- 20 7月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Joerg Roedel 提交于
Allow PTI to be compiled on x86_32. Signed-off-by: NJoerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: NPavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com> Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca> Cc: joro@8bytes.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-38-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
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- 03 7月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Kamal Mostafa 提交于
There is no need to "select BUG" when CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled. The kernel thread will always die, regardless of the CONFIG_BUG. Signed-off-by: NKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> [kees: tweak commit log] Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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- 16 1月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Kees Cook 提交于
This introduces CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK to control the behavior of hardened usercopy whitelist violations. By default, whitelist violations will continue to WARN() so that any bad or missing usercopy whitelists can be discovered without being too disruptive. If this config is disabled at build time or a system is booted with "slab_common.usercopy_fallback=0", usercopy whitelists will BUG() instead of WARN(). This is useful for admins that want to use usercopy whitelists immediately. Suggested-by: NMatthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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- 14 1月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 W. Trevor King 提交于
When the config option for PTI was added a reference to documentation was added as well. But the documentation did not exist at that point. The final documentation has a different file name. Fix it up to point to the proper file. Fixes: 385ce0ea ("x86/mm/pti: Add Kconfig") Signed-off-by: NW. Trevor King <wking@tremily.us> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3009cc8ccbddcd897ec1e0cb6dda524929de0d14.1515799398.git.wking@tremily.us
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- 03 1月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
This really want's to be enabled by default. Users who know what they are doing can disable it either in the config or on the kernel command line. Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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- 24 12月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Dave Hansen 提交于
Finally allow CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION to be enabled. PARAVIRT generally requires that the kernel not manage its own page tables. It also means that the hypervisor and kernel must agree wholeheartedly about what format the page tables are in and what they contain. PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION, unfortunately, changes the rules and they can not be used together. I've seen conflicting feedback from maintainers lately about whether they want the Kconfig magic to go first or last in a patch series. It's going last here because the partially-applied series leads to kernels that can not boot in a bunch of cases. I did a run through the entire series with CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y to look for build errors, though. [ tglx: Removed SMP and !PARAVIRT dependencies as they not longer exist ] Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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- 18 12月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Kees Cook 提交于
As done for /proc/kcore in commit df04abfd ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data") this adds a bounce buffer when reading memory via /dev/mem. This is needed to allow kernel text memory to be read out when built with CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY (which refuses to read out kernel text) and without CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM (which would have refused to read any RAM contents at all). Since this build configuration isn't common (most systems with CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY also have CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM), this also tries to inform Kconfig about the recommended settings. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's changes to /dev/mem code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Reported-by: NMichael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Fixes: f5509cc1 ("mm: Hardened usercopy") Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- 13 7月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Daniel Micay 提交于
This adds support for compiling with a rough equivalent to the glibc _FORTIFY_SOURCE=1 feature, providing compile-time and runtime buffer overflow checks for string.h functions when the compiler determines the size of the source or destination buffer at compile-time. Unlike glibc, it covers buffer reads in addition to writes. GNU C __builtin_*_chk intrinsics are avoided because they would force a much more complex implementation. They aren't designed to detect read overflows and offer no real benefit when using an implementation based on inline checks. Inline checks don't add up to much code size and allow full use of the regular string intrinsics while avoiding the need for a bunch of _chk functions and per-arch assembly to avoid wrapper overhead. This detects various overflows at compile-time in various drivers and some non-x86 core kernel code. There will likely be issues caught in regular use at runtime too. Future improvements left out of initial implementation for simplicity, as it's all quite optional and can be done incrementally: * Some of the fortified string functions (strncpy, strcat), don't yet place a limit on reads from the source based on __builtin_object_size of the source buffer. * Extending coverage to more string functions like strlcat. * It should be possible to optionally use __builtin_object_size(x, 1) for some functions (C strings) to detect intra-object overflows (like glibc's _FORTIFY_SOURCE=2), but for now this takes the conservative approach to avoid likely compatibility issues. * The compile-time checks should be made available via a separate config option which can be enabled by default (or always enabled) once enough time has passed to get the issues it catches fixed. Kees said: "This is great to have. While it was out-of-tree code, it would have blocked at least CVE-2016-3858 from being exploitable (improper size argument to strlcpy()). I've sent a number of fixes for out-of-bounds-reads that this detected upstream already" [arnd@arndb.de: x86: fix fortified memcpy] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170627150047.660360-1-arnd@arndb.de [keescook@chromium.org: avoid panic() in favor of BUG()] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170626235122.GA25261@beast [keescook@chromium.org: move from -mm, add ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE, tweak Kconfig help] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170526095404.20439-1-danielmicay@gmail.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-8-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.orgSigned-off-by: NDaniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 24 5月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Daniel Jurgens 提交于
