First, io_close() misses filp_close() and io_cqring_add_event(), when
f_op->flush is defined. That's because in this case it will
io_queue_async_work() itself not grabbing files, so the corresponding
chunk in io_close_finish() won't be executed.

Second, when submitted through io_wq_submit_work(), it will do
filp_close() and *_add_event() twice: first inline in io_close(),
and the second one in call to io_close_finish() from io_close().
The second one will also fire, because it was submitted async through
generic path, and so have grabbed files.

And the last nice thing is to remove this weird pilgrimage with checking
work/old_work and casting it to nxt. Just use a helper instead.
Signed-off-by: NPavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Don't just check for dirfd == -1, we should allow AT_FDCWD as well for
relative lookups.
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

This passes it in to io-wq, so it assumes the right fs_struct when
executing async work that may need to do lookups.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.3+
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Some work items need this for relative path lookup, make it available
like the other inherited credentials/mm/etc.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.3+
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

For non-blocking issue, we set IOCB_NOWAIT in the kiocb. However, on a
raw block device, this yields an -EOPNOTSUPP return, as non-blocking
writes aren't supported. Turn this -EOPNOTSUPP into -EAGAIN, so we retry
from blocking context with IOCB_NOWAIT cleared.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.5
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

openat() and statx() may have allocated ->open.filename, which should be
be put. Add cleanup handlers for them.
Signed-off-by: NPavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Allocated iovec is freed only in io_{read,write,send,recv)(), and just
leaves it if an error occured. There are plenty of such cases:
- cancellation of non-head requests
- fail grabbing files in __io_queue_sqe()
- set REQ_F_NOWAIT and returning in __io_queue_sqe()

Add REQ_F_NEED_CLEANUP, which will force such requests with custom
allocated resourses go through cleanup handlers on put.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.5
Signed-off-by: NPavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

struct io_async_open is unused, remove it.
Signed-off-by: NPavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

In io_uring_poll() we must flush overflowed CQ events before to
check if there are CQ events available, to avoid missing events.

We call the io_cqring_events() that checks and flushes any overflow
and returns the number of CQ events available.
Signed-off-by: NStefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

All of these opcodes take a directory file descriptor. We can't easily
support fixed files for these operations, and the use case for that
probably isn't all that clear (or sensible) anyway.

Disable IOSQE_FIXED_FILE for these operations.
Reported-by: NStefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

After defer, a request will be prepared, that includes allocating iovec
if needed, and then submitted through io_wq_submit_work() but not custom
handler (e.g. io_rw_async()/io_sendrecv_async()). However, it'll leak
iovec, as it's in io-wq and the code goes as follows:

io_read() {
	if (!io_wq_current_is_worker())
		kfree(iovec);
}

Put all deallocation logic in io_{read,write,send,recv}(), which will
leave the memory, if going async with -EAGAIN.

It also fixes a leak after failed io_alloc_async_ctx() in
io_{recv,send}_msg().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.5
Signed-off-by: NPavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Make bitfields of size 1 bit be unsigned (since there is no room
for the sign bit).
This clears up the sparse warnings:

  CHECK   ../fs/io_uring.c
../fs/io_uring.c:207:50: error: dubious one-bit signed bitfield
../fs/io_uring.c:208:55: error: dubious one-bit signed bitfield
../fs/io_uring.c:209:63: error: dubious one-bit signed bitfield
../fs/io_uring.c:210:54: error: dubious one-bit signed bitfield
../fs/io_uring.c:211:57: error: dubious one-bit signed bitfield

Found by sight and then verified with sparse.

Fixes: 69b3e546 ("io_uring: change io_ring_ctx bool fields into bit fields")
Signed-off-by: NRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: io-uring@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Fail fast if can't grab mm, so past that requests always have an mm
when required. This allows us to remove req->user altogether.
Signed-off-by: NPavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

syzbot reports a use-after-free in io_ring_file_ref_switch() when it
tries to switch back to percpu mode. When we put the final reference to
the table by calling percpu_ref_kill_and_confirm(), we don't want the
zero reference to queue async work for flushing the potentially queued
up items. We currently do a few flush_work(), but they merely paper
around the issue, since the work item may not have been queued yet
depending on the when the percpu-ref callback gets run.

