= min_val;

		if (max_val > ilog2(BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE))
			dst_reg->max_value = BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE;
1601
		else if (dst_reg->max_value != BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE)
1602 1603 1604
			dst_reg->max_value <<= max_val;
		break;
	case BPF_RSH:
1605 1606
		/* RSH by a negative number is undefined, and the BPF_RSH is an
		 * unsigned shift, so make the appropriate casts.
1607
		 */
1608 1609 1610 1611 1612 1613 1614
		if (min_val < 0 || dst_reg->min_value < 0)
			dst_reg->min_value = BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE;
		else
			dst_reg->min_value =
				(u64)(dst_reg->min_value) >> min_val;
		if (dst_reg->max_value != BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE)
			dst_reg->max_value >>= max_val;
1615 1616 1617 1618 1619 1620 1621 1622 1623
		break;
	default:
		reset_reg_range_values(regs, insn->dst_reg);
		break;
	}

	check_reg_overflow(dst_reg);
}

1624
/* check validity of 32-bit and 64-bit arithmetic operations */
1625
static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
1626
{
1627
	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs, *dst_reg;
1628 1629 1630 1631 1632 1633 1634 1635 1636 1637 1638 1639 1640 1641 1642 1643 1644 1645 1646 1647 1648 1649 1650 1651
	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
	int err;

	if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) {
		if (opcode == BPF_NEG) {
			if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != 0 ||
			    insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
			    insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) {
				verbose("BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n");
				return -EINVAL;
			}
		} else {
			if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
			    (insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64)) {
				verbose("BPF_END uses reserved fields\n");
				return -EINVAL;
			}
		}

		/* check src operand */
		err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
		if (err)
			return err;

1652 1653 1654 1655 1656 1657
		if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
			verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
				insn->dst_reg);
			return -EACCES;
		}

1658 1659 1660 1661 1662 1663 1664 1665 1666 1667 1668 1669 1670 1671 1672 1673 1674 1675 1676 1677 1678 1679 1680 1681 1682 1683 1684 1685 1686
		/* check dest operand */
		err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
		if (err)
			return err;

	} else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) {

		if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
			if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
				verbose("BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
				return -EINVAL;
			}

			/* check src operand */
			err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
			if (err)
				return err;
		} else {
			if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
				verbose("BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
				return -EINVAL;
			}
		}

		/* check dest operand */
		err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
		if (err)
			return err;

1687 1688 1689 1690 1691
		/* we are setting our register to something new, we need to
		 * reset its range values.
		 */
		reset_reg_range_values(regs, insn->dst_reg);

1692 1693 1694 1695 1696 1697 1698
		if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
			if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
				/* case: R1 = R2
				 * copy register state to dest reg
				 */
				regs[insn->dst_reg] = regs[insn->src_reg];
			} else {
1699 1700 1701 1702 1703
				if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
					verbose("R%d partial copy of pointer\n",
						insn->src_reg);
					return -EACCES;
				}
1704
				mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, insn->dst_reg);
1705 1706 1707 1708 1709 1710 1711
			}
		} else {
			/* case: R = imm
			 * remember the value we stored into this reg
			 */
			regs[insn->dst_reg].type = CONST_IMM;
			regs[insn->dst_reg].imm = insn->imm;
1712 1713
			regs[insn->dst_reg].max_value = insn->imm;
			regs[insn->dst_reg].min_value = insn->imm;
1714 1715 1716 1717 1718 1719 1720 1721 1722 1723 1724 1725 1726 1727 1728 1729 1730 1731 1732 1733 1734 1735 1736 1737 1738 1739 1740 1741 1742 1743 1744 1745 1746 1747 1748
		}

	} else if (opcode > BPF_END) {
		verbose("invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode);
		return -EINVAL;

	} else {	/* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */

		if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
			if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
				verbose("BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
				return -EINVAL;
			}
			/* check src1 operand */
			err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
			if (err)
				return err;
		} else {
			if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
				verbose("BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
				return -EINVAL;
			}
		}

		/* check src2 operand */
		err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
		if (err)
			return err;

		if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) &&
		    BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) {
			verbose("div by zero\n");
			return -EINVAL;
		}

R
Rabin Vincent 已提交
1749 1750 1751 1752 1753 1754 1755 1756 1757 1758
		if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH ||
		     opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
			int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32;

			if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) {
				verbose("invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm);
				return -EINVAL;
			}
		}

A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
1759 1760 1761 1762 1763 1764 1765
		/* check dest operand */
		err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
		if (err)
			return err;

		dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];

1766 1767 1768
		/* first we want to adjust our ranges. */
		adjust_reg_min_max_vals(env, insn);

1769 1770
		/* pattern match 'bpf_add Rx, imm' instruction */
		if (opcode == BPF_ADD && BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 &&
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
1771 1772 1773 1774
		    dst_reg->type == FRAME_PTR && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
			dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_STACK;
			dst_reg->imm = insn->imm;
			return 0;
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
1775 1776
		} else if (opcode == BPF_ADD &&
			   BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 &&
1777 1778 1779
			   (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET ||
			    (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X &&
			     regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET))) {
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791
			/* ptr_to_packet += K|X */
			return check_packet_ptr_add(env, insn);
		} else if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 &&
			   dst_reg->type == UNKNOWN_VALUE &&
			   env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
			/* unknown += K|X */
			return evaluate_reg_alu(env, insn);
		} else if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 &&
			   dst_reg->type == CONST_IMM &&
			   env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
			/* reg_imm += K|X */
			return evaluate_reg_imm_alu(env, insn);
1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801
		} else if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
			verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
				insn->dst_reg);
			return -EACCES;
		} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X &&
			   is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
			verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
				insn->src_reg);
			return -EACCES;
		}
1802

1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813
		/* If we did pointer math on a map value then just set it to our
		 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ type so we can deal with any stores or
		 * loads to this register appropriately, otherwise just mark the
		 * register as unknown.
		 */
		if (env->allow_ptr_leaks &&
		    (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE ||
		     dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ))
			dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ;
		else
			mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, insn->dst_reg);
1814 1815 1816 1817 1818
	}

	return 0;
}

1819 1820
static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *state,
				   struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
1821
{
1822
	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg;
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
1823
	int i;
1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852

	/* LLVM can generate two kind of checks:
	 *
	 * Type 1:
	 *
	 *   r2 = r3;
	 *   r2 += 8;
	 *   if (r2 > pkt_end) goto <handle exception>
	 *   <access okay>
	 *
	 *   Where:
	 *     r2 == dst_reg, pkt_end == src_reg
	 *     r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0)
	 *     r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0)
	 *
	 * Type 2:
	 *
	 *   r2 = r3;
	 *   r2 += 8;
	 *   if (pkt_end >= r2) goto <access okay>
	 *   <handle exception>
	 *
	 *   Where:
	 *     pkt_end == dst_reg, r2 == src_reg
	 *     r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0)
	 *     r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0)
	 *
	 * Find register r3 and mark its range as r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8)
	 * so that range of bytes [r3, r3 + 8) is safe to access.
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
1853
	 */
1854

