There are a few reasons it's not a good idea to make
.gitmodules a symlink, including:

  1. It won't be portable to systems without symlinks.

  2. It may behave inconsistently, since Git may look at
     this file in the index or a tree without bothering to
     resolve any symbolic links. We don't do this _yet_, but
     the config infrastructure is there and it's planned for
     the future.

With some clever code, we could make (2) work. And some
people may not care about (1) if they only work on one
platform. But there are a few security reasons to simply
disallow it:

  a. A symlinked .gitmodules file may circumvent any fsck
     checks of the content.

  b. Git may read and write from the on-disk file without
     sanity checking the symlink target. So for example, if
     you link ".gitmodules" to "../oops" and run "git
     submodule add", we'll write to the file "oops" outside
     the repository.

Again, both of those are problems that _could_ be solved
with sufficient code, but given the complications in (1) and
(2), we're better off just outlawing it explicitly.

Note the slightly tricky call to verify_path() in
update-index's update_one(). There we may not have a mode if
we're not updating from the filesystem (e.g., we might just
be removing the file). Passing "0" as the mode there works
fine; since it's not a symlink, we'll just skip the extra
checks.
Signed-off-by: NJeff King <peff@peff.net>

In the update_one(), we check verify_path() on the proposed
path before doing anything else. In preparation for having
verify_path() look at the file mode, let's stat the file
earlier, so we can check the mode accurately.

This is made a bit trickier by the fact that this function
only does an lstat in a few code paths (the ones that flow
down through process_path()). So we can speculatively do the
lstat() here and pass the results down, and just use a dummy
mode for cases where we won't actually be updating the index
from the filesystem.
Signed-off-by: NJeff King <peff@peff.net>

We're more restrictive than we need to be in matching ".GIT"
on case-sensitive filesystems; let's make a note that this
is intentional.
Signed-off-by: NJeff King <peff@peff.net>

We check ".git" and ".." in the same switch statement, and
fall through the cases to share the end-of-component check.
While this saves us a line or two, it makes modifying the
function much harder. Let's just write it out.
Signed-off-by: NJeff King <peff@peff.net>

We have the convenient skip_prefix() helper, but if you want
to do case-insensitive matching, you're stuck doing it by
hand. We could add an extra parameter to the function to
let callers ask for this, but the function is small and
somewhat performance-critical. Let's just re-implement it
for the case-insensitive version.
Signed-off-by: NJeff King <peff@peff.net>

This tests primarily for NTFS issues, but also adds one example of an
HFS+ issue.

Thanks go to Congyi Wu for coming up with the list of examples where
NTFS would possibly equate the filename with `.gitmodules`.
Signed-off-by: NJohannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: NJeff King <peff@peff.net>

When we started to catch NTFS short names that clash with .git, we only
looked for GIT~1. This is sufficient because we only ever clone into an
empty directory, so .git is guaranteed to be the first subdirectory or
file in that directory.

However, even with a fresh clone, .gitmodules is *not* necessarily the
first file to be written that would want the NTFS short name GITMOD~1: a
malicious repository can add .gitmodul0000 and friends, which sorts
before `.gitmodules` and is therefore checked out *first*. For that
reason, we have to test not only for ~1 short names, but for others,
too.

It's hard to just adapt the existing checks in is_ntfs_dotgit(): since
Windows 2000 (i.e., in all Windows versions still supported by Git),
NTFS short names are only generated in the <prefix>~<number> form up to
number 4. After that, a *different* prefix is used, calculated from the
long file name using an undocumented, but stable algorithm.

For example, the short name of .gitmodules would be GITMOD~1, but if it
is taken, and all of ~2, ~3 and ~4 are taken, too, the short name
GI7EBA~1 will be used. From there, collisions are handled by
incrementing the number, shortening the prefix as needed (until ~9999999
is reached, in which case NTFS will not allow the file to be created).

We'd also want to handle .gitignore and .gitattributes, which suffer
from a similar problem, using the fall-back short names GI250A~1 and
GI7D29~1, respectively.