Coming into the file unregister, we know we have the ring quiesced.
io_ring_file_ref_switch() can check for whether or not the ref is dying
or not, and not queue anything async at that point. Once the ref has
been confirmed killed, flush any potential items manually.

Reported-by: syzbot+7caeaea49c2c8a591e3d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 05f3fb3c ("io_uring: avoid ring quiesce for fixed file set unregister and update")
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

As part of io_uring shutdown, we cancel work that is pending and won't
necessarily complete on its own. That includes requests like poll
commands and timeouts.

If we're using SQPOLL for kernel side submission and we shutdown the
ring immediately after queueing such work, we can race with the sqthread
doing the submission. This means we may miss cancelling some work, which
results in the io_uring shutdown hanging forever.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

'PTR_ERR(p) == -E*' is a stronger condition than IS_ERR(p).
Hence, IS_ERR(p) is unneeded.

The semantic patch that generates this commit is as follows:

// <smpl>
@@
expression ptr;
constant error_code;
@@
-IS_ERR(ptr) && (PTR_ERR(ptr) == - error_code)
+PTR_ERR(ptr) == - error_code
// </smpl>

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200106045833.1725-1-masahiroy@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NMasahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr>
Acked-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org> [drivers/clk/clk.c]
Acked-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bgolaszewski@baylibre.com> [GPIO]
Acked-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de> [drivers/i2c]
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> [acpi/scan.c]
Acked-by: NRob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The most notable change is DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE macro split in
seq_file.h.

Conversion rule is:

	llseek		=> proc_lseek
	unlocked_ioctl	=> proc_ioctl

	xxx		=> proc_xxx

	delete ".owner = THIS_MODULE" line

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix drivers/isdn/capi/kcapi_proc.c]
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fix kernel/sched/psi.c]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200122180545.36222f50@canb.auug.org.au
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191225172546.GB13378@avx2Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NStephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Currently core /proc code uses "struct file_operations" for custom hooks,
however, VFS doesn't directly call them.  Every time VFS expands
file_operations hook set, /proc code bloats for no reason.

Introduce "struct proc_ops" which contains only those hooks which /proc
allows to call into (open, release, read, write, ioctl, mmap, poll).  It
doesn't contain module pointer as well.

Save ~184 bytes per usage:

	add/remove: 26/26 grow/shrink: 1/4 up/down: 1922/-6674 (-4752)
	Function                                     old     new   delta
	sysvipc_proc_ops                               -      72     +72
				...
	config_gz_proc_ops                             -      72     +72
	proc_get_inode                               289     339     +50
	proc_reg_get_unmapped_area                   110     107      -3
	close_pdeo                                   227     224      -3
	proc_reg_open                                289     284      -5
	proc_create_data                              60      53      -7
	rt_cpu_seq_fops                              256       -    -256
				...
	default_affinity_proc_fops                   256       -    -256
	Total: Before=5430095, After=5425343, chg -0.09%

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191225172228.GA13378@avx2Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The pte_hole() callback is called at multiple levels of the page tables.
Code dumping the kernel page tables needs to know what at what depth the
missing entry is.  Add this is an extra parameter to pte_hole().  When the
depth isn't know (e.g.  processing a vma) then -1 is passed.

The depth that is reported is the actual level where the entry is missing
(ignoring any folding that is in place), i.e.  any levels where
PTRS_PER_P?D is set to 1 are ignored.

Note that depth starts at 0 for a PGD so that PUD/PMD/PTE retain their
natural numbers as levels 2/3/4.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191218162402.45610-16-steven.price@arm.comSigned-off-by: NSteven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Tested-by: NZong Li <zong.li@sifive.com>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: "Liang, Kan" <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

If max_pfn does not fall onto a section boundary, it is possible to
inspect PFNs up to max_pfn, and PFNs above max_pfn, however, max_pfn
itself can't be inspected.  We can have a valid (and online) memmap at and
above max_pfn if max_pfn is not aligned to a section boundary.  The whole
early section has a memmap and is marked online.  Being able to inspect
the state of these PFNs is valuable for debugging, especially because
max_pfn can change on memory hotplug and expose these memmaps.