Add new LSM hooks to allocate and free security contexts and check for permission to access a PKey. Allocate and free a security context when creating and destroying a QP. This context is used for controlling access to PKeys. When a request is made to modify a QP that changes the port, PKey index, or alternate path, check that the QP has permission for the PKey in the PKey table index on the subnet prefix of the port. If the QP is shared make sure all handles to the QP also have access. Store which port and PKey index a QP is using. After the reset to init transition the user can modify the port, PKey index and alternate path independently. So port and PKey settings changes can be a merge of the previous settings and the new ones. In order to maintain access control if there are PKey table or subnet prefix change keep a list of all QPs are using each PKey index on each port. If a change occurs all QPs using that device and port must have access enforced for the new cache settings. These changes add a transaction to the QP modify process. Association with the old port and PKey index must be maintained if the modify fails, and must be removed if it succeeds. Association with the new port and PKey index must be established prior to the modify and removed if the modify fails. 1. When a QP is modified to a particular Port, PKey index or alternate path insert that QP into the appropriate lists. 2. Check permission to access the new settings. 3. If step 2 grants access attempt to modify the QP. 4a. If steps 2 and 3 succeed remove any prior associations. 4b. If ether fails remove the new setting associations. If a PKey table or subnet prefix changes walk the list of QPs and check that they have permission. If not send the QP to the error state and raise a fatal error event. If it's a shared QP make sure all the QPs that share the real_qp have permission as well. If the QP that owns a security structure is denied access the security structure is marked as such and the QP is added to an error_list. Once the moving the QP to error is complete the security structure mark is cleared. Maintaining the lists correctly turns QP destroy into a transaction. The hardware driver for the device frees the ib_qp structure, so while the destroy is in progress the ib_qp pointer in the ib_qp_security struct is undefined. When the destroy process begins the ib_qp_security structure is marked as destroying. This prevents any action from being taken on the QP pointer. After the QP is destroyed successfully it could still listed on an error_list wait for it to be processed by that flow before cleaning up the structure. If the destroy fails the QPs port and PKey settings are reinserted into the appropriate lists, the destroying flag is cleared, and access control is enforced, in case there were any cache changes during the destroy flow. To keep the security changes isolated a new file is used to hold security related functionality. Signed-off-by: NDaniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Acked-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> [PM: merge fixup in ib_verbs.h and uverbs_cmd.c] Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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- 15 5月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Geert Uytterhoeven 提交于
Signed-off-by: NGeert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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- 27 4月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 06 3月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 James Morris 提交于
Subsequent patches will add RO hardening to LSM hooks, however, SELinux still needs to be able to perform runtime disablement after init to handle architectures where init-time disablement via boot parameters is not feasible. Introduce a new kernel configuration parameter CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS, and a helper macro __lsm_ro_after_init, to handle this case. Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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- 19 1月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Greg Kroah-Hartman 提交于
Some usermode helper applications are defined at kernel build time, while others can be changed at runtime. To provide a sane way to filter these, add a new kernel option "STATIC_USERMODEHELPER". This option routes all call_usermodehelper() calls through this binary, no matter what the caller wishes to have called. The new binary (by default set to /sbin/usermode-helper, but can be changed through the STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH option) can properly filter the requested programs to be run by the kernel by looking at the first argument that is passed to it. All other options should then be passed onto the proper program if so desired. To disable all call_usermodehelper() calls by the kernel, set STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to an empty string. Thanks to Neil Brown for the idea of this feature. Cc: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- 08 9月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Kees Cook 提交于
A custom allocator without __GFP_COMP that copies to userspace has been found in vmw_execbuf_process[1], so this disables the page-span checker by placing it behind a CONFIG for future work where such things can be tracked down later. [1] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1373326Reported-by: NVinson Lee <vlee@freedesktop.org> Fixes: f5509cc1 ("mm: Hardened usercopy") Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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- 20 8月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Linus Torvalds 提交于
The kernel test robot reported a usercopy failure in the new hardened sanity checks, due to a page-crossing copy of the FPU state into the task structure. This happened because the kernel test robot was testing with SLOB, which doesn't actually do the required book-keeping for slab allocations, and as a result the hardening code didn't realize that the task struct allocation was one single allocation - and the sanity checks fail. Since SLOB doesn't even claim to support hardening (and you really shouldn't use it), the straightforward solution is to just make the usercopy hardening code depend on the allocator supporting it. Reported-by: Nkernel test robot <xiaolong.ye@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 27 7月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Kees Cook 提交于
