- 19 10月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Minchan Kim 提交于
There is usecase that System Management Software(SMS) want to give a memory hint like MADV_[COLD|PAGEEOUT] to other processes and in the case of Android, it is the ActivityManagerService. The information required to make the reclaim decision is not known to the app. Instead, it is known to the centralized userspace daemon(ActivityManagerService), and that daemon must be able to initiate reclaim on its own without any app involvement. To solve the issue, this patch introduces a new syscall process_madvise(2). It uses pidfd of an external process to give the hint. It also supports vector address range because Android app has thousands of vmas due to zygote so it's totally waste of CPU and power if we should call the syscall one by one for each vma.(With testing 2000-vma syscall vs 1-vector syscall, it showed 15% performance improvement. I think it would be bigger in real practice because the testing ran very cache friendly environment). Another potential use case for the vector range is to amortize the cost ofTLB shootdowns for multiple ranges when using MADV_DONTNEED; this could benefit users like TCP receive zerocopy and malloc implementations. In future, we could find more usecases for other advises so let's make it happens as API since we introduce a new syscall at this moment. With that, existing madvise(2) user could replace it with process_madvise(2) with their own pid if they want to have batch address ranges support feature. ince it could affect other process's address range, only privileged process(PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS) or something else(e.g., being the same UID) gives it the right to ptrace the process could use it successfully. The flag argument is reserved for future use if we need to extend the API. I think supporting all hints madvise has/will supported/support to process_madvise is rather risky. Because we are not sure all hints make sense from external process and implementation for the hint may rely on the caller being in the current context so it could be error-prone. Thus, I just limited hints as MADV_[COLD|PAGEOUT] in this patch. If someone want to add other hints, we could hear the usecase and review it for each hint. It's safer for maintenance rather than introducing a buggy syscall but hard to fix it later. So finally, the API is as follows, ssize_t process_madvise(int pidfd, const struct iovec *iovec, unsigned long vlen, int advice, unsigned int flags); DESCRIPTION The process_madvise() system call is used to give advice or directions to the kernel about the address ranges from external process as well as local process. It provides the advice to address ranges of process described by iovec and vlen. The goal of such advice is to improve system or application performance. The pidfd selects the process referred to by the PID file descriptor specified in pidfd. (See pidofd_open(2) for further information) The pointer iovec points to an array of iovec structures, defined in <sys/uio.h> as: struct iovec { void *iov_base; /* starting address */ size_t iov_len; /* number of bytes to be advised */ }; The iovec describes address ranges beginning at address(iov_base) and with size length of bytes(iov_len). The vlen represents the number of elements in iovec. The advice is indicated in the advice argument, which is one of the following at this moment if the target process specified by pidfd is external. MADV_COLD MADV_PAGEOUT Permission to provide a hint to external process is governed by a ptrace access mode PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS check; see ptrace(2). The process_madvise supports every advice madvise(2) has if target process is in same thread group with calling process so user could use process_madvise(2) to extend existing madvise(2) to support vector address ranges. RETURN VALUE On success, process_madvise() returns the number of bytes advised. This return value may be less than the total number of requested bytes, if an error occurred. The caller should check return value to determine whether a partial advice occurred. FAQ: Q.1 - Why does any external entity have better knowledge? Quote from Sandeep "For Android, every application (including the special SystemServer) are forked from Zygote. The reason of course is to share as many libraries and classes between the two as possible to benefit from the preloading during boot. After applications start, (almost) all of the APIs end up calling into this SystemServer process over IPC (binder) and back to the application. In a fully running system, the SystemServer monitors every single process periodically to calculate their PSS / RSS and also decides which process is "important" to the user for interactivity. So, because of how these processes start _and_ the fact that the SystemServer is looping to monitor each process, it does tend to *know* which address range of the application is not used / useful. Besides, we can never rely on applications to clean things up themselves. We've had the "hey app1, the system is low on memory, please trim your memory usage down" notifications for a long time[1]. They rely on applications honoring the broadcasts and very few do. So, if we want to avoid the inevitable killing of the application and restarting it, some way to be able to tell the OS about unimportant memory in these applications will be useful. - ssp Q.2 - How to guarantee the race(i.e., object validation) between when giving a hint from an external process and get the hint from the target process? process_madvise operates on the target process's address space as it exists at the instant that process_madvise is called. If the space target process can run between the time the process_madvise process inspects the target process address space and the time that process_madvise is actually called, process_madvise may operate on memory regions that