A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867
	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
		if (regs[i].type == PTR_TO_PACKET && regs[i].id == dst_reg->id)
			regs[i].range = dst_reg->off;

	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
		if (state->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL)
			continue;
		reg = &state->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE];
		if (reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && reg->id == dst_reg->id)
			reg->range = dst_reg->off;
	}
}

1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
/* Adjusts the register min/max values in the case that the dst_reg is the
 * variable register that we are working on, and src_reg is a constant or we're
 * simply doing a BPF_K check.
 */
static void reg_set_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg,
			    struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, u64 val,
			    u8 opcode)
{
	switch (opcode) {
	case BPF_JEQ:
		/* If this is false then we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is
		 * true then we know for sure.
		 */
		true_reg->max_value = true_reg->min_value = val;
		break;
	case BPF_JNE:
		/* If this is true we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is false
		 * we know the value for sure;
		 */
		false_reg->max_value = false_reg->min_value = val;
		break;
	case BPF_JGT:
		/* Unsigned comparison, the minimum value is 0. */
		false_reg->min_value = 0;
	case BPF_JSGT:
		/* If this is false then we know the maximum val is val,
		 * otherwise we know the min val is val+1.
		 */
		false_reg->max_value = val;
		true_reg->min_value = val + 1;
		break;
	case BPF_JGE:
		/* Unsigned comparison, the minimum value is 0. */
		false_reg->min_value = 0;
	case BPF_JSGE:
		/* If this is false then we know the maximum value is val - 1,
		 * otherwise we know the mimimum value is val.
		 */
		false_reg->max_value = val - 1;
		true_reg->min_value = val;
		break;
	default:
		break;
	}

	check_reg_overflow(false_reg);
	check_reg_overflow(true_reg);
}

/* Same as above, but for the case that dst_reg is a CONST_IMM reg and src_reg
 * is the variable reg.
 */
static void reg_set_min_max_inv(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg,
				struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, u64 val,
				u8 opcode)
{
	switch (opcode) {
	case BPF_JEQ:
		/* If this is false then we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is
		 * true then we know for sure.
		 */
		true_reg->max_value = true_reg->min_value = val;
		break;
	case BPF_JNE:
		/* If this is true we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is false
		 * we know the value for sure;
		 */
		false_reg->max_value = false_reg->min_value = val;
		break;
	case BPF_JGT:
		/* Unsigned comparison, the minimum value is 0. */
		true_reg->min_value = 0;
	case BPF_JSGT:
		/*
		 * If this is false, then the val is <= the register, if it is
		 * true the register <= to the val.
		 */
		false_reg->min_value = val;
		true_reg->max_value = val - 1;
		break;
	case BPF_JGE:
		/* Unsigned comparison, the minimum value is 0. */
		true_reg->min_value = 0;
	case BPF_JSGE:
		/* If this is false then constant < register, if it is true then
		 * the register < constant.
		 */
		false_reg->min_value = val + 1;
		true_reg->max_value = val;
		break;
	default:
		break;
	}

	check_reg_overflow(false_reg);
	check_reg_overflow(true_reg);
}

1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
static void mark_map_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, u32 id,
			 enum bpf_reg_type type)
{
	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &regs[regno];

	if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL && reg->id == id) {
		reg->type = type;
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
		/* We don't need id from this point onwards anymore, thus we
		 * should better reset it, so that state pruning has chances
		 * to take effect.
		 */
		reg->id = 0;
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
		if (type == UNKNOWN_VALUE)
			mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, regno);
	}
}

/* The logic is similar to find_good_pkt_pointers(), both could eventually
 * be folded together at some point.
 */
static void mark_map_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, u32 regno,
			  enum bpf_reg_type type)
{
	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
1990
	u32 id = regs[regno].id;
1991 1992 1993
	int i;

	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
1994
		mark_map_reg(regs, i, id, type);
1995 1996 1997 1998

	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
		if (state->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL)
			continue;
1999
		mark_map_reg(state->spilled_regs, i / BPF_REG_SIZE, id, type);
2000 2001 2002
	}
}

2003
static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
2004 2005
			     struct bpf_insn *insn, int *insn_idx)
{
2006 2007
	struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch, *this_branch = &env->cur_state;
	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = this_branch->regs, *dst_reg;
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
	u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
	int err;

	if (opcode > BPF_EXIT) {
		verbose("invalid BPF_JMP opcode %x\n", opcode);
		return -EINVAL;
	}

	if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
		if (insn->imm != 0) {
			verbose("BPF_JMP uses reserved fields\n");
			return -EINVAL;
		}

		/* check src1 operand */
		err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
		if (err)
			return err;
2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031

		if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
			verbose("R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n",
				insn->src_reg);
			return -EACCES;
		}
2032 2033 2034 2035 2036 2037 2038 2039 2040 2041 2042 2043
	} else {
		if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
			verbose("BPF_JMP uses reserved fields\n");
			return -EINVAL;
		}
	}

	/* check src2 operand */
	err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
	if (err)
		return err;

A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
2044 2045
	dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];

2046 2047 2048
	/* detect if R == 0 where R was initialized to zero earlier */
	if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K &&
	    (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) &&
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
2049
	    dst_reg->type == CONST_IMM && dst_reg->imm == insn->imm) {
2050 2051 2052 2053 2054 2055 2056 2057 2058 2059 2060 2061 2062 2063 2064 2065 2066 2067 2068
		if (opcode == BPF_JEQ) {
			/* if (imm == imm) goto pc+off;
			 * only follow the goto, ignore fall-through
			 */
			*insn_idx += insn->off;
			return 0;
		} else {
			/* if (imm != imm) goto pc+off;
			 * only follow fall-through branch, since
			 * that's where the program will go
			 */
			return 0;
		}
	}

	other_branch = push_stack(env, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, *insn_idx);
	if (!other_branch)
		return -EFAULT;

2069 2070 2071 2072 2073 2074 2075 2076 2077 2078 2079 2080 2081 2082 2083 2084 2085
	/* detect if we are comparing against a constant value so we can adjust
	 * our min/max values for our dst register.
	 */
	if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
		if (regs[insn->src_reg].type == CONST_IMM)
			reg_set_min_max(&other_branch->regs[insn->dst_reg],
					dst_reg, regs[insn->src_reg].imm,
					opcode);
		else if (dst_reg->type == CONST_IMM)
			reg_set_min_max_inv(&other_branch->regs[insn->src_reg],
					    &regs[insn->src_reg], dst_reg->imm,
					    opcode);
	} else {
		reg_set_min_max(&other_branch->regs[insn->dst_reg],
					dst_reg, insn->imm, opcode);
	}