To accommodate for that, we could reimplement the hashing algorithm, but
it is just safer and simpler to provide the known prefixes. This
algorithm has been reverse-engineered and described at
https://usn.pw/blog/gen/2015/06/09/filenames/, which is defunct but
still available via https://web.archive.org/.

These can be recomputed by running the following Perl script:

-- snip --
use warnings;
use strict;

sub compute_short_name_hash ($) {
        my $checksum = 0;
        foreach (split('', $_[0])) {
                $checksum = ($checksum * 0x25 + ord($_)) & 0xffff;
        }

        $checksum = ($checksum * 314159269) & 0xffffffff;
        $checksum = 1 + (~$checksum & 0x7fffffff) if ($checksum & 0x80000000);
        $checksum -= (($checksum * 1152921497) >> 60) * 1000000007;

        return scalar reverse sprintf("%x", $checksum & 0xffff);
}

print compute_short_name_hash($ARGV[0]);
-- snap --

E.g., running that with the argument ".gitignore" will
result in "250a" (which then becomes "gi250a" in the code).
Signed-off-by: NJohannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: NJeff King <peff@peff.net>

Both verify_path() and fsck match ".git", ".GIT", and other
variants specific to HFS+. Let's allow matching other
special files like ".gitmodules", which we'll later use to
enforce extra restrictions via verify_path() and fsck.
Signed-off-by: NJeff King <peff@peff.net>

We walk through the "name" string using an int, which can
wrap to a negative value and cause us to read random memory
before our array (e.g., by creating a tree with a name >2GB,
since "int" is still 32 bits even on most 64-bit platforms).
Worse, this is easy to trigger during the fsck_tree() check,
which is supposed to be protecting us from malicious
garbage.

Note one bit of trickiness in the existing code: we
sometimes assign -1 to "len" at the end of the loop, and
then rely on the "len++" in the for-loop's increment to take
it back to 0. This is still legal with a size_t, since
assigning -1 will turn into SIZE_MAX, which then wraps
around to 0 on increment.
Signed-off-by: NJeff King <peff@peff.net>

Submodule "names" come from the untrusted .gitmodules file,
but we blindly append them to $GIT_DIR/modules to create our
on-disk repo paths. This means you can do bad things by
putting "../" into the name (among other things).

Let's sanity-check these names to avoid building a path that
can be exploited. There are two main decisions:

  1. What should the allowed syntax be?

     It's tempting to reuse verify_path(), since submodule
     names typically come from in-repo paths. But there are
     two reasons not to:

       a. It's technically more strict than what we need, as
          we really care only about breaking out of the
          $GIT_DIR/modules/ hierarchy.  E.g., having a
          submodule named "foo/.git" isn't actually
          dangerous, and it's possible that somebody has
          manually given such a funny name.

       b. Since we'll eventually use this checking logic in
          fsck to prevent downstream repositories, it should
          be consistent across platforms. Because
          verify_path() relies on is_dir_sep(), it wouldn't
          block "foo\..\bar" on a non-Windows machine.

  2. Where should we enforce it? These days most of the
     .gitmodules reads go through submodule-config.c, so
     I've put it there in the reading step. That should
     cover all of the C code.

     We also construct the name for "git submodule add"
     inside the git-submodule.sh script. This is probably
     not a big deal for security since the name is coming
     from the user anyway, but it would be polite to remind
     them if the name they pick is invalid (and we need to
     expose the name-checker to the shell anyway for our
     test scripts).

     This patch issues a warning when reading .gitmodules
     and just ignores the related config entry completely.
     This will generally end up producing a sensible error,
     as it works the same as a .gitmodules file which is
     missing a submodule entry (so "submodule update" will
     barf, but "git clone --recurse-submodules" will print
     an error but not abort the clone.

     There is one minor oddity, which is that we print the
     warning once per malformed config key (since that's how
     the config subsystem gives us the entries). So in the
     new test, for example, the user would see three
     warnings. That's OK, since the intent is that this case
     should never come up outside of malicious repositories
     (and then it might even benefit the user to see the
     message multiple times).