the calling process does not expect. It's the responsibility of the process calling process_madvise to close this race condition. For example, the calling process can suspend the target process with ptrace, SIGSTOP, or the freezer cgroup so that it doesn't have an opportunity to change its own address space before process_madvise is called. Another option is to operate on memory regions that the caller knows a priori will be unchanged in the target process. Yet another option is to accept the race for certain process_madvise calls after reasoning that mistargeting will do no harm. The suggested API itself does not provide synchronization. It also apply other APIs like move_pages, process_vm_write. The race isn't really a problem though. Why is it so wrong to require that callers do their own synchronization in some manner? Nobody objects to write(2) merely because it's possible for two processes to open the same file and clobber each other's writes --- instead, we tell people to use flock or something. Think about mmap. It never guarantees newly allocated address space is still valid when the user tries to access it because other threads could unmap the memory right before. That's where we need synchronization by using other API or design from userside. It shouldn't be part of API itself. If someone needs more fine-grained synchronization rather than process level, there were two ideas suggested - cookie[2] and anon-fd[3]. Both are applicable via using last reserved argument of the API but I don't think it's necessary right now since we have already ways to prevent the race so don't want to add additional complexity with more fine-grained optimization model. To make the API extend, it reserved an unsigned long as last argument so we could support it in future if someone really needs it. Q.3 - Why doesn't ptrace work? Injecting an madvise in the target process using ptrace would not work for us because such injected madvise would have to be executed by the target process, which means that process would have to be runnable and that creates the risk of the abovementioned race and hinting a wrong VMA. Furthermore, we want to act the hint in caller's context, not the callee's, because the callee is usually limited in cpuset/cgroups or even freezed state so they can't act by themselves quick enough, which causes more thrashing/kill. It doesn't work if the target process are ptraced(e.g., strace, debugger, minidump) because a process can have at most one ptracer. [1] https://developer.android.com/topic/performance/memory" [2] process_getinfo for getting the cookie which is updated whenever vma of process address layout are changed - Daniel Colascione - https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190520035254.57579-1-minchan@kernel.org/T/#m7694416fd179b2066a2c62b5b139b14e3894e224 [3] anonymous fd which is used for the object(i.e., address range) validation - Michal Hocko - https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200120112722.GY18451@dhcp22.suse.cz/ [minchan@kernel.org: fix process_madvise build break for arm64] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200303145756.GA219683@google.com [minchan@kernel.org: fix build error for mips of process_madvise] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200508052517.GA197378@google.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix patch ordering issue] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix arm64 whoops] [minchan@kernel.org: make process_madvise() vlen arg have type size_t, per Florian] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix i386 build] [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fix syscall numbering] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200905142639.49fc3f1a@canb.auug.org.au [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: madvise.c needs compat.h] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200908204547.285646b4@canb.auug.org.au [minchan@kernel.org: fix mips build] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200909173655.GC2435453@google.com [yuehaibing@huawei.com: remove duplicate header which is included twice] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200915121550.30584-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com [minchan@kernel.org: do not use helper functions for process_madvise] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200921175539.GB387368@google.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: pidfd_get_pid() gained an argument] [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fix up for "iov_iter: transparently handle compat iovecs in import_iovec"] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200928212542.468e1fef@canb.auug.org.auSigned-off-by: NMinchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NYueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NStephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: NSuren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Reviewed-by: NVlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: NDavid Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@linux.intel.com> Cc: Brian Geffon <bgeffon@google.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Cc: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: John Dias <joaodias@google.com> Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@redhat.com> Cc: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com> Cc: SeongJae Park <sj38.park@gmail.com> Cc: SeongJae Park <sjpark@amazon.de> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@google.com> Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Cc: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de> Cc: <linux-man@vger.kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200302193630.68771-3-minchan@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200508183320.GA125527@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200622192900.22757-4-minchan@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200901000633.1920247-4-minchan@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 03 10月, 2020 3 次提交