Also, querying page flags via "./page-types -r -a 0x144001,"
(tools/vm/page-types.c) inside a x86-64 guest with 4160MB under QEMU
results in an (almost) endless loop in user space, because the end is not
detected properly when starting after max_pfn.

Instead, let's allow to inspect all pages in the highest section and
return 0 directly if we try to access pages above that section.

While at it, check the count before adjusting it, to avoid masking user
errors.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191211163201.17179-3-david@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Bob Picco <bob.picco@oracle.com>
Cc: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
Cc: Steven Sistare <steven.sistare@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Writing a cloned file triggers a kernel oops and the user-space command
process is also killed by the system.  The bug can be reproduced stably
via:

1) create a file under ocfs2 file system directory.

  journalctl -b > aa.txt

2) create a cloned file for this file.

  reflink aa.txt bb.txt

3) write the cloned file with dd command.

  dd if=/dev/zero of=bb.txt bs=512 count=1 conv=notrunc

The dd command is killed by the kernel, then you can see the oops message
via dmesg command.

[  463.875404] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000028
[  463.875413] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[  463.875416] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[  463.875418] PGD 0 P4D 0
[  463.875425] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[  463.875431] CPU: 1 PID: 2291 Comm: dd Tainted: G           OE     5.3.16-2-default
[  463.875433] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[  463.875500] RIP: 0010:ocfs2_refcount_cow+0xa4/0x5d0 [ocfs2]
[  463.875505] Code: 06 89 6c 24 38 89 eb f6 44 24 3c 02 74 be 49 8b 47 28
[  463.875508] RSP: 0018:ffffa2cb409dfce8 EFLAGS: 00010202
[  463.875512] RAX: ffff8b1ebdca8000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffff8b1eb73a9df0
[  463.875515] RDX: 0000000000056a01 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[  463.875517] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffff8b1eb73a9de0 R09: 0000000000000000
[  463.875520] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
[  463.875522] R13: ffff8b1eb922f048 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8b1eb922f048
[  463.875526] FS:  00007f8f44d15540(0000) GS:ffff8b1ebeb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  463.875529] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  463.875532] CR2: 0000000000000028 CR3: 000000003c17a000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[  463.875546] Call Trace:
[  463.875596]  ? ocfs2_inode_lock_full_nested+0x18b/0x960 [ocfs2]
[  463.875648]  ocfs2_file_write_iter+0xaf8/0xc70 [ocfs2]
[  463.875672]  new_sync_write+0x12d/0x1d0
[  463.875688]  vfs_write+0xad/0x1a0
[  463.875697]  ksys_write+0xa1/0xe0
[  463.875710]  do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1f0
[  463.875743]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[  463.875758] RIP: 0033:0x7f8f4482ed44
[  463.875762] Code: 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 80 00 00 00
[  463.875765] RSP: 002b:00007fff300a79d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[  463.875769] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f8f4482ed44
[  463.875771] RDX: 0000000000000200 RSI: 000055f771b5c000 RDI: 0000000000000001
[  463.875774] RBP: 0000000000000200 R08: 00007f8f44af9c78 R09: 0000000000000003
[  463.875776] R10: 000000000000089f R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055f771b5c000
[  463.875779] R13: 0000000000000200 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000055f771b5c000

This regression problem was introduced by commit e74540b2 ("ocfs2:
protect extent tree in ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write()").

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200121050153.13290-1-ghe@suse.com
Fixes: e74540b2 ("ocfs2: protect extent tree in ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write()").
Signed-off-by: NGang He <ghe@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

If we have nested or circular eventfd wakeups, then we can deadlock if
we run them inline from our poll waitqueue wakeup handler. It's also
possible to have very long chains of notifications, to the extent where
we could risk blowing the stack.