Credit for finding this vulnerability and the proof of
concept from which the test script was adapted goes to
Etienne Stalmans.
Signed-off-by: NJeff King <peff@peff.net>

Signed-off-by: NJunio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>

Signed-off-by: NJunio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>

Signed-off-by: NJunio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>

Signed-off-by: NJunio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>

Signed-off-by: NJunio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>

Signed-off-by: NJunio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>

Signed-off-by: NJunio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>

We run `git rev-parse` though the shell, and quote its
argument only with single-quotes. This prevents most
metacharacters from being a problem, but misses the obvious
case when $name itself has single-quotes in it. We can fix
this by applying the usual shell-quoting formula.
Signed-off-by: NJeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: NJunio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>

Refnames can contain shell metacharacters which need to be
passed verbatim to sub-processes. Using safe_pipe_capture
skips the shell entirely.
Signed-off-by: NJeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: NJunio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>

The git-cvsserver script is old and largely unmaintained
these days. But git-shell allows untrusted users to run it
out of the box, significantly increasing its attack surface.

Let's drop it from git-shell's list of internal handlers so
that it cannot be run by default.  This is not backwards
compatible. But given the age and development activity on
CVS-related parts of Git, this is likely to impact very few
users, while helping many more (i.e., anybody who runs
git-shell and had no intention of supporting CVS).

There's no configuration mechanism in git-shell for us to
add a boolean and flip it to "off". But there is a mechanism
for adding custom commands, and adding CVS support here is
fairly trivial. Let's document it to give guidance to
anybody who really is still running cvsserver.
Signed-off-by: NJeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: NJunio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>

This is not strictly necessary, but it is a good code hygiene.
Signed-off-by: NJunio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>

This makes the script pass arguments that are derived from end-user
input in safer way when invoking subcommands.
Reported-by: Njoernchen <joernchen@phenoelit.de>
Signed-off-by: Njoernchen <joernchen@phenoelit.de>
Signed-off-by: NJunio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>

As a preparation for replacing `command` with a call to this
function from outside GITCVS::updater package, move it to the main
package.
Signed-off-by: NJunio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>

Signed-off-by: NJunio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>

Signed-off-by: NJunio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>

Signed-off-by: NJunio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>

Doc clean-up.

* ks/doc-fixes:
  doc: reformat the paragraph containing the 'cut-line'
  doc: camelCase the i18n config variables to improve readability

A test fix.

* jk/test-copy-bytes-fix:
  t: handle EOF in test_copy_bytes()

Code refactoring.

* pw/unquote-path-in-git-pm:
  t9700: add tests for Git::unquote_path()
  Git::unquote_path(): throw an exception on bad path
  Git::unquote_path(): handle '\a'
  add -i: move unquote_path() to Git.pm

We run an early part of "git gc" that deals with refs before
daemonising (and not under lock) even when running a background
auto-gc, which caused multiple gc processes attempting to run the
early part at the same time.  This is now prevented by running the
early part also under the GC lock.

* jk/gc-pre-detach-under-hook:
  gc: run pre-detach operations under lock

Code clean-up, that makes us in sync with Debian by one patch.

* jn/hooks-pre-rebase-sample-fix:
  pre-rebase hook: capture documentation in a <<here document

The progress meter did not give a useful output when we haven't had
0.5 seconds to measure the throughput during the interval.  Instead
show the overall throughput rate at the end, which is a much more
useful number.

* rs/progress-overall-throughput-at-the-end:
  progress: show overall rate in last update

On Cygwin, similar to Windows, "git push //server/share/repository"
ought to mean a repository on a network share that can be accessed
locally, but this did not work correctly due to stripping the double
slashes at the beginning.

This may need to be heavily tested before it gets unleashed to the
wild, as the change is at a fairly low-level code and would affect
not just the code to decide if the push destination is local.  There
may be unexpected fallouts in the path normalization.

* tb/push-to-cygwin-unc-path:
  cygwin: allow pushing to UNC paths

Code cleanup.

* rs/apply-avoid-over-reading:
  apply: use strcmp(3) for comparing strings in gitdiff_verify_name()
  apply: use starts_with() in gitdiff_verify_name()

Signed-off-by: NJunio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>