2086
	/* detect if R == 0 where R is returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem() */
2087
	if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K &&
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
2088 2089
	    insn->imm == 0 && (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) &&
	    dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) {
2090 2091 2092 2093 2094 2095 2096
		/* Mark all identical map registers in each branch as either
		 * safe or unknown depending R == 0 or R != 0 conditional.
		 */
		mark_map_regs(this_branch, insn->dst_reg,
			      opcode == BPF_JEQ ? PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE : UNKNOWN_VALUE);
		mark_map_regs(other_branch, insn->dst_reg,
			      opcode == BPF_JEQ ? UNKNOWN_VALUE : PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE);
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
2097 2098 2099
	} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JGT &&
		   dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
		   regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) {
2100 2101 2102 2103 2104
		find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg);
	} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JGE &&
		   dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
		   regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET) {
		find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, &regs[insn->src_reg]);
2105 2106 2107
	} else if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
		verbose("R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n", insn->dst_reg);
		return -EACCES;
2108 2109
	}
	if (log_level)
2110
		print_verifier_state(this_branch);
2111 2112 2113
	return 0;
}

2114 2115 2116 2117 2118 2119 2120 2121
/* return the map pointer stored inside BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
static struct bpf_map *ld_imm64_to_map_ptr(struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
	u64 imm64 = ((u64) (u32) insn[0].imm) | ((u64) (u32) insn[1].imm) << 32;

	return (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) imm64;
}

2122
/* verify BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
2123
static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
2124
{
2125
	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
2126 2127 2128 2129 2130 2131 2132 2133 2134 2135 2136 2137 2138 2139 2140
	int err;

	if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) {
		verbose("invalid BPF_LD_IMM insn\n");
		return -EINVAL;
	}
	if (insn->off != 0) {
		verbose("BPF_LD_IMM64 uses reserved fields\n");
		return -EINVAL;
	}

	err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
	if (err)
		return err;

2141 2142 2143 2144 2145 2146 2147 2148 2149 2150 2151
	if (insn->src_reg == 0) {
		/* generic move 64-bit immediate into a register,
		 * only analyzer needs to collect the ld_imm value.
		 */
		u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm;

		if (!env->analyzer_ops)
			return 0;

		regs[insn->dst_reg].type = CONST_IMM;
		regs[insn->dst_reg].imm = imm;
2152
		return 0;
2153
	}
2154 2155 2156 2157 2158 2159 2160 2161 2162

	/* replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr() should have caught bad ld_imm64 */
	BUG_ON(insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD);

	regs[insn->dst_reg].type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
	regs[insn->dst_reg].map_ptr = ld_imm64_to_map_ptr(insn);
	return 0;
}

2163 2164 2165 2166 2167
static bool may_access_skb(enum bpf_prog_type type)
{
	switch (type) {
	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER:
	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS:
2168
	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT:
2169 2170 2171 2172 2173 2174
		return true;
	default:
		return false;
	}
}

2175 2176 2177 2178 2179 2180 2181 2182 2183 2184 2185 2186 2187 2188 2189
/* verify safety of LD_ABS|LD_IND instructions:
 * - they can only appear in the programs where ctx == skb
 * - since they are wrappers of function calls, they scratch R1-R5 registers,
 *   preserve R6-R9, and store return value into R0
 *
 * Implicit input:
 *   ctx == skb == R6 == CTX
 *
 * Explicit input:
 *   SRC == any register
 *   IMM == 32-bit immediate
 *
 * Output:
 *   R0 - 8/16/32-bit skb data converted to cpu endianness
 */
2190
static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
2191
{
2192
	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
2193
	u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code);
2194
	struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
2195 2196
	int i, err;

2197
	if (!may_access_skb(env->prog->type)) {
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
2198
		verbose("BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] instructions not allowed for this program type\n");
2199 2200 2201 2202
		return -EINVAL;
	}

	if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
2203
	    BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW ||
2204
	    (mode == BPF_ABS && insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0)) {
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
2205
		verbose("BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] uses reserved fields\n");
2206 2207 2208 2209 2210 2211 2212 2213 2214 2215 2216 2217 2218 2219 2220 2221 2222 2223 2224 2225 2226 2227 2228 2229 2230 2231 2232 2233 2234 2235 2236 2237 2238 2239
		return -EINVAL;
	}

	/* check whether implicit source operand (register R6) is readable */
	err = check_reg_arg(regs, BPF_REG_6, SRC_OP);
	if (err)
		return err;

	if (regs[BPF_REG_6].type != PTR_TO_CTX) {
		verbose("at the time of BPF_LD_ABS|IND R6 != pointer to skb\n");
		return -EINVAL;
	}

	if (mode == BPF_IND) {
		/* check explicit source operand */
		err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
		if (err)
			return err;
	}

	/* reset caller saved regs to unreadable */
	for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
		reg = regs + caller_saved[i];
		reg->type = NOT_INIT;
		reg->imm = 0;
	}

	/* mark destination R0 register as readable, since it contains
	 * the value fetched from the packet
	 */
	regs[BPF_REG_0].type = UNKNOWN_VALUE;
	return 0;
}

2240 2241 2242 2243 2244 2245 2246 2247 2248 2249 2250 2251 2252 2253 2254 2255 2256 2257 2258 2259 2260 2261 2262 2263 2264 2265 2266 2267 2268 2269 2270 2271 2272 2273 2274 2275 2276 2277 2278 2279
/* non-recursive DFS pseudo code
 * 1  procedure DFS-iterative(G,v):
 * 2      label v as discovered
 * 3      let S be a stack
 * 4      S.push(v)
 * 5      while S is not empty
 * 6            t <- S.pop()
 * 7            if t is what we're looking for:
 * 8                return t
 * 9            for all edges e in G.adjacentEdges(t) do
 * 10               if edge e is already labelled
 * 11                   continue with the next edge
 * 12               w <- G.adjacentVertex(t,e)
 * 13               if vertex w is not discovered and not explored
 * 14                   label e as tree-edge
 * 15                   label w as discovered
 * 16                   S.push(w)
 * 17                   continue at 5
 * 18               else if vertex w is discovered
 * 19                   label e as back-edge
 * 20               else
 * 21                   // vertex w is explored
 * 22                   label e as forward- or cross-edge
 * 23           label t as explored
 * 24           S.pop()
 *
 * convention:
 * 0x10 - discovered
 * 0x11 - discovered and fall-through edge labelled
 * 0x12 - discovered and fall-through and branch edges labelled
 * 0x20 - explored
 */

enum {
	DISCOVERED = 0x10,
	EXPLORED = 0x20,
	FALLTHROUGH = 1,
	BRANCH = 2,
};

