1. 12 12月, 2019 2 次提交
  2. 11 12月, 2019 1 次提交
  3. 09 12月, 2019 2 次提交
  4. 30 10月, 2019 1 次提交
  5. 28 10月, 2019 2 次提交
  6. 25 10月, 2019 18 次提交
  7. 24 10月, 2019 1 次提交
    • B
      Only assign merge params when allowed · 61d16cb0
      Bob Van Landuyt 提交于
      When a user updates a merge request coming from a fork, they should
      not be able to set `force_remove_source_branch` if they cannot push
      code to the source project.
      
      Otherwise developers of the target project could remove the source
      branch of the source project by setting this flag through the API.
      61d16cb0
  8. 23 10月, 2019 4 次提交
  9. 17 10月, 2019 2 次提交
    • L
      Pass all wiki markup formats through pipelines · 6cbdc90c
      Luke Duncalfe 提交于
      Previously, when the wiki page format was anything other than `markdown`
      or `asciidoc` the formatted content would be returned though a Gitaly
      call. Gitaly in turn would delegate formatting to the gitlab-gollum-lib
      gem, which in turn would delegate that to various gems (like RDoc for
      `rdoc`) and then apply some very liberal sanitization.
      
      It was too liberal!
      
      This change brings our wiki content formatting in line with how we
      format other markdown at GitLab, so we have a SSOT for sanitization.
      
      https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/issues/30540
      6cbdc90c
    • R
      Mask Sentry auth token · 97711758
      Ryan Cobb 提交于
      This makes it so we mask Sentry's auth token. This mask only occurs in
      the UI.
      97711758
  10. 14 10月, 2019 2 次提交
  11. 11 10月, 2019 2 次提交
  12. 10 10月, 2019 1 次提交
    • K
      Avoid #authenticate_user! in #route_not_found · 81eba220
      Kerri Miller 提交于
      This method, #route_not_found, is executed as the final fallback for
      unrecognized routes (as the name might imply.) We want to avoid
      `#authenticate_user!` when calling `#route_not_found`;
      `#authenticate_user!` can, depending on the request format, return a 401
      instead of redirecting to a login page. This opens a subtle security
      exploit where anonymous users will receive a 401 response when
      attempting to access a private repo, while a recognized user will
      receive a 404, exposing the existence of the private, hidden repo.
      81eba220
  13. 09 10月, 2019 2 次提交