This is the start of porting PAX_USERCOPY into the mainline kernel. This is the first set of features, controlled by CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. The work is based on code by PaX Team and Brad Spengler, and an earlier port from Casey Schaufler. Additional non-slab page tests are from Rik van Riel. This patch contains the logic for validating several conditions when performing copy_to_user() and copy_from_user() on the kernel object being copied to/from: - address range doesn't wrap around - address range isn't NULL or zero-allocated (with a non-zero copy size) - if on the slab allocator: - object size must be less than or equal to copy size (when check is implemented in the allocator, which appear in subsequent patches) - otherwise, object must not span page allocations (excepting Reserved and CMA ranges) - if on the stack - object must not extend before/after the current process stack - object must be contained by a valid stack frame (when there is arch/build support for identifying stack frames) - object must not overlap with kernel text Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: NValdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Tested-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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- 21 4月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Kees Cook 提交于
This LSM enforces that kernel-loaded files (modules, firmware, etc) must all come from the same filesystem, with the expectation that such a filesystem is backed by a read-only device such as dm-verity or CDROM. This allows systems that have a verified and/or unchangeable filesystem to enforce module and firmware loading restrictions without needing to sign the files individually. Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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- 28 7月, 2015 1 次提交
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由 Kees Cook 提交于
Now that minor LSMs can cleanly stack with major LSMs, remove the unneeded config for Yama to be made to explicitly stack. Just selecting the main Yama CONFIG will allow it to work, regardless of the major LSM. Since distros using Yama are already forcing it to stack, this is effectively a no-op change. Additionally add MAINTAINERS entry. Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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- 16 4月, 2015 1 次提交
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由 Iulia Manda 提交于
There are a lot of embedded systems that run most or all of their functionality in init, running as root:root. For these systems, supporting multiple users is not necessary. This patch adds a new symbol, CONFIG_MULTIUSER, that makes support for non-root users, non-root groups, and capabilities optional. It is enabled under CONFIG_EXPERT menu. When this symbol is not defined, UID and GID are zero in any possible case and processes always have all capabilities. The following syscalls are compiled out: setuid, setregid, setgid, setreuid, setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setgroups, getgroups, setfsuid, setfsgid, capget, capset. Also, groups.c is compiled out completely. In kernel/capability.c, capable function was moved in order to avoid adding two ifdef blocks. This change saves about 25 KB on a defconfig build. The most minimal kernels have total text sizes in the high hundreds of kB rather than low MB. (The 25k goes down a bit with allnoconfig, but not that much. The kernel was booted in Qemu. All the common functionalities work. Adding users/groups is not possible, failing with -ENOSYS. Bloat-o-meter output: add/remove: 7/87 grow/shrink: 19/397 up/down: 1675/-26325 (-24650) [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: NIulia Manda <iulia.manda21@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: NJosh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Acked-by: NGeert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Tested-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 05 2月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Colin Cross 提交于
Binaries compiled for arm may run on arm64 if CONFIG_COMPAT is selected. Set LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR to 32768 if ARM64 && COMPAT to prevent selinux failures launching 32-bit static executables that are mapped at 0x8000. Signed-off-by: NColin Cross <ccross@android.com> Acked-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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- 11 5月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 David Howells 提交于
Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig as there are going to be a lot of key-related options. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
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- 10 2月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Kees Cook 提交于
This adds the Yama Linux Security Module to collect DAC security improvements (specifically just ptrace restrictions for now) that have existed in various forms over the years and have been carried outside the mainline kernel by other Linux distributions like Openwall and grsecurity. Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 15 9月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
Encrypted keys are decrypted/encrypted using either a trusted-key or, for those systems without a TPM, a user-defined key. This patch removes the trusted-keys and TCG_TPM dependencies. Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
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- 19 7月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directory in order to share the iint among the different integrity models. Changelog: - don't define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE - rename several globally visible 'ima_' prefixed functions, structs, locks, etc to 'integrity_' - replace '20' with SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE - reflect location change in appropriate Kconfig and Makefiles - remove unnecessary initialization of iint_initialized to 0 - rebased on current ima_iint.c - define integrity_iint_store/lock as static There should be no other functional changes. Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
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- 22 3月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Paul Gortmaker 提交于