2280
#define STATE_LIST_MARK ((struct bpf_verifier_state_list *) -1L)
2281

2282 2283 2284 2285 2286 2287 2288 2289 2290
static int *insn_stack;	/* stack of insns to process */
static int cur_stack;	/* current stack index */
static int *insn_state;

/* t, w, e - match pseudo-code above:
 * t - index of current instruction
 * w - next instruction
 * e - edge
 */
2291
static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
2292 2293 2294 2295 2296 2297 2298 2299 2300 2301 2302 2303
{
	if (e == FALLTHROUGH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | FALLTHROUGH))
		return 0;

	if (e == BRANCH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | BRANCH))
		return 0;

	if (w < 0 || w >= env->prog->len) {
		verbose("jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", t, w);
		return -EINVAL;
	}

2304 2305 2306 2307
	if (e == BRANCH)
		/* mark branch target for state pruning */
		env->explored_states[w] = STATE_LIST_MARK;

2308 2309 2310 2311 2312 2313 2314 2315 2316 2317 2318 2319 2320 2321 2322 2323 2324 2325 2326 2327 2328 2329 2330 2331
	if (insn_state[w] == 0) {
		/* tree-edge */
		insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e;
		insn_state[w] = DISCOVERED;
		if (cur_stack >= env->prog->len)
			return -E2BIG;
		insn_stack[cur_stack++] = w;
		return 1;
	} else if ((insn_state[w] & 0xF0) == DISCOVERED) {
		verbose("back-edge from insn %d to %d\n", t, w);
		return -EINVAL;
	} else if (insn_state[w] == EXPLORED) {
		/* forward- or cross-edge */
		insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e;
	} else {
		verbose("insn state internal bug\n");
		return -EFAULT;
	}
	return 0;
}

/* non-recursive depth-first-search to detect loops in BPF program
 * loop == back-edge in directed graph
 */
2332
static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
2333 2334 2335 2336 2337 2338 2339 2340 2341 2342 2343 2344 2345 2346 2347 2348 2349 2350 2351 2352 2353 2354 2355 2356 2357 2358 2359 2360 2361 2362 2363 2364 2365 2366 2367 2368
{
	struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
	int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
	int ret = 0;
	int i, t;

	insn_state = kcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!insn_state)
		return -ENOMEM;

	insn_stack = kcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!insn_stack) {
		kfree(insn_state);
		return -ENOMEM;
	}

	insn_state[0] = DISCOVERED; /* mark 1st insn as discovered */
	insn_stack[0] = 0; /* 0 is the first instruction */
	cur_stack = 1;

peek_stack:
	if (cur_stack == 0)
		goto check_state;
	t = insn_stack[cur_stack - 1];

	if (BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) == BPF_JMP) {
		u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insns[t].code);

		if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) {
			goto mark_explored;
		} else if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
			ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
			if (ret == 1)
				goto peek_stack;
			else if (ret < 0)
				goto err_free;
2369 2370
			if (t + 1 < insn_cnt)
				env->explored_states[t + 1] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
2371 2372 2373 2374 2375 2376 2377 2378 2379 2380 2381 2382
		} else if (opcode == BPF_JA) {
			if (BPF_SRC(insns[t].code) != BPF_K) {
				ret = -EINVAL;
				goto err_free;
			}
			/* unconditional jump with single edge */
			ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1,
					FALLTHROUGH, env);
			if (ret == 1)
				goto peek_stack;
			else if (ret < 0)
				goto err_free;
2383 2384 2385
			/* tell verifier to check for equivalent states
			 * after every call and jump
			 */
2386 2387
			if (t + 1 < insn_cnt)
				env->explored_states[t + 1] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
2388 2389 2390 2391 2392 2393 2394 2395 2396 2397 2398 2399 2400 2401 2402 2403 2404 2405 2406 2407 2408 2409 2410 2411 2412 2413 2414 2415 2416 2417 2418 2419 2420 2421 2422 2423 2424 2425 2426 2427 2428 2429 2430 2431 2432 2433 2434 2435 2436 2437
		} else {
			/* conditional jump with two edges */
			ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
			if (ret == 1)
				goto peek_stack;
			else if (ret < 0)
				goto err_free;

			ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, BRANCH, env);
			if (ret == 1)
				goto peek_stack;
			else if (ret < 0)
				goto err_free;
		}
	} else {
		/* all other non-branch instructions with single
		 * fall-through edge
		 */
		ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
		if (ret == 1)
			goto peek_stack;
		else if (ret < 0)
			goto err_free;
	}

mark_explored:
	insn_state[t] = EXPLORED;
	if (cur_stack-- <= 0) {
		verbose("pop stack internal bug\n");
		ret = -EFAULT;
		goto err_free;
	}
	goto peek_stack;

check_state:
	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
		if (insn_state[i] != EXPLORED) {
			verbose("unreachable insn %d\n", i);
			ret = -EINVAL;
			goto err_free;
		}
	}
	ret = 0; /* cfg looks good */

err_free:
	kfree(insn_state);
	kfree(insn_stack);
	return ret;
}

A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
2438 2439 2440
/* the following conditions reduce the number of explored insns
 * from ~140k to ~80k for ultra large programs that use a lot of ptr_to_packet
 */
2441 2442
static bool compare_ptrs_to_packet(struct bpf_reg_state *old,
				   struct bpf_reg_state *cur)
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
2443 2444 2445 2446 2447 2448 2449 2450 2451 2452 2453 2454 2455 2456 2457 2458 2459 2460 2461 2462 2463 2464 2465 2466 2467 2468 2469 2470 2471 2472 2473 2474 2475 2476 2477 2478 2479 2480 2481 2482 2483 2484 2485 2486 2487 2488 2489 2490
{
	if (old->id != cur->id)
		return false;

	/* old ptr_to_packet is more conservative, since it allows smaller
	 * range. Ex:
	 * old(off=0,r=10) is equal to cur(off=0,r=20), because
	 * old(off=0,r=10) means that with range=10 the verifier proceeded
	 * further and found no issues with the program. Now we're in the same
	 * spot with cur(off=0,r=20), so we're safe too, since anything further
	 * will only be looking at most 10 bytes after this pointer.
	 */
	if (old->off == cur->off && old->range < cur->range)
		return true;

