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  1. 08 6月, 2015 2 次提交
    • I
      x86/asm/entry: Untangle 'system_call' into two entry points: entry_SYSCALL_64 and entry_INT80_32 · b2502b41
      由 Ingo Molnar 提交于 
      The 'system_call' entry points differ starkly between native 32-bit and 64-bit
kernels: on 32-bit kernels it defines the INT 0x80 entry point, while on
64-bit it's the SYSCALL entry point.

This is pretty confusing when looking at generic code, and it also obscures
the nature of the entry point at the assembly level.

So unangle this by splitting the name into its two uses:

	system_call (32) -> entry_INT80_32
	system_call (64) -> entry_SYSCALL_64

As per the generic naming scheme for x86 system call entry points:

	entry_MNEMONIC_qualifier

where 'qualifier' is one of _32, _64 or _compat.

Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      b2502b41
    • I
      x86/asm/entry: Rename compat syscall entry points · 2cd23553
      由 Ingo Molnar 提交于 
      Rename the following system call entry points:

	ia32_cstar_target       -> entry_SYSCALL_compat
	ia32_syscall            -> entry_INT80_compat

The generic naming scheme for x86 system call entry points is:

	entry_MNEMONIC_qualifier

where 'qualifier' is one of _32, _64 or _compat.

Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      2cd23553
  3. 10 5月, 2015 1 次提交
  5. 31 3月, 2015 1 次提交
    • I
      x86/asm/entry: Remove user_mode_ignore_vm86() · 55474c48
      由 Ingo Molnar 提交于 
      user_mode_ignore_vm86() can be used instead of user_mode(), in
places where we have already done a v8086_mode() security
check of ptregs.

But doing this check in the wrong place would be a bug that
could result in security problems, and also the naming still
isn't very clear.

Furthermore, it only affects 32-bit kernels, while most
development happens on 64-bit kernels.

If we replace them with user_mode() checks then the cost is only
a very minor increase in various slowpaths:

   text             data   bss     dec              hex    filename
   10573391         703562 1753042 13029995         c6d26b vmlinux.o.before
   10573423         703562 1753042 13030027         c6d28b vmlinux.o.after

So lets get rid of this distinction once and for all.
Acked-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150329090233.GA1963@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      55474c48
  7. 23 3月, 2015 4 次提交
  9. 10 3月, 2015 1 次提交
  11. 09 3月, 2015 1 次提交
    • F
      context_tracking: Rename context symbols to prepare for transition state · c467ea76
      由 Frederic Weisbecker 提交于 
      Current context tracking symbols are designed to express living state.
As such they are prefixed with "IN_": IN_USER, IN_KERNEL.

Now we are going to use these symbols to also express state transitions
such as context_tracking_enter(IN_USER) or context_tracking_exit(IN_USER).
But while the "IN_" prefix works well to express entering a context, it's
confusing to depict a context exit: context_tracking_exit(IN_USER)
could mean two things:
	1) We are exiting the current context to enter user context.
	2) We are exiting the user context
We want 2) but the reviewer may be confused and understand 1)

So lets disambiguate these symbols and rename them to CONTEXT_USER and
CONTEXT_KERNEL.
Acked-by: NRik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Will deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Luiz Capitulino <lcapitulino@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NFrederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
      c467ea76
  13. 07 3月, 2015 1 次提交
  15. 06 3月, 2015 1 次提交
  17. 05 3月, 2015 1 次提交
  19. 26 2月, 2015 1 次提交
  21. 19 2月, 2015 1 次提交
  23. 01 2月, 2015 1 次提交
  25. 20 1月, 2015 1 次提交
  27. 03 1月, 2015 3 次提交
    • A
      x86, traps: Add ist_begin_non_atomic and ist_end_non_atomic · bced35b6
      由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于 
      In some IST handlers, if the interrupt came from user mode,
we can safely enable preemption.  Add helpers to do it safely.

This is intended to be used my the memory failure code in
do_machine_check.
Acked-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      bced35b6
    • A
      x86, traps: Track entry into and exit from IST context · 95927475
      由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于 
      We currently pretend that IST context is like standard exception
context, but this is incorrect.  IST entries from userspace are like
standard exceptions except that they use per-cpu stacks, so they are
atomic.  IST entries from kernel space are like NMIs from RCU's
perspective -- they are not quiescent states even if they
interrupted the kernel during a quiescent state.

Add and use ist_enter and ist_exit to track IST context.  Even
though x86_32 has no IST stacks, we track these interrupts the same
way.

This fixes two issues:

 - Scheduling from an IST interrupt handler will now warn.  It would
   previously appear to work as long as we got lucky and nothing
   overwrote the stack frame.  (I don't know of any bugs in this
   that would trigger the warning, but it's good to be on the safe
   side.)

 - RCU handling in IST context was dangerous.  As far as I know,
   only machine checks were likely to trigger this, but it's good to
   be on the safe side.

Note that the machine check handlers appears to have been missing
any context tracking at all before this patch.

Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Frédéric Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      95927475
    • A
      x86, entry: Switch stacks on a paranoid entry from userspace · 48e08d0f
      由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于 
      This causes all non-NMI, non-double-fault kernel entries from
userspace to run on the normal kernel stack.  Double-fault is
exempt to minimize confusion if we double-fault directly from
userspace due to a bad kernel stack.

This is, suprisingly, simpler and shorter than the current code.  It
removes the IMO rather frightening paranoid_userspace path, and it
make sync_regs much simpler.

There is no risk of stack overflow due to this change -- the kernel
stack that we switch to is empty.

This will also enable us to create non-atomic sections within
machine checks from userspace, which will simplify memory failure
handling.  It will also allow the upcoming fsgsbase code to be
simplified, because it doesn't need to worry about usergs when
scheduling in paranoid_exit, as that code no longer exists.

Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Acked-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      48e08d0f
  29. 08 12月, 2014 1 次提交
  31. 25 11月, 2014 1 次提交
  33. 24 11月, 2014 3 次提交
    • A
      x86_64, traps: Rework bad_iret · b645af2d
      由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于 
      It's possible for iretq to userspace to fail.  This can happen because
of a bad CS, SS, or RIP.

Historically, we've handled it by fixing up an exception from iretq to
land at bad_iret, which pretends that the failed iret frame was really
the hardware part of #GP(0) from userspace.  To make this work, there's
an extra fixup to fudge the gs base into a usable state.

This is suboptimal because it loses the original exception.  It's also
buggy because there's no guarantee that we were on the kernel stack to
begin with.  For example, if the failing iret happened on return from an
NMI, then we'll end up executing general_protection on the NMI stack.
This is bad for several reasons, the most immediate of which is that
general_protection, as a non-paranoid idtentry, will try to deliver
signals and/or schedule from the wrong stack.

This patch throws out bad_iret entirely.  As a replacement, it augments
the existing swapgs fudge into a full-blown iret fixup, mostly written
in C.  It's should be clearer and more correct.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      b645af2d
    • A
      x86_64, traps: Stop using IST for #SS · 6f442be2
      由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于 
      On a 32-bit kernel, this has no effect, since there are no IST stacks.

On a 64-bit kernel, #SS can only happen in user code, on a failed iret
to user space, a canonical violation on access via RSP or RBP, or a
genuine stack segment violation in 32-bit kernel code.  The first two
cases don't need IST, and the latter two cases are unlikely fatal bugs,
and promoting them to double faults would be fine.

This fixes a bug in which the espfix64 code mishandles a stack segment
violation.

This saves 4k of memory per CPU and a tiny bit of code.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      6f442be2
    • A
      x86_64, traps: Fix the espfix64 #DF fixup and rewrite it in C · af726f21
      由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于 
      There's nothing special enough about the espfix64 double fault fixup to
justify writing it in assembly.  Move it to C.

This also fixes a bug: if the double fault came from an IST stack, the
old asm code would return to a partially uninitialized stack frame.

Fixes: 3891a04aSigned-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      af726f21
  35. 18 11月, 2014 1 次提交
    • D
      x86, mpx: On-demand kernel allocation of bounds tables · fe3d197f
      由 Dave Hansen 提交于 
      This is really the meat of the MPX patch set.  If there is one patch to
review in the entire series, this is the one.  There is a new ABI here
and this kernel code also interacts with userspace memory in a
relatively unusual manner.  (small FAQ below).

Long Description:

This patch adds two prctl() commands to provide enable or disable the
management of bounds tables in kernel, including on-demand kernel
allocation (See the patch "on-demand kernel allocation of bounds tables")
and cleanup (See the patch "cleanup unused bound tables"). Applications
do not strictly need the kernel to manage bounds tables and we expect
some applications to use MPX without taking advantage of this kernel
support. This means the kernel can not simply infer whether an application
needs bounds table management from the MPX registers.  The prctl() is an
explicit signal from userspace.

PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT is meant to be a signal from userspace to
require kernel's help in managing bounds tables.

PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT is the opposite, meaning that userspace don't
want kernel's help any more. With PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT, the kernel
won't allocate and free bounds tables even if the CPU supports MPX.

PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT will fetch the base address of the bounds
directory out of a userspace register (bndcfgu) and then cache it into
a new field (->bd_addr) in  the 'mm_struct'.  PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT
will set "bd_addr" to an invalid address.  Using this scheme, we can
use "bd_addr" to determine whether the management of bounds tables in
kernel is enabled.

Also, the only way to access that bndcfgu register is via an xsaves,
which can be expensive.  Caching "bd_addr" like this also helps reduce
the cost of those xsaves when doing table cleanup at munmap() time.
Unfortunately, we can not apply this optimization to #BR fault time
because we need an xsave to get the value of BNDSTATUS.

==== Why does the hardware even have these Bounds Tables? ====

MPX only has 4 hardware registers for storing bounds information.
If MPX-enabled code needs more than these 4 registers, it needs to
spill them somewhere. It has two special instructions for this
which allow the bounds to be moved between the bounds registers
and some new "bounds tables".

They are similar conceptually to a page fault and will be raised by
the MPX hardware during both bounds violations or when the tables
are not present. This patch handles those #BR exceptions for
not-present tables by carving the space out of the normal processes
address space (essentially calling the new mmap() interface indroduced
earlier in this patch set.) and then pointing the bounds-directory
over to it.