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由 Christoph Hellwig 提交于
Now that import_iovec handles compat iovecs, the native syscalls can be used for the compat case as well. Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Christoph Hellwig 提交于
Now that import_iovec handles compat iovecs, the native vmsplice syscall can be used for the compat case as well. Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Christoph Hellwig 提交于
Now that import_iovec handles compat iovecs, the native readv and writev syscalls can be used for the compat case as well. Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 23 9月, 2020 2 次提交
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由 Christoph Hellwig 提交于
compat_sys_mount is identical to the regular sys_mount now, so remove it and use the native version everywhere. Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
Sami reported that run_on_irqstack_cond() requires the caller to cast functions to mismatching types, which trips indirect call Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) in Clang. Instead of disabling CFI on that function, provide proper helpers for the three call variants. The actual ASM code stays the same as that is out of reach. [ bp: Fix __run_on_irqstack() prototype to match. ] Fixes: 931b9414 ("x86/entry: Provide helpers for executing on the irqstack") Reported-by: NNathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Reported-by: NSami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: NSami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1052 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87pn6eb5tv.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
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- 18 9月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Christoph Hellwig 提交于
Fold the misaligned u64 workarounds into the main quotactl flow instead of implementing a separate compat syscall handler. Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 09 9月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Joerg Roedel 提交于
The #VC handler needs special entry code because: 1. It runs on an IST stack 2. It needs to be able to handle nested #VC exceptions To make this work, the entry code is implemented to pretend it doesn't use an IST stack. When entered from user-mode or early SYSCALL entry path it switches to the task stack. If entered from kernel-mode it tries to switch back to the previous stack in the IRET frame. The stack found in the IRET frame is validated first, and if it is not safe to use it for the #VC handler, the code will switch to a fall-back stack (the #VC2 IST stack). From there, it can cause nested exceptions again. Signed-off-by: NJoerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-46-joro@8bytes.org
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- 04 9月, 2020 2 次提交
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
Andy reported that the syscall treacing for 32bit fast syscall fails: # ./tools/testing/selftests/x86/ptrace_syscall_32 ... [RUN] SYSEMU [FAIL] Initial args are wrong (nr=224, args=10 11 12 13 14 4289172732) ... [RUN] SYSCALL [FAIL] Initial args are wrong (nr=29, args=0 0 0 0 0 4289172732) The eason is that the conversion to generic entry code moved the retrieval of the sixth argument (EBP) after the point where the syscall entry work runs, i.e. ptrace, seccomp, audit... Unbreak it by providing a split up version of syscall_enter_from_user_mode(). - syscall_enter_from_user_mode_prepare() establishes state and enables interrupts - syscall_enter_from_user_mode_work() runs the entry work Replace the call to syscall_enter_from_user_mode() in the 32bit fast syscall C-entry with the split functions and stick the EBP retrieval between them. Fixes: 27d6b4d1 ("x86/entry: Use generic syscall entry function") Reported-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87k0xdjbtt.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
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由 Uros Bizjak 提交于
inst.h was included in calling.h solely to instantiate the RDPID macro. The usage of RDPID was removed in 6a3ea3e6 ("x86/entry/64: Do not use RDPID in paranoid entry to accomodate KVM") so remove the include. Fixes: 6a3ea3e6 ("x86/entry/64: Do not use RDPID in paranoid entry to accomodate KVM") Signed-off-by: NUros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200827171735.93825-1-ubizjak@gmail.com
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- 26 8月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Peter Zijlstra 提交于
Unused remnants Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: NRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Tested-by: NMarco Elver <elver@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200821085348.487040689@infradead.org
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- 24 8月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Borislav Petkov 提交于
Add the proper explanation why an LFENCE is not needed in the FSGSBASE case. Fixes: c82965f9 ("x86/entry/64: Handle FSGSBASE enabled paranoid entry/exit") Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200821090710.GE12181@zn.tnic
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- 21 8月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Sean Christopherson 提交于