	/* old(off=20,r=10) is equal to cur(off=22,re=22 or 5 or 0)
	 * since both cannot be used for packet access and safe(old)
	 * pointer has smaller off that could be used for further
	 * 'if (ptr > data_end)' check
	 * Ex:
	 * old(off=20,r=10) and cur(off=22,r=22) and cur(off=22,r=0) mean
	 * that we cannot access the packet.
	 * The safe range is:
	 * [ptr, ptr + range - off)
	 * so whenever off >=range, it means no safe bytes from this pointer.
	 * When comparing old->off <= cur->off, it means that older code
	 * went with smaller offset and that offset was later
	 * used to figure out the safe range after 'if (ptr > data_end)' check
	 * Say, 'old' state was explored like:
	 * ... R3(off=0, r=0)
	 * R4 = R3 + 20
	 * ... now R4(off=20,r=0)  <-- here
	 * if (R4 > data_end)
	 * ... R4(off=20,r=20), R3(off=0,r=20) and R3 can be used to access.
	 * ... the code further went all the way to bpf_exit.
	 * Now the 'cur' state at the mark 'here' has R4(off=30,r=0).
	 * old_R4(off=20,r=0) equal to cur_R4(off=30,r=0), since if the verifier
	 * goes further, such cur_R4 will give larger safe packet range after
	 * 'if (R4 > data_end)' and all further insn were already good with r=20,
	 * so they will be good with r=30 and we can prune the search.
	 */
	if (old->off <= cur->off &&
	    old->off >= old->range && cur->off >= cur->range)
		return true;

	return false;
}

2491 2492 2493 2494 2495 2496 2497 2498 2499 2500 2501 2502 2503 2504 2505 2506 2507 2508 2509 2510 2511 2512 2513 2514 2515 2516
/* compare two verifier states
 *
 * all states stored in state_list are known to be valid, since
 * verifier reached 'bpf_exit' instruction through them
 *
 * this function is called when verifier exploring different branches of
 * execution popped from the state stack. If it sees an old state that has
 * more strict register state and more strict stack state then this execution
 * branch doesn't need to be explored further, since verifier already
 * concluded that more strict state leads to valid finish.
 *
 * Therefore two states are equivalent if register state is more conservative
 * and explored stack state is more conservative than the current one.
 * Example:
 *       explored                   current
 * (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) == (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC)
 * (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) != (slot1=INV slot2=MISC)
 *
 * In other words if current stack state (one being explored) has more
 * valid slots than old one that already passed validation, it means
 * the verifier can stop exploring and conclude that current state is valid too
 *
 * Similarly with registers. If explored state has register type as invalid
 * whereas register type in current state is meaningful, it means that
 * the current state will reach 'bpf_exit' instruction safely
 */
2517 2518
static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
			 struct bpf_verifier_state *old,
2519
			 struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
2520
{
2521
	bool varlen_map_access = env->varlen_map_value_access;
2522
	struct bpf_reg_state *rold, *rcur;
2523 2524 2525
	int i;

	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
2526 2527 2528 2529 2530 2531
		rold = &old->regs[i];
		rcur = &cur->regs[i];

		if (memcmp(rold, rcur, sizeof(*rold)) == 0)
			continue;

2532 2533 2534
		/* If the ranges were not the same, but everything else was and
		 * we didn't do a variable access into a map then we are a-ok.
		 */
2535
		if (!varlen_map_access &&
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
2536
		    memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetofend(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0)
2537 2538
			continue;

2539 2540 2541 2542
		/* If we didn't map access then again we don't care about the
		 * mismatched range values and it's ok if our old type was
		 * UNKNOWN and we didn't go to a NOT_INIT'ed reg.
		 */
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
2543
		if (rold->type == NOT_INIT ||
2544 2545
		    (!varlen_map_access && rold->type == UNKNOWN_VALUE &&
		     rcur->type != NOT_INIT))
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
2546 2547
			continue;

A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
2548 2549 2550 2551
		if (rold->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && rcur->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
		    compare_ptrs_to_packet(rold, rcur))
			continue;

A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
2552
		return false;
2553 2554 2555
	}

	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i++) {
2556 2557 2558 2559 2560 2561 2562 2563
		if (old->stack_slot_type[i] == STACK_INVALID)
			continue;
		if (old->stack_slot_type[i] != cur->stack_slot_type[i])
			/* Ex: old explored (safe) state has STACK_SPILL in
			 * this stack slot, but current has has STACK_MISC ->
			 * this verifier states are not equivalent,
			 * return false to continue verification of this path
			 */
2564
			return false;
2565 2566 2567 2568 2569 2570 2571 2572 2573
		if (i % BPF_REG_SIZE)
			continue;
		if (memcmp(&old->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE],
			   &cur->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE],
			   sizeof(old->spilled_regs[0])))
			/* when explored and current stack slot types are
			 * the same, check that stored pointers types
			 * are the same as well.
			 * Ex: explored safe path could have stored
2574
			 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .imm = -8}
2575
			 * but current path has stored:
2576
			 * (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .imm = -16}
2577 2578 2579 2580 2581 2582
			 * such verifier states are not equivalent.
			 * return false to continue verification of this path
			 */
			return false;
		else
			continue;
2583 2584 2585 2586
	}
	return true;
}

2587
static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
2588
{
2589 2590
	struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl;
	struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl;
2591 2592 2593 2594 2595 2596 2597 2598 2599

	sl = env->explored_states[insn_idx];
	if (!sl)
		/* this 'insn_idx' instruction wasn't marked, so we will not
		 * be doing state search here
		 */
		return 0;

	while (sl != STATE_LIST_MARK) {
2600
		if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, &env->cur_state))
2601 2602 2603 2604 2605 2606 2607 2608 2609 2610 2611 2612 2613
			/* reached equivalent register/stack state,
			 * prune the search
			 */
			return 1;
		sl = sl->next;
	}

	/* there were no equivalent states, remember current one.
	 * technically the current state is not proven to be safe yet,
	 * but it will either reach bpf_exit (which means it's safe) or
	 * it will be rejected. Since there are no loops, we won't be
	 * seeing this 'insn_idx' instruction again on the way to bpf_exit
	 */
2614
	new_sl = kmalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list), GFP_USER);
2615 2616 2617 2618 2619 2620 2621 2622 2623 2624
	if (!new_sl)
		return -ENOMEM;

	/* add new state to the head of linked list */
	memcpy(&new_sl->state, &env->cur_state, sizeof(env->cur_state));
	new_sl->next = env->explored_states[insn_idx];
	env->explored_states[insn_idx] = new_sl;
	return 0;
}

2625 2626 2627 2628 2629 2630 2631 2632 2633
static int ext_analyzer_insn_hook(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
				  int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx)
{
	if (!env->analyzer_ops || !env->analyzer_ops->insn_hook)
		return 0;

	return env->analyzer_ops->insn_hook(env, insn_idx, prev_insn_idx);
}

2634
static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
2635
{
2636
	struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
2637
	struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
2638
	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
2639 2640 2641 2642 2643 2644 2645
	int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
	int insn_idx, prev_insn_idx = 0;
	int insn_processed = 0;
	bool do_print_state = false;

	init_reg_state(regs);
	insn_idx = 0;
2646
	env->varlen_map_value_access = false;
2647 2648 2649 2650 2651 2652 2653 2654 2655 2656 2657 2658 2659 2660
	for (;;) {
		struct bpf_insn *insn;
		u8 class;
		int err;

		if (insn_idx >= insn_cnt) {
			verbose("invalid insn idx %d insn_cnt %d\n",
				insn_idx, insn_cnt);
			return -EFAULT;
		}

		insn = &insns[insn_idx];
		class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);