Check the eventfd recursion count before calling eventfd_signal(). If
it's non-zero, then punt the signaling to async context. This is always
safe, as it takes us out-of-line in terms of stack and locking context.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Reviewed-by: NJeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Both iocb_flags() and kiocb_set_rw_flags() are inline and modify
kiocb->ki_flags. Place them close, so they can be potentially better
optimised.
Signed-off-by: NPavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Grab requests from cache-array from the end, so can get by only
free_reqs.
Signed-off-by: NPavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Andres correctly points out that read-ahead can block, if it needs to
read in meta data (or even just through the page cache page allocations).
Play it safe for now and just ensure WILLNEED is also punted to async
context.

While in there, allow the file settings hints from non-blocking
context. They don't need to start/do IO, and we can safely do them
inline.

Fixes: 4840e418 ("io_uring: add IORING_OP_FADVISE")
Reported-by: NAndres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

We punt close to async for the final fput(), but we log the completion
even before that even in that case. We rely on the request not having
a files table assigned to detect what the final async close should do.
However, if we punt the async queue to __io_queue_sqe(), we'll get
->files assigned and this makes io_close_finish() think it should both
close the filp again (which does no harm) AND log a new CQE event for
this request. This causes duplicate CQEs.

Queue the request up for async manually so we don't grab files
needlessly and trigger this condition.
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

It won't ever get into io_prep_rw() when req->file haven't been set in
io_req_set_file(), hence remove the check.
Signed-off-by: NPavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

If we have a read/write that is deferred, we already setup the async IO
context for that request, and mapped it. When we later try and execute
the request and we get -EAGAIN, we don't want to attempt to re-map it.
If we do, we end up with garbage in the iovec, which typically leads
to an -EFAULT or -EINVAL completion.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.5
Reported-by: NDan Melnic <dmm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Don't use the recvmsg/sendmsg helpers, use the same helpers that the
recv(2) and send(2) system calls use.
Reported-by: N李通洲 <carter.li@eoitek.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

If we have nested or circular eventfd wakeups, then we can deadlock if
we run them inline from our poll waitqueue wakeup handler. It's also
possible to have very long chains of notifications, to the extent where
we could risk blowing the stack.

Check the eventfd recursion count before calling eventfd_signal(). If
it's non-zero, then punt the signaling to async context. This is always
safe, as it takes us out-of-line in terms of stack and locking context.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.1+
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

eventfd use cases from aio and io_uring can deadlock due to circular
or resursive calling, when eventfd_signal() tries to grab the waitqueue
lock. On top of that, it's also possible to construct notification
chains that are deep enough that we could blow the stack.

Add a percpu counter that tracks the percpu recursion depth, warn if we
exceed it. The counter is also exposed so that users of eventfd_signal()
can do the right thing if it's non-zero in the context where it is
called.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

ovl_lseek() is using ssize_t to return the value from vfs_llseek().  On a
32-bit kernel ssize_t is a 32-bit signed int, which overflows above 2 GB.

Assign the return value of vfs_llseek() to loff_t to fix this.
Reported-by: NBoris Gjenero <boris.gjenero@gmail.com>
Fixes: 9e46b840 ("ovl: support stacked SEEK_HOLE/SEEK_DATA")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>

There was some logic added a while ago to clear out f_bavail in statfs()
if we did not have enough free metadata space to satisfy our global
reserve.  This was incorrect at the time, however didn't really pose a
problem for normal file systems because we would often allocate chunks
if we got this low on free metadata space, and thus wouldn't really hit
this case unless we were actually full.

Fast forward to today and now we are much better about not allocating
metadata chunks all of the time.  Couple this with d792b0f1 ("btrfs:
always reserve our entire size for the global reserve") which now means
we'll easily have a larger global reserve than our free space, we are
now more likely to trip over this while still having plenty of space.