KVM has an optmization to avoid expensive MRS read/writes on VMENTER/EXIT. It caches the MSR values and restores them either when leaving the run loop, on preemption or when going out to user space. The affected MSRs are not required for kernel context operations. This changed with the recently introduced mechanism to handle FSGSBASE in the paranoid entry code which has to retrieve the kernel GSBASE value by accessing per CPU memory. The mechanism needs to retrieve the CPU number and uses either LSL or RDPID if the processor supports it. Unfortunately RDPID uses MSR_TSC_AUX which is in the list of cached and lazily restored MSRs, which means between the point where the guest value is written and the point of restore, MSR_TSC_AUX contains a random number. If an NMI or any other exception which uses the paranoid entry path happens in such a context, then RDPID returns the random guest MSR_TSC_AUX value. As a consequence this reads from the wrong memory location to retrieve the kernel GSBASE value. Kernel GS is used to for all regular this_cpu_*() operations. If the GSBASE in the exception handler points to the per CPU memory of a different CPU then this has the obvious consequences of data corruption and crashes. As the paranoid entry path is the only place which accesses MSR_TSX_AUX (via RDPID) and the fallback via LSL is not significantly slower, remove the RDPID alternative from the entry path and always use LSL. The alternative would be to write MSR_TSC_AUX on every VMENTER and VMEXIT which would be inflicting massive overhead on that code path. [ tglx: Rewrote changelog ] Fixes: eaad9812 ("x86/entry/64: Introduce the FIND_PERCPU_BASE macro") Reported-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Debugged-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Suggested-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Suggested-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200821105229.18938-1-pbonzini@redhat.com
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- 15 8月, 2020 3 次提交
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由 Juergen Gross 提交于
There are some code parts using CONFIG_PARAVIRT for Xen pvops related issues instead of the more stringent CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL. Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200815100641.26362-4-jgross@suse.com
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由 Juergen Gross 提交于
The last 32-bit user of stuff under CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL is gone. Remove 32-bit specific parts. Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200815100641.26362-2-jgross@suse.com
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由 Xiaoming Ni 提交于
Since commit 61a47c1a ("sysctl: Remove the sysctl system call"), sys_sysctl is actually unavailable: any input can only return an error. We have been warning about people using the sysctl system call for years and believe there are no more users. Even if there are users of this interface if they have not complained or fixed their code by now they probably are not going to, so there is no point in warning them any longer. So completely remove sys_sysctl on all architectures. [nixiaoming@huawei.com: s390: fix build error for sys_call_table_emu] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200618141426.16884-1-nixiaoming@huawei.comSigned-off-by: NXiaoming Ni <nixiaoming@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> [arm/arm64] Acked-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Bin Meng <bin.meng@windriver.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: chenzefeng <chenzefeng2@huawei.com> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Diego Elio Pettenò <flameeyes@flameeyes.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com> Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Kars de Jong <jongk@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org> Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net> Cc: Paul Burton <paulburton@kernel.org> Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com> Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@stackframe.org> Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Cc: Zhou Yanjie <zhouyanjie@wanyeetech.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616030734.87257-1-nixiaoming@huawei.comSigned-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 11 8月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Juergen Gross 提交于
Xen is requiring 64-bit machines today and since Xen 4.14 it can be built without 32-bit PV guest support. There is no need to carry the burden of 32-bit PV guest support in the kernel any longer, as new guests can be either HVM or PVH, or they can use a 64 bit kernel. Remove the 32-bit Xen PV support from the kernel. Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reviewed-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
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- 24 7月, 2020 7 次提交
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
Remove the temporary defines and fixup all references. Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200722220520.855839271@linutronix.de
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
Replace the x86 code with the generic variant. Use temporary defines for idtentry_* which will be cleaned up in the next step. Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200722220520.711492752@linutronix.de
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
Replace the x86 variant with the generic version. Provide the relevant architecture specific helper functions and defines. Use a temporary define for idtentry_exit_user which will be cleaned up seperately. Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200722220520.494648601@linutronix.de
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
Replace the syscall entry work handling with the generic version. Provide the necessary helper inlines to handle the real architecture specific parts, e.g. ptrace. Use a temporary define for idtentry_enter_user which will be cleaned up seperately. Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200722220520.376213694@linutronix.de
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