2661
		if (++insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) {
2662 2663 2664 2665 2666
			verbose("BPF program is too large. Proccessed %d insn\n",
				insn_processed);
			return -E2BIG;
		}

2667 2668 2669 2670 2671 2672 2673 2674 2675 2676 2677 2678 2679 2680 2681
		err = is_state_visited(env, insn_idx);
		if (err < 0)
			return err;
		if (err == 1) {
			/* found equivalent state, can prune the search */
			if (log_level) {
				if (do_print_state)
					verbose("\nfrom %d to %d: safe\n",
						prev_insn_idx, insn_idx);
				else
					verbose("%d: safe\n", insn_idx);
			}
			goto process_bpf_exit;
		}

2682 2683
		if (log_level && do_print_state) {
			verbose("\nfrom %d to %d:", prev_insn_idx, insn_idx);
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
2684
			print_verifier_state(&env->cur_state);
2685 2686 2687 2688 2689 2690 2691 2692
			do_print_state = false;
		}

		if (log_level) {
			verbose("%d: ", insn_idx);
			print_bpf_insn(insn);
		}

2693 2694 2695 2696
		err = ext_analyzer_insn_hook(env, insn_idx, prev_insn_idx);
		if (err)
			return err;

2697
		if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
2698
			err = check_alu_op(env, insn);
2699 2700 2701 2702
			if (err)
				return err;

		} else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
2703
			enum bpf_reg_type *prev_src_type, src_reg_type;
2704 2705 2706

			/* check for reserved fields is already done */

2707 2708 2709 2710 2711 2712 2713 2714 2715
			/* check src operand */
			err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
			if (err)
				return err;

			err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
			if (err)
				return err;

2716 2717
			src_reg_type = regs[insn->src_reg].type;

2718 2719 2720 2721 2722 2723 2724 2725 2726
			/* check that memory (src_reg + off) is readable,
			 * the state of dst_reg will be updated by this func
			 */
			err = check_mem_access(env, insn->src_reg, insn->off,
					       BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ,
					       insn->dst_reg);
			if (err)
				return err;

2727
			reset_reg_range_values(regs, insn->dst_reg);
2728 2729
			if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W &&
			    BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) {
2730 2731 2732
				insn_idx++;
				continue;
			}
2733

2734 2735 2736
			prev_src_type = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ptr_type;

			if (*prev_src_type == NOT_INIT) {
2737 2738
				/* saw a valid insn
				 * dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + off)
2739
				 * save type to validate intersecting paths
2740
				 */
2741
				*prev_src_type = src_reg_type;
2742

2743
			} else if (src_reg_type != *prev_src_type &&
2744
				   (src_reg_type == PTR_TO_CTX ||
2745
				    *prev_src_type == PTR_TO_CTX)) {
2746 2747 2748 2749 2750 2751 2752 2753 2754 2755 2756
				/* ABuser program is trying to use the same insn
				 * dst_reg = *(u32*) (src_reg + off)
				 * with different pointer types:
				 * src_reg == ctx in one branch and
				 * src_reg == stack|map in some other branch.
				 * Reject it.
				 */
				verbose("same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n");
				return -EINVAL;
			}

2757
		} else if (class == BPF_STX) {
2758
			enum bpf_reg_type *prev_dst_type, dst_reg_type;
2759

2760 2761 2762 2763 2764 2765 2766 2767 2768 2769 2770 2771 2772 2773 2774 2775 2776
			if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD) {
				err = check_xadd(env, insn);
				if (err)
					return err;
				insn_idx++;
				continue;
			}

			/* check src1 operand */
			err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
			if (err)
				return err;
			/* check src2 operand */
			err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
			if (err)
				return err;

2777 2778
			dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type;

2779 2780 2781 2782 2783 2784 2785
			/* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */
			err = check_mem_access(env, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
					       BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE,
					       insn->src_reg);
			if (err)
				return err;

2786 2787 2788 2789 2790
			prev_dst_type = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ptr_type;

			if (*prev_dst_type == NOT_INIT) {
				*prev_dst_type = dst_reg_type;
			} else if (dst_reg_type != *prev_dst_type &&
2791
				   (dst_reg_type == PTR_TO_CTX ||
2792
				    *prev_dst_type == PTR_TO_CTX)) {
2793 2794 2795 2796
				verbose("same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n");
				return -EINVAL;
			}

2797 2798 2799 2800 2801 2802 2803 2804 2805 2806 2807 2808 2809 2810 2811 2812 2813 2814 2815 2816 2817 2818 2819 2820 2821 2822 2823 2824 2825 2826 2827 2828 2829 2830 2831 2832 2833 2834 2835 2836 2837 2838 2839 2840 2841 2842 2843 2844 2845 2846 2847 2848 2849 2850 2851 2852 2853 2854 2855 2856 2857 2858 2859 2860 2861
		} else if (class == BPF_ST) {
			if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM ||
			    insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
				verbose("BPF_ST uses reserved fields\n");
				return -EINVAL;
			}
			/* check src operand */
			err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
			if (err)
				return err;

			/* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */
			err = check_mem_access(env, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
					       BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE,
					       -1);
			if (err)
				return err;

		} else if (class == BPF_JMP) {
			u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);

			if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
				if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
				    insn->off != 0 ||
				    insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
				    insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
					verbose("BPF_CALL uses reserved fields\n");
					return -EINVAL;
				}

				err = check_call(env, insn->imm);
				if (err)
					return err;

			} else if (opcode == BPF_JA) {
				if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
				    insn->imm != 0 ||
				    insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
				    insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
					verbose("BPF_JA uses reserved fields\n");
					return -EINVAL;
				}

				insn_idx += insn->off + 1;
				continue;

			} else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) {
				if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
				    insn->imm != 0 ||
				    insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
				    insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
					verbose("BPF_EXIT uses reserved fields\n");
					return -EINVAL;
				}

				/* eBPF calling convetion is such that R0 is used
				 * to return the value from eBPF program.
				 * Make sure that it's readable at this time
				 * of bpf_exit, which means that program wrote
				 * something into it earlier
				 */
				err = check_reg_arg(regs, BPF_REG_0, SRC_OP);
				if (err)
					return err;

2862 2863 2864 2865 2866
				if (is_pointer_value(env, BPF_REG_0)) {
					verbose("R0 leaks addr as return value\n");
					return -EACCES;
				}