The tables *need* to be accessed and controlled by userspace because
the instructions for moving bounds in and out of them are extremely
frequent. They potentially happen every time a register pointing to
memory is dereferenced. Any direct kernel involvement (like a syscall)
to access the tables would obviously destroy performance.

==== Why not do this in userspace? ====

This patch is obviously doing this allocation in the kernel.
However, MPX does not strictly *require* anything in the kernel.
It can theoretically be done completely from userspace. Here are
a few ways this *could* be done. I don't think any of them are
practical in the real-world, but here they are.

Q: Can virtual space simply be reserved for the bounds tables so
   that we never have to allocate them?
A: As noted earlier, these tables are *HUGE*. An X-GB virtual
   area needs 4*X GB of virtual space, plus 2GB for the bounds
   directory. If we were to preallocate them for the 128TB of
   user virtual address space, we would need to reserve 512TB+2GB,
   which is larger than the entire virtual address space today.
   This means they can not be reserved ahead of time. Also, a
   single process's pre-popualated bounds directory consumes 2GB
   of virtual *AND* physical memory. IOW, it's completely
   infeasible to prepopulate bounds directories.

Q: Can we preallocate bounds table space at the same time memory
   is allocated which might contain pointers that might eventually
   need bounds tables?
A: This would work if we could hook the site of each and every
   memory allocation syscall. This can be done for small,
   constrained applications. But, it isn't practical at a larger
   scale since a given app has no way of controlling how all the
   parts of the app might allocate memory (think libraries). The
   kernel is really the only place to intercept these calls.

Q: Could a bounds fault be handed to userspace and the tables
   allocated there in a signal handler instead of in the kernel?
A: (thanks to tglx) mmap() is not on the list of safe async
   handler functions and even if mmap() would work it still
   requires locking or nasty tricks to keep track of the
   allocation state there.

Having ruled out all of the userspace-only approaches for managing
bounds tables that we could think of, we create them on demand in
the kernel.
Based-on-patch-by: NQiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141114151829.AD4310DE@viggo.jf.intel.comSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      fe3d197f
  37. 14 6月, 2014 1 次提交
  39. 14 5月, 2014 7 次提交
  41. 06 5月, 2014 1 次提交
  43. 24 4月, 2014 3 次提交
    • M
      kprobes, x86: Use NOKPROBE_SYMBOL() instead of __kprobes annotation · 9326638c
      由 Masami Hiramatsu 提交于 
      Use NOKPROBE_SYMBOL macro for protecting functions
from kprobes instead of __kprobes annotation under
arch/x86.

This applies nokprobe_inline annotation for some cases,
because NOKPROBE_SYMBOL() will inhibit inlining by
referring the symbol address.

This just folds a bunch of previous NOKPROBE_SYMBOL()
cleanup patches for x86 to one patch.
Signed-off-by: NMasami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140417081814.26341.51656.stgit@ltc230.yrl.intra.hitachi.co.jp
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Fernando Luis Vázquez Cao <fernando_b1@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Raghavendra K T <raghavendra.kt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Seiji Aguchi <seiji.aguchi@hds.com>
Cc: Srivatsa Vaddagiri <vatsa@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      9326638c
    • M
      kprobes, x86: Call exception_enter after kprobes handled · ecd50f71
      由 Masami Hiramatsu 提交于 
      Move exception_enter() call after kprobes handler
is done. Since the exception_enter() involves
many other functions (like printk), it can cause
recursive int3/break loop when kprobes probe such
functions.
Signed-off-by: NMasami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>
Reviewed-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Seiji Aguchi <seiji.aguchi@hds.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140417081740.26341.10894.stgit@ltc230.yrl.intra.hitachi.co.jpSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      ecd50f71
    • M
      kprobes/x86: Call exception handlers directly from do_int3/do_debug · 6f6343f5
      由 Masami Hiramatsu 提交于 
      To avoid a kernel crash by probing on lockdep code, call
kprobe_int3_handler() and kprobe_debug_handler()(which was
formerly called post_kprobe_handler()) directly from
do_int3 and do_debug.

Currently kprobes uses notify_die() to hook the int3/debug
exceptoins. Since there is a locking code in notify_die,
the lockdep code can be invoked. And because the lockdep
involves printk() related things, theoretically, we need to
prohibit probing on such code, which means much longer blacklist
we'll have. Instead, hooking the int3/debug for kprobes before
notify_die() can avoid this problem.

Anyway, most of the int3 handlers in the kernel are already
called from do_int3 directly, e.g. ftrace_int3_handler,
poke_int3_handler, kgdb_ll_trap. Actually only
kprobe_exceptions_notify is on the notifier_call_chain.
Signed-off-by: NMasami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>
Reviewed-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Seiji Aguchi <seiji.aguchi@hds.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140417081733.26341.24423.stgit@ltc230.yrl.intra.hitachi.co.jpSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      6f6343f5
  45. 12 12月, 2013 1 次提交
  47. 13 11月, 2013 1 次提交