Guests and user space share certain MSRs. KVM sets these MSRs to guest values once and does not set them back to user space values on every VM exit to spare the costly MSR operations. User return notifiers ensure that these MSRs are set back to the correct values before returning to user space in exit_to_usermode_loop(). There is no reason to evaluate the TIF flag indicating that user return notifiers need to be invoked in the loop. The important point is that they are invoked before returning to user space. Move the invocation out of the loop into the section which does the last preperatory steps before returning to user space. That section is not preemptible and runs with interrupts disabled until the actual return. Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200722220520.159112003@linutronix.de
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
64bit and 32bit entry code have the same open coded syscall entry handling after the bitwidth specific bits. Move it to a helper function and share the code. Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200722220520.051234096@linutronix.de
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
The user register sanity check is sprinkled all over the place. Move it into enter_from_user_mode(). Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200722220519.943016204@linutronix.de
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- 21 7月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于
To allow the kernel not to play games with set_fs to call exec implement kernel_execve. The function kernel_execve takes pointers into kernel memory and copies the values pointed to onto the new userspace stack. The calls with arguments from kernel space of do_execve are replaced with calls to kernel_execve. The calls do_execve and do_execveat are made static as there are now no callers outside of exec. The comments that mention do_execve are updated to refer to kernel_execve or execve depending on the circumstances. In addition to correcting the comments, this makes it easy to grep for do_execve and verify it is not used. Inspired-by: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200627072704.2447163-1-hch@lst.deReviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87wo365ikj.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.orgSigned-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- 20 7月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Christoph Hellwig 提交于
Now that the ->compat_{get,set}sockopt proto_ops methods are gone there is no good reason left to keep the compat syscalls separate. This fixes the odd use of unsigned int for the compat_setsockopt optlen and the missing sock_use_custom_sol_socket. It would also easily allow running the eBPF hooks for the compat syscalls, but such a large change in behavior does not belong into a consolidation patch like this one. Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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- 19 7月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Kees Cook 提交于
Some builds of GCC enable stack protector by default. Simply removing the arguments is not sufficient to disable stack protector, as the stack protector for those GCC builds must be explicitly disabled. Remove the argument removals and add -fno-stack-protector. Additionally include missed x32 argument updates, and adjust whitespace for readability. Fixes: 20355e5f ("x86/entry: Exclude low level entry code from sanitizing") Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/202006261333.585319CA6B@keescook
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- 10 7月, 2020 2 次提交
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由 Peter Zijlstra 提交于
Now that the macros use per-cpu data, we no longer need the argument. Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200623083721.571835311@infradead.org
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由 Peter Zijlstra 提交于
While the nmi_enter() users did trace_hardirqs_{off_prepare,on_finish}() there was no matching lockdep_hardirqs_*() calls to complete the picture. Introduce idtentry_{enter,exit}_nmi() to enable proper IRQ state tracking across the NMIs. Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200623083721.216740948@infradead.org
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- 09 7月, 2020 2 次提交
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
No users outside this file anymore. Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200708192934.301116609@linutronix.de
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
It's called from the non-instrumentable section. Fixes: c9c26150 ("x86/entry: Assert that syscalls are on the right stack") Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200708192934.191497962@linutronix.de
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- 08 7月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Christian Brauner 提交于
As discussed on-list (cf. [1]), in order to make setns() support time namespaces when attaching to multiple namespaces at once properly we need to tweak vdso_join_timens() to always succeed. So switch vdso_join_timens() to using a read lock and replacing mmap_write_lock_killable() to mmap_read_lock() as we discussed. Last cycle setns() was changed to support attaching to multiple namespaces atomically. This requires all namespaces to have a point of no return where they can't fail anymore. Specifically, <namespace-type>_install() is allowed to perform permission checks and install the namespace into the new struct nsset that it has been given but it is not allowed to make visible changes to the affected task. Once <namespace-type>_install() returns anything that the given namespace type requires to be setup in addition needs to ideally be done in a function that can't fail or if it fails the failure is not fatal. For time namespaces the relevant functions that fall into this category are timens_set_vvar_page() and vdso_join_timens(). Currently the latter can fail but doesn't need to. With this we can go on to implement a timens_commit() helper in a follow up patch to be used by setns(). [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200611110221.pgd3r5qkjrjmfqa2@wittgensteinSigned-off-by: NChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Reviewed-by: NAndrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200706154912.3248030-2-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