2867
process_bpf_exit:
2868 2869 2870 2871 2872 2873 2874 2875 2876 2877 2878 2879 2880 2881 2882 2883
				insn_idx = pop_stack(env, &prev_insn_idx);
				if (insn_idx < 0) {
					break;
				} else {
					do_print_state = true;
					continue;
				}
			} else {
				err = check_cond_jmp_op(env, insn, &insn_idx);
				if (err)
					return err;
			}
		} else if (class == BPF_LD) {
			u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code);

			if (mode == BPF_ABS || mode == BPF_IND) {
2884 2885 2886 2887
				err = check_ld_abs(env, insn);
				if (err)
					return err;

2888 2889 2890 2891 2892 2893 2894 2895 2896 2897
			} else if (mode == BPF_IMM) {
				err = check_ld_imm(env, insn);
				if (err)
					return err;

				insn_idx++;
			} else {
				verbose("invalid BPF_LD mode\n");
				return -EINVAL;
			}
2898
			reset_reg_range_values(regs, insn->dst_reg);
2899 2900 2901 2902 2903 2904 2905 2906
		} else {
			verbose("unknown insn class %d\n", class);
			return -EINVAL;
		}

		insn_idx++;
	}

A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
2907
	verbose("processed %d insns\n", insn_processed);
2908 2909 2910
	return 0;
}

2911 2912 2913 2914 2915 2916 2917 2918 2919 2920 2921 2922 2923 2924
static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_map *map,
					struct bpf_prog *prog)

{
	if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT &&
	    (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH ||
	     map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH) &&
	    (map->map_flags & BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC)) {
		verbose("perf_event programs can only use preallocated hash map\n");
		return -EINVAL;
	}
	return 0;
}

2925 2926 2927
/* look for pseudo eBPF instructions that access map FDs and
 * replace them with actual map pointers
 */
2928
static int replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
2929 2930 2931
{
	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
	int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
2932
	int i, j, err;
2933

2934 2935 2936 2937
	err = bpf_prog_calc_digest(env->prog);
	if (err)
		return err;

2938
	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
2939
		if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX &&
2940
		    (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0)) {
2941 2942 2943 2944
			verbose("BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n");
			return -EINVAL;
		}

2945 2946 2947 2948 2949 2950 2951
		if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX &&
		    ((BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM &&
		      BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_XADD) || insn->imm != 0)) {
			verbose("BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n");
			return -EINVAL;
		}

2952 2953 2954 2955 2956 2957 2958 2959 2960 2961 2962 2963 2964 2965 2966 2967 2968 2969 2970 2971 2972
		if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) {
			struct bpf_map *map;
			struct fd f;

			if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 ||
			    insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 ||
			    insn[1].off != 0) {
				verbose("invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
				return -EINVAL;
			}

			if (insn->src_reg == 0)
				/* valid generic load 64-bit imm */
				goto next_insn;

			if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD) {
				verbose("unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
				return -EINVAL;
			}

			f = fdget(insn->imm);
2973
			map = __bpf_map_get(f);
2974 2975 2976 2977 2978 2979
			if (IS_ERR(map)) {
				verbose("fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n",
					insn->imm);
				return PTR_ERR(map);
			}

2980 2981 2982 2983 2984 2985
			err = check_map_prog_compatibility(map, env->prog);
			if (err) {
				fdput(f);
				return err;
			}

2986 2987 2988 2989 2990 2991 2992 2993 2994 2995 2996 2997 2998 2999 3000 3001 3002 3003 3004 3005 3006
			/* store map pointer inside BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
			insn[0].imm = (u32) (unsigned long) map;
			insn[1].imm = ((u64) (unsigned long) map) >> 32;

			/* check whether we recorded this map already */
			for (j = 0; j < env->used_map_cnt; j++)
				if (env->used_maps[j] == map) {
					fdput(f);
					goto next_insn;
				}

			if (env->used_map_cnt >= MAX_USED_MAPS) {
				fdput(f);
				return -E2BIG;
			}

			/* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier,
			 * the map will be released by release_maps() or it
			 * will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded
			 * and all maps are released in free_bpf_prog_info()
			 */
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
3007 3008 3009 3010 3011 3012 3013
			map = bpf_map_inc(map, false);
			if (IS_ERR(map)) {
				fdput(f);
				return PTR_ERR(map);
			}
			env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map;

3014 3015 3016 3017 3018 3019 3020 3021 3022 3023 3024 3025 3026 3027 3028
			fdput(f);
next_insn:
			insn++;
			i++;
		}
	}

	/* now all pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions load valid
	 * 'struct bpf_map *' into a register instead of user map_fd.
	 * These pointers will be used later by verifier to validate map access.
	 */
	return 0;
}

/* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */
3029
static void release_maps(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
3030 3031 3032 3033 3034 3035 3036 3037
{
	int i;

	for (i = 0; i < env->used_map_cnt; i++)
		bpf_map_put(env->used_maps[i]);
}

/* convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic BPF_LD_IMM64 */
3038
static void convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
3039 3040 3041 3042 3043 3044 3045 3046 3047 3048
{
	struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
	int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
	int i;

	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++)
		if (insn->code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW))
			insn->src_reg = 0;
}

3049 3050 3051
/* convert load instructions that access fields of 'struct __sk_buff'
 * into sequence of instructions that access fields of 'struct sk_buff'
 */
3052
static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
3053
{
3054
	const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops = env->prog->aux->ops;
3055
	const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
3056
	struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16], *insn;
3057
	struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
3058
	enum bpf_access_type type;
3059
	int i, cnt, delta = 0;
3060

3061 3062 3063 3064 3065 3066 3067 3068 3069 3070 3071 3072
	if (ops->gen_prologue) {
		cnt = ops->gen_prologue(insn_buf, env->seen_direct_write,
					env->prog);
		if (cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) {
			verbose("bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
			return -EINVAL;
		} else if (cnt) {
			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, 0,
							 insn_buf, cnt);
			if (!new_prog)
				return -ENOMEM;
			env->prog = new_prog;
3073
			delta += cnt - 1;
3074 3075 3076 3077
		}
	}

	if (!ops->convert_ctx_access)
3078 3079
		return 0;

3080
	insn = env->prog->insnsi + delta;
3081

3082
	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
3083 3084
		if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
		    insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW))
3085
			type = BPF_READ;
3086 3087
		else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
			 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW))
3088 3089
			type = BPF_WRITE;
		else
3090 3091
			continue;

3092
		if (env->insn_aux_data[i].ptr_type != PTR_TO_CTX)
3093 3094
			continue;

3095 3096
		cnt = ops->convert_ctx_access(type, insn->dst_reg, insn->src_reg,
					      insn->off, insn_buf, env->prog);
3097 3098 3099 3100 3101
		if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) {
			verbose("bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
			return -EINVAL;
		}