The default for this is universally set to 64k, but the help says: For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems. On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768. The text is right, in that we are seeing selinux-enabled ARM targets that fail to launch /sbin/init because selinux blocks a memory map. So select the right value if we know we are building ARM. Signed-off-by: NPaul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 29 11月, 2010 2 次提交
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由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
Define a new kernel key-type called 'encrypted'. Encrypted keys are kernel generated random numbers, which are encrypted/decrypted with a 'trusted' symmetric key. Encrypted keys are created/encrypted/decrypted in the kernel. Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs. Changelog: - bug fix: replaced master-key rcu based locking with semaphore (reported by David Howells) - Removed memset of crypto_shash_digest() digest output - Replaced verification of 'key-type:key-desc' using strcspn(), with one based on string constants. - Moved documentation to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt - Replace hash with shash (based on comments by David Howells) - Make lengths/counts size_t where possible (based on comments by David Howells) Could not convert most lengths, as crypto expects 'unsigned int' (size_t: on 32 bit is defined as unsigned int, but on 64 bit is unsigned long) - Add 'const' where possible (based on comments by David Howells) - allocate derived_buf dynamically to support arbitrary length master key (fixed by Roberto Sassu) - wait until late_initcall for crypto libraries to be registered - cleanup security/Kconfig - Add missing 'update' keyword (reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu) - Free epayload on failure to create key (reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu) - Increase the data size limit (requested by Roberto Sassu) - Crypto return codes are always 0 on success and negative on failure, remove unnecessary tests. - Replaced kzalloc() with kmalloc() Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: NRoberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Mimi Zohar 提交于
Define a new kernel key-type called 'trusted'. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys, generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. The TPM only unseals the keys, if the boot PCRs and other criteria match. Userspace can only ever see encrypted blobs. Based on suggestions by Jason Gunthorpe, several new options have been added to support additional usages. The new options are: migratable= designates that the key may/may not ever be updated (resealed under a new key, new pcrinfo or new auth.) pcrlock=n extends the designated PCR 'n' with a random value, so that a key sealed to that PCR may not be unsealed again until after a reboot. keyhandle= specifies the sealing/unsealing key handle. keyauth= specifies the sealing/unsealing key auth. blobauth= specifies the sealed data auth. Implementation of a kernel reserved locality for trusted keys will be investigated for a possible future extension. Changelog: - Updated and added examples to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt - Moved generic TPM constants to include/linux/tpm_command.h (David Howell's suggestion.) - trusted_defined.c: replaced kzalloc with kmalloc, added pcrlock failure error handling, added const qualifiers where appropriate. - moved to late_initcall - updated from hash to shash (suggestion by David Howells) - reduced worst stack usage (tpm_seal) from 530 to 312 bytes - moved documentation to Documentation directory (suggestion by David Howells) - all the other code cleanups suggested by David Howells - Add pcrlock CAP_SYS_ADMIN dependency (based on comment by Jason Gunthorpe) - New options: migratable, pcrlock, keyhandle, keyauth, blobauth (based on discussions with Jason Gunthorpe) - Free payload on failure to create key(reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu) - Updated Kconfig and other descriptions (based on Serge Hallyn's suggestion) - Replaced kzalloc() with kmalloc() (reported by Serge Hallyn) Signed-off-by: NDavid Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 12 11月, 2010 1 次提交
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由 Dan Rosenberg 提交于
The kernel syslog contains debugging information that is often useful during exploitation of other vulnerabilities, such as kernel heap addresses. Rather than futilely attempt to sanitize hundreds (or thousands) of printk statements and simultaneously cripple useful debugging functionality, it is far simpler to create an option that prevents unprivileged users from reading the syslog. This patch, loosely based on grsecurity's GRKERNSEC_DMESG, creates the dmesg_restrict sysctl. When set to "0", the default, no restrictions are enforced. When set to "1", only users with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can read the kernel syslog via dmesg(8) or other mechanisms. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: explain the config option in kernel.txt] Signed-off-by: NDan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> Acked-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Acked-by: NEugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org> Acked-by: NKees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 02 8月, 2010 1 次提交
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由 John Johansen 提交于
Kconfig and Makefiles to enable configuration and building of AppArmor. Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 24 11月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Serge E. Hallyn 提交于
As far as I know, all distros currently ship kernels with default CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y. Since having the option on leaves a 'no_file_caps' option to boot without file capabilities, the main reason to keep the option is that turning it off saves you (on my s390x partition) 5k. In particular, vmlinux sizes came to: without patch fscaps=n: 53598392 without patch fscaps=y: 53603406 with this patch applied: 53603342 with the security-next tree. Against this we must weigh the fact that there is no simple way for userspace to figure out whether file capabilities are supported, while things like per-process securebits, capability bounding sets, and adding bits to pI if CAP_SETPCAP is in pE are not supported with SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=n, leaving a bit of a problem for applications wanting to know whether they can use them and/or why something failed. It also adds another subtly different set of semantics which we must maintain at the risk of severe security regressions. So this patch removes the SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES compile option. It drops the kernel size by about 50k over the stock SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y kernel, by removing the cap_limit_ptraced_target() function. Changelog: Nov 20: remove cap_limit_ptraced_target() as it's logic was ifndef'ed. Signed-off-by: NSerge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: NAndrew G. Morgan" <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 09 11月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 John Johansen 提交于
The LSM currently requires setting a kernel parameter at boot to select a specific LSM. This adds a config option that allows specifying a default LSM that is used unless overridden with the security= kernel parameter. If the the config option is not set the current behavior of first LSM to register is used. Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 20 10月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 James Morris 提交于
Remove the root_plug example LSM code. It's unmaintained and increasingly broken in various ways. Made at the 2009 Kernel Summit in Tokyo! Acked-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 02 9月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Shane Wang 提交于
Move tboot.h from asm to linux to fix the build errors of intel_txt patch on non-X86 platforms. Remove the tboot code from generic code init/main.c and kernel/cpu.c. Signed-off-by: NShane Wang <shane.wang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
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- 19 8月, 2009 2 次提交
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由 Andreas Schwab 提交于
Fix prompt for LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR. (Verbs are cool!) Signed-off-by: NAndreas Schwab <schwab@linux-m68k.org> Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Dave Jones 提交于
Commit 788084ab added the LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR option, whose help text states "For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems." Which implies that it's default setting was typoed. Signed-off-by: NDave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 17 8月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
Currently SELinux enforcement of controls on the ability to map low memory is determined by the mmap_min_addr tunable. This patch causes SELinux to ignore the tunable and instead use a seperate Kconfig option specific to how much space the LSM should protect. The tunable will now only control the need for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and SELinux permissions will always protect the amount of low memory designated by CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR. This allows users who need to disable the mmap_min_addr controls (usual reason being they run WINE as a non-root user) to do so and still have SELinux controls preventing confined domains (like a web server) from being able to map some area of low memory. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 15 8月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 提交于
Signed-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
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- 06 8月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
Currently SELinux enforcement of controls on the ability to map low memory is determined by the mmap_min_addr tunable. This patch causes SELinux to ignore the tunable and instead use a seperate Kconfig option specific to how much space the LSM should protect. The tunable will now only control the need for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and SELinux permissions will always protect the amount of low memory designated by CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR. This allows users who need to disable the mmap_min_addr controls (usual reason being they run WINE as a non-root user) to do so and still have SELinux controls preventing confined domains (like a web server) from being able to map some area of low memory. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 22 7月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Joseph Cihula 提交于
This patch adds kernel configuration and boot support for Intel Trusted Execution Technology (Intel TXT). Intel's technology for safer computing, Intel Trusted Execution Technology (Intel TXT), defines platform-level enhancements that provide the building blocks for creating trusted platforms. Intel TXT was formerly known by the code name LaGrande Technology (LT). Intel TXT in Brief: o Provides dynamic root of trust for measurement (DRTM) o Data protection in case of improper shutdown o Measurement and verification of launched environment Intel TXT is part of the vPro(TM) brand and is also available some non-vPro systems. It is currently available on desktop systems based on the Q35, X38, Q45, and Q43 Express chipsets (e.g. Dell Optiplex 755, HP dc7800, etc.) and mobile systems based on the GM45, PM45, and GS45 Express chipsets. For more information, see http://www.intel.com/technology/security/. This site also has a link to the Intel TXT MLE Developers Manual, which has been updated for the new released platforms. A much more complete description of how these patches support TXT, how to configure a system for it, etc. is in the Documentation/intel_txt.txt file in this patch. This patch provides the TXT support routines for complete functionality, documentation for TXT support and for the changes to the boot_params structure, and boot detection of a TXT launch. Attempts to shutdown (reboot, Sx) the system will result in platform resets; subsequent patches will support these shutdown modes properly. Documentation/intel_txt.txt | 210 +++++++++++++++++++++ Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt | 1 arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h | 3 arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h | 3 arch/x86/include/asm/tboot.h | 197 ++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 1 arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 4 arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c | 379 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/Kconfig | 30 +++ 9 files changed, 827 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) Signed-off-by: NJoseph Cihula <joseph.cihula@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NShane Wang <shane.wang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NGang Wei <gang.wei@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
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- 04 6月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Christoph Lameter 提交于
This patch removes the dependency of mmap_min_addr on CONFIG_SECURITY. It also sets a default mmap_min_addr of 4096. mmapping of addresses below 4096 will only be possible for processes with CAP_SYS_RAWIO. Signed-off-by: NChristoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Looks-ok-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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