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- 07 7月, 2020 2 次提交
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由 Masahiro Yamada 提交于
Some Makefiles already pass -fno-stack-protector unconditionally. For example, arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/Makefile, arch/x86/xen/Makefile. No problem report so far about hard-coding this option. So, we can assume all supported compilers know -fno-stack-protector. GCC 4.8 and Clang support this option (https://godbolt.org/z/_HDGzN) Get rid of cc-option from -fno-stack-protector. Remove CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE, which is always 'y'. Note: arch/mips/vdso/Makefile adds -fno-stack-protector twice, first unconditionally, and second conditionally. I removed the second one. Signed-off-by: NMasahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: NNick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
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由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于
They were originally called _cond_rcu because they were special versions with conditional RCU handling. Now they're the standard entry and exit path, so the _cond_rcu part is just confusing. Drop it. Also change the signature to make them more extensible and more foolproof. No functional change -- it's pure refactoring. Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/247fc67685263e0b673e1d7f808182d28ff80359.1593795633.git.luto@kernel.org
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- 05 7月, 2020 2 次提交
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由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于
Chasing down a Xen bug caused me to realize that the new entry sanity checks are still fairly weak. Add some more checks. Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/881de09e786ab93ce56ee4a2437ba2c308afe7a9.1593795633.git.luto@kernel.org
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由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于
Move the clearing of the high bits of RAX after Xen PV joins the SYSENTER path so that Xen PV doesn't skip it. Arguably this code should be deleted instead, but that would belong in the merge window. Fixes: ffae641f ("x86/entry/64/compat: Fix Xen PV SYSENTER frame setup") Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/9d33b3f3216dcab008070f1c28b6091ae7199969.1593795633.git.luto@kernel.org
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- 01 7月, 2020 3 次提交
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由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于
The SYSENTER frame setup was nonsense. It worked by accident because the normal code into which the Xen asm jumped (entry_SYSENTER_32/compat) threw away SP without touching the stack. entry_SYSENTER_compat was recently modified such that it relied on having a valid stack pointer, so now the Xen asm needs to invoke it with a valid stack. Fix it up like SYSCALL: use the Xen-provided frame and skip the bare metal prologue. Fixes: 1c3e5d3f ("x86/entry: Make entry_64_compat.S objtool clean") Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/947880c41ade688ff4836f665d0c9fcaa9bd1201.1593191971.git.luto@kernel.org
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由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于
The SYSENTER asm (32-bit and compat) contains fixups for regs->sp and regs->flags. Move the fixups into C and fix some comments while at it. This is a valid cleanup all by itself, and it also simplifies the subsequent patch that will fix Xen PV SYSENTER. Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/fe62bef67eda7fac75b8f3dbafccf571dc4ece6b.1593191971.git.luto@kernel.org
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由 Andy Lutomirski 提交于
Now that the entry stack is a full page, it's too easy to regress the system call entry code and end up on the wrong stack without noticing. Assert that all system calls (SYSCALL64, SYSCALL32, SYSENTER, and INT80) are on the right stack and have pt_regs in the right place. Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/52059e42bb0ab8551153d012d68f7be18d72ff8e.1593191971.git.luto@kernel.org
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- 18 6月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Chang S. Bae 提交于
Without FSGSBASE, user space cannot change GSBASE other than through a PRCTL. The kernel enforces that the user space GSBASE value is postive as negative values are used for detecting the kernel space GSBASE value in the paranoid entry code. If FSGSBASE is enabled, user space can set arbitrary GSBASE values without kernel intervention, including negative ones, which breaks the paranoid entry assumptions. To avoid this, paranoid entry needs to unconditionally save the current GSBASE value independent of the interrupted context, retrieve and write the kernel GSBASE and unconditionally restore the saved value on exit. The restore happens either in paranoid_exit or in the special exit path of the NMI low level code. All other entry code pathes which use unconditional SWAPGS are not affected as they do not depend on the actual content. [ tglx: Massaged changelogs and comments ] Suggested-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Suggested-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Suggested-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: NChang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1557309753-24073-13-git-send-email-chang.seok.bae@intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200528201402.1708239-12-sashal@kernel.org
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