3102 3103
		new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, i + delta, insn_buf,
						 cnt);
3104 3105 3106
		if (!new_prog)
			return -ENOMEM;

3107
		delta += cnt - 1;
3108 3109 3110

		/* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */
		env->prog = new_prog;
3111
		insn      = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
3112 3113 3114 3115 3116
	}

	return 0;
}

3117
static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
3118
{
3119
	struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, *sln;
3120 3121 3122 3123 3124 3125 3126 3127 3128 3129 3130 3131 3132 3133 3134 3135 3136 3137 3138
	int i;

	if (!env->explored_states)
		return;

	for (i = 0; i < env->prog->len; i++) {
		sl = env->explored_states[i];

		if (sl)
			while (sl != STATE_LIST_MARK) {
				sln = sl->next;
				kfree(sl);
				sl = sln;
			}
	}

	kfree(env->explored_states);
}

3139
int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr)
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
3140
{
3141
	char __user *log_ubuf = NULL;
3142
	struct bpf_verifier_env *env;
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
3143 3144
	int ret = -EINVAL;

3145
	/* 'struct bpf_verifier_env' can be global, but since it's not small,
3146 3147
	 * allocate/free it every time bpf_check() is called
	 */
3148
	env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL);
3149 3150 3151
	if (!env)
		return -ENOMEM;

3152 3153 3154 3155 3156
	env->insn_aux_data = vzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) *
				     (*prog)->len);
	ret = -ENOMEM;
	if (!env->insn_aux_data)
		goto err_free_env;
3157
	env->prog = *prog;
3158

3159 3160 3161 3162 3163 3164 3165 3166 3167 3168 3169 3170 3171 3172 3173 3174
	/* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */
	mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock);

	if (attr->log_level || attr->log_buf || attr->log_size) {
		/* user requested verbose verifier output
		 * and supplied buffer to store the verification trace
		 */
		log_level = attr->log_level;
		log_ubuf = (char __user *) (unsigned long) attr->log_buf;
		log_size = attr->log_size;
		log_len = 0;

		ret = -EINVAL;
		/* log_* values have to be sane */
		if (log_size < 128 || log_size > UINT_MAX >> 8 ||
		    log_level == 0 || log_ubuf == NULL)
3175
			goto err_unlock;
3176 3177 3178 3179

		ret = -ENOMEM;
		log_buf = vmalloc(log_size);
		if (!log_buf)
3180
			goto err_unlock;
3181 3182 3183 3184
	} else {
		log_level = 0;
	}

3185 3186 3187 3188
	ret = replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(env);
	if (ret < 0)
		goto skip_full_check;

3189
	env->explored_states = kcalloc(env->prog->len,
3190
				       sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list *),
3191 3192 3193 3194 3195
				       GFP_USER);
	ret = -ENOMEM;
	if (!env->explored_states)
		goto skip_full_check;

3196 3197 3198 3199
	ret = check_cfg(env);
	if (ret < 0)
		goto skip_full_check;

3200 3201
	env->allow_ptr_leaks = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);

3202
	ret = do_check(env);
3203

3204
skip_full_check:
3205
	while (pop_stack(env, NULL) >= 0);
3206
	free_states(env);
3207

3208 3209 3210 3211
	if (ret == 0)
		/* program is valid, convert *(u32*)(ctx + off) accesses */
		ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env);

3212 3213 3214 3215 3216 3217 3218 3219 3220 3221 3222 3223 3224
	if (log_level && log_len >= log_size - 1) {
		BUG_ON(log_len >= log_size);
		/* verifier log exceeded user supplied buffer */
		ret = -ENOSPC;
		/* fall through to return what was recorded */
	}

	/* copy verifier log back to user space including trailing zero */
	if (log_level && copy_to_user(log_ubuf, log_buf, log_len + 1) != 0) {
		ret = -EFAULT;
		goto free_log_buf;
	}

3225 3226
	if (ret == 0 && env->used_map_cnt) {
		/* if program passed verifier, update used_maps in bpf_prog_info */
3227 3228 3229
		env->prog->aux->used_maps = kmalloc_array(env->used_map_cnt,
							  sizeof(env->used_maps[0]),
							  GFP_KERNEL);
3230

3231
		if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) {
3232 3233 3234 3235
			ret = -ENOMEM;
			goto free_log_buf;
		}

3236
		memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_maps, env->used_maps,
3237
		       sizeof(env->used_maps[0]) * env->used_map_cnt);
3238
		env->prog->aux->used_map_cnt = env->used_map_cnt;
3239 3240 3241 3242 3243 3244

		/* program is valid. Convert pseudo bpf_ld_imm64 into generic
		 * bpf_ld_imm64 instructions
		 */
		convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(env);
	}
3245 3246 3247 3248

free_log_buf:
	if (log_level)
		vfree(log_buf);
3249
	if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps)
3250 3251 3252 3253
		/* if we didn't copy map pointers into bpf_prog_info, release
		 * them now. Otherwise free_bpf_prog_info() will release them.
		 */
		release_maps(env);
3254
	*prog = env->prog;
3255
err_unlock:
3256
	mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
3257 3258 3259
	vfree(env->insn_aux_data);
err_free_env:
	kfree(env);
A
Alexei Starovoitov 已提交
3260 3261
	return ret;
}
3262 3263 3264 3265 3266 3267 3268 3269 3270 3271 3272 3273 3274 3275 3276 3277 3278 3279 3280 3281 3282 3283 3284 3285 3286 3287 3288 3289 3290 3291 3292 3293 3294 3295 3296 3297 3298 3299 3300 3301 3302 3303 3304 3305 3306 3307 3308 3309 3310 3311 3312

int bpf_analyzer(struct bpf_prog *prog, const struct bpf_ext_analyzer_ops *ops,
		 void *priv)
{
	struct bpf_verifier_env *env;
	int ret;

	env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!env)
		return -ENOMEM;

	env->insn_aux_data = vzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) *
				     prog->len);
	ret = -ENOMEM;
	if (!env->insn_aux_data)
		goto err_free_env;
	env->prog = prog;
	env->analyzer_ops = ops;
	env->analyzer_priv = priv;

	/* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */
	mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock);

	log_level = 0;

	env->explored_states = kcalloc(env->prog->len,
				       sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list *),
				       GFP_KERNEL);
	ret = -ENOMEM;
	if (!env->explored_states)
		goto skip_full_check;

	ret = check_cfg(env);
	if (ret < 0)
		goto skip_full_check;

	env->allow_ptr_leaks = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);

	ret = do_check(env);

skip_full_check:
	while (pop_stack(env, NULL) >= 0);
	free_states(env);

	mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
	vfree(env->insn_aux_data);
err_free_env:
	kfree(env);
	return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_analyzer);