Fix this by skipping this logic if the global rsv's space_info is not
full.  space_info->full is 0 unless we've attempted to allocate a chunk
for that space_info and that has failed.  If this happens then the space
for the global reserve is definitely sacred and we need to report
b_avail == 0, but before then we can just use our calculated b_avail.
Reported-by: NMartin Steigerwald <martin@lichtvoll.de>
Fixes: ca8a51b3 ("btrfs: statfs: report zero available if metadata are exhausted")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.5+
Reviewed-by: NQu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Tested-By: NMartin Steigerwald <martin@lichtvoll.de>
Signed-off-by: NJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

Brown paperbag time: fetching ->i_uid/->i_mode really should've been
done from nd->inode.  I even suggested that, but the reason for that has
slipped through the cracks and I went for dir->d_inode instead - made
for more "obvious" patch.

Analysis:

 - at the entry into do_last() and all the way to step_into(): dir (aka
   nd->path.dentry) is known not to have been freed; so's nd->inode and
   it's equal to dir->d_inode unless we are already doomed to -ECHILD.
   inode of the file to get opened is not known.

 - after step_into(): inode of the file to get opened is known; dir
   might be pointing to freed memory/be negative/etc.

 - at the call of may_create_in_sticky(): guaranteed to be out of RCU
   mode; inode of the file to get opened is known and pinned; dir might
   be garbage.

The last was the reason for the original patch.  Except that at the
do_last() entry we can be in RCU mode and it is possible that
nd->path.dentry->d_inode has already changed under us.

In that case we are going to fail with -ECHILD, but we need to be
careful; nd->inode is pointing to valid struct inode and it's the same
as nd->path.dentry->d_inode in "won't fail with -ECHILD" case, so we
should use that.
Reported-by: N"Rantala, Tommi T. (Nokia - FI/Espoo)" <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+190005201ced78a74ad6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Wearing-brown-paperbag: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: d0cb5018 ("do_last(): fetch directory ->i_mode and ->i_uid before it's too late")
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

To 2.25
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>

There were few episodes of silent downgrade to an executable stack over
years:

1) linking innocent looking assembly file will silently add executable
   stack if proper linker options is not given as well:

	$ cat f.S
	.intel_syntax noprefix
	.text
	.globl f
	f:
	        ret

	$ cat main.c
	void f(void);
	int main(void)
	{
	        f();
	        return 0;
	}

	$ gcc main.c f.S
	$ readelf -l ./a.out
	  GNU_STACK      0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
                         0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000  RWE    0x10
			 					 ^^^

2) converting C99 nested function into a closure
   https://nullprogram.com/blog/2019/11/15/

	void intsort2(int *base, size_t nmemb, _Bool invert)
	{
	    int cmp(const void *a, const void *b)
	    {
	        int r = *(int *)a - *(int *)b;
	        return invert ? -r : r;
	    }
	    qsort(base, nmemb, sizeof(*base), cmp);
	}

will silently require stack trampolines while non-closure version will
not.

Without doubt this behaviour is documented somewhere, add a warning so
that developers and users can at least notice.  After so many years of
x86_64 having proper executable stack support it should not cause too
many problems.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191208171918.GC19716@avx2Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The variable inode may be NULL in reiserfs_insert_item(), but there is
no check before accessing the member of inode.

Fix this by adding NULL pointer check before calling reiserfs_debug().

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/79c5135d-ff25-1cc9-4e99-9f572b88cc00@huawei.comSigned-off-by: NYunfeng Ye <yeyunfeng@huawei.com>
Cc: zhengbin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Cc: Hu Shiyuan <hushiyuan@huawei.com>
Cc: Feilong Lin <linfeilong@huawei.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Unmapping whole address space at once with

	munmap(0, (1ULL<<47) - 4096)

or equivalent will create empty coredump.

It is silly way to exit, however registers content may still be useful.

The right to coredump is fundamental right of a process!

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191222150137.GA1277@avx2Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

array_size() macro will do overflow check anyway.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191222144009.GB24341@avx2Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Comment says ELF header is "too large to be on stack".  64 bytes on
64-bit is not large by any means.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191222143850.GA24341